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Wyświetlanie 1-11 z 11
Tytuł:
CSR i etyka przekonań
CSR and the ethics of conviction
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/653181.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
CSR
ethics of conviction
ethics of responsibility
Max Weber
Opis:
Examples of scandals related to exposing the unethical practices of companies which are classified as CSR leaders include cases where their declarations on undertaking social responsibility, as well as spending a lot of money on spectacular social campaigns and then rigorously reporting it in the appropriate documents, are accompanied by acts of abusing workers’ and environmental rights, misleading customers, i.e., abusing consumer rights, and finally “tax optimisation”, which generates measurable losses to the local communities. These cases raise the question about the reason for corporate social responsibility not being immune to abuse or opportunities to treat it as merely an image-related issue. The problem is presented using Max Weber’s widely known typology. It contrasts the ethics of conviction (ruled by the principle of intentionally keeping to the rules which have been adopted as being right) with the ethics of responsibility for the consequences of actions, including those that were undertaken in good faith but which have unintentional consequences. The usefulness of Weber’s typology when considering CSR problems becomes evident when we notice that the dominant interpretation of the corporate social responsibility concept, with its characteristic emphasis on voluntariness and positivity of actions within CSR, brings this concept closer to the ethics of conviction model. Voluntary actions in the field of CSR should go beyond carrying out regular goals of economic activities, i.e., the maximisation of profits, by providing good quality, desirable goods and services. However, what should be considered a prosocial activity –and thus, social responsibility –remains unclear in some companies. In accordance with the thesis of the paper, this ambiguity is one of the important factors that create discrepancies between declarations and real corporate activities. As we can see, the focus on voluntarily doing good which has been adopted in the current interpretation of CSR pre-empts the pursuit to avoid bad practices, both in theory and in the implementation of CSR programmes. Moreover, the CSR-dominant interpretation leads to a particular terminological confusion and replaces the companies’ responsibility towards concrete stakeholders, which is appropriate for the economic activity, with an abstractly understood responsibility towards an abstractly understood society. In this sense, the conceptual analysis of the relationship between CSR and ethics reveals that one of the important sources of problems with CSR is joining this concept with an unsuitable model of ethics. This is not because of the alleged defects of the ethics of conviction, appreciated by Weber, among other thinkers, but because it is a model that, in fact, is not suitable for business ethics. If the ethics of conviction is private, then it cannot be used to regulate social relations. In conclusion, it may be stated that, paradoxically, a dominant way of thinking about the social responsibility of corporations leads more to separation than to bringing together ethics and business. CSR, in its current form, cannot be an efficient means of implementing ethical objectives in business because it defines the issue of social responsibility as a sphere of private beliefs and arbitrary interpretations. Therefore, it undermines the relevance of the proper and socially significant notion of responsibility for economic activities and their consequences. Of course, the CSR concept can and should be modified; the question remains as to whether eliminating the elements that bring it closer to the ethics of conviction does not actually translate into giving it up entirely.
Źródło:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym; 2019, 22, 2; 55-69
1899-2226
2353-4869
Pojawia się w:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
CSR i problem organizacyjnej hipokryzji
CSR and the Problem of Organizational Hypocrisy
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/468724.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
etyka biznesu
społeczna odpowiedzialność przedsiębiorstw
organizacyjna hipokryzja
legalizacja CSR
business ethics
corporate social responsibility
organizational hypocrisy
legalization of CSR
Opis:
Przedmiotem artykułu jest problem organizacyjnej hipokryzji w zakresie CSR, a zatem rozbieżności między deklaracjami dotyczącymi społecznej odpowiedzialności a faktycznymi działaniami firm w tym zakresie. Autor rozważa przykłady „ideologicznego”, „menedżerskiego”, „integracyjnego”, „aspiracyjnego” i „legalistycznego” podejścia do kwestii hipokryzji w CSR, starając się ocenić ich przydatność w przywrócaniu wiarygodności idei społecznej odpowiedzialności biznesu. Wyniki tego przeglądu skłaniają do przyjęcia „negatywnej” wykładni CSR, skoncentrowanej na unikaniu społecznej nieodpowiedzialności. Wbrew obawom wyrażanym przez wielu teoretyków właściwym narzędziem tak rozumianej koncepcji jest legalizacja CSR, to znaczy stopniowe wprowadzanie wybranych i skonkretyzowanych postulatów z zakresu społecznej odpowiedzialności do systemu prawnego.
