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Tytuł:
O kolejności ruchów w dwuosobowej grze na konkurencyjnym rynku telekomunikacyjnym z asymetrią informacyjną
On the order of movement in two person game on the competitive telecommunications market with information asymmetry
Autorzy:
Laskowski, S.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/317658.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
gry rynkowe
konkurencja
kolejność ruchów w grze
teoria gier
negocjacje
asymetria informacyjna
rynek usług telekomunikacyjnych
ceny detaliczne i hurtowe
market games
competition
order of market player movement
game theory
negotiation
information asymmetry
telecommunications services market
Opis:
Rozpatrzono wpływ kolejności procesów ustalania cen na rynkach detalicznych i negocjacji stawek rozliczeniowych na rynkach hurtowych na sprawność procesu negocjacji. Zaproponowano sposób określania wartości korzyści ze zmiany kolejności ruchów w grze rynkowej bez informacji o macierzy wypłat konkurenta.
The impact of the order of processes of setting retail and wholesale prices on the efficiency of the negotiation process was analyzed. The method of calculating the value of changing the order of market player movement in situation when the competitor's pay off matrix is unknown was proposed.
Źródło:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne; 2005, 3-4; 47-68
1640-1549
1899-8933
Pojawia się w:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The use of complexity hierarchies in descriptive set theory and automata theory
Autorzy:
Andretta, A.
Camerlo, R.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1964199.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005
Wydawca:
Politechnika Gdańska
Tematy:
hierarchies
infinite games
Borel reducibility
automata theory
Opis:
The concept of a reduction between subsets of a given space is described, giving rise to various complexity hierarchies, studied both in descriptive set theory and in automata theory. We discuss in particular the Wadge and Lipschitz hierarchies for subsets of the Baire and Cantor spaces and the hierarchy of Borel reducibility for finitary relations on standard Borel spaces. The notions of Wadge and Lipschitz reductions are related to corresponding perfect information games.
Źródło:
TASK Quarterly. Scientific Bulletin of Academic Computer Centre in Gdansk; 2005, 9, 3; 337-356
1428-6394
Pojawia się w:
TASK Quarterly. Scientific Bulletin of Academic Computer Centre in Gdansk
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Wspomaganie procesu ustalania cen detalicznych na konkurencyjnym rynku usług telekomunikacyjnych z asymetrią informacyjną
Detail price setting support on competitive telecommunication services market with information asymmetry
Autorzy:
Laskowski, S.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/317508.pdf
Data publikacji:
2006
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
teoria gier
kryteria wyboru strategii w grach przeciwko naturze
gry rynkowe
metoda punktu odniesienia
koncepcja operatora najbardziej obiecującego
ceny usług telekomunikacyjnych
game theory
criteria of choosing strategy in games against nature
market games
reference point method
most promises operator concept
prices for telecommunication services
Opis:
Na podstawie elementów teorii gier i wspomagania decyzji zaprezentowano analityczne narzędzia, wspierające graczy rynkowych w procesie ustalania cen detalicznych za świadczone usługi, w przypadku braku informacji o macierzy wypłat graczy konkurencyjnych.
Basing on elements of game theory and theory of decision support, analytical tools of supporting market players in setting detail prices for telecommunication services in the situation of unknown payoff matrix of competitive player have been proposed.
Źródło:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne; 2006, 1-2; 25-50
1640-1549
1899-8933
Pojawia się w:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O metodzie wyboru strategii w konkurencyjnej grze podwójnej ze znanym celem konkurenta - przypadki AHB i ABH
On the method of choosing strategy in competitive double game with the known goal of the competitor - cases AHB and ABH
Autorzy:
Laskowski, S.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/317620.pdf
Data publikacji:
2007
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
teoria gier
gry rynkowe
konkurencja
kooperacja
negocjacje
analiza wielokryterialna
wspomaganie decyzji w warunkach ryzyka
game theory
market games
competition
cooperation
negotiation
multi-objective analysis
decision suport under risk
Opis:
Zaprezentowano metodę wyboru strategii w dwuosobowej, sekwencyjnej grze rynkowej, w której gracze są zmuszeni zarówno konkurować, jak i kooperować. Założono obustronną i wzajemną znajomość macierzy wypłat oraz celu, który gracze chcą osiągnąć. Przyjęto, że decyzja o charakterze konkurencyjnym danego gracza poprzedza decyzję o charakterze kooperacji oraz konkurencyjną odpowiedź drugiego gracza. Zaproponowano przykład zastosowania metody w rozwiązaniu problemu wyboru strategii cen detalicznych na lokalnym rynku usług telekomunikacyjnych, w perspektywie konieczności nawiązania współpracy międzyoperatorskiej oraz odpowiedzi na rynku detalicznym konkurencyjnego gracza.
