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Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 145
Tytuł:
Some Problems With Judging Rationality
Autorzy:
Swistak, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/494300.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-06-15
Wydawca:
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
Game Theory
rationality
behavioral game theory
ultimatum game
Opis:
The gap between game-theoretic predictions and actual choices people make in, for instance, gaming experiments has been over-interpreted as evidence against rationality of players. I consider a version of the ultimatum game and examine its equilibria under different assumptions about players’ preferences. Using standard notions of rationality I show that the discrepancy between the “normative” and the “descriptive” cannot be established by a simple comparison of what is predicted by the equilibrium choices and the actual choices people make.
Źródło:
Decyzje; 2015, 23; 5-22
1733-0092
2391-761X
Pojawia się w:
Decyzje
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Dlaczego w dylemat więźnia warto grać kwantowo?
Why is it Worth Playing Quantum Prisoners Dilemma?
Autorzy:
Szopa, Marek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/589703.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
Tematy:
Teoria gier
Game theory
Opis:
The Prisoner's Dilemma [PD] is the best known example of a two-person, simultaneous game, for which the Nash equilibrium is far from Pareto-optimal solutions. In this paper we define a quantum PD, for which player's strategies are defined as rotations of the SU(2) group, parameterized by three angles. Quantum strategies are correlated through the mechanism of quantum entanglement and the result of the game is obtained by the collapse of the wave function. Classic PD is a particular case of the quantum game for which the set of rotations is limited to one dimension. Each quantum strategy can be, by appropriate choice of counter-strategy, interpreted as a "cooperation" or "defection". Quantum PD has Nash equilibria that are more favorable than the classic PD and close to the Pareto optimal solutions. With proper selection of strategies, quantum PD can be reduced to the classic, zero-sum, "matching pennies" game. In this paper we show examples of economic phenomena (price collusion, the chess strategy) that mimics the Nash equilibria of quantum PD.
Źródło:
Studia Ekonomiczne; 2014, 178; 174-189
2083-8611
Pojawia się w:
Studia Ekonomiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Economic analysis of implementing VMI model using game theory
Autorzy:
Stehel, Vojtěch
Vochozka, Marek
Kliestik, Tomas
Bakes, Vladimir
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/19090921.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Instytut Badań Gospodarczych
Tematy:
VMI
game theory
sensitivity analysis
Opis:
Research background: The article deals with implementing VMI between the supplier and customer. To assess whether the system will be implemented, the evolution game theory is used. The contribution is based on the limitations of the study of the evolutionary game theory approach to modelling VMI policies (Torres et al., 2014) and its later extension, The evolutionary game theory approach to modelