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Tytuł:
Safe information exchange on board of the ship
Autorzy:
Ahvenjärvi, S.
Czarnowski, I.
Kåla, J.
Kyster, A.
Meyer, I.
Mogensen, J.
Szyman, P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/116173.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Morski w Gdyni. Wydział Nawigacyjny
Tematy:
information exchange
navigation safety
autonomous ship
autonomous ships navigation
information technology (IT)
safe information exchange
maritime education and training (MET)
cyber security
Opis:
The first ever attempt at fully autonomous dock-to-dock operation has been tested and demonstrated successfully at the end of 2018. The revolutionary shift is feared to have a negative impact on the safety of navigation and the getting of real-time situation awareness. Especially, the centralized context onboard could be changed to a distributed context. In navigation safety domain, monitoring, control, assessment of dangerous situations, support of operators of decision-making support system should be implemented in real time. In the context of autonomous ships, decision-making processes will play an important role under such ocean autonomy, therefore the same technologies should consist of adequate system intelligence. At the same time, situation awareness is the key element of the decision-making processes. Although there is substantial research on situation awareness measurement techniques, they are not suitable to directly execute quantitative processing for the situation awareness of autonomous ships navigation. Hence, a novel quantitative model of situation awareness is firstly proposed based on the system safety control structure of remotely controlled vessel. The data source is greatly limited, but the main result still indicates that the probability of operator lose adequate situation awareness of the autonomous ship is significantly higher than the conventional ship. Finally, the paper provides a probabilistic theory and model for high-level abstractions of situation awareness to guide future evaluation of the navigation safety of autonomous ships.
Źródło:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation; 2019, 13, 1; 165-171
2083-6473
2083-6481
Pojawia się w:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Navigational Trip: Safety, Security, and Protection as Compliance to Interntional Standard
Autorzy:
Alimen, R. A.
Galve, R. M.
Francisco, S. F.
Mongan, C. I.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/117207.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Morski w Gdyni. Wydział Nawigacyjny
Tematy:
navigational trip
safety at sea
ship security
Maritime Education and Training (MET)
MET System in the Philippines
interntional standards
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
Ship-Board Training Officer (SBTO)
Opis:
This study was determined the evaluation of the safety, security, and protection of the navigational trip in terms of safety among marine engineering students as an entire group and when they were classified according to section such as Polaris 3-A, Polaris 3-B, and Polaris 3-C. Respondents of the study were the one hundred twenty (120) Polaris marine engineering students who are currently enrolled in the College of Maritime Education of JBLFMU-Molo for School Year 2017-2018 who were on board or have undertaken the navigational trip and have observed some of the safety and security services on board. The researchers employed quantitative-qualitative research design by Creswell (2013) to determine the navigational trip and observations of the safety and security services on board. Results revealed that the respondents had “excellent evaluation” about the safety, protection, and security of the navigational trip vessel. There were no significant differences in the evaluation of the respondents as to the different sections; no relationships were observed when the respondents’ evaluation results were compared according to sections. The observations and comments cited in this study signify that the navigational trip vessel exhibited safety and security, maintain clean and safe environment, and followed the strict implementation of safety as prescribed by the international standards. The respondents’ comments attested that the navigational ship has implemented the international standard of safety and procedure on board.
Źródło:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation; 2018, 12, 3; 533-538
2083-6473
2083-6481
Pojawia się w:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The main challenges and barriers to the successful “smart shipping”
Autorzy:
Alop, A.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/116779.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Morski w Gdyni. Wydział Nawigacyjny
Tematy:
smart shipping
maritime affairs
intelligent ship
no records
autonomous ship
cyber security
artificial intelligence (AI)
SWOT analyze
Opis:
As with the powerful digitalization of the world in the 21st century, maritime affairs, like all other areas, are facing not only new opportunities, but also new big challenges and problems. From the point of view of the development of new technologies, it seems that everything is possible, for example the bringing of so-called "intelligent ships" and “smart ports” into one global system on base of internet of things and big data applications. However, if to look at the matter further, a number of factors and obstacles may appear which could be major threats to the normal functioning of such a system. While it is clear that systems with such high degree of complexity are even technically vulnerable, it seems to the author of this paper that questions that are no less difficult are in the field of human relations. For example, when ships and ports are becoming more and more "smarter" and need less and less people to intervene in their interactions, who at the end will be responsible for everything that can and definitely will happened at sea or in the port? What about liability of cargo carrier if “carrier” is an autonomous ship without any person on-board during the entire journey? How to ensure cyber security? How to be secured against the risks of so-called artificial intelligence systemic errors? It is possible that only new non-trivial approaches can lead to acceptable results in this area, but what they may be and whether these approaches are possible at all - these questions are still waiting for answers.
Źródło:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation; 2019, 13, 3; 521-528
2083-6473
2083-6481
Pojawia się w:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Implementation and Compliance of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code in Mexico: A literature Review and Selected Issues
Autorzy:
Ávila‐Zúñiga‐Nordfjeld, A.
Dalaklis, D.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/116798.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Morski w Gdyni. Wydział Nawigacyjny
Tematy:
Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP)
literature review
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)
ISPS Code in Mexico
ISPS Code
SOLAS Convention
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
International Standards Implementation
Opis:
This paper provides a literature review of the state of the art on implementation and compliance of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), for the case of Mexico. This investigation was initially oriented solely towards Mexico, but due to the absence of research within this subject for the referred country the review had to be done through subcategories with the conditional connection of Mexico and relevant issues were selected. The primary data confirmed the absence of research within this subject in Mexico. The secondary data, were other words related to the ISPS Code were used for the search, allowed for a wider geographical coverage and an expanded on general bases the scope of analysis, since ten (10) different academic databases were exploited. The literature review from an author-centric approach is initially presented; then, it is used as the basis to further develop (and examine) the concept-centric approach, through eight selected categories. The careful screening of literature, constructed on specific concepts, allowed the identification of cross fertilization of such concepts in the respective fields. It is observed that the research efforts focused on the ISPS Code and the development of a Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) have an integrated perspective, where the categories of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as maritime security management and the issue of port security have a strong interaction and dominant status. The results demonstrate the limited number of academic contributions in these areas from America Central and South America in relation to other parts of the globe, as well as the total absence of research efforts about the ISPS Code in Mexico. In the scientific contributions on the subject were Mexico is included; it is in reference to isolated cases of armed robbery, drugs organizations or proliferation of crime on general bases, but not regarding the ISPS Code itself. The absence of scientific research on this area for the specific country might also be related to the lack of a national maritime security policy and a poor maritime security culture as the authors have pointed out in other contributions.
Źródło:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation; 2018, 12, 2; 363-373
2083-6473
2083-6481
Pojawia się w:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Opening of offshore oil business in Mexico and associated framework to cope with potential maritime security threats
Autorzy:
Ávila-Zúñiga-Nordfjeld, A.
Dalaklis, D.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/117224.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Morski w Gdyni. Wydział Nawigacyjny
Tematy:
offshore oil business
ISPS Code
critical offshore infrastructure
offshore technology
Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP)
port’s security program
Mexican ports
maritime security
Opis:
After 75 years of State oil monopoly, Mexico performed the first business oil round in 2015 involving the private sector. This auction-round offered 14 oil exploration fields located on the continental shelf to private companies. The development and exploitation of these hydrocarbon fields faces significant challenges regarding security. The economic loss for theft of hydrocarbons through illegal connections to pipelines is estimated to 973 million, 125 thousand U.S. dollar, only for the year of 2014. While productive research has been made, it has mainly focused on transportation systems and basically, pipelines. The development and establishment of policies prioritizing maritime security and protection of critical offshore infrastructure against theft of hydrocarbons, drugs organizations and terror attacks needs to be included in the national agenda to improve maritime security and mitigate potential security threats at sea, including damage to the marine environment. This could increase the trust of investors and stakeholders and would contribute to the faster development of new exploration and production fields. While the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) is the cornerstone for the construction of the port's security program and establishes the requirements of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), including oil port facilities, it has not been fully implemented in several important Mexican ports. It is concluded that some important ports lack many of the core security processes, procedures and controls that should be included in any PFSP. This article briefly reviews the situation of the oil industry from a security perspective and discusses key elements of maritime security; addressing the necessity of the inclusion of maritime security and protection of critical oil infrastructure offshore in the national agenda that would provide for future research directions in the maritime security domain and contribute to the establishment of a national maritime security policy.