Method of choosing strategy in two persons, sequential market game, when players are forced so to compete as to cooperate was presented. It was assumed that players know their own and the other player pay off matrix as well as the goal that the other aims to realize. The decision of competitive character precedes the cooperative one, and the competitive response of the other player. It was illustrated how the method could be applied by the telecommunication operator in the problem of choosing retail prices on local telecommunications services market, in prospect to necessity of negotiate conditions of interconnection agreement (wholesale decision) with the other player and to possible it's response on retail market.
Źródło:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne; 2007, 1-2; 50-71
1640-1549
1899-8933
Pojawia się w:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Ustalona a preferowana kolejność ruchów w grze pojedynczej
Fixed and preferable order of moves in a single-game
Autorzy:
Laskowski, S.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/317570.pdf
Data publikacji:
2007
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
teoria gier
gry rynkowe
kolejność ruchów w grze
równowaga Nasha
gry Stackelberga
gra pojedyncza
gra podwójna
game theory
market games
order of market player movement
Nash equilibrium
Stackelberg games
single game
double game
Opis:
Przeanalizowano dwuosobowe gry o sumie niezerowej pod kątem preferowanej dla graczy kolejności ruchów, ich związku z faktem istnienia lub nieistnienia równowagi Nasha, związku z modelami gry Stackelberga oraz konieczności wykonywania ruchów w określonej kolejności.
An analyses of two-person non-zero sum games in the context of preferable order of the players moves, and their relationship with the fact of existing or non existing Nash equilibrium, with the models of Stackelberg games and with the necessity of making a move in a given order was made.
Źródło:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne; 2007, 3-4; 10-29
1640-1549
1899-8933
Pojawia się w:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Better versus longer series of heads and tails
Autorzy:
Krech, I.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/121655.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Humanistyczno-Przyrodniczy im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie. Wydawnictwo Uczelniane
Tematy:
games theory
game strategy
teoria gier
strategia gier
Opis:
This article considers a part of games theory by Penney. We intuitionally believe that a shorter series is always a better one. We will prove that this is not always so, and a longer series may happen to be better (see also [1]). In the case of Penney's game, in which players can choose their series, the proved theorems an be a part of a player's game strategy.
Źródło:
Scientific Issues of Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa. Mathematics; 2011, 16; 55-60
2450-9302
Pojawia się w:
Scientific Issues of Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa. Mathematics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rodzina współczesna wobec wirtualnej rzeczywistości - między rozrywką a uzależnieniem
Autorzy:
Gizella, Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/527538.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego
Tematy:
family values
virtual reality
digital identity
persuasion
mind control
computer games
social psychology
personality disorders
behavioral disorders
cognitive science
entertainment
infotainment
cyberspace
communication
cultivation theory
advertising
propaganda
media bias
Opis:
There are two definitions of the term Virtual Reality (VR) according to the VR pioneer, Jaron Lanier. The first definition refers to the visual programming technology (especially in computer games) which uses custom designed tools (like helmets, gloves and glasses) combined with special effects in order to achieve an illusion of physical space. The second meaning of the term VR encompasses all the elements of the „alternative” reality of cyberspace in which people communicate by means of different electronic devices. As such, VR allows those who participate in these interactions to manipulate and multiply their digital selves to such an extent as to loose their actual sense of self. VR technologies are used in a variety of professional capacities such as education, medicine, engineering, architecture and so on. Some negative consequences occur primarily with the overuse of VR for entertainment purposes (such as computer games) and include personality and behavioral changes in younger, adolescent users. There are also larger cultural influences to consider. The mind of a modern user of new technologies cannot keep up with the pace of societal changes, promoting behaviors which hinder communication, mutual understanding and cooperation. VR continues to affect the emotional, behavioral and sensory aspects of the psyche. The invasive persuasion of media and advertising influences people’s habits, opinions and ethics. One of the most disturbing cultural changes is the confusion of public and private spheres, Facebook friends for family and the substitution of cyberspace for home life.
