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Wyszukujesz frazę "Games theory" wg kryterium: Temat


Tytuł:
Better versus longer series of heads and tails
Autorzy:
Krech, I.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/121655.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Humanistyczno-Przyrodniczy im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie. Wydawnictwo Uczelniane
Tematy:
games theory
game strategy
teoria gier
strategia gier
Opis:
This article considers a part of games theory by Penney. We intuitionally believe that a shorter series is always a better one. We will prove that this is not always so, and a longer series may happen to be better (see also [1]). In the case of Penney's game, in which players can choose their series, the proved theorems an be a part of a player's game strategy.
Źródło:
Scientific Issues of Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa. Mathematics; 2011, 16; 55-60
2450-9302
Pojawia się w:
Scientific Issues of Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa. Mathematics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Ogrywając porażkę. Konceptualizacja doświadczenia porażki w groznawstwie
Autorzy:
Kozyra, Magdalena
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1041939.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
gry wideo
teoria gier wideo
teoria queer
porażka
video games
video games theory
queer theory
failure
Opis:
Celem artykułu jest przegląd najważniejszych teorii przybliżających zjawisko porażki w grach cyfrowych, a następnie zaproponowanie nowej metody jego opisu. Analizie zostały poddane teoria przepływu autorstwa Mihály Csíkszentmihályi oraz książka Jespera Juula Sztuka przegrywania, w których badacze skupiają się na motywacyjnym aspekcie porażki; opisane przez Iana Bogosta retoryka porażki oraz jej perswazyjna rola; a także podejście reprezentowane między innymi przez Shuen-shinga Lee, Jacka Halberstama oraz Bonnie Ruberg, zwracające uwagę na pozytywne aspekty porażki. Autorka proponuje alternatywną analizę porażki z sześciu różnych perspektyw, opartą na modelu zaangażowania gracza Gordona Calleji oraz łączącą opisywane wcześniej teorie. Celem wypracowanego modelu jest zwrócenie uwagi na różne funkcje spełniane przez mechanizm porażki w grach cyfrowych, które nie ograniczają się jedynie do jej edukacyjnego aspektu.
The aim of the article is to present examples of already existing theories about the experience of failure in digital games and then propose a different approach to it. Firstly, it shows the way Csíkszentmihályi’s flow theory and Juul’s The Art of failure describe the motivational role of failure; then it points out the persuasive aspects of Bogost’s rhetoric of failure used in serious games industry; and lastly Lee’s, Roche’s and Halberstam’s approaches trying to recognize the positive features of failure are examined. The author then introduces six dimensions of failure based on Calleja’s Player Involvement Model. Through them, an alternative way of thinking about failure is proposed, in which the failure is perceived not (only) as an occurrence which needs fixing, but as a possibility for a different experience of gameplay.
Źródło:
Replay. The Polish Journal of Game Studies; 2019, 6, 1; 37-49
2391-8551
2449-8394
Pojawia się w:
Replay. The Polish Journal of Game Studies
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On ”Games and Dynamic Games” by A. Haurie, J.B. Krawczyk and G. Zaccour
Autorzy:
Więcek, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/748451.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
Tematy:
game theory, dynamic games, equilibrium
Opis:
Although the title, ''Games and Dynamic Games"  of the new book by Alain Haurie, Jacek B. Krawczyk and Georges Zaccour suggests just another textbook on general game theory, with a little more stress made on dynamic aspect of games, the book appears to be something of novelty both in the scope and the treatment of the material. From the very first chapters of the book, it is clear that we will not be given another standard course of game theory, and that the dynamics of games will be the main issue. It starts with the simplest treatment of game dynamics, which is the extensive form of the game, and, having defined and explained the basic notions of static game theory, progresses to more complex dynamic models. Those start with deterministic repeated games, continue with variable state discrete time (or multistage) dynamic games and deterministic differential (that is, continuous time) games, and finish with stochastic models extending the ones presented before. Each part presents in a self-contained and comprehensive way, the main notions and