Źródło:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation; 2018, 12, 1; 173-179
2083-6473
2083-6481
Pojawia się w:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A multiple case study of METI cybersecurity education and training: A basis for the development of a guiding framework for educational approaches
Autorzy:
Bacasdoon, J.
Bolmsten, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2172506.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Morski w Gdyni. Wydział Nawigacyjny
Tematy:
maritime cyber security
maritime education and training
STCW Convention
cyber security course
cyber security course design
cyber security training
Opis:
Cyberattacks have become a serious global concern, effecting enormous losses to different sectors. In the shipping business, major companies report violations to their operations’ integrity and security, and losing great amounts of money. While the International Maritime Organization (IMO), through the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 1978, as amended, is yet to release a standard for the cybersecurity education and training of seafarers, some maritime education and training institutions (METIs) have acted proactively and included cybersecurity knowledge and skills in their curricular offerings. This study looked into the cybersecurity course offerings of four METIs that served as the case studies of the researchers. In particular, the following objectives were addressed: the cybersecurity knowledge and skills included in their curriculum; the importance of the cybersecurity knowledge and skills to seafarers; and the educational approaches of the METIs in delivering their topics on cybersecurity. The first and third objectives were answered using different sources of qualitative data, including document analysis, interview and direct observation. The quantitative approach, in the form of a survey questionnaire, was used to address the second objective. The METIs, though not the same in content, were found to have included cybersecurity knowledge and skills in their curriculum. These knowledge and skills were perceived to be very important by seafarers. Similar to the content of their courses, the METIs delivered their cybersecurity courses by employing varied educational approaches. To address the gap on the lack of cybersecurity course design and delivery minimum standards, a framework in the shape of a lantern is developed and proposed to guide maritime courses designers, in particular, and other course designers, in general.
Źródło:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation; 2022, 16, 2; 319--334
2083-6473
2083-6481
Pojawia się w:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
An analysis of the possibilities of using LNG terminal in Swinoujscie
Analiza możliwości wykorzystania terminalu LNG w Świnoujściu
Autorzy:
Barańska, M.
Deja, A.
Kabulak, P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309858.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy "SPATIUM"
Tematy:
LNG terminal
Świnoujście
Ishikawa diagram
natural gas
energy security
maritime transport
shipping natural gas
terminal LNG
diagram Ishikawy
gaz ziemny
bezpieczeństwo energetyczne
transport morski gazu ziemnego
Opis:
The article presents the results of analysis services LNG terminal in Swinoujscie using the Ishikawa Diagram. Presented analysis of the services currently offered by the terminal, indicating and analyzing the possibility of extending the range of services in order to increase competitiveness in the international terminal.
W artykule przedstawiono wyniki analizy usług terminalu LNG w Świnoujściu przy zastosowaniu Diagramu Ishikawy. Zaprezentowano analizę stanu usług obecnie oferowanych przez terminal z jednoczesnym wskazaniem i analizą możliwości rozszerzenia wachlarza usług celem podniesienia konkurencyjności terminalu na arenie międzynarodowej.