In this article we will try to answer the question of organizational hypocrisy in the context of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) This way, we will be able to illustrate the problems that arise as a result of discrepancies between the CSR declarations and actual company activities. Author of the article lists examples of “ideological”, “managerial”, “integrative”, “aspirational” and “legalistic” approaches towards CSR organizational hypocrisy, and he also tries to evaluate its suitability in restoring credibility of the CSR idea. The results of the overview, lead to “negative” interpretation of CSR, which underlines the social irresponsibility. Contrary to often expressed theoreticians’ fears, the proper approach would be legalization of CSR which would lead to gradual implementation of chosen and concretized CSR postulates in the legal system.
Źródło:
Prakseologia; 2018, 160; 223-241
0079-4872
Pojawia się w:
Prakseologia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/653156.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
stakeholder theory
pragmatism
facts and values
Freeman
Rorty
Opis:
Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory-which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics-are mainly connected to the questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions, he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism that in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. These assumptions contain a false dilemma, taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, because of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.
Źródło:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym; 2018, 21, 7; 75-84
1899-2226
2353-4869
Pojawia się w:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Teoria interesariuszy a neopragmatyzm
Stakeholder Theory and Neopragmatism
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/468674.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
teoria interesariuszy
neopragmatyzm
fakty i wartości
Freeman
Rorty
stakeholder theory
neopragmatism
facts and values
Opis:
Celem artykułu jest uporządkowanie zarzutów, jakie – zdaniem autora – należy postawić próbom powiązania teorii interesariuszy z neopragmatyzmem w wersji Rorty’ego. Przedmiotem krytyki jest zwłaszcza stanowisko R. Edwarda Freemana, jednego z głównych autorów i popularyzatorów teorii interesariuszy, który – skądinąd zgodnie z filozoficzną modą – w końcu lat dziewięćdziesiątych porzucił dość szeroko rozpowszechnioną kantowską wersję uzasadnienia teorii interesariuszy na rzecz jej wykładni neopragmatycznej. Dyskutowane zarzuty wynikają wprost ze specyfiki neopragmatycznego ujęcia kwestii prawdy, a także relacji między faktami i wartościami, w szczególności z odrzucenia korespondencyjnej koncepcji prawdy oraz zatarcia różnicy między opisem i normą. Przesadne uogólnienia i fałszywe alternatywy, na jakich opierają się tego rodzaju rozstrzygnięcia, podważają opisowy sens teorii interesariuszy. W rezultacie powiązania z neopragmatyzmem teoria interesariuszy traci jednak również swoje praktyczne zalety, stając się arbitralną narracją niezdolną do uporania się z problemami jej normatywnego zastosowania i dlatego z reguły maskującą rzeczywiste stosunki władzy.
The goal of this article was to sort out the accusations that must be made against attempts to connect stakeholder theory with neopragmatism in Rorty’s version. The main subject of criticism is the stand of R. Edward Freeman, one of the main authors and popularizers of stakeholder theory who – in accordance with philosophical fashion – at the end of the 90s, rejected popular Kantian version of substantiation of stakeholder theory, choosing its neopragmatic interpretation. Discussed accusations result directly from specificity of neopragmatic perspective of the issue of truth, as well as of relations between facts and values, especially from rejection of correspondence concept of the truth and blurring the difference between description and norm. Exaggerated generalizations and false alternatives that such settlements are based on undermine descriptive meaning of stakeholder theory. As a result of connection with neopragmatism, stakeholder theory is also losing its practical values, becoming narration unable to deal with the problems of its normative application and hiding real relations of power.
Źródło:
Prakseologia; 2017, 159; 83-106
0079-4872
Pojawia się w:
Prakseologia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Filozoficzne trudności teorii interesariuszy
Philosophical Difficulties of Stakeholder Theory
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965198.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016-09-15
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
stakeholder theory
pragmatism
facts and values
Freeman
Rorty
A13
L21
M14
Opis:
Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory – which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics – are connected first of all with questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism, which in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood at the same time as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. To the assumptions belongs a false dilemma taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, as a result of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a return to a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.