Źródło:
Państwo i Społeczeństwo; 2011, 3; 183-197
1643-8299
2451-0858
Pojawia się w:
Państwo i Społeczeństwo
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On ”Games and Dynamic Games” by A. Haurie, J.B. Krawczyk and G. Zaccour
Autorzy:
Więcek, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/748451.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
Tematy:
game theory, dynamic games, equilibrium
Opis:
Although the title, ''Games and Dynamic Games"  of the new book by Alain Haurie, Jacek B. Krawczyk and Georges Zaccour suggests just another textbook on general game theory, with a little more stress made on dynamic aspect of games, the book appears to be something of novelty both in the scope and the treatment of the material. From the very first chapters of the book, it is clear that we will not be given another standard course of game theory, and that the dynamics of games will be the main issue. It starts with the simplest treatment of game dynamics, which is the extensive form of the game, and, having defined and explained the basic notions of static game theory, progresses to more complex dynamic models. Those start with deterministic repeated games, continue with variable state discrete time (or multistage) dynamic games and deterministic differential (that is, continuous time) games, and finish with stochastic models extending the ones presented before. Each part presents in a self-contained and comprehensive way, the main notions and solution concepts (such as open- and closed-loop strategies, Nash and correlated equilibria, subgame-perfectness, using threats to improve the performance of the equilibrium strategies) and theoretical results. It complements them with a number of economic applications, presented in detail. These applications relate to many fields of interest of economists, such as exploitation of renewable resources, environmental and energy issues, macroeconomics and finance. Each chapter ends with a set of excercices and a {\it game engineering} part, where a detailed presentation of a real-life application of some relevant game model is presented. Just this part is a novelty in the game-theoretic literature, as it shows to what extent the game-theoretic models can be applicable. Although the book presents the mathematical tools to model the situations of conflict in a rather rigorous way, it is clear that its target reader is someone with a background in economics or managemant science rather than mathematics. All the basic mathematical concepts used in the book are carefully explained, with those more complex ones (which appear in the latter chapters of the book) approached mainly through examples and intuitions. I believe this is a good decision of the authors, as in that way it makes the book really accessible to its potential readers. In fact, even though the tools (even those most advanced) of dynamic game theory have now been for many years used to model the economic interactions, surprisingly there has not been a single textbook addressed to more advanced students and researchers in economics and management science, presenting the state-of-art in the theory and applications of dynamic games in a comprehensive way. Those already existing required mathematical expertise well beyond what one could expect from typical economics/management students, and could not serve as textbooks for this type of readers. Moreover, those existing books concentrated without exception on some particular classes of dynamic games (such as differential games and their subclasses, stochastic games, repeated games). The book of Haurie, Krawczyk and Zaccour fills well the existing gap.Another important advantage of the book is its stress made not only on theoretical concepts and their adoption in real-life models, but on computation issues. The authors present a host of techniques to compute the solutions to the considered games either symbolically or numerically. They also provide information about software that can be used to solve similar games. Also the examples presented in game engineering sections are not abstract. They are based on real data, and issues of the credibility of the solutions obtained is discussed.The clarity of the exposition of often complicated topics is in general a big advantage of the book, although in latter chapters this clarity is sometimes unfortunatelly lost. The best example is the part about games over event trees with a confusing introduction concerning game with finite action sets and then the whole chapter concerning games with continuous ones. Also the last chapter, about stochastic-diffusion games, seems not very well conceived, as it jumps forth and back between an example and some more general considerations, leaving the reader confused about the generality of what is presented. These are certainly minor problems, but unfortunatelly there are other, more upseting issues. In general, it seems that the manuscript was not proofread carefully enough. The number of typos is enormous (the errata added to the book enumerates just a small fraction). Also some other faults, such as references to the colors on one of the figures, which is in black and white (p. 187), self-contradicting sentences like ''We use $\beta$ for a discount factor because we use $\beta$ to denote a strategy'' (p. 233), faults in references between chapters of the book (p. 372, footnote on p. 419) could have been easily eliminated if the book was properly proofread. What is worse though, is that there are also some more serious mistakes: one of the assumptions of the Kakutani fixed point theorem is missing, $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in Lemma 10.1 should be $A\epsilon$-equilibrium. And finally---it seems that most of the section 11.6.1 is missing from the manuscript. This significantly reduces the value of the book. Nevertheless, although I believe that all these errors should make the reader more cautious when reading the book, they do not unmake its main quality, which is acquainting all those interested in describing some real-life multi-agent economic situations in a rigorous way with the theory which provides the tools for doing it.
