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Wyświetlanie 1-13 z 13
Tytuł:
Dzisiaj odpowiedź, za miesiąc pytanie. Idea wiedzy negatywnej a miejscepytań w kształceniu akademickim (Answer today, question in a month. The concept ofnegative knowledge and the place of questions in academic education)
Autorzy:
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2076613.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
wiedza negatywna vs wiedza pozytywna
„nieodpowiedziane pytania”
odpowiedzi na niezadane pytania
edukacja akademicka
negative vs. positive knowledge
‘unanswered questions’
answers to unasked questions
academic education
Opis:
The author puts forward his own conceptualization of knowledge based on two independent pairs of concepts: positive vs. negative knowledge and knowledge vs. anti-knowledge. The suggested categories are mainly associated with declarative knowledge as that is the type of knowledge that dominates in academic education. There appears also a suggestion that the Copernicus-Gresham law refers to allocation of knowledge. The author assumes that the negative knowledge is expressed through ‘unanswered questions’, negated statements, paradoxes and statements that contain a considerable margin of uncertainty. In an attempt to name the place and role of questions in education, the author reaches the conclusion that on a macro scale the answers given precede in chronological order possible questions, even before the latter appear in student minds. In a certain way what is involved here is: (1) reversing of the chronological order on which the concept of problem teaching is based and (2) natural cognitive process in which questions that appear and cognitive dissonance that is experienced initiate, maintain and orientate further stages of the process.
Źródło:
Rocznik Komisji Nauk Pedagogicznych; 2016, LXIX; 17-33
0079-3418
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Komisji Nauk Pedagogicznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Recenzja książki: Brockman, J. (Ed.) (2019). The Last Unknowns: Deep, Elegant, Profound Unanswered Questions About the Universe, the Mind, the Future of Civilizations, and the Meaning of Life
Autorzy:
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2051468.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie
Opis:
Recenzja książki: Brockman, J. (Ed.) (2019). The Last Unknowns: Deep, Elegant, Profound Unanswered Questions About the Universe, the Mind, the Future of Civilizations, and the Meaning of Life. New York: Morrow (p. 352). ISBN: 978-0-06-289794-7
The review of the book by J. Brockmana (Ed.) (2019): The Last Unknowns: Deep, Elegant, Profound Unanswered Questions About the Universe, the Mind, the Future of Civilizations, and the Meaning of Life
Źródło:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica; 2020, 13; 235-238
2084-5596
Pojawia się w:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Orientacja estetyczna. Przyczynek do Homo aestheticus
Aesthetic Orientation. A Contribution to the Concept of Homo Aestheticus
Autorzy:
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/468050.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie
Tematy:
orientacja estetyczna
orientacje życiowe
wartości jawne i niejawne
Opis:
W nawiązaniu do koncepcji Eduarda Sprangera i wyróżnionych przez niego typów osobo-wości wprowadzone zostaje pojęcie orientacji życiowych, badanych przy użyciu autorskiej metody Rzeczywiste – Nierzeczywiste (RN-02). Autor dokonuje przeglądu badań prowadzonych przy użyciu klasycznej metody SOV (ZPW) Allporta, Vernona i Lindzeya oraz przy użyciu metody RN-02. Obydwie metody, nawiązując do koncepcji Sprangera, proponują odmienne sposoby operacjonalizacji wyróżnionych przez niego wartości (teoretycznych, ekonomicznych, społecznych, politycznych i religijnych). Pierwsza z wymienionych metod ma charakter bezpośredni, druga zaś –charakter projekcyjny. Wyniki zebrane przy pomocy obydwu metod wskazują, że orientacja estetyczna odgrywa ważniejszą rolę u kobiet niż u mężczyzn, wraz z orientacją społeczną oraz religijną wchodzi w skład skupienia holistycznego, podczas gdy pozostałe trzy orientacje wchodząw skład tak zwanego skupienia analityczno-instrumentalnego. Orientacja estetyczna (w odróżnieniu od społecznej, religijnej i ekonomicznej) okazuje się mało wrażliwa na uwarunkowania środowiskowe, utożsamiane ze zmiennymi demograficznymi. W końcowej części artykułu autor próbuje naszkicować specyfikę estetycznego sposobu doświadczania rzeczywistości. Uzasadnia też tezę, iż orientacja estetyczna nie musi wyrażać sięczynnym uprawianiem sztuki ani posiadaniem rozbudowanej wiedzy w odniesieniu do historii sztuki i jej wytworów.
