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Tytuł:
"Homo non est intellectus". Aquinas about relation between soul and intellect
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/431257.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
Aquinas
intellect
soul–body problem
impediment argument
hylomorphism
whole–part relation
Tomasz z Akwinu
intelekt
problem psychofizyczny
hylemorfizm
relacja część–całość
Opis:
This paper discusses Thomas Aquinas’ stance on the relation between intellect and human soul, where the former is a power and the latter its principle. Due to the fact that Aquinas understands soul as the form of a body, rather than its mover, the problem of how to separate and characterize intellective powers arises. For it is accidental intellectuality that enables cognitive and volitional acts, which are independent of body in their essence. To explain his own position, Aquinas employs the so-called “impediment argument” for the spirituality of the human intellect. He also employs the whole/part distinction when discussing the relation between intellect and soul as whole/part categories. As a result, his account can avoid Averroistic flaws without having to identify intellect with the soul or the whole human being (as argued by Albert the Great). M. Gogacz’s thesis that the intellectual accident of the soul is identical with the possible intellect seems to solve the problem of the accidental and potential character of this particular human power.
Źródło:
Studia Philosophiae Christianae; 2017, 53, 4; 75-101
0585-5470
Pojawia się w:
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Czy poznanie jest wyższe niż miłość? Uzasadnienie wyższości intelektu nad wolą w ujęciu Tomasza z Akwinu
Is cognition better than love? Justification of intellect’s superiority over will in Thomas Aquinas’ account
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452475.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
intelekt
wola
miłość
poznanie
Tomasz z Akwinu
intellect
will
love
cognition
Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
Thomas Aquinas in his works sympathizes with the priority and thus superiority of intellect over will definitely. Presenting various ways of arguing he intends to point out the perfection of intellect, which becomes perfect in its act of cognition, it assures the proper action of will. Because of its object – truth about reality – as well as final and formal causation intellect moves will which aims to good. Only in the situation of such an object of intellect, which somehow exceeds human cognition potencies, will could acquire superiority over cognition. Thus a man only in an act of love of God is able to love by will that, which he cannot cognize. In other cases, particularly in case of natural cognition of sensual reality, in which man grasps an essence, cognition always goes before volition. Stressing superiority of intellect over will is not a matter of introducing into the consideration of their mutual relations additional topic. It is crucial problem, which allows proper understanding issue of freedom in Aquinas’ account.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2014, 3; 75-97
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Głupota, ignorancja i acedia a poznanie intelektualne i działanie moralne
Stupidity, ignorance, acedia and their meaning for the intellectual cognition and moral action
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2057885.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Tomasz z Akwinu
intelekt
moralność
głupota
ignorancja
acedia
Aquinas
intellect
morality
stupidity
ignorance
Opis:
The aim of the article is to answer the question how the deficiencies and indisposition of intellectual cognition can influence the moral actions of a person. Three vices have been analyzed: stupidity, ignorance and acedia. The natural desire to know (Aristotle) is expressed in the transition from potency to act; consists in a natural inclination to perfect knowledge, realizing the perfection of human nature; it is fulfilled in the happiness that comes from passing from theoretical to practical knowledge, because knowledge cannot be something vain (vanus). In this context, it is clear that acedia blocks the transition of the potential intellect to any cognitive act. Ignorance explains why man does not acquire knowledge that could be used in moral acts, and therefore he does not realize his nature because of it. Ignorance is probably the best proof of the intellectual weakness of man's nature, its peculiar imperfection (internal resistance of the intellect). As for the practical order and the fulfillment of happiness in human action, it is best seen in contrast to the wisdom of stupidity. Lack of judgment in final matters (theoretical and practical) blocks the natural human disire for happiness.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2021, 10; 127-146
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Intelekt bierny a intelekt możnościowy w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
Passive intellect and potential intellect according to St. Thomas Aquinas
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452457.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
intelekt bierny
intelekt możnościowy
perypatetycka tradycja epistemologiczna
Tomasz z Akwinu
passive intellect
potential intellect
peripatetic epistemological tradition
Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
The article is an attempt to respond the following questions: is there a difference between operations of potential and passive intellect? Could one call the potential intellect passive intellect? Are there any questions, statements or opinions in the history of philosophy which separate potential from passive intellect? The passivity of potential intellect is not a problem here, because its nature and its act is to be in the state of potency towards ist object. The subject of analysis tends to define teechnical terms "intellectus passivus" and to reach philosophical implications resulting from it.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2012, 1; 65-84
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Józef M. Bocheński jako tomista
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1966205.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Tomasz z Akwinu
tomizm
J.M. Bocheński
filozofia tomistyczna w Polsce
Opis:
The aim of the paper is to present the following, how Thomism was understood by Bocheński, next, path of Thomistic inspirations he had followed, and finally we show Thomism Bocheński had explored when teaching his own philosophical abbreviation (ABC tomizmu). Analysis based on these issues would allow to identify the specific features of Thomism studied and explored by Bocheński. Hence, the question we might pose does not to regard the fact whether Bocheński was a Thomist or not but, what sort of Thomism he represented. Bocheński should rather be considered to be a traditional Thomist than existential one because in his philosophical work he barely treated the problem of act of existence and importance of this particular problem. However, he refrained from adopting the method fundamental for traditional Thomism, which is strict adherence (fidelity) to source texts of Aquinas. Bocheński, in being open to achievements of contemporary philosophy, especially logic, was closer to Louvain Thomism. But, he never decided to implement modern scientific trends to philosophy of Aquinas, the tendency which was foreign to the very essence of philosophy, at least in its shape understood by Bocheński. In his philosophical views Bocheński was closer to Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition. And because he preferred to follow Aristotelian realism he consequently kept that stance. His interest in analysis the utterances of Thomism from a perspective of logic allow to classify Bocheński to analytical Thomism, but we should remember that in times contemporary to Bocheński, the very notion of analytical Thomism had not been coined. The aforementioned conclusions allow to recognize originality of Thomistic thought represented by Bocheński and also, to admit that Bocheński’s thought cannot be classified univocally to a particular school of Thomism.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2020, 1, 9; 265-289
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Poznanie Adama i wiedza Chrystusa a intelekt możnościowy i czynny. Ujęcie Tomasza z Akwinu
The Cognition of Adam and Knowldege of Christ in the Context of Potential and Agent Intellect
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2078915.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Tomasz z Akwinu
intelekt możnościowy i czynny
wiedza Chrystusa
wiedza Adama
Thomas Aquinas
potential intellect
agent intellect
knowledge of Christ
knowledge of Adam
Opis:
Thomas Aquinas anthropology is related to the description of human nature, which was established at the beginning, before original sin, as well as taking into account all its effects, and the nature that was united with God. The distinction of two intellects adopted by Aristotle - a potential and active intellect - for Aquinas was helpful in showing the unique character of the knowledge that Adam and Christ had. Adam as the one who was appointed as teacher of people, had perfect knowledge and did not have a potential intellect that would be an unwritten tablet. His potential intellect had the habits of knowledge, by which he had a perfect knowledge of everything that can be embraced in any field of cognition by the power of the first principles of knowledge. The perfection of Christ's knowledge was incomparably greater than knowledge of Adam and every other human being – it was result of unification with the Word, but not the mixing of two natures. Christ had knowledge which have blessed (saved), infused knowledge (resulting from union with the Word) and had experiential knowledge appropriate to age and time. Christ developed in knowledge and wisdom because he grew in human experience.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2019, 8; 123-138
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Poznanie niewyraźne Boga ("cognitio confusa") – Tomasz z Akwinu i Kartezjusz
Confused cognition of God ("cognitio confusa") – St. Thomas Aquinas and Descartes
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452593.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Tomasz z Akwinu
Kartezjusz
poznanie niewyraźne
naturalne poznanie Boga
poznanie Boga przez łaskę
poznanie Boga w chwale