Źródło:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym; 2016, 19, 3
1899-2226
2353-4869
Pojawia się w:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Interesariusze internetu
The Internet’s Stakeholders
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/469110.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
zarządzanie Internetem
model „wielości interesariuszy”
prywatność
inwigilacja
społeczeństwo informacyjne
Internet governance
multi-stakeholder approach
privacy
surveillance
information society
Opis:
Artykuł zawiera krytyczną analizę głównych wątków dyskusji na temat modelu zarządzania internetem, skupioną na wadach i zaletach modelu „wielości interesariuszy” jako obecnie obowiązującego rozstrzygnięcia. Autor omawia historię i motywy akceptacji tego modelu, jak również „mocną” i „słabą” wersję jego krytyki, nasilonej zwłaszcza po informacjach Snowdena na temat masowej inwigilacji użytkowników internetu. Ilustracją różnicy stanowisk (i interesów) reprezentowanych w tej debacie są poprawki zgłoszone do końcowego dokumentu szczytu ONZ WSIS+10 (Nowy Jork, grudzień 2015), zwołanego w celu oceny procesu implementacji modelu „wielości interesariuszy”. Analiza stanowisk wyrażonych w tych dyskusjach wskazuje na specyfikę poszczególnych interesariuszy i jest podstawą wniosków dotyczących charakteru i funkcji tego modelu.
The article contains a critical analysis of the main threads of the Internet-governance debate, focused on the failings and merits of the multi-stakeholder approach as the currently prevailing solution. The author discusses the history of, and reasons for, acceptance of the model as well as “strong” and “weak” forms of criticism of it, intensified especially after Snowden’s revelations about mass surveillance of Internet users. The differences between positions (and interests) represented in the debate are illustrated by the amendments proposed to the final document of the United Nations meeting WSIS+10 (New York, December 2015), called to review the implementation process of the multi-stakeholder approach. An analysis concerning standpoints expressed in the debate indicates the specific characters of the individual stakeholders and forms the basis of conclusions about the nature and functions of the model.
Źródło:
Prakseologia; 2016, 158/1; 213-240
0079-4872
Pojawia się w:
Prakseologia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Nie warto żyć bezmyślnym życiem. Filozoficzne refleksje nad tym, co ważne
Autorzy:
Sośnicka, Joanna
Soin, Maciej
Bernat, Paweł
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/books/2021076.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Politechnika Łódzka. Wydawnictwo Politechniki Łódzkiej
Opis:
The unexamined life is not worth living Philosophical reflections about this, what important It is difficult to speak of philosophy. It is even more difficult to teach philosophy. As is the case with every academic discipline, it can be said that philosophy is in its own way unique. This uniqueness is a result of a certain, as it is sometimes stated, self-evident nature of the subject. Obviously, everyone knows (even intuitively), what philosophy is about making use consciously or unconsciously of the terminology associated with some fields of philosophy: ethics, anthropology and epistemology. The obviousness of this concept (although perhaps not the academic discipline), which is connected with this universality of understanding could lead one to wonder that since this is the case, speaking of it is unnecessary. If something is self-explanatory, it can only be pointed out and cannot be put into words1 . However, if one speaks of obvious matters, it is most likely, because they are continually questioned. It seems that questions related to philosophy arise from this universal understanding, which in turn is possibly a result of a certain 1 R. Spaemann, Basic Moral Concepts, Routledge, Londyn 1990, s. VII. Summary 160 ambiguity in the understanding of the reality known as “philosophy.” It is also interesting that semantic misuse generally affects basic terms including important phenomena related to the essence of human life. But owing to the fact that “the highest does not stand without the lowest,” one should hope that all of these misuses have something in common, in the ambiguity of this word, in the dynamism of building other at times twisted meanings based on it, common points are found. As one of the greatest representatives of philosophical thought, Plato claims, philosophy begins in wonder of the world2 . It is the only type of intellectual activity where posing questions and searching for answers is more important than constructing theories and verifying them. Socrates is one of the most important people in the world of philosophy and he was the first to make moral problems the subject of dialogues and not of lectures, nor the topic of treaties or public addresses. It is worth emphasising that in Socrates’s dialogues, one cannot find any traces of pride, moralization, self-exultation, but rather we encounter curiosity, provocation to think, an escape from shallow thinking and a superficial view of the world. Socrates took what may seem as trivial and obvious issues for the topics of his dialogues (after all, who is not familiar with justice, honesty, law or piety) – however, throughout the dialogue it becomes apparent that the inquisitiveness of the philosopher was not limited to superficial intuitions and speculations. By means of forming appropriate questions, he attempted to reach the speaker’s most basic knowledge and then assist him to draw from it obvious conclusions. The essence of Socrates’s dialogue is based on provocation, stimulating thought (often critical