Źródło:
Autobusy : technika, eksploatacja, systemy transportowe; 2016, 17, 6; 51-55
1509-5878
2450-7725
Pojawia się w:
Autobusy : technika, eksploatacja, systemy transportowe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Aspekty polityczne kształcenia ofi cerów Polskiej Marynarki Wojennej w zagranicznych ośrodkach szkoleniowych i ich rola w budowaniu systemu bezpieczeństwa morskiego państwa w XX wieku Część II: lata II wojny światowej
Political aspects of the education of Polish Navy officers in foreign training centers and their role in building the maritime safety system of the state in the 20th century. Part II: the World War II years
Autorzy:
Będźmirowski, Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1201059.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego
Tematy:
Polish Navy
cooperation between the Polish Navy and Royal Navy in the years of World War II
training of the Polish Navy personnel in training centres
concepts of maritime security of Poland after the World War II
Polska Marynarka Wojenna (PMW)
współpraca Polskiej Marynarki Wojennej z Royal Navy w latach II wojny światowej
szkolenie kadr Polskiej Marynarki Wojennej w ośrodkach szkoleniowych
koncepcje bezpieczeństwa morskiego Polski po zakończeniu II wojny
Opis:
Polska Marynarka Wojenna (PMW) praktycznie od początku II wojny światowej aktywnie uczestniczyła w działaniach morskich u boku Royal Navy. Funkcjonujące na terytorium Wielkiej Brytanii Kierownictwo Marynarki Wojennej starało się wpłynąć na Admiralicję Brytyjską i uzyskać możliwość uruchomienia Szkoły Podchorążych MW, kształcącej przyszłych oficerów PMW, a także ośrodków kształcących kadrę podoficerską i szkolących marynarzy-specjalistów okrętowych. Po rozpoczęciu przez Niemców działań lotniczych i morskich przeciwko Wielkiej Brytanii, okręty PMW zostały włączone w skład brytyjskich morskich zespołów bojowych, co wymagało uruchomienia specjalistycznego szkolenia dla załóg okrętów PMW. W związku z tym Royal Navy wyraziło zgodę na korzystanie przez oficerów, podoficerów i marynarzy PMW z brytyjskich morskich ośrodków szkoleniowych, a także uczelni cywilnych. Miało to na celu przygotowanie wysokiej klasy specjalistów PMW do współpracy z siłami morskim aliantów. Dynamika działań na morzach i wzrost liczby okrętów PMW spowodowały, że w 1943 r. powołano do życia Szkołę Podchorążych Rezerwy MW. Przez cały okres II wojny światowej współpraca szkoleniowa między PMW a Royal Navy funkcjonowała sprawnie, a profesjonalizm załóg okrętów PMW znalazł uznanie władz brytyjskich oraz Admiralicji Brytyjskiej.
Practically since the outbreak of World War II, the Polish Navy has actively participated in naval operations alongside the Royal Navy. The Naval Leadership, operating in the territory of Great Britain, has tried to influence the British Admiralty to enable the launch of the Naval Officer Cadet School, educating the future officers of the Polish Navy, as well as of the centres educating the non-commissioned officer personnel and the training of seamen-shipping specialists. After the Germans began their air and sea operations in Britain, the ships of the Polish Navy were included in the British naval combat teams, which called for the launch of specialized specialist training for the crews of the Polish Navy ships. As a result, the Royal Navy approved the use by officers, non-commissioned officers and seamen of the Polish Navy of British maritime training centres and civilian colleges. All this was aimed at preparing high-class Polish Navy specialists to cooperate with the Allied naval forces. The dynamics of the operations in sea areas and the increase in the number of Polish Navy ships led to the establishing of the Naval Reserve Officer Cadets School in 1943. Throughout the Second World War, training cooperation between the Polish Navy and the Royal Navy functioned well. The professionalism of the crews of the Polish Navy ships was recognized by the British authorities, and the British Admiralty.