Thomas Aquinas
Descartes
unclear cognition
natural knowledge of God
knowledge of God by grace
knowledge of God in glory
Opis:
A man has a natural need for cognition of causes, particularly when he perceives reality, which is an effect of someone’s action. Aristotle, when describing a philosopher (the wise man), emphasizes that he’s a person, who has knowledge about all things (as far as possible) and cognitions of things, which are difficult to cognire and also knows causes, which are cognizable at most. But whether it’s possible recognition of causes and the paradigm of realistic philosophy nowadays, when we inherit principles of Cartesian Philosophy in our mindset and culture? When is everything unclear, inaccurate or mysterious regard as false? And when only mathematical clearness preserves state of knowledge and certainty? Therefore the problem of unclear cognition is so significant. This issue was prepared by St. Thomas Aquinas, who on that basis considered question of cognition of God. Descartes, however, completely negated this kind of cognition and built ‘boundary sign’ for the truth of the cognition. It seems that reinstatement of the right place of confused cognition and its protection in philosophy is possible inasmuch as it is still possible cognition of reality, i.e. cognition of thing-in-itself. A wonderment (admiration), which was the beginning of philosophy (because it express confused cognition of world) in post-Cartesian paradigm of reflection is unconvincing – the essence of the philosophy is purely and simply clear thinking. But emphasize the role of confused cognition is not a recognition it as sufficient and only way to perfect knowledge. Emphasizing confused knowledge is an objection to the thesis of the possession of only excellent knowledge and in the act, and objection to the claims that deny the potentiality and potency of knowing reality. If so, there would be no compromise statement that for the beliver the existence of God is obvious and for non-beliver non-existence of God is equally obvious.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2013, 2; 137-153
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Prawda o intelekcie. Mieczysława Gogacza rozumienie intelektu możnościowego i czynnego
Truth about intellect. Understanding of possible and agent intellect in the thought of Mieczysław Gogacz
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452563.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
intelekt możnościowy
intelekt czynny
dusza i ciało
jednostkowienie
Tomasz z Akwinu
Mieczysław Gogacz
possible intellect
agent intellect
soul and body
individuation
Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
The aim of the article is presentation the problems of possible intellect and agent intellect in philosophy Mieczyslaw Gogacz, founder of consequent version of thomism (Warsaw School of Thomism). His understanding of the intellect was dictated by the successive publications. Difference between intellects, was first shown in the context of fundamental metaphysical positions - realism and idealism. According to M. Gogacz realistic proposition is depends on the distinction between two intellects, and idealistic related with the acceptance of a single intellect with passive and active function, and identification of the faculties of the soul with itself. M. Gogacz presented the metaphysical description of the nature of the intellect, emphasizing its being, as well as the very essence. He underlined that the possible intellect should be defined as the possibility of the soul, which is it imperfection (intellect is principle of individuation of the soul), located in the soul, but not identical with its essence. Agent intellect in his opinion should be defined as an accident of the possible intellect. Distinction between possible intellect and agent intellect allowed to remark the difference between knowing confused and clearly, and to build the theory of “speech of the heart”, which describes the most important way of knowing a principle of being – act of being.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2016, 5; 75-89
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem mind-body w świetle Tomaszowej koncepcji hylemorfizmu
Mind-body problem in the light of Aquinas’s conception of hylomorphism
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2075807.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
problem umysł-ciało
hylemorfizm
jedność duszy i ciała
Tomasz z Akwinu
mind-body problem
hylomorphism
unity of the soul and body
Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to approach the mind- body problem in the context of philosophy of Aquinas, especially in the context of his understanding of hylomorphism. Disproportion between the issues of the philosophy of mind and Thomas's position are not to the extend which would unable us to see at the variety of questions from his perspective discussed nowadays by philosophers. On the contrary, Thomas' stance might be an attractive solution with regard to positions already fixed (established)- materialism and dualism. What follows in this paper are four issues: the problem of causative interaction between soul and body, the question of cognition of other senses, the issue of personal identity, and at least, the issue of qualia. All these questions, contemporary discussed, find their answers in Aquinas' explanation which points out the most proper understanding of human being, which is defining a human being as a person.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2018, 7; 159-176
