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Wyszukujesz frazę "stopping game" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
Random priority two-person full-information best choice problem with imperfect observation
Autorzy:
Porosiński, Zdzisław
Szajowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1208161.pdf
Data publikacji:
2000
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Matematyczny PAN
Tematy:
mixed strategy
best choice problem
zero-sum game
stopping game
Opis:
The following version of the two-player best choice problem is considered. Two players observe a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with a known continuous distribution. The random variables cannot be perfectly observed. Each time a random variable is sampled, the sampler is only informed whether it is greater than or less than some level specified by him. The aim of the players is to choose the best observation in the sequence (the maximal one). Each player can accept at most one realization of the process. If both want to accept the same observation then a random assignment mechanism is used. The zero-sum game approach is adopted. The normal form of the game is derived. It is shown that in the fixed horizon case the game has a solution in pure strategies whereas in the random horizon case with a geometric number of observations one player has a pure strategy and the other one has a mixed strategy from two pure strategies. The asymptotic behaviour of the solution is also studied.
Źródło:
Applicationes Mathematicae; 2000, 27, 3; 251-263
1233-7234
Pojawia się w:
Applicationes Mathematicae
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On nonzero-sum stopping game related to discrete risk processes
Autorzy:
Bobecka, K.
Ferenstein, E.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205836.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
gra stopująca
proces ryzyka
równowaga Nasha
Nash equilibrium
risk process
stopping game
Opis:
We consider two-person nonzero-sum stopping game. The players (insurers) observe discrete time risk processes until one of them decides to stop his process. Strategies of the players are stopping times. The aim of each player is to maximize his expected gain. We find Nash equilibrium point for this game under certain assumptions on reward sequences.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2001, 30, 3; 339-354
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time
Gra o typie wyboru partnera z kontinuum graczy, preferencjami homotypowymi oraz czasem ciągłym
Autorzy:
Ramsey, David Mark
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/953347.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
Tematy:
dynamic game
nash equilibrium
stopping problem
partnership formation
tworzenie partnerstwa
gra dynamiczne
równowaga nasha
problem
stopowania
Opis:
 A model of partnership formation is considered in which there are two classes of player (called male and female). There is a continuum of players and two types of both sexes. These two types can be interpreted, e.g. as two subspecies, and each searcher prefers to pair with an individual of the same type. Players begin searching at time zero and search until they find a mutually acceptable prospective partner or the mating season ends. When a pair is formed, both individuals leave the pool of searchers. Hence, the proportion of players still searching and the distribution of types changes over time. Prospective partners are found at a rate which is non- decreasing the proportion of players still searching. Nash equilibria are derived which satisfy the following optimality criterion: each searcher accepts a prospective partner if and only if the reward from such a partnership is greater or equal to the expected reward obtained from future search. So called ”completely symmetric” versions of this game are considered, where the two types of player are equally frequent. A unique Nash equilibrium exists regardless of the precise rule determining the rate at which prospective partners are found. Two examples are given. 
Źródło:
Mathematica Applicanda; 2018, 46, 2
1730-2668
2299-4009
Pojawia się w:
Mathematica Applicanda
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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