Źródło:
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka; 2020, 3; 127-146
1899-6264
2451-0718
Pojawia się w:
Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Międzynarodowe uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa morskiego Polski w okresie międzywojennym. Próba usystematyzowania
International Factors of Polish Maritime Security in the Interwar Times. A Systematization Attempt
Autorzy:
Będźmirowski, Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2140932.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-26
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej
Tematy:
bezpieczeństwo morskie
Polska
międzywojnie
maritime security
interwar times
Polska
Opis:
Zakończenie I wojny światowej i podpisane traktaty pokojowe, a także powołanie do życia Ligi Narodów, miały zagwarantować społeczności międzynarodowej pokojowe współistnienie. Gwarantami tego miały być państwa sojusznicze, które podczas konferencji pokojowej w Paryżu decydowały o kształcie granic i powstaniu nowych państw. Nałożyły one na sprawców tej strasznej wojny szereg ograniczeń, głównie w obszarze zbrojeń. Nie dopuściły do rozmów Rosji bolszewickiej, co było jednoznaczne z wykluczeniem jej z politycznego życia na kontynencie europejskim. Jak się okazało, to znakomite gremium polityków i decydentów nie uniknęło błędów, które w dyplomacji, tak jak w piłce nożnej, mszczą się. Świat i Europa po dwudziestu latach, pełnych zawirowań politycznych w państwach i regionach, przekonały się, że trzeba być odpowiedzialnym za treści zawarte i podpisane w porozumieniach wielostronnych, czy też bilateralnych. Niestety, wśród państw, które przekonały się o braku odpowiedzialności za treść porozumień, znalazła się Polska, płacąc za to ogromną cenę. Lata międzywojenne to czas, w którym Polska poszukiwała swojego miejsca polityczno-militarnego na kontynencie europejskim, a sojusznikiem, który mógłby wesprzeć bezpieczeństwo morskie państwa, była Wielka Brytania lub Francja. Niestety, wybory okazały się niefortunne. W tym miejscu należy zadać pytanie: Jeśli nie oni, to kto? I udzielenie odpowiedzi na tak postawione pytanie nie jest proste, ponieważ w okresie międzywojennym sytuacja polityczno-militarna w basenie Morza Bałtyckiego była bardzo złożona. Polskie Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych miało ograniczone „pole manewru” w poszukiwaniu sojuszników. Ktoś kiedyś stwierdził, iż sojuszników należy szukać najbliżej siebie, niestety – to powiedzenie nie było osiągalne dla ówczesnych polskich decydentów. Efekty ich działań okazały się dla Polski tragiczne, a weryfikatorem byli przywódcy państw „za miedzą” – Niemiec i Związku Radzieckiego.
The end of the World War I, the peace treaties signed there and the creation of the League of Nations, were meant to ensure a peaceful co-existence of the international community. The very same allied powers, which during the peace conference in Paris, France, determined the creation and the shape of borders of both new and existing states, assumed the role of guarantors of such a co-existence. Executing the role they imposed on the perpetrators of that horrific war a number of limitations, mainly with respect to armaments. It is noteworthy that the allied powers barred Bolshevik Russia from talks which was tantamount to its exclusion from the political life on the European continent. As it turned out, that great body of politicians and policy-makers did not avoid mistakes which in diplomacy â just like in football, to use the famous adage â, could, and in fact did, come back to haunt them. The whole world, and Europe in particular, after twenty years full of political turmoil both at the state and regional levels, learned that whatever is covered by and signed in the multilateral or bilateral agreements entails responsibility. Unfortunately, Poland was among the countries that learned their responsibility the hard way, and paid a huge price for such tuition. The interwar years were a time when Poland was trying to find its place on the political and military map of the continent of Europe, knowing well that the only potential ally to back its maritime security up was either the United Kingdom or France. Sadly, the choice finally made proved somewhat unfortunate. At this point, the following question must be asked: If not them, then who? Even in hindsight, answering this question is not an easy task; it is enough to say that the political and military situation in the Baltic Sea region in the interwar period was extremely complex. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs enjoyed little room for maneuvering in its search for allies. Someone once famously said that the allies should be first sought in one’s neighborhood, but the saying was unknown to the Polish decision-makers of the time. The effects of their actions proved disastrous for Poland as tested by the leaders of the neighboring states, that is Germany and the Soviet Union.