solution concepts (such as open- and closed-loop strategies, Nash and correlated equilibria, subgame-perfectness, using threats to improve the performance of the equilibrium strategies) and theoretical results. It complements them with a number of economic applications, presented in detail. These applications relate to many fields of interest of economists, such as exploitation of renewable resources, environmental and energy issues, macroeconomics and finance. Each chapter ends with a set of excercices and a {\it game engineering} part, where a detailed presentation of a real-life application of some relevant game model is presented. Just this part is a novelty in the game-theoretic literature, as it shows to what extent the game-theoretic models can be applicable. Although the book presents the mathematical tools to model the situations of conflict in a rather rigorous way, it is clear that its target reader is someone with a background in economics or managemant science rather than mathematics. All the basic mathematical concepts used in the book are carefully explained, with those more complex ones (which appear in the latter chapters of the book) approached mainly through examples and intuitions. I believe this is a good decision of the authors, as in that way it makes the book really accessible to its potential readers. In fact, even though the tools (even those most advanced) of dynamic game theory have now been for many years used to model the economic interactions, surprisingly there has not been a single textbook addressed to more advanced students and researchers in economics and management science, presenting the state-of-art in the theory and applications of dynamic games in a comprehensive way. Those already existing required mathematical expertise well beyond what one could expect from typical economics/management students, and could not serve as textbooks for this type of readers. Moreover, those existing books concentrated without exception on some particular classes of dynamic games (such as differential games and their subclasses, stochastic games, repeated games). The book of Haurie, Krawczyk and Zaccour fills well the existing gap.Another important advantage of the book is its stress made not only on theoretical concepts and their adoption in real-life models, but on computation issues. The authors present a host of techniques to compute the solutions to the considered games either symbolically or numerically. They also provide information about software that can be used to solve similar games. Also the examples presented in game engineering sections are not abstract. They are based on real data, and issues of the credibility of the solutions obtained is discussed.The clarity of the exposition of often complicated topics is in general a big advantage of the book, although in latter chapters this clarity is sometimes unfortunatelly lost. The best example is the part about games over event trees with a confusing introduction concerning game with finite action sets and then the whole chapter concerning games with continuous ones. Also the last chapter, about stochastic-diffusion games, seems not very well conceived, as it jumps forth and back between an example and some more general considerations, leaving the reader confused about the generality of what is presented. These are certainly minor problems, but unfortunatelly there are other, more upseting issues. In general, it seems that the manuscript was not proofread carefully enough. The number of typos is enormous (the errata added to the book enumerates just a small fraction). Also some other faults, such as references to the colors on one of the figures, which is in black and white (p. 187), self-contradicting sentences like ''We use $\beta$ for a discount factor because we use $\beta$ to denote a strategy'' (p. 233), faults in references between chapters of the book (p. 372, footnote on p. 419) could have been easily eliminated if the book was properly proofread. What is worse though, is that there are also some more serious mistakes: one of the assumptions of the Kakutani fixed point theorem is missing, $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in Lemma 10.1 should be $A\epsilon$-equilibrium. And finally---it seems that most of the section 11.6.1 is missing from the manuscript. This significantly reduces the value of the book. Nevertheless, although I believe that all these errors should make the reader more cautious when reading the book, they do not unmake its main quality, which is acquainting all those interested in describing some real-life multi-agent economic situations in a rigorous way with the theory which provides the tools for doing it.
