The problem of limits of
cognition as seen from
the hyper system point of view
A summary
„The hyper system point of view”, as it is defined here, is a consequence
of an ontological assumption, which states that reality does not exactly consist of more comprehensive creation called systems (as well as a non- system
reminder) but it is the only absolutely closed hyper system consisting of relatively open systems. This assumption entails also renouncement of attempts
to enclose particular systems within the limits of the hierarchical schema,
according to which each (and every) system is to be viewed, on one hand,
as one composed of subsystem and, on the other hand, interpreted as an
element of a superior system which, at times, is identified with environment
of the system being analyzed.
Within the alternative schema put forward here, environment of any
distinguished open system is always a system remainder of the Universe.
The Universe is defined here as a synonym for total Reality and, that is,
the only unquestionably closed hyper system which, as an absolute closed
system, has all the features of a well-conceived Absolute. Therefore, it can
fulfil the heuristic function of an absolute point of reference, or the so called „Archimedes’ point of support”, showing by the above means a relative
character of all other systems which are thought of as alterable points of an
unalterable whole of the Universe.
According to the point of view adopted beforehand, in the first part of
the dissertation, the notion of progress (and development) in general and
the idea of scientific progress in particular, have been subject to a theoretical
analysis. In this critical part of dissertation the author has dwelled on various
„cultural stereotypes” implied by the ideas of progress and development.
Particularly, however, the author has brought in question not solely the idea
of progress of science, but also the category of „scientific knowledge” itself as
a phenomenon possessing its own specific character as well as a privileged
cognitive value. In accordance with the direction the author’s argumentation
points to, a conviction that science provides us with „objective knowledge”
or, in any sense, the best knowledge possible” which, at the same time, is
endowed with a certain methodological „common denominator”, is nothing
more than a stereotype well-rooted in our culture, which has been widespread in the last two hundred years, that is, since the time of Enlightenment.
* * *
In the second, constructive part of the dissertation, a number of theoretical and terminological suggestions have been introduced. Thus, among
other things, the cognitive value of the „possibility–necessity” opposition in
its conventional interpretation has been questioned. The author’s reasoning
tends in a direction stating that if something is indeed possible under certain
circumstances, then it is necessary as well. And if something has appeared
to be possible, but had not taken place, it means that (in spite of all appearances) under specific local circumstances it had been neither necessary
nor possible, but simply impossible. Therefore, it has been suggested that
the category of possibility (in accordance with its common use) should be
restricted to the description of deficiency or incompleteness of our knowledge solely. In other words, the category of possibility should be applied only
with reference to properties of our knowledge of reality and not as a category referring to properties of the course of events in the so called outside
world.
The notion of „objectiveness” has been questioned as well, and not only
when it appears in the sense of „objective cognition” (knowledge), but also
when it appears in the context of „objective existence” of outside reality,
that is, one existing beyond a subject. From the hyper system point of view,
the so called subject of cognition is, undoubtedly, a most significant part of
entire reality, and any process of cognition assumes unquestionably an active
presence of a subject of cognition. Thus a category of „objective cognition”
turns out to be an inwardly contradictory notion. Even though we deem
it relevant to assume the existence of outside (with reference to the subject
of cognition) reality, by no means does it imply, that properties of outside
reality are of a well-defined and unalterable character. And even if they have
such properties (which, as a matter of fact, would be out of accord with the
ontological assumption adopted at the beginning), they would be solely „for
their own sake” or „in themselves” and not for us as subjects studying them.
Thus it has been suggested that it would not be incongruous to adopt
the alternative assumption that „indefiniteness” is not only a feature of our
cognition of reality, but also that it is a feature of at least some symptoms of
reality itself. According to the proposed direction of reasoning, the author
has attempted to give rational grounds for adopting extremely opposite
assumptions about „the nature of reality”, while maintaining, that it is
a requirement for theoretical approval of a more extensive class of its manifold symptoms. Therefore, it seems that only by means of increasing the
diversity of states of environment distinguishable by „an observer” can one,
in a satisfactory way, counterbalance the diversity of states of reality, since
the diversity of reality being studied is always incomparably larger than the
cognitive diversity of any subject of cognition.