Źródło:
Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego; 2014, 8, 2; 52-76
1896-8848
2450-3436
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Odzyskanie dostępu do Bałtyku w 1920 roku i problem bezpieczeństwa morskiego Polski
Recovery of access to the Baltic Sea in 1920 and Poland’s national maritime security
Autorzy:
Będźmirowski, Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/540023.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Geopolityczne
Tematy:
Polska Marynarka Wojenna
bezpieczeństwo morskie państwa
sytuacja polityczno-militarna w okresie międzywojennym
Polish Navy
maritime security of a state
political and military situation of Poland in the interwar period
Opis:
W prezentowanym artykule, przedstawiono problematykę dotyczącą budowania bezpieczeństwa morskiego naszego państwa. Odzyskanie dostępu do morza, chociaż bardzo okrojonego, było bardzo ważnym wydarzeniem w dziejach Polski. Naród był dumny i nie szczędził sił, ani środków aby jak najszybciej zagospodarować wybrzeże. Gospodarka morska i handel morski miały w przyszłości umiejscowić Polskę wśród państw nadmorskich, z dynamicznym rozwojem gospodarki. Zdawano sobie sprawę, że otrzymany dostęp do morza, wymagał zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa żegludze na wodach terytorialnych oraz tzw. torach podejściowych do portu Gdynia. Trzeba było uruchomić punkty obserwacyjne, służbę hydrograficzną, a co najważniejsze stworzyć flotę wojenną. Zadań ogrom, środków finansowych brak, a sąsiedzi głośno mówią o wyeliminowaniu w przyszłości Polski z areny międzynarodowej. Poszukiwania sojuszników w obrębie Morza Bałtyckiego nie powiodło się, a Wielka Brytania i Francja, dbały tylko o swoje partykularne interesy. Niestety zagrożeniem dla budowania bezpieczeństwa morskiego państwa, również okazali się decydenci zarówno w ówczesnym rządzie, jak i Ministerstwie Spraw Wojskowych. Chociaż mocno „sypano piaskiem po oczach” ówczesnemu Kierownictwu Marynarki Wojennej, to ono konsekwentnie starało się realizować zadania związane z bezpieczeństwem morskim państwa. Były to ciężkie lata. Wojna w 1939 r., obnażyła efekty złej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa realizowanej przez ówczesnych polityków. Artykuł ten powstał w oparciu o materiały archiwalne (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Archiwum Marynarki Wojennej ) oraz bogatą literaturę.
The following paper discusses the matter of building the maritime security of our country. Regaining the access to the sea, although limited greatly in scope, was a very important event in the history of Poland. The nation was proud and spared neither strength nor resources to develop the coastline as soon as possible. The maritime economy and maritime trade were meant to place Poland among the coastal states with a dynamic economy. Obviously, the regained access to the sea required that the safety of navigation in the territorial waters and the so-called “approach fairways” to the port of Gdynia be ensured. It was necessary to set up observation posts, hydrographic service and, most importantly, to create a war fleet. The tasks were immense, there were no financial means, and the neighbors were vocal in their talk of ejecting Poland from the international arena in the future. The quest for allies within the Baltic Sea proved unsuccessful, and Great Britain and France would only take care of their particular interests. Unfortunately, the decision-makers both in the then government and in the Ministry of Military Affairs also proved to be a threat to fostering the state's maritime security. Although time and again a spanner was thrown in the works of the then Naval Directorate, it consistently tried to carry out tasks related to the maritime security of the state. Those were some hard years. The war in 1939 exposed the effects of bad foreign and security policy pursued by the politicians of the time. The paper was based on archival materials (Central Military Archive, Archive of New Files, Naval Archive) and rich literature.
Źródło:
Przegląd Geopolityczny; 2020, 32; 9-34
2080-8836
2392-067X
Pojawia się w:
Przegląd Geopolityczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Polska Marynarka Wojenna w działaniach dyplomatycznych na rzecz budowania bezpieczeństwa morskiego państwa w okresie międzywojennym
The Polish Navy in diplomatic activities aimed at building the maritime security of the state in the interwar period
Autorzy:
Będźmirowski, Jerzy
Nawrot, Dariusz
Ziętarski, Mateusz
Kufel, Jakub
Gac, Miłosz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/32304204.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Fundacja PSC
Tematy:
Polish Navy
maritime security of a state
polish foreign policy between the years of 1919 and 1939
political cum military situation of Poland in the interwar period
Opis:
The purpose of the article is to present the diplomatic activity of representatives of the Polish Navy, aimed at creating solid political and military foundations for the foundation, which was the maritime security of the state. Poland found itself in a new reality, becoming a coastal state. It had a maritime border and the company of states that were not satisfied with such a state, namely: the Weimar Republic and Bolshevik Russia. In addition to these countries, new countries have emerged in the Baltic Sea basin, such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. One cannot ignore the eternal Baltic States, i.e., Denmark and Sweden. Poland decided that its foreign policy in the Baltic Sea basin should be based on good neighborly relations with countries that, like it, have regained their independence, as well as with Denmark and Sweden. Today, from the perspective of several decades, it can be said that this task was difficult to implement. This was influenced by many factors, which will be presented in the article. Unfortunately, one of them, independent of the Polish side, were the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, which were not able to prevent the revival of German power and the revolutionary Soviet Union. The Versailles order achieved neither legitimacy nor a balance of power. A key role in the foreign policy of coastal states is played by the navy, which is its most important component. The Navy is the only branch of the armed forces of a country that, through the sovereignty of the decks and their immunity, has a much greater diplomatic „potential” than the land forces or the air force. Therefore, representatives of the navy are participants in universally understood diplomacy and function as naval attachés. It is they who are responsible for maintaining „maritime” relations between the states with which international relations are maintained. It is they who prepare the visits of warships in a given country and take care of their proper setting. It was, it is, and it will be. Poland began to fit into this mechanism practically from the establishment of the Polish Navy and continues to this day. The presented article focuses on the diplomatic missions of PMI officers in the interwar period.