Źródło:
Mathematica Applicanda; 2013, 41, 1
1730-2668
2299-4009
Pojawia się w:
Mathematica Applicanda
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Piłka nożna jako przedmiot badań ekonomicznych
Football as the subject of economic research
Autorzy:
Murak, Jan
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/569834.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:
sport
economics of sports
decision making
theory of games
efficiency
Opis:
For a long time football, despite being a very important part of modern world, and because of it an important part of the socio-economic sphere, has not been the subject of scientific considerations. Economists have been interested in new problems, including football, since L.C. Robbins proposed a definition of economics and G.S. Becker started his economic approach. Furthermore, the development of economic instruments helpsthose changes. The main purpose of this paper is to show the usefulness of economic methods and instruments in finding solutions of various problems. Therefore, we choose and describe a part of scientific, football research. At the beginning, we try to answer two questions. Why has not football been the subject of scientific consideration? Do football clubs differ from other firms? The second question is vital for businessmen. We present the most important, economic characteristics of a football club, for example: a diversity of sports clubs targets and the lack of incentives to monopolize markets. We argue that only a sum of all mentioned characteristics makes a football clubs managment special. In the next part, we present and try to assess different propositions which should make football matches more attractive. We find three groups of features, which should grow the demand for football matches. In the first group there are principles during a match. The second group is connected with the league system, and the last one refers to organizing big, football tournaments. The application of economic instruments gives arguments for and against various propositions. The most important results suggest that if only one type of fouls is punished, it does not improve the flow of the game. Furthermore, the results show that the effect of the rule of three points for a win on the game is ambiguous. It can improve the attractiveness of a match, but it also grows the number of fouls. Next, we discuss the effectiveness of football clubs and coaches. First of all, we try to find whether positions in the football leagues after a season match to clubs classifications of effectiveness well. For this purpose, we present the results of effectiveness research which use data set from Spanish leagues. The results differ from each other, thus we do not get a clear answer. In the next step, we show research about coach effectiveness which suggests that coaches should not be judged solely on the basis of a number of won matches.In the last part, we argue, that the use of the data set from football matches allows for empirical verification of the economic instruments and methods, on the one hand. On the other hand, it helps to solve many problems related to football. However, not all situations related to football are suitable for scientific research. Part of them are too complex.
Źródło:
Ekonomia XXI Wieku; 2015, 1 (5); 138-151
2353-8929
Pojawia się w:
Ekonomia XXI Wieku
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Kontrakt jako obiekt obserwacji naukowej w teorii ekonomii
Contract as a subject of scientific observation in economics
Autorzy:
Tyc, Waldemar
Schneider, Marzena
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/588888.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
Tematy:
Ekonomiczna analiza prawa
Instytucje
Kontrakt
Koszty transakcyjne
Teoria agencji
Teoria gier
Teoria praw własności
Teoria wyboru publicznego
Agency theory
Contract
Economic analysis of law
Games theory
Institutions
Property rights theory
Public choice theory
Transaction costs
Opis:
W artykule dokonano identyfikacji i syntezy podejść badawczych, wykorzystujących, pojęcie kontraktu w teorii ekonomii, jako narzędzia wyjaśniania oraz rozumienia wyborów społeczno-ekonomicznych. W szczególności omówiono trzy zasadnicze podejścia badawcze wypracowane przez: nową ekonomię instytucjonalną, ekonomiczną analizę prawa i teorię gier. Przyjęto, że uznanie kontraktu za obiekt obserwacji naukowej w ekonomii jest heurystycznie płodne, zaś interpretacja kontraktu w kontekście analizy ponoszonych kosztów transakcyjnych może stanowić uniwersalną miarą oceny efektywności instytucji.
In the hereby article the identification and synthesis of research approaches that use the “contract” concept in the economic theory has been done. The contract concept has also been used as a tool for clarifying and understanding the socio-economic choices. The three essential research approaches have been discussed in particular: the neo-institutional, economic analysis of law and game theory one. It has been assumed that identifying the contract as a scientific observation object is heuristically fertile, and interpretation of the contract in the transaction cost analysis context can be a universal measure for institution effectiveness.
Źródło:
Studia Ekonomiczne; 2017, 311; 48-60
2083-8611
Pojawia się w:
Studia Ekonomiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Berge equilibrium in discontinuous games
Autorzy:
Deghdak, M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/206586.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
Berge equilibrium
game theory
discontinuous games
abstract games
Opis:
In this paper we consider some classes of abstract discontinuous games, for which the games possessing essential Berge equilibrium are the generic case. We extend the essential Berge equilibrium result from Deghdak (2014) to general abstract games.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2014, 43, 3; 439-448
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A note on on-line Ramsey numbers for quadrilaterals
Autorzy:
Cyman, J.