* * *
With reference to considerations about the notions of „possibility”
and „necessity”, the author proposed to introduce the term „ontological
impermissible states”, meaning states of affairs impossible under given
circumstances. As a further consequence, he suggested that the extremely
metaphoric a notion of „limits of cognition” be substituted with „epistemological impermissible states”. The latter have been recognized as specific
cases of ontological impermissible states.
As far as „the problem of cognition” itself, is concerned it has been
acknowledged that identifying the problem of cognition with „criteria of
truth” or, on the wider scale, with criteria of evaluating any kind of knowledge (interpreted as „relatively permanent representation of environment”)
and separately of purposes of activity worked out by a given system, would
be anachronistic.
First of all, since the term „truth” itself, which (irrespective of its interpretations) still remains too much permeated with its classical and, at
the same time, conventional interpretation. Secondly, although we cannot
avoid evaluation of cognition defined at large, identifying cognition with
knowledge interpreted as a relatively permanent phenomenon would be
too narrow a formulation of the problem. It would be too narrow because
a living system functioning efficiently must also possess the capacity to
reflect situational changeability of its environment without any permanent
and detailed recording of the reflection’s consequences in the form of, let
us say „long term memory”.
***
It has been suggested that between the process of cognition interpreted
as creating permanent representations of environment, and the process of
cognition interpreted as impermanent reflection of „unique” properties of
changing situations there takes place „functional contradiction”, which means
that already at this point we deal with „an epistemological impermissible
state”. Both aspects of the process of cognition hinted at above have been
recognized to be complementary, and therefore, irreducible proper ties of
every living system whose functioning is efficient.
It has been also acknowledged that in the case of more complex living
systems (and undoubtedly, the case of man included) cognition should be
viewed as a process to some extent parallel on various levels of the cognitive
system, each of which is characterized by a different degree of simplification
with regard to the diversity of environment or, in other words, by a different
degree of minuteness of detail concerning its cognitive representations. This
statement implies, among other things, that there are good grounds for (while
discussing the process of cognition) keeping in mind also a specific version
of the process, and that is, the process of reflecting, by means of a given
system, certain properties of cognitive representations it already possesses,
as well as, the process of creating permanent cognitive representations of
a higher order which refer to representations encoded in the same system
on a lower level of generality.
From what has already been said it seems to be evident that, among
other things, instead of looking for an answer to a question of the kind of
„what is true”, or „what can constitute a criterion for truth” or „what is the
difference between a more adequate knowledge and a less adequate one”,
it has been acknowledged that it is more reasonable to ask questions about
what could be a difference between a cognitive system whose functioning is
efficient, and a system whose functioning is worse or even disastrously bad.
* * *
Simultaneously, the author has paid attention to the facts that the
process of cognition entails, above other thing, necessity to create relatively
permanent generalized representations of environment or, at least, as a result
of inevitable generalization, it must lead to generalized ways of reacting to
specific (thus, in a sense, unique) circumstances and requirements of its
local environment. Therefore, the process of cognition of reality to a grater
or smaller degree is inevitably and inseparably related to the process of
simplifying the picture of reality. In this context there has also been proposed a promising, as it appears to be, differentiation between „reversible
simplifications” and „irreversible simplifications”.
The latter, at least in the sense of functional consequences, would not
be any different from deformations. Encoding information about „the same
object” on different levels of generality within the limits of the same cognitive
system would be a prerequisite of reversibility for simplifications made in the
course of the process of cognition. In other words, as long as we have only one
cognitive representation of a given object, or as long as we „do not realize”
that two or more out of the representations we have refer, in fact, to „the same
object”, we are in a position when, if we apply a statement by A. Korzybski
(1933/1994, p. 750), we are inclined to identify a map with a territory which
it stands for. Still in other words, as long as we are in possession of only one
cognitive representation of a given object which, in addition to that, does not
come into cognitive collision with any other representations, we have neither
any reason for, nor possibility of questioning „ultimate reality” of an image
we perceive. And if so, then neither have we any reason for attempting to
learn „anything more”, or rather „anything different” about a given object.
