- Tytuł:
-
Aitia – wina arystotelesowska. Zagadnienia definicyjne. Część I
Aitia – Aristotlelian guilt. Definitional issues - Autorzy:
- Gontarski, Waldemar
- Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/927375.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2012
- Wydawca:
- Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
- Tematy:
-
Arystoteles
triada przyczyn
triada skutków
sprawiedliwość
Aristotle
the triad of causes
the triad of consequences
justice - Opis:
- When engaging in polemics with Pythagoras, Aristotle observed that the retributive function of punishment, as distinguished from the preventative one, does not involve revenge understood as material retaliation (i.e. suffering for suffering, meaning retaliation proportional to the damage suffered). It does not encompass a simple reciprocity, such as suffering in turn (ἀντιπάσχω), but instead shall be considered as a just reciprocity, meaning doing in return (ἀντιποιέω), whereby the degree of mental contribution is taken into account. The classical theory of responsibility, at least under the meaning assigned to it by Aristotle, considers human responsibility by means of reference to the mental capabilities of the actor in respect to the particular harmful action. An action involving human guilt is consequently contrasted with an accidentally caused action. In the works of Stagirite the mental attitude of the actor towards his action distinguishes human causation from the accidental one and from the forced one. Pythagoras, on the other hand, discussed material retaliation, meaning objective responsibility. At the same time, the author of Nicomachean Ethics had already experienced the system of subjective responsibility based on the concept of knowingly caused damage as opposed to the system of objective responsibility involving the objective causal relationship between actor’s behavior and the resulting damage. Aristotle has extended the concept of subjective responsibility to cover both knowingly caused damage (intentional fault) and unintentional fault, whereby the damage is directly caused by the negligent conduct of the actor, meaning the failure of the latter to observe required objective and abstract standards. The mental component and related to it subjectivization involve the actor possessing required intellectual capabilities, but not using them in a way as to observe the aforementioned imposed standards. Nonetheless, the potential mental component is itself not sufficient to establish guilt. Otherwise, all the people (apart from those lacking capacity at all) shall be declared guilty regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by them accidentally.
- Źródło:
-
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej; 2012, 2(5); 51-66
2082-3304 - Pojawia się w:
- Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
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