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Realna różnica między intelektem czynnym i możnościowym w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
The Real Distinction Between Agent and Potential Intellect in Approach Thomas Aquinas
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452459.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Thomas Aquinas
potential intellect
agent intellect
real distinction
object oh intellectual cognition
Tomasz z Akwinu
intelekt możnościowy
intelekt czynny
różnica realna
przedmiot poznania intelektualnego
Opis:
The aim of article was to prove the existence of the real difference between active intellect and potential intellect, based on the epistemological thought of Thomas Aquinas. Although many authors suggested such a character distinction, yet no one does not try to justifying it. In this article are comments on intellects in Aristotle account, very short history – following the Aquinas - of distinguishing and separating intellects. Presented is the same understanding of the real difference between existence and essence of beings created and in this light given difference between intellects, because Aquinas, actually never spoke about it in this way. A basic element of the article is to distinguish intellects on the basis of a formal rules of their objects and distinguish them on the basis of acts, which allows to build a proper argumentation. It has been shown that between what is recognized in the potential intellect is a disproportion, which may be removed by the allocation of truly different between potential and active intellect. Between intellects there is a real difference only in the case of the human intellect, since both in God and in the angelic beings, this differentiation is not needed. The real difference between intellects is based on the difference between the act and potency or being in act and being in potency, however, are not they act and potency relative to each other, but to the cognized object. Moreover, the active intellect as being in the act, is not determined nor determining the object of cognition potential intellect, it is not the object recognized by him. Finally, if the way of cognition depends on the mode of existence, the intellectual knowledge infinity of human remains in potency, by what must be in man two intellects.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2015, 4; 63-95
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Tomaszowy argument „z blokowania” za niematerialnością działań intelektu.
Aquinas’s impediment argument for the immateriality of the intellect
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452485.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
Tomasz z Akwinu
intelekt możnościowy
niematerialność intelektu
poznanie intelektualne
dusza i ciało
Thomas Aquinas
possible intellect
immateriality
intellectual cognition
soul and body
Opis:
Argument for spirituality of soul appears in a few places of Aquinas’ text and is sometimes called “the impediment argument”, “the argument for plasticity of intellect”, “the argument from common dimension”. The names differ as far as Thomas did not establish himself any name for his reasoning in this matter. There is no doubt that the argument derives from the Aristotelian On the soul, however, Aquinas does not develop it. The argument is present in four places and its most important presumptions would be summarized as follows: (1) man can cognize the nature of all bodies by his own intellect; (2) that what is able to cognize everything can not in itself have a nature of the cognized object – the nature of body would block a process of cognition; (3) it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body – it would not be possible for the principle of intellectual action to act through a bodily part; (4) the intellectual principle which is called the intellect or the mind acts per se does not contain any bodily involvement in its action. Hence, according to Aquinas, soul is something subsisting with regard to actions which are not the acts of body. However, this statement is disturbingly mistaken. In Summa, nevertheless, Thomas develops this issue further. In response to some objections he would emphasize that none of parts (as far as part is understood as a part of a whole) could not exist separately and act separately – neither soul nor body (as well as an eye or a hand). This is for the fact that soul is something subsisting (quod est) and inherited in matter (quo aliquid aliud est). Aquinas tries to explain the status of soul significantly, nevertheless left some questions open to make analysis on a whole human being possible, including body for which soul serves as a form. Thus, through the intellect we would observe a unique characteristic of human soul as a rational being.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2017, 6; 77-98
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
What Place Does Scripture Have in Thomas Aquinas’s Reasoning?