By making reference to Eduard Spranger’s theory of personality types, the paper introduces the concept of life orientations which are examined by means of the author’s Real-Nonreal Questionnaire (RN-02). An overview of studies conducted using the classic Allport, Vernon and Lindzey SOV method and the RN-02 tool is given in this paper. Even though both methods relate to Spranger’s theory, they propound different ways of operationalizing the values he distinguished (i.e. theoretical, economic, social, political and religious). The first technique is direct, whereas the second — projective. The results of both methods indicate that the aesthetic orientation is more important to women than men. Together with social and re-ligious orientation, it forms a holistic cluster, while the remaining three values belong to the so-called analytical and instrumental cluster. The aesthetic orientation (unlike social, religious and economic ones) is weakly affected by environmental conditions representing demographic variables. In the last part of the article, the author attempts to define the sin-gularity of the aesthetic experience of the reality. He also proves the thesis that aesthetic orientation does need to manifest itself by the practice of art or vast knowledge about art history and works of art.
Źródło:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica; 2016, 9; 55-74
2084-5596
Pojawia się w:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Poczucie nierealności i jego konteksty. Fenomenologiczne aspekty procesów dysocjacyjnych
Feeling of unreality and its contexts. The phenomenological aspects of dissociative processes
Autorzy:
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/468140.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie
Tematy:
feeling of unreality
situational contexts of "unreality"
dissociative processes
dissociation vs. association
Opis:
Diversity of contexts of the feeling of unreality, regarded as a phenomenological symptom of dissociative processes, is presented and discussed in the article. Seeking for the common denominator of such experiences, the author aims to relate the psychopathological tradition and non-pathological appearances of the feeling of unreality in everyday life, in the classics, as well as in relation to the research on altered states of consciousness. With reference to the concept of "directed dissociation" (Edges 2004) and the so-called "three place dissociation" (a therapeutic technique used in NLP), the author emphasizes adaptive aspects of dissociative processes. Finally, he poses a question: how should we describe, identify and understand the state of "being in complete association" with (currently taking place) mental processes?
Źródło:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica; 2012, 5; 85-100
2084-5596
Pojawia się w:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Tolerancja niepewności a szacowany konsensus i efekt fałszywej zgodności
Intolerance of Uncertainty, Estimated Consensus, and the False Consensus Effect
Autorzy:
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/468244.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie
Tematy:
intolerance of uncertainty
estimated consensus
false consensus effect
tolerancja niepewności
szacowany konsensus
efekt fałszywej zgodności
Opis:
False consensus means a tendency to overestimate the frequency of one’s views and preferences compared to others in the population. The factors that determine the strength of this tendency are still being explored. Research on a sample of 246 students examined the relationship between the level of intolerable uncertainty, measured by the Polish version of the Intolerance Uncertainty Scale (IUS-12), and the strength of the estimated and false consensus. It was assumed that people with less tolerance to uncertainty were more likely to overestimate the universality of their opinions. People with low (lower quartile) and high (upper quartile) uncertainty tolerance were compared using two indicators: the magnitudes of the estimated consensus and the false consensus. It was found that people with low uncertainty tolerance frequently overestimated their own choices: t(121) = -2.03, p = 0.022 compared to people with high tolerance; the second indicator confirmed the expected relationship only at the level of the trend: t(121) = -1.48, p = 0.071. Also, it was shown that people with low tolerance to uncertainty more often chose the less radical options of “probably yes” or “probably no”: t(121)