Źródło:
Mathematica Applicanda; 2013, 41, 1
1730-2668
2299-4009
Pojawia się w:
Mathematica Applicanda
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A note on on-line Ramsey numbers for quadrilaterals
Autorzy:
Cyman, J.
Dzido, T.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/255268.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza im. Stanisława Staszica w Krakowie. Wydawnictwo AGH
Tematy:
Ramsey theory
on-line games
Opis:
We consider on-line Ramsey numbers defined by a game played between two players, Builder and Painter. In each round Builder draws an the edge and Painter colors it either red or blue, as it appears. Builder’s goal is to force Painter to create a monochromatic copy of a fixed graph H in as few rounds as possible. The minimum number of rounds (assuming both players play perfectly) is the on-line Ramsey number (H) of the graph H. An asymmetric version of the on-line Ramsey numbers r(G,H) is defined accordingly. In 2005, Kurek and Ruciński computed r(C3). In this paper, we compute r(C4,Ck) for 3 ≤k ≤ 7. Most of the results are based on computer algorithms but we obtain the exact value r(C4) and do so without the help of computer algorithms.
Źródło:
Opuscula Mathematica; 2014, 34, 3; 463-468
1232-9274
2300-6919
Pojawia się w:
Opuscula Mathematica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
An application of the representations of symmetric groups to characterizing solutions of games in partition function form
Autorzy:
Sánchez-Pérez, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/406330.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:
games in partition function form
value
representation theory
symmetric group
Opis:
A different perspective from the more “traditional” approaches to studying solutions of games in partition function form has been presented. We provide a decomposition of the space of such games under the action of the symmetric group, for the cases with three and four players. In particular, we identify all the irreducible subspaces that are relevant to the study of linear symmetric solutions. We then use such a decomposition to derive a characterization of the class of linear and symmetric solutions, as well as of the class of linear, symmetric and efficient solutions.
Źródło:
Operations Research and Decisions; 2014, 24, 2; 97-122
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:
Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Berge equilibrium in discontinuous games
Autorzy:
Deghdak, M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/206586.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
Berge equilibrium
game theory
discontinuous games
abstract games
Opis:
In this paper we consider some classes of abstract discontinuous games, for which the games possessing essential Berge equilibrium are the generic case. We extend the essential Berge equilibrium result from Deghdak (2014) to general abstract games.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2014, 43, 3; 439-448
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Stock market as a game with continuum of players
Giełda jako gra z continuum graczy
Autorzy:
Michałowski, P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/305927.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna im. Jarosława Dąbrowskiego
Tematy:
stock market
behavior models
individual investors
game theory
games with continuum of players
giełda
modele zachowań
inwestorzy masowi
teoria gier
gra z kontinuum graczy
Opis:
The paper presents specifics and assumptions included in games theory. Author made first attempt to create stock exchange model based on games theory, specific games with continuum of players. The article is the result of efforts to create an adequate mathematic model in order to investigate the specificity of the decision-making behavior of so-called individual stock market investors.
W artykule przedstawiono możliwość wykorzystania teorii gier z continuum graczy w modelowaniu zachowań graczy na giełdzie. Dokonano pierwszej próby opracowania modelu giełdy w oparciu o teorie gier z continuum graczy. Artykuł jest wynikiem prac nad opracowaniem matematycznego modelu pozwalającego badać specyfikę zachowań decyzyjnych tzw. giełdowych inwestorów masowych.