Jakie miejsce w argumentacji Tomasza z Akwinu zajmuje Pismo Święte?
Autorzy:
Zatwardnicki, Sławomir
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28394764.pdf
Data publikacji:
2024
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
Tomasz z Akwinu
uzasadnianie wiary
De rationibus fidei
miejsce Pisma w argumentacji
tomizm biblijny
sacra doctrina
Thomas Aquinas
justification of faith
place of Scripture in argumentation
biblical Thomism
Opis:
W artykule zaakcentowano współistnienie teologii biblijnej i teologii systematycznej w twórczości Tomasza z Akwinu; w tym celu skorzystano z badań tomizmu biblijnego. Następnie ukazano, w jaki sposób Biblia wiąże się ze spekulacją teologiczną w początkowych kwestiach Sumy teologicznej, w których autor charakteryzuje sacra doctrina. Kolejno przedstawiono modus operandi Akwinaty w dyskusji z adwersarzami nieuznającymi autorytetu Pisma Świętego oraz jego apologię autorytetu sacra Scriptura. Dalej zademonstrowano przykładową polemikę z chrześcijanami prowadzoną w oparciu o teksty natchnione. W zakończeniu zebrano wnioski dotyczące miejsca i funkcji Pisma Świętego w argumentacji Tomasza, które zależą po pierwsze od adresatów dzieł Tomasza, a po drugie od rodzajów wypowiedzi Doktora Anielskiego.
This paper emphasises the coexistence of biblical theology and systematic theology in the works of Thomas Aquinas. For this purpose, it draws on the study of biblical Thomism. It then shows how the Bible is linked to theological speculation in the opening questions of the Theological Summa, in which the author characterises the sacra doctrina. Aquinas’s modus operandi in his discussion with adversaries who do not recognise the authority of Scripture, as well as his apology for the authority of sacra Scriptura, is then presented. A sample polemic with Christians conducted on the basis of inspired texts is demonstrated further on. The paper closes with conclusions regarding the place and function of Scripture in Thomas’s argumentation, which depend firstly on the addressees of Thomas’s works and secondly on the types of statements made by the Angelic Doctor.
Źródło:
Collectanea Theologica; 2024, 94, 1; 107-166
0137-6985
2720-1481
Pojawia się w:
Collectanea Theologica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Arystoteles czy św. Tomasz z Akwinu? Głębsze rozumienie intelektu
Aristotle or St. Thomas Aquinas? Deeper the understanding of intellect
Autorzy:
Zaorski, Mariusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1008974.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-10-03
Wydawca:
Akademia Katolicka w Warszawie
Tematy:
intelekt
dusza
nieśmiertelność
św. Tomasz z Akwinu
Arystoteles
St. Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
intellect
soul
immortality
Opis:
The presented concept of intellect shows the size and innovation of St. Thomas Aquinas. As opposed to Aristotle, St. Thomas explains the nature of intellect more precisely. Aristotle used only one concept in describing form and matter. However, this was not enough to show the existence of intellect a
Źródło:
Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne; 2018, 31, 3; 80-90
0209-3782
2719-7530
Pojawia się w:
Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Gott ist die Umwelt des Menschen. Über die Gotteserkenntnis nach Thomas von Aquin
Bóg jako środowisko dla człowieka. O poznaniu Boga w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
God as the environment for man. The knowledge of God in account of St. Thomas Aquinas
Autorzy:
Zan, Richard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452375.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
poznawalność Boga
teologia naturalna
filozofia bytu
św. Tomasz z Akwinu
knowability of God
natural theology
philosophy of being
St. Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