Fałszywy konsensus oznacza tendencję do przeceniania częstości własnych poglądów i preferencji w populacji. Sprawą otwartą pozostaje wciąż pytanie, od jakich czynników zależy nasilenie tej tendencji. W badaniach, zrealizowanych na próbie 246 studentów, poszukiwano związku między poziomem nietolerowanej niepewności, mierzonej polską wersją Intolerance Uncertainty Scale (IUS-12), a wielkością szacowanego i fałszywego konsensusu. Zakładano, że osoby o mniejszej tolerancji niepewności będą bardziej przeceniać powszechność wybieranych przez siebie opcji. Porównano osoby o niskiej (dolny kwartyl) oraz wysokiej (górny kwartyl) tolerancji niepewności, posługując się dwoma wskaźnikami, tj. wielkością szacowanego oraz fałszywego konsensusu. Stwierdzono, że osoby o niskiej tolerancji niepewności bardziej przeszacowywały częstość własnych wyborów: t(121) = -2,03, p = 0,022 w porównaniu z osobami o wysokiej tolerancji, podczas gdy drugi wskaźnik potwierdził oczekiwaną zależność tylko na poziomie trendu: t(121) = -1,48, p = 0,071. Ponadto wykazano też, że osoby o niskiej tolerancji niepewności częściej wybierały mniej radykalne opcje odpowiedzi typu „raczej tak” lub „raczej nie”: t(121) = 2,01, p < 0,05 oraz przejawiały zdecydowanie niższą samoocenę: t(120) = 3,94, p = 0,000. Słowa kluczowe: tolerancja niepewności,
Źródło:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica; 2019, 12; 39-62
2084-5596
Pojawia się w:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On the Two Ways of Metaphorizing the World Pars Pro Toto or Intra Pro Extra
Autorzy:
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1929548.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009-06-30
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Socjologiczne
Tematy:
world metaphors
recognized and unrecognized metaphors
dominant way of experiencing oneself
Opis:
What experiences can be referred to when attempting to familiarize metaphorically oneself with the nature (essence) of the world? What is the source of thus emerging metaphors? The author suggests that there are two possible strategies of metaphorical representing the world as a whole: 1) pars pro toto, 2) intra pro extra. In other words, the source of metaphors can be either a more familiar part of outer reality or a dominant manner of experiencing oneself. Furthermore, the author introduce a distinction between two types of metaphorical language: 1) an intentional use of lexical constructions treated by user as metaphors, 2) a metaphorical expression of something without a conscious realization that a conventional metaphor is being used instead of a specific description. Concluding, the author considers the consequences of an “intra pro extra” hypothesis, as well as the possibility of its empirical verification; either in the case of individual differences or between-culture comparisons. He suggests that in some circumstances we experience ourselves more as “I am my body” while in others, we concentrate on the mental aspect of our existence, “I am my mind.” This dominant manner of experiencing oneself may pass onto a preferred way of metaphorizing entire reality.
Źródło:
Polish Sociological Review; 2009, 166, 2; 179-192
1231-1413
2657-4276
Pojawia się w:
Polish Sociological Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pomijanie działań kształtujących poziom zadowolenia zawodowego pracowników jako przejaw dysfunkcji w procesie zarządzania zasobami ludzkim
Disregard for actions shaping the level of employees job satisfaction as a dysfunction in the human resources management process
Autorzy:
Fiech, Marta
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/525947.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011-11-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
Opis:
Celem artykułu jest podkreślenie znaczenia, jakie dla sprawnego i efektywnego funkcjonowania organizacji ma uwzględnianie w procesie zarządzania kapitałem ludzkim poziomu zadowolenia pracowników. Omówione zostały korzyści płynące z podejmowania działań ukierunkowanych na podnoszenie satysfakcji z pracy pracowników oraz konsekwencje, jakie dla wyników pracy może mieć pomijanie tego aspektu. Lekceważenie tego elementu, mimo jasnych przesłanek mówiących o korzyściach, jakie niesie ze sobą zatrudnianie usatysfakcjonowanych pracowników, stanowi przejaw swego rodzaju dysfunkcji w procesie zarządzania. W artykule przedstawione zostały poszczególne aspekty pracy, które wiążą się z poziomem doświadczanego przez pracowników zadowolenia zawodowego, a także czynniki, kształtujące w pewnym stopniu poziom satysfakcji z pracy. Autorzy prezentują również definicyjne ujęcie zadowolenia zawodowego oraz wyniki badań własnych nad relacją pomiędzy poziomem satysfakcji menedżerów oraz ich pracowników.