thinking), a break from routine, pride and thoughtlessness, and reflection on what is important (although this would seem unquestionable), because a philosophical problem, as Plato states “does not admit exposition like other branches of knowledge; but after much converse about the matter itself and a life lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps 2 “Wonder (thaumazein) is the attitude of someone who truly loves wisdom; yes there is no other beginning of philosophy than this.” Plato, Theaitetus, 155D. Summary 161 to it from another, and thereafter sustains itself ”3 . Discussions about matters simple and at the same time difficult, about known issues, but somehow unknown, and pointing out lack of knowledge did know finish well for Socrates. As a matter of fact, he was forced to drink hemlock, because he was accused of corrupting the morals of the youth, but still the Socratic message that “the unexamined life is not worth living”4 . did not fall in value. The need of reflection is still current, especially nowadays, in the time of fast life, relative values and fast decisions. To dwell on, for some time, the important, (philosophical, but not only) issues, should not be treated as a challenge. Giving it such non-committal reflection, consideration of the matters which are present in the life of every person, should be treated as an intellectual journey, confrontation with a philosophical understanding of such every-day and common phenomena. To discover a new meaning of such known issues should be an inspiration, refreshing, a kind of distraction from mundane thinking, should force to renewed reflection, should be a escape from evil (in Socratic understanding, evil actions are the result of ignorance) – maybe it will keep us in “a wind of thoughts.” The above mentioned reflection is presented in five chapters, i.e. analysis of five issues form the perspective of five philosophers. The choice of the guides in this reflection is intentional, because each of them is an expert in given area and has dedicated more than one book or article to this topic. The guide in the reflection about „human person” is prof. Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec. This distinguished Polish philosopher, is the long-standing Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, and one of the main founders of the Lublin Philosophical School also known as the Polish School of Classical Philosophy. According to Krapiec, the starting point for philosophical anthropology is data which comes from the existential judgment “I exist.” In the scope of the basic 3 Plato, The Platonic Epistles 341 c, J. Harward (trans), Cambridge University Press 2014, s. 135. 4 Plato, Apology 38a Summary 162 data, subjectivity and agency of human being are included. Krapiec strongly underlines the uniqueness of a human being, as a one who is chosen among all nature, because of his peculiar structure of soul and body. The human being focuses on himself, like in a lens, all the essential features of living beings, but he also has unique characteristics such as: freedom, sovereignty and the possibility of improvement. Reflection on the relation between body and soul, the problem of freedom, human dignity, are aspects which Krapiec fully explains and clarifies. There are also other very important aspects, in order to understand different spheres of human activity: love, self-knowledge, civilizations or the aim of communities: the common good. The reflection on the human being, is important also because of the other reason, as Krapiec underlines – each of us should know, who he is as a human in order to live humanely. Analysis of human being, undoubtedly, is connected with the problem of self-cognition – who I am as a human being? In such analysis, we will follow the conception of Saint Thomas Aquinas. According to Saint Thomas, self-cognition is a final stage of cognition as such, kind of a “return,” because only then a human being actualizes himself as a free and rational being. The dependency of self-cognition and cognition of the world is natural and necessary for it is the reason of self-knowledge. One can compare this process to looking at photos, which he has taken of himself. Cognition of something, which has been cognized before, is a totally different cognition, and the perception of the subject is also different. When person cognizes “our mind through its considering successively one thing after another: because never “does our intellect understand so many things, that it cannot understand more”5 . Aquinas analyses the problem of cognition in different places of his works, but especially in The Summa Theologiae, The Summa Philosophica, Disputed Questions on Truth (Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate), Disputed Questions on the Soul 5 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. 