Źródło:
Alcumena. Pismo Interdyscyplinarne; 2023, 3(15); 157-178
2719-9851
Pojawia się w:
Alcumena. Pismo Interdyscyplinarne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Vision of the Decision Support Model on Board of the Vessel with Use of the Shore Based IT Tools
Autorzy:
Bibik, L.
Krolikowski, A.
Czaplewski, K.
Duda, D.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/117203.pdf
Data publikacji:
2008
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Morski w Gdyni. Wydział Nawigacyjny
Tematy:
e-Navigation
Decision Support Model
Information Technology (IT)
Shore Based IT Tools
Maritime Safety and Security Information Exchange System (MarSSIES)
Maritime Safety
communication technology
Opis:
The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) at its 81st session decided to include, in the work programmes of the NAV and COMSAR Sub-Committees, a high priority item on "Development of an e–navigation strategy”. E-navigation is meant to integrate existing and new electronic navigational tools (ship and shore based) into one comprehensive system that will contribute to enhanced navigational safety and security while reducing the workload of the mariner (navigator). This paper describes present IT created to support navigational and administrative activities related to vessel movement and cargo transhipment. Direction of development of existing systems is drafted with reference to E-Navigation concept. Information sets available for the vessel in Polish Sea Areas are grouped.
Źródło:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation; 2008, 2, 3; 255-258
2083-6473
2083-6481
Pojawia się w:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Safety of Maritime Critical Infrastructure Facilities in the Aspect of Contemporary Threats
Bezpieczeństwo obiektów morskiej infrastruktury krytycznej w aspekcie współczesnych zagrożeń
Autorzy:
Bursztyński, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2139704.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-08-03
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej
Tematy:
morska infrastruktura krytyczna
obiekt portowy
ochrona portu
procedury ochrony portu
systemy monitoringu
maritime critical infrastructure
port facility
port security
port security procedures
monitoring systems
Opis:
The article attempts to present maritime infrastructure facilities that may or should be included in critical infrastructure facilities. Due to their nature and importance for safety and economy, these facilities may be classified as national or European critical infrastructure facilities. The threats resulting from intentional criminal human activity, which may disrupt the functioning of port facilities, were also presented. The basic and also the most vulnerable facilities of maritime critical infrastructure are seaports. Their safety can be violated from three directions: land, air, and sea. At the same time, it is not possible to ensure the same level of security in all port and land areas. Therefore, port facilities were particularly vulnerable to threats. Ensuring the proper level of port facilities security requires undertaking a number of organizational and technical projects.
W artykule podjęto próbę przedstawienia obiektów infrastruktury morskiej, które mogą lub powinny zostać włączone do obiektów infrastruktury krytycznej. Ze względu na ich charakter i znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa i gospodarki, obiekty te mogą być klasyfikowane jako krajowe lub europejskie obiekty infrastruktury krytycznej. Przedstawiono również zagrożenia wynikające z umyślnej działalności przestępczej człowieka, która może zakłócić funkcjonowanie obiektów portowych. Podstawowymi i najbardziej wrażliwymi obiektami morskiej infrastruktury krytycznej są porty morskie. Ich bezpieczeństwo może być naruszane z trzech kierunków: lądowego, powietrznego i morskiego. Jednocześnie nie jest możliwe zapewnienie tego samego poziomu bezpieczeństwa we wszystkich obszarach portowych i lądowych. Dlatego też obiekty portowe były szczególnie narażone na zagrożenia. Zapewnienie właściwego poziomu ochrony obiektów portowych wymaga podjęcia szeregu przedsięwzięć organizacyjnych i technicznych.