Każdy człowiek z natury pragnie poznać siebie i swoje otoczenie. Zdaje sobie przy tym sprawę z tego, że otaczający go świat nie został stworzony przez niego, człowieka, lecz przez Boga. W myśli średniowiecznej uznano, że wiara jest najlepszym sposobem na poznanie Boga. Wystarczy przypomnieć koncepcję Pseudo-Dionizego Areopagity o niepoznawalności Boga na naturalnej drodze poznania umysłowego. Kluczowym problemem artykułu jest pytanie, czy Bóg jest do tego stopnia nieadekwatny jako przedmiot naturalnego poznania, że konieczne jest poznanie nadprzyrodzone w celu osiągnięcia wiedzy o Bogu? Odpowiedź leży w filozofii św. Tomasza z Akwinu, a dokładniej w jego ujęciu relacji między wiarą a poznaniem. Dodatkowo, artykuł dowodzi, że historycznie wcześniejsze od ujęcia Akwinaty propozycje rozwiązania tego problemu (opracowane przede wszystkim w ramach średniowiecznej filozofii neoplatońskiej) okazały się nietrafne i niewystarczające. W filozofii Tomasza dopiero wypracowana przez niego (za filozofią Arystotelesa) oryginalna filozofia bytu (zwłaszcza tezy z De ente et essentia) zapewnia właściwe ujęcie zarazem relacji między wiarą a rozumem oraz naturalnego poznania Boga przez człowieka. Autor artykułu pokazuje - za Akwinatą - że naturalne poznanie Boga realizuje się przede wszystkim w poznaniu skutków Jego działań.
Every man naturally desires to cognize himself and his world. He realizes at the same time that the world around him was not created by him, man, but by God. In medieval thought it was the faith, that is the best way to cognize God. Let us remind the concept of Pseudo- Dionysius the Areopagite on the unknowability of God in the natural way. Thus, the key problem of the article is the question of whether God is so inadequate as a matter of natural knowledge, that it is necessary to cognize him supernaturally. The answer lies in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, and more specifically in his view on the relationship between faith and cognition. In addition, the article argues that historically earlier shots of proposals of solution of this problem (developed primarily in the context of neo-medieval philosophy) proved to be inaccurate and inadequate. Thomas worked out (as a addition to the Aristotelian framework) the original philosophy of being (especially the thesis of De ente et essentia), which provided appropriate recognition the relationship between faith and reason and the natural knowledge of God by man. The author shows - following Aquinas - that the natural knowledge of God is realized above all in the knowledge of the results of his actions (causes). This proves the inalienability of metaphysics in natural theology.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2016, 5; 165-172
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pojęcie „ius gentium” w „Summa Theologiae” św. Tomasza z Akwinu
Concept of ius gentium in Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas
Autorzy:
Zalewski, Bartosz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/5946010.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-12-31
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
ius gentium
prawo narodów
prawo rzymskie
św. Tomasz z Akwinu
Izydor z Sewilli
law of nations
roman law
Thomas Aquinas
Isidore of Sevilla
Opis:
The subject of the considerations in presented paper is the concept of ius gentium in two selected fragments of St. Thomas Aquinas: S.Th. I-II, q. 95, a. 4 and S.Th. II-II, q. 57, a. 3. The introduction to their detailed analysis is the discussion of three issues necessary for the correct interpretation of Aquinas’ argu-ments, i.e. the concept of ius gentium in the first book of the Justinian Digest, the definition of ius gentium in the Etymologies of St. Isidore of Seville and an explanation of the relationship between the concepts of ius and lex in the Summa Theologica. The conducted research allows to conclude that the Angelic Doctor uses the concept of ius gentium in a twofold sense. The first of them is of a juridical nature and can be equated with the understanding of this term on the basis of the sources of Roman law. Ius gentium is therefore a set of legal norms common to all peoples, which enable, first of all, mutual economic turnover, although to some extent also apply to the external activity of the state. The second meaning of the term ius gentium, although also to some extent inspired by the sources of Roman law, has a broader character and a deeper philosophical foundation. On the basis of the treaty on justice, ius gentium constitutes the social order of functioning of all people based on natural reason (naturalis ratio).
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2022, 11; 159-179
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł

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