1, part 1, q. 86, art.1, Fathers of the English Dominican Province (trans.), Cosimo, Inc., New York 2007, s. 441. Summary 163 (Quaestiones disputatae de Anima) or the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (Scriptum super libros Sententiarum). “Love” is the third stop – undoubtedly closely connected with the earlier analyzed issues. The master of the phenomenological description of love is German philosopher Dietrich von Hildebrand, for whom the problem of “love” is, in a sense, the central point of his philosophical system. Von Hildebrand proposes a short and simple definition of love, which will be the guide for the analyses conducted in this chapter: “love as a value response” introduces vast range philosophical explanations. Apparently, this simple definition implicates, however, a number of problems connected with the definition of person, her value, possibility and ways of how to respond to it. Love has an influence on the development of the person, it should be pure and a complete realization of humanity, and as von Hildebrand underlines, it is a gift and giving, conscious dedication from one person to other, it is happiness and should give happiness. Love is everything that is precious and its absence can only be compare to hell. As Dostoevsky’s Russian monk says, love really does not exists in hell, but its absence is precisely what makes up the essence of hell. In Michael Novak’s conception of “the common good” the fundamental thesis based on the fact that in order to fulfill his own perfection human being should have proper conditions. Novak points out economy as the best field where important human attributes appear: intellectual, moral and creative ones. In his analysis concerning “the common good,” he uses theological, political and economical threads and in spite of this diversity he tries to show some universal rules. Novak underlines the rank and subjective character of the human person. Man in Novak’s conception is not a “wolf ” (as Hobbes described him), but a brother. Awareness of the common good allows people to discover their interdependence with each other them and will to strive for good. To build a good community is to protect and assist the development of free human beings. Novak then underlines, that “The common good is the inner dynamo of human progress, rooted in the human’s capacity to reflect upon his or her own actions, to grasp their deficiencies and incompletenesses, and Summary 164 to choose to press onward toward the full development of the entire range of human possibilities”6 . The final meeting will be with Professor Feliks Koneczny when analyzing the notion of “civilization.” Koneczny’s theory is based on convictions about the social character of human person. This conviction comes from facts, assembled through commonsensical cognition and inductive method. The splendor of every kind of method of system of communal life always depended on man, who by his own acts of intellect and free will, organizes himself in communities. Since man in society realizes his own subjectivity, actualizes the potentiality written in his nature and develops it; and as a result, he has the chance to find fulfillment. From man depends a faith of civilization. Koneczny saw in community the power of creating civilizations. The social form develops from the kin, which by differentiation created higher social structure. Society is a part of human beings, so strongly, that the need of interaction with people resulted in the continued, unifying and dynamic development of humanity. Thus, human communities were formed naturally and not by order, persons united in order to develop, improve. Personal being has an open structure; therefore, he is not formed at once, but he needs other people to live a full life. Today’s civilisation is characterised by the trend of socialisation, because social and economic processes demand the inclusions of small communities into the greater ones. Teilhard de Chardin wrote about the phenomenon of ‘planetisation’ Popes have spoken about the “human family,” and politicians about globalisation. The process of creating larger communities, which exceed-families, tribes and even states, which were opposed by Rousseau and the Romantics, is not an illusion. However, the issue of social life widens more and more. It is an irreversible process. The civilization, which is focused just on consumption, leads to the depersonalization of mankind. In this great disorientation, the sense of great notions and great words, is lost. They become unclear, unrealized and suppressed. In such 6 M. Novak, Free persons and common good, Medison Books, Lanham MD 1989, s. 187. Summary 165 a situation, it is quite easy, to indicate their mendacity, banality and falseness. Rousseau explains: “I would not take it upon myself to try to teach people, if others did not keep on delude them.” Following a text about human beings, self-cognition, love, the common good and civilization is not at all an instruction, but it more likely has to move closer to the this “much converse about the matter itself ” from Plato and which result one can just indirectly predict.
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Książka
Tytuł:
O możliwych kierunkach nauczania filozofii
On Posible Ways of Teaching of Philosophy
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31341707.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
nauczanie filozofii
myślenie krytyczne
Wittgenstein
teaching of philosophy
critical thinking
Opis:
Artykuł jest próbą odpowiedzi na postulaty wprowadzone w Krajowych Ramach Kwalifikacji, wymagające by programy nauczania na poziomie wyższym kształtowały „zdolności do autonomicznego i odpowiedzialnego działania”. Autor rozważa przydatność różnych kierunków nauczania filozofii do tego celu, dochodząc do wniosku, że największe szanse na jego osiągnięcie ma nauczanie krytycznego myślenia w wersji wzorowanej na dociekaniach filozoficznych Wittgensteina. Program tak rozumianego nauczania nie sprowadza się do logicznej analizy argumentacji i obejmuje między innymi problematykę wieloznaczności pojęć i wynikających z niej sporów werbalnych, a także umiejętność unikania trudności wynikających z niedostrzegania różnic między rozmaitymi sposobami użycia języka. Nauczanie myślenia krytycznego na poziomie zaawansowanym dotyczyć mogłoby natomiast problematyki prawdy: zróżnicowania kryteriów uznawania prawdziwości zdań, umiejętności odróżniania wypowiedzi empirycznych i gramatycznych oraz porównawczej roli wzorców w praktyce badawczej różnych dziedzin nauki.