Źródło:
Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego; 2020, 14, 1; 167-182
1896-8848
2450-3436
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Human factor - the weakest link of security system
Autorzy:
Chojnowska, M.
Królikowska, I.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/320418.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Polskie Forum Nawigacyjne
Tematy:
human factor
security system
maritime safet culture
Opis:
The authors of the following article reveal what happens with so-called ‘human factor’ on board during routine work as well as in life-threatening situations. They analyze two groups of variables, which determine safe behaviors: subjective (emotional, temperamental, sense of control, vocational experiences, individual experiences in emergencies) and social conditioning (organizational culture of workplace, safety culture). They point out, that in todays’ maritime education the analysis of human behaviors on board and broadening of ideals of maritime safety culture, are being devoted not enough attention. No safety system, even the most advanced one in respect of procedures, law, technology or corporeality can reduce all the possibilities of making a mistake by a human being. Therefore the authors put forward a thesis that it is a human factor that is the weakest link of security system. Based on this theory future trainings of mariners should focus on reduction of human factor in the process of making mistakes.
W artykule przedstawiono znaczenie tak zwanego czynnika ludzkiego w trakcie rutynowej podróży statku oraz w sytuacjach zagrożenia życia. Analizie poddano dwie grupy zmiennych, które określają bezpieczne zachowania: subiektywne (emocje, temperament, zmysły, doświadczenie zawodowe, indywidualne doświadczenia wyniesione z sytuacji krytycznych) i uwarunkowania społeczne (kultura organizacyjna oraz kultura bezpieczeństwa). Zwrócono uwagę na niedocenianie we współczesnym szkolnictwie morskim analizy ludzkich zachowań oraz potrzeby upowszechniania ideałów morskiej kultury bezpieczeństwa. Żaden system bezpieczeństwa, nawet najbardziej zaawansowany pod względem proceduralnym, prawnym, technologicznym czy organizacyjnym, wciąż nie potrafi wyeliminować ryzyka popełniania błędu przez człowieka. Dlatego autorki wysuwają tezę, że czynnik ludzki jest nadal najsłabszym ogniwem systemu bezpieczeństwa. Opierając się na takim założeniu, proponują, by podczas szkolenia marynarzy w większej mierze uczyć, jak redukować błędy czynnika ludzkiego.
Źródło:
Annual of Navigation; 2013, 20; 5-24
1640-8632
Pojawia się w:
Annual of Navigation
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
State-sponsored and organized crime threats to maritime transportationsystems in the context of the attack on Ukraine
Autorzy:
Cichocki, R.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/24811512.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Morski w Gdyni. Wydział Nawigacyjny
Tematy:
cyber attack
cyber incidents
maritime cyber resilience
cyber resilience
maritime cyber security
maritime cyber threats
cybersecurity
advanced persistent threat
Opis:
Due to its strategic importance and vast impact on the world economy, maritime transport has become a cyber battlefield. Cybersecurity organizations across the world notice and analyze adversaries such as Bear from Russia, Panda from China, Buffalo from Vietnam, Chollima from North Korea (DPRK), and others from Columbia, India, Turkey, and Iran, as well as hacktivist and E-Crime. In 2014 - 2023, Ukraine became the object of massive cyberattacks aimed at its political, social, and economic destabilization. This situation changes the perception of cyberspace and its importance for ensuring the security of the global economy, in particular, the maritime economy. Reports published by the US Coast Guard show that. In this publication, the author reviews the cybersecurity threat landscape targeting the maritime industry and transportation systems and analyzes the technics, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) used by threat actors.
Źródło:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation; 2023, 17, 3; 717--721
2083-6473
2083-6481
Pojawia się w:
TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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