The main objective of the work is to underline the importance of actions undertaken in the process of human resources management aiming at improving the level of job satisfaction among employees. The authors present the value of this approach for efficient functioning of the organization as well as the consequences of ignoring this aspect, which - regarding the broad knowledge on the benefits that building the employees' satisfaction can bring into the organization - can be interpreted as a sort of a dysfunction in the management process. The article presents the list of aspects related to the level of job satisfaction experienced by the employees, indicates factors shaping this level and identifies the area in which the organization can benefit from the high level of job satisfaction among its employees. The authors grasp also the definitional and conceptual framework of job satisfaction and present the results of self research on the relation between the level of job satisfaction between managers and their subordinate employees.
Źródło:
Problemy Zarządzania; 2011, 4/2011 (34) t.1; 147 - 161
1644-9584
Pojawia się w:
Problemy Zarządzania
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Emotionality of people with the alcohol problem. Comparison of patients starting therapy and patients after six months of therapy
Emocjonalność osób z problemem alkoholowym. Porównanie pacjentów rozpoczynających terapię i pacjentów po sześciu miesiącach terapii
Autorzy:
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Dudek, Robert
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2130409.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-23
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Collegium Medicum
Tematy:
patients with alcohol use disorders
emotional intelligence
UMACL
reality of feelings
pacjenci z problemem alkoholowym
inteligencja emocjonalna
realność uczuć
Opis:
Objective. The aim of the study was to compare the emotionality of two groups of patients with alcohol problems – those who started therapy and patients after 6 months of therapy. Method and participants. The research was transversal. Each group of patients consisted of 40 people. In each group, the proportion of women to men was approx. 1:2 (women constituted 36.25% of the total number of respondents). Three research tools were used: the UMACL Mood Scale, the DINEMO Two-Dimensional Emotional Intelligence Inventory and the Reality of Feelings Questionnaire (RU-04). Results. There were no significant differences with regard to the current mood in any of the three dimensions. On the other hand, there were (contrary to expectations) significant differences with regard to emotional intelligence, but in favor of patients starting the therapy (t = 2.62, p = 0.011). In patients who remained in therapy for at least 6 months, a greater intensity of personality-specific feelings was found – both negative (t = –2.09; p = 0.04) and (at the trend level) positive (t = –1.49; p = 0.14). A similar tendency occurred also with regard to many personality-nonspecific feelings, such as jealousy, optimism, sadness or a sense of security. Conclusion. It should be assumed that after a few months of therapy, patients experience a gradual thawing of feelings, especially negative ones, and the related deterioration of well-being. It is a desirable process as it shows an improvement in contact with one’s own feelings, although it is perceived by patients rather as discomfort and lack of progress in therapy.
Cel. Celem pracy było porównanie emocjonalności dwóch grup pacjentów z problemem alkoholowym – rozpoczynających terapię oraz po 6 miesiącach terapii. Metoda i osoby badane. Badania miały charakter poprzeczny. Każda z grup pacjentów liczyła po 40 osób. W każdej z grup proporcja kobiet do mężczyzn wynosiła ok. 1:2 (kobiety stanowiły 36,25% ogółu badanych osób). Wykorzystano 3 narzędzia badawcze: Skalę Nastroju UMACL, Dwuwymiarowy Inwentarz Inteligencji Emocjonalnej DINEMO oraz Kwestionariusz Realność Uczuć (RU-04). Wyniki. Nie odnotowano istotnych różnic w odniesieniu do aktualnego nastroju w żadnym z trzech wymiarów. Odnotowano natomiast (wbrew oczekiwaniom) istotną różnice w odniesieniu do inteligencji emocjonalnej, tyle że na korzyść pacjentów rozpoczynających terapię (t = 2,62, p = 0,011). U pacjentów pozostających w terapii co najmniej 6 miesięcy stwierdzono z kolei większą intensywność uczuć osobowościowo specyficznych – tak negatywnych (t = –2,09; p = 0,04), jak i (na poziomie trendu) pozytywnych (t = –1,49; p = 0,14). Analogiczna tendencja wystąpiła też w odniesieniu do wielu uczuć osobowościowo niespecyficznych, takich, jak np. zazdrość, optymizm, smutek czy poczucie bezpieczeństwa. Wnioski. Należy sądzić, że po kilku miesiącach terapii u pacjentów następuje stopniowe odmrażanie uczuć, zwłaszcza negatywnych, i związane z tym pogorszenie samopoczucia. To proces pożądany, gdyż świadczy o poprawie kontaktu z własnymi uczuciami, choć przez pacjentów bywa odczuwany raczej jako dyskomfort i brak postępów w terapii.