The paper attempts to respond to the postulates included in the National Frameworks of Qualifications. Those require syllabuses in higher education be shaped by “abilities of autonomous and responsible actions”. The Author considers the usefulness of various fields of teaching of philosophy for this goal, and he concludes that the greatest prospects for its attaining lie in the teaching of critical thinking in the version based on Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations. The syllabuses of such teaching are not being reduced to the logical analysis of argumentation, but embrace among others problems of polysemousness of concepts and the verbal disputes emerging when differences between various ways of language use are neglected. The teaching of critical thinking at an advanced level can be engaged in the problem of truth: the diversification of criteria of truthfulness, abilities of differentiating empirical and grammatical statements, and the comparative role of samples in research practices in various domains of science.
Źródło:
Filozofia i Nauka; 2014, 2; 47-64
2300-4711
2545-1936
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia i Nauka
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O sporze Poppera z Wittgensteinem
Autorzy:
SOIN, MACIEJ
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/705522.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Źródło:
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria; 2014, 4
1230-1493
Pojawia się w:
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Fakty, wartosci i 'panika moralna'
FACTS, VALUES, AND MORAL PANICS
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/427861.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
VALUE-FREE INQUIRY
FACTS/VALUES DICHOTOMY
MORAL PANICS
SOCIOLOGICAL SYLLOGISM
SZTOMPKA
Wertfreiheit
dychotomia faktów i wartości
panika moralna
socjologiczny sylogizm
Sztompka.
Opis:
Artykuł zawiera krytyczną analizę głównych wątków „Powrotu do wartości we współcze- snej teorii socjologicznej”, przeprowadzoną z punktu widzenia wyników dyskusji na temat dychotomizacji faktów i wartości. Autor krytykuje stanowisko prof. Sztompki w sprawie implikacji wartości przez „socjologiczne fakty” oraz rozważa główne warunki opisowego zastosowania pojęć wartościujących. Jak wskazują wnioski z tej dyskusji, dychotomiczne ujęcie faktów i wartości w socjologii (Weber) było próbą odpowiedzi na rozproszenie gramatyki, tj. wieloznaczność reguł wiążacych oceny i faktualne kryteria ich użycia. Dlatego współczesne porzucenie postulatu Wertfreiheit – rozważane na przykładzie pojęcia „paniki moralnej” – prowadzi do przekształcenia socjologii w zbiór wykrzykników.
The article contains a critical analysis of the main threads of 'The Return to Values in Recent Sociological Theory' by Prof. Sztompka, performed from the point of view of the results of dispute over fact/value dichotomy. The author criticizes the thesis about implication of values by 'sociological facts', and ponders the main conditions of descriptive use of evaluative concepts as discussed by analytic philosophers. The main results of the dispute indicate that dichotomic approach to facts and values in sociology (Weber) was an attempt to manage on the decomposition of grammar or ambiguity of rules connecting evaluations and factual criteria of their use. That is why a recent abandoning of Wertfreiheit postulate - exemplified by the concept of 'moral panics' - leads to the transformation of sociology into a collection of avowals.
Źródło:
Studia Socjologiczne; 2011, 2(201); 147-163
0039-3371
Pojawia się w:
Studia Socjologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Kryzys finansowy, odpowiedzialność dziennikarza i problem etyki szczegółowej
The Financial Crisis, Journalist’s Responsibility and the Problem of Applied Ethics
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/469158.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
financial crisis
self-fulfilling prophecy
responsibility
journalism ethics
Wittgenstein
Opis:
The financial crisis as a realization of self-fulfilling prophecy reveals an important ethical dilemma of journalist’s responsibility. The dilemma is expressed in a question, if one should publish the information on crisis, since the publication probably increases the degree of crisis. The difficulty to answer this question points to the shortcomings of the standard conception of moral reasoning and to an approach to the relation between general normative theory and applied ethics. Instead of the standard conception the author proposes a „grammatical” account of general/applied ethics relation, connected with the Wittgenstein’s approach to the question of necessity in mathematics and other non-descriptive disciplines.
Źródło:
Prakseologia; 2010, 150; 93-108
0079-4872
Pojawia się w:
Prakseologia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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