Dzido, T.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/255268.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza im. Stanisława Staszica w Krakowie. Wydawnictwo AGH
Tematy:
Ramsey theory
on-line games
Opis:
We consider on-line Ramsey numbers defined by a game played between two players, Builder and Painter. In each round Builder draws an the edge and Painter colors it either red or blue, as it appears. Builder’s goal is to force Painter to create a monochromatic copy of a fixed graph H in as few rounds as possible. The minimum number of rounds (assuming both players play perfectly) is the on-line Ramsey number (H) of the graph H. An asymmetric version of the on-line Ramsey numbers r(G,H) is defined accordingly. In 2005, Kurek and Ruciński computed r(C3). In this paper, we compute r(C4,Ck) for 3 ≤k ≤ 7. Most of the results are based on computer algorithms but we obtain the exact value r(C4) and do so without the help of computer algorithms.
Źródło:
Opuscula Mathematica; 2014, 34, 3; 463-468
1232-9274
2300-6919
Pojawia się w:
Opuscula Mathematica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The use of complexity hierarchies in descriptive set theory and automata theory
Autorzy:
Andretta, A.
Camerlo, R.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1964199.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005
Wydawca:
Politechnika Gdańska
Tematy:
hierarchies
infinite games
Borel reducibility
automata theory
Opis:
The concept of a reduction between subsets of a given space is described, giving rise to various complexity hierarchies, studied both in descriptive set theory and in automata theory. We discuss in particular the Wadge and Lipschitz hierarchies for subsets of the Baire and Cantor spaces and the hierarchy of Borel reducibility for finitary relations on standard Borel spaces. The notions of Wadge and Lipschitz reductions are related to corresponding perfect information games.
Źródło:
TASK Quarterly. Scientific Bulletin of Academic Computer Centre in Gdansk; 2005, 9, 3; 337-356
1428-6394
Pojawia się w:
TASK Quarterly. Scientific Bulletin of Academic Computer Centre in Gdansk
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Playing distressed art: Adorno’s aesthetic theory in game design
Autorzy:
Hanussek, Benjamin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2135603.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-08-09
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
games as art
game studies
Adorno
aesthetic theory
critical theory
Distressed
Opis:
The discussion on games as (not) art has been raging for decades without reaching a consensus. It is argued here that the ontological status of games is irrelevant for the perception and development of aesthetic experiences in videogames. Instead, game design should be regarded as ripe to convey the experience of art according  to established aesthetic theories. The essay presents Adorno’s aesthetic theory and highlights its reflections in the games Papers, Please and Observer. It then describes how they were synthesized into a  critical gameplay experience in the author’s game Distressed. The latter may be regarded as an example of a method in game studies in which the aesthetic potential of games is explored by creation rather than analysis. Arguably, this reveals the importance of epistemological approaches  towards games and art instead of the predominant ontological ones.
Źródło:
Replay. The Polish Journal of Game Studies; 2021, 8, 1; 73-87
2391-8551
2449-8394
Pojawia się w:
Replay. The Polish Journal of Game Studies
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Stackelberg Security Games: Models, Applications and Computational Aspects
Autorzy:
Wilczyński, A.
Jakóbik, A.
Kołodziej, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309423.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
Bayesian game
game theory
leadership
Nash equilibrium
normal form games
security games
Stackelberg equilibrium
Stackelberg games
Opis:
Stackelberg games are non-symmetric games where one player or specified group of players have the privilege position and make decision before the other players. Such games are used in telecommunication and computational systems for supporting administrative decisions. Recently Stackleberg games became useful also in the systems where security issues are the crucial decision criteria. In this paper authors briefly survey the most popular Stackelberg security game models and provide the analysis of the model properties illustrated in the realistic use cases.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2016, 3; 70-79
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A process algebraic form to represent extensive games
Autorzy:
Gheibi, O.