Źródło:
Sztuka Leczenia; 2020, 35, 2; 15-27
1234-7175
1898-2026
Pojawia się w:
Sztuka Leczenia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On the false ontological consensus
Autorzy:
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Kałużna-Wielobób, lina
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/430416.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-06-01
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
False Consensus Effect
qualitative vs quantitative ontology
Ontological Uncertainty Effect
Opis:
The objective of the research was to check whether False Consensus Effect (FCE), shown in much research, is also valid for ontological decisions. Test participants, faced with an ontological dilemma, made a choice three times, which of the 3 item set (Cracow City, Me myself, the Universe) refers to something most real. The research conducted first among psychology students (N=116), then replicated on mathematics students (N=126) and middle-aged people (N=106). Results: 1) All groups chose the Universe most seldom (4%-11% subjects), the remaining two “objects” were chosen with similar frequency, 2) FCE occurred in all groups and in reference to each choice, 3) with people who made inconsequent choices (16% of test participants), FCE was notably higher (p <.001) in comparison to people making consequent choices, 4) FCE with inconsequent people turned out to be higher (p <.01) even in comparison with “the smallest minority”, people who (consequently) chose the Universe.
Źródło:
Polish Psychological Bulletin; 2015, 46, 2; 160-173
0079-2993
Pojawia się w:
Polish Psychological Bulletin
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Uwarunkowania i psychologiczne konsekwencje antropomorfizacji
Determinants and Psychological Consequences of Anthropomorphism
Autorzy:
La Torre, Amelia
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/468111.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie
Tematy:
antropomorfizacja
dehumanizacja
wartościowanie
konsekwencje antropomorfizacji
anthropomorphism
dehumanisation
evaluation
consequences of anthropomorphism
Opis:
Artykuł jest syntezą dotychczasowych badań psychologicznych nad zjawiskiem antropomorfizacji, ukazującą różne perspektywy spojrzenia na to zagadnienie, przyczyny antropomorfizacji oraz jej konsekwencje dla indywidualnego i społecznego funkcjonowania. Antropomorfizacja traktowana tu jest przede wszystkim jako wyraz nadania obiektowi znaczenia, prowadzący do wiary w posiadanie przez obiekt ludzkich atrybutów, co sprawia, że zabieg ten ma głęboki wydźwięk w poglądach i działaniach stosujących go osób.
The following review is a synthesis of current studies concerning antrophomorphism, its antescendants and consequences for the individual and the society. Different perspectives and definitions of anthropomorphism are shown here, although the article emphasises anthropomorphism as anact of giving meaning to an object, connected with the belief that the object has human attributes This belief has a deeper effect on people’s opinions and acts concerning the objects, society and environment.
Źródło:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica; 2014, 7; 57-68
2084-5596
Pojawia się w:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Cenione wartości a jakość życia. Problem wartości przeciwstawnych
The Esteemed Values and Quality of Life. The Problem of Opposing Values
Autorzy:
Kałużna-Wielobób, Alina
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/468124.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie
Tematy:
dobrostan
poczucie jakości życia
wartości osobiste
wartości przeciwstawne
well-being
sense of quality of life
personal values
opposing values
Opis:
Celem badań było ustalenie związków między cenionymi wartościami (w tym wartościami przeciwstawnymi) a wymiarami jakości życia i dobrostanu. Badanie przeprowadzono metodami kwestionariuszowymi. Wykorzystano Portretowy Kwestionariusz Wartości Schwartza (PVQ-21), Kwestionariusz Poczucia Jakości Życia (KPJŻ) Straś-Romanowskiej, Oleszkowicza i Frąckowiak oraz Skale Psychologicznego Dobrostanu (Psychological Well-Being, PWB) Ryff. Wyniki pokazały, że z cenionymi wartościami najbardziej związany jest wymiar metafizyczny, a najmniej psychofizyczny. Takie wartości, jak: uniwersalizm, życzliwość, kierowanie sobą i osiągnięcia korelują z jakością życia i dobrostanem wyłącznie pozytywnie, w przypadku pozostałych wartości korelacje są mieszane. Bardziej korzystne dla dobrostanu jest wysokie cenienie wartości przeciwstawnych (np. orientacja na siebie i na innych) niż wysokie cenienie jednych, a niskie drugich.