Participation of yet existing language in the process of cognition of
reality has been considered in the above mentioned context as well. The
author has paid particular attention to the function of language as a tool
for intentional simplification of reality, on one hand, and as a factor leading
to deformations of image of reality we are not aware of, on the other hand.
* * *
Finally, a somewhat more radical theoretical proposals have been
suggested, which can easily result in further consequences as far as a way
of formulating the problem of cognition at large is concerned. Namely, the
author has acknowledged that, it is not „lack of knowledge” which is the
opposite of knowledge”, but rather „anti-knowledge”, defined as being in
possession of oversimplified or, for some other reasons, inadequate cognitive
representations of reality.
The principal difficulty and the main problem consist in the fact, that
if one considers these „inadequate representations” from the point of view
of their possessor, then in fact, they do not differ from those cognitive representations which deserve the name of knowledge. And whether a given
representation deserves the name of knowledge depends, to a great degree,
on the purpose which it is applied by a given system to achieve.
One way or another, „antiknowledge” (and not lack of knowledge, or
„ignorance”, as it is commonly understood) would be the opposite of „knowledge”. Ignorance in the literal sense of the word, that is, as lack of cognitive
representations on a certain topic, has been recognized as a practically
non-existent phenomenon or, at least, as a short term state of transition.
The author maintains that „blanks” within a cognitive map of reality one
possesses, would be a phenomenon contrary to fundamental (basic principles
of one’s cognitive activity. At best, such a state would be almost impossible,
a kind of luxury which only the most sophisticated minds could afford.
In the above context there have also been introduced another terminological differentiation independently of the previous one, that is, a division (based upon a formal criterion) into positive knowledge and negative
knowledge. The latter would comprise among other things, „knowledge of
one’s own ignorance”, as well as knowledge of „how things are not” or „how
things happen not to be” under definite circumstances. This is a particularly
scarce and, if only for this very reason, very valuable kind of knowledge,
and the adjective „negative” refers solely to a linguistic form which seems
to be the simplest one to express it. Thus by negative knowledge the author
means, as a rule, the same phenomenon which Nicholas of Cusa called
docta ignorantia and which happens to be translated into Polish as uczona
niewiedza (learned ignorance) and into German as die belehrte Unwlssenheit,
that is, as „instructed ignorance”. However, using the word „ignorance” in
such a context and meaning is vastly misleading with regard to common
connotations of this word which differ distinctly from intentions of the
eminent philosopher of Cusa.
Thus one of the symptoms of limits of cognition would be impossibility
of indicating any simple and explicit criterion, allowing one to distinguish
between knowledge and anti-knowledge. Obviously, this does not exhaust all
ways of a consistent discussion on the limits of cognition, and neither can
it substitute other methods concerning the process of defining „epistemological impermissible states” of various types. In the dissertation itself the
author has attempted, after all, to define precisely, or to locate, the problem
The problem of limits of cognition as seen from the hyper system point of view
of limits (or limitations) of cognition by means of other terminological
conventions as well.
* * *
To sum all the conclusions up, one could also say that a discussion on
the limits of cognition is necessary, among other things, in order to transcend more efficiently the cognitive limitations which, in a sense, allow one
to transcend or, at least, evade them if, in spite of the best intentions, they
tum out to be impossible (to transcend). At such times one can compensate
them by means of other different, and not necessarily cognitive, ways.
A series of advantageous, as they seem to be, practical consequences can
result from the mere fact of dealing with, and discussing limits of cognition
understood in any possible sense. These consequences could embrace, at
least, tolerance for differing views of other inhabitants of our local Universe.