Ramezanian, R.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205871.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
extensive games
Nash equilibrium
process theory
process algebra
Opis:
In this paper, we introduce an agent-based representation of games, in order to propose a compact representation for multi-party games in game theory. Our method is inspired by concepts in process theory and process algebra. In addition, we introduce an algorithm whose input is a game in the form of process algebra (proposed in this paper) and as an output, the algorithm finds the Nash equilibrium of the game in linear space complexity.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2015, 44, 1; 129-148
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A Bayesian Blessing: A Biblical Decision Explained by Game Theory
Autorzy:
Dodell, Leah
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1198590.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
Game Theory
Economics
Bayesian Games
Strategic Communication
Deception
Old Testament
Opis:
This paper revisits one of the most debated tales from the Old Testament, Jacob’s deception of his father Isaac, and models it in the framework of a Bayesian game. Solving for the equilibrium that occurs in the Torah reveals what conditions must hold for biblical characters to be willing to make the decisions that they make. The paper also examines how the protagonists’ decisions would have changed if they had held different values. The analysis sheds light on which interpretations of the biblical story hold the most weight when its characters maintain consistent beliefs and act upon them in a sequentially rational manner.
Źródło:
Decyzje; 2018, 30; 53-61
1733-0092
2391-761X
Pojawia się w:
Decyzje
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
An application of the representations of symmetric groups to characterizing solutions of games in partition function form
Autorzy:
Sánchez-Pérez, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/406330.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:
games in partition function form
value
representation theory
symmetric group
Opis:
A different perspective from the more “traditional” approaches to studying solutions of games in partition function form has been presented. We provide a decomposition of the space of such games under the action of the symmetric group, for the cases with three and four players. In particular, we identify all the irreducible subspaces that are relevant to the study of linear symmetric solutions. We then use such a decomposition to derive a characterization of the class of linear and symmetric solutions, as well as of the class of linear, symmetric and efficient solutions.
Źródło:
Operations Research and Decisions; 2014, 24, 2; 97-122
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:
Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Po co matematykom Jan Jakub Rousseau?
Why do mathematicians need Jean-Jacques Rousseau?
Autorzy:
Kalinowska, Alina
Stański, Adam
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1388538.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-09-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Gdański. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego
Tematy:
Game Theory
Competitive game
Cooperative games
Nash equilibrium
Pareto efficiency
Opis:
One day, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who was known mainly as a philosopher and a pedagogue, told a deer hunting story. In doing so, he managed to play a small role in the development of the branch of maths called ‘game theory’. Later his story was converted into a game. Initially game theory was used to explain exchange in the field of economics. Over time, the mathematical modeling was found to be useful in the social sciences. A game theory describes diverse and cognizant participants forced to make decisions. In regards to the game based on cooperation, a choice is at the same time a dilemma. It can be viewed as a moral or philosophical predicament and in addition it gives as an inside into the human psyche and behaviour. Game theory has the potential to offer an attractive mathematical model, useful in analyzing social interactions. Though currently unappreciated by pedagogy, it has the potential to be successfully used in pedagogical studies analyzing conflict of interest of all participants in an educational process.
Źródło:
Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji; 2015, 30, 3; 121-125
1734-1582
2451-2230
Pojawia się w:
Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rethinking Digital Games in a Critical and Participatory Perspectives. A Brief Reflection
Autorzy:
da Silva Leite, Patrícia
Andrade Torquato Schimidt, Deborah
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/781380.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
digital games
Critical Theory
disability
people with disabilities
education
Freire
Habermas
Opis:
Digital games are social objects created based on our culture and society and at the same time they contribute to shaping our world. Through a critical perspective of digital games and technology, it is possible to discuss the unfolding of these artefacts in our society and also understand their relevance beyond an instrumental view. In this paper, we present a brief reflection based on two researches developed by the authors: the first, regarding the link between digital games and people with disabilities; and the second, about contributions of digital games to a critical education. Our goal with this work is to highlight the emancipatory and participatory potential present in the critical vision of digital games.
Źródło:
Ethics in Progress; 2019, 10, 2; 112-117
2084-9257
Pojawia się w:
Ethics in Progress
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł

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