Źródło:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica; 2015, 8; 109-132
2084-5596
Pojawia się w:
Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Psychologica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem granic poznania z hipersystemowego punktu widzenia
Autorzy:
Mudyń, Krzysztof
Bremer, Józef
Tadeusiewicz, Ryszard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/books/2040157.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Liberi Libri
Opis:
The problem of limits of cognition as seen from the hyper system point of view A summary „The hyper system point of view”, as it is defined here, is a consequence of an ontological assumption, which states that reality does not exactly consist of more comprehensive creation called systems (as well as a non- system reminder) but it is the only absolutely closed hyper system consisting of relatively open systems. This assumption entails also renouncement of attempts to enclose particular systems within the limits of the hierarchical schema, according to which each (and every) system is to be viewed, on one hand, as one composed of subsystem and, on the other hand, interpreted as an element of a superior system which, at times, is identified with environment of the system being analyzed. Within the alternative schema put forward here, environment of any distinguished open system is always a system remainder of the Universe. The Universe is defined here as a synonym for total Reality and, that is, the only unquestionably closed hyper system which, as an absolute closed system, has all the features of a well-conceived Absolute. Therefore, it can fulfil the heuristic function of an absolute point of reference, or the so called „Archimedes’ point of support”, showing by the above means a relative character of all other systems which are thought of as alterable points of an unalterable whole of the Universe. According to the point of view adopted beforehand, in the first part of the dissertation, the notion of progress (and development) in general and the idea of scientific progress in particular, have been subject to a theoretical analysis. In this critical part of dissertation the author has dwelled on various „cultural stereotypes” implied by the ideas of progress and development. Particularly, however, the author has brought in question not solely the idea of progress of science, but also the category of „scientific knowledge” itself as a phenomenon possessing its own specific character as well as a privileged cognitive value. In accordance with the direction the author’s argumentation points to, a conviction that science provides us with „objective knowledge” or, in any sense, the best knowledge possible” which, at the same time, is endowed with a certain methodological „common denominator”, is nothing more than a stereotype well-rooted in our culture, which has been widespread in the last two hundred years, that is, since the time of Enlightenment. * * * In the second, constructive part of the dissertation, a number of theoretical and terminological suggestions have been introduced. Thus, among other things, the cognitive value of the „possibility–necessity” opposition in its conventional interpretation has been questioned. The author’s reasoning tends in a direction stating that if something is indeed possible under certain circumstances, then it is necessary as well. And if something has appeared to be possible, but had not taken place, it means that (in spite of all appearances) under specific local circumstances it had been neither necessary nor possible, but simply impossible. Therefore, it has been suggested that the category of possibility (in accordance with its common use) should be restricted to the description of deficiency or incompleteness of our knowledge solely. In other words, the category of possibility should be applied only with reference to properties of our knowledge of reality and not as a category referring to properties of the course of events in the so called outside world. The notion of „objectiveness” has been questioned as well, and not only when it appears in the sense of „objective cognition” (knowledge), but also when it appears in the context of „objective existence” of outside reality, that is, one existing beyond a subject. From the hyper system point of view, the so called subject of cognition is, undoubtedly, a most significant part of entire reality, and any process of cognition assumes unquestionably an active presence of a subject of cognition. Thus a category of „objective cognition” turns out to be an inwardly contradictory notion. Even though we deem it relevant to assume the existence of outside (with reference to the subject of cognition) reality, by no means does it imply, that properties of outside reality are of a well-defined and unalterable character. And even if they have such properties (which, as a matter of fact, would be out of accord with the ontological assumption adopted at the beginning), they would be solely „for their own sake” or „in themselves” and not for us as subjects studying them. Thus it has been suggested that it would not be incongruous to adopt the alternative assumption that „indefiniteness” is not only a feature of our cognition of reality, but also that it is a feature of at least some symptoms of reality itself. According to the proposed