Źródło:
Biuletyn Instytutu Systemów Informatycznych; 2014, 14; 19-24
1508-4183
Pojawia się w:
Biuletyn Instytutu Systemów Informatycznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A process algebraic form to represent extensive games
Autorzy:
Gheibi, O.
Ramezanian, R.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205871.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
extensive games
Nash equilibrium
process theory
process algebra
Opis:
In this paper, we introduce an agent-based representation of games, in order to propose a compact representation for multi-party games in game theory. Our method is inspired by concepts in process theory and process algebra. In addition, we introduce an algorithm whose input is a game in the form of process algebra (proposed in this paper) and as an output, the algorithm finds the Nash equilibrium of the game in linear space complexity.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2015, 44, 1; 129-148
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Piłka nożna jako przedmiot badań ekonomicznych
Football as the subject of economic research
Autorzy:
Murak, Jan
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/569834.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:
sport
economics of sports
decision making
theory of games
efficiency
Opis:
For a long time football, despite being a very important part of modern world, and because of it an important part of the socio-economic sphere, has not been the subject of scientific considerations. Economists have been interested in new problems, including football, since L.C. Robbins proposed a definition of economics and G.S. Becker started his economic approach. Furthermore, the development of economic instruments helpsthose changes. The main purpose of this paper is to show the usefulness of economic methods and instruments in finding solutions of various problems. Therefore, we choose and describe a part of scientific, football research. At the beginning, we try to answer two questions. Why has not football been the subject of scientific consideration? Do football clubs differ from other firms? The second question is vital for businessmen. We present the most important, economic characteristics of a football club, for example: a diversity of sports clubs targets and the lack of incentives to monopolize markets. We argue that only a sum of all mentioned characteristics makes a football clubs managment special. In the next part, we present and try to assess different propositions which should make football matches more attractive. We find three groups of features, which should grow the demand for football matches. In the first group there are principles during a match. The second group is connected with the league system, and the last one refers to organizing big, football tournaments. The application of economic instruments gives arguments for and against various propositions. The most important results suggest that if only one type of fouls is punished, it does not improve the flow of the game. Furthermore, the results show that the effect of the rule of three points for a win on the game is ambiguous. It can improve the attractiveness of a match, but it also grows the number of fouls. Next, we discuss the effectiveness of football clubs and coaches. First of all, we try to find whether positions in the football leagues after a season match to clubs classifications of effectiveness well. For this purpose, we present the results of effectiveness research which use data set from Spanish leagues. The results differ from each other, thus we do not get a clear answer. In the next step, we show research about coach effectiveness which suggests that coaches should not be judged solely on the basis of a number of won matches.In the last part, we argue, that the use of the data set from football matches allows for empirical verification of the economic instruments and methods, on the one hand. On the other hand, it helps to solve many problems related to football. However, not all situations related to football are suitable for scientific research. Part of them are too complex.
Źródło:
Ekonomia XXI Wieku; 2015, 1 (5); 138-151
2353-8929
Pojawia się w:
Ekonomia XXI Wieku
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Po co matematykom Jan Jakub Rousseau?
Why do mathematicians need Jean-Jacques Rousseau?
Autorzy:
Kalinowska, Alina
Stański, Adam
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1388538.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-09-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Gdański. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego
Tematy:
Game Theory
Competitive game
Cooperative games
Nash equilibrium
Pareto efficiency
Opis:
One day, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who was known mainly as a philosopher and a pedagogue, told a deer hunting story. In doing so, he managed to play a small role in the development of the branch of maths called ‘game theory’. Later his story was converted into a game. Initially game theory was used to explain exchange in the field of economics. Over time, the mathematical modeling was found to be useful in the social sciences. A game theory describes diverse and cognizant participants forced to make decisions. In regards to the game based on cooperation, a choice is at the same time a dilemma. It can be viewed as a moral or philosophical predicament and in addition it gives as an inside into the human psyche and behaviour. Game theory has the potential to offer an attractive mathematical model, useful in analyzing social interactions. Though currently unappreciated by pedagogy, it has the potential to be successfully used in pedagogical studies analyzing conflict of interest of all participants in an educational process.
Źródło:
Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji; 2015, 30, 3; 121-125
1734-1582
2451-2230
Pojawia się w:
Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 36

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