direction of reasoning, the author has attempted to give rational grounds for adopting extremely opposite assumptions about „the nature of reality”, while maintaining, that it is a requirement for theoretical approval of a more extensive class of its manifold symptoms. Therefore, it seems that only by means of increasing the diversity of states of environment distinguishable by „an observer” can one, in a satisfactory way, counterbalance the diversity of states of reality, since the diversity of reality being studied is always incomparably larger than the cognitive diversity of any subject of cognition. * * * With reference to considerations about the notions of „possibility” and „necessity”, the author proposed to introduce the term „ontological impermissible states”, meaning states of affairs impossible under given circumstances. As a further consequence, he suggested that the extremely metaphoric a notion of „limits of cognition” be substituted with „epistemological impermissible states”. The latter have been recognized as specific cases of ontological impermissible states. As far as „the problem of cognition” itself, is concerned it has been acknowledged that identifying the problem of cognition with „criteria of truth” or, on the wider scale, with criteria of evaluating any kind of knowledge (interpreted as „relatively permanent representation of environment”) and separately of purposes of activity worked out by a given system, would be anachronistic. First of all, since the term „truth” itself, which (irrespective of its interpretations) still remains too much permeated with its classical and, at the same time, conventional interpretation. Secondly, although we cannot avoid evaluation of cognition defined at large, identifying cognition with knowledge interpreted as a relatively permanent phenomenon would be too narrow a formulation of the problem. It would be too narrow because a living system functioning efficiently must also possess the capacity to reflect situational changeability of its environment without any permanent and detailed recording of the reflection’s consequences in the form of, let us say „long term memory”. *** It has been suggested that between the process of cognition interpreted as creating permanent representations of environment, and the process of cognition interpreted as impermanent reflection of „unique” properties of changing situations there takes place „functional contradiction”, which means that already at this point we deal with „an epistemological impermissible state”. Both aspects of the process of cognition hinted at above have been recognized to be complementary, and therefore, irreducible proper ties of every living system whose functioning is efficient. It has been also acknowledged that in the case of more complex living systems (and undoubtedly, the case of man included) cognition should be viewed as a process to some extent parallel on various levels of the cognitive system, each of which is characterized by a different degree of simplification with regard to the diversity of environment or, in other words, by a different degree of minuteness of detail concerning its cognitive representations. This statement implies, among other things, that there are good grounds for (while discussing the process of cognition) keeping in mind also a specific version of the process, and that is, the process of reflecting, by means of a given system, certain properties of cognitive representations it already possesses, as well as, the process of creating permanent cognitive representations of a higher order which refer to representations encoded in the same system on a lower level of generality. From what has already been said it seems to be evident that, among other things, instead of looking for an answer to a question of the kind of „what is true”, or „what can constitute a criterion for truth” or „what is the difference between a more adequate knowledge and a less adequate one”, it has been acknowledged that it is more reasonable to ask questions about what could be a difference between a cognitive system whose functioning is efficient, and a system whose functioning is worse or even disastrously bad. * * * Simultaneously, the author has paid attention to the facts that the process of cognition entails, above other thing, necessity to create relatively permanent generalized representations of environment or, at least, as a result of inevitable generalization, it must lead to generalized ways of reacting to specific (thus, in a sense, unique) circumstances and requirements of its local environment. Therefore, the process of cognition of reality to a grater or smaller degree is inevitably and inseparably related to the process of simplifying the picture of reality. In this context there has also been proposed a promising, as it appears to be, differentiation between „reversible simplifications” and „irreversible simplifications”. The latter, at least in the sense of functional consequences, would not be any different from deformations. Encoding information about „the same object” on different levels of generality within the limits of the same cognitive system would be a prerequisite of reversibility for simplifications made in the course of the process of cognition. In other words, as long as we have only one cognitive representation of a given object, or as long as we „do not realize” that two or more out of the representations we have refer, in fact, to „the same object”, we are in a position when, if we apply a statement by A. Korzybski (1933/1994, p. 750), we are inclined to identify a map with a territory which it stands for. Still in other words, as long as we are in possession of only one cognitive representation of a given object which, in addition to that, does not come into cognitive collision with any other representations, we have neither any reason for, nor possibility of questioning „ultimate reality” of an image we perceive. And if so, then neither have we any reason for attempting to learn „anything more”, or rather „anything different” about a given object. Participation of yet existing language in the process of cognition of reality has been considered in the above mentioned context as well. The author has paid particular attention to the function of language as a tool for intentional simplification of reality, on one hand, and as a factor leading to deformations of image of reality we are not aware of, on the other hand. * * * Finally, a somewhat more radical theoretical proposals have been suggested, which can easily result in further consequences as far as a way of formulating the problem of cognition at large is concerned. Namely, the author has acknowledged that, it is not „lack of knowledge” which is the opposite of knowledge”, but rather „anti-knowledge”, defined as being in possession of oversimplified or, for some other reasons, inadequate cognitive representations of reality. The principal difficulty and the main problem consist in the fact, that if one considers these „inadequate representations” from the point of view of their possessor, then in fact, they do not differ from those cognitive representations which deserve the name of knowledge. And whether a given representation deserves the name of knowledge depends, to a great degree, on the purpose which it is applied by a given system to achieve. One way or another, „antiknowledge” (and not lack of knowledge, or „ignorance”, as it is commonly understood) would be the opposite of „knowledge”. Ignorance in the literal sense of the word, that is, as lack of cognitive representations on a certain topic, has been recognized as a practically non-existent phenomenon or, at least, as a short term state of transition. The author maintains that „blanks” within a cognitive map of reality one possesses, would be a phenomenon contrary to fundamental (basic principles of one’s cognitive activity. At best, such a state would be almost impossible, a kind of luxury which only the most sophisticated minds could afford. In the above context there have also been introduced another terminological differentiation independently of the previous one, that is, a division (based upon a formal criterion) into positive knowledge and negative knowledge. The latter would comprise among other things, „knowledge of one’s own ignorance”, as well as knowledge of „how things are not” or „how things happen not to be” under definite circumstances. This is a particularly scarce and, if only for this very reason, very valuable kind of knowledge, and the adjective „negative” refers solely to a linguistic form which seems to be the simplest one to express it. Thus by negative knowledge the author means, as a rule, the same phenomenon which Nicholas of Cusa called docta ignorantia and which happens to be translated into Polish as uczona niewiedza (learned ignorance) and into German as die belehrte Unwlssenheit, that is, as „instructed ignorance”. However, using the word „ignorance” in such a context and meaning is vastly misleading with regard to common connotations of this word which differ distinctly from intentions of the eminent philosopher of Cusa. Thus one of the symptoms of limits of cognition would be impossibility of indicating any simple and explicit criterion, allowing one to distinguish between knowledge and anti-knowledge. Obviously, this does not exhaust all ways of a consistent discussion on the limits of cognition, and neither can it substitute other methods concerning the process of defining „epistemological impermissible states” of various types. In the dissertation itself the author has attempted, after all, to define precisely, or to locate, the problem The problem of limits of cognition as seen from the hyper system point of view of limits (or limitations) of cognition by means of other terminological conventions as well. * * * To sum all the conclusions up, one could also say that a discussion on the limits of cognition is necessary, among other things, in order to transcend more efficiently the cognitive limitations which, in a sense, allow one to transcend or, at least, evade them if, in spite of the best intentions, they tum out to be impossible (to transcend). At such times one can compensate them by means of other different, and not necessarily cognitive, ways. A series of advantageous, as they seem to be, practical consequences can result from the mere fact of dealing with, and discussing limits of cognition understood in any possible sense. These consequences could embrace, at least, tolerance for differing views of other inhabitants of our local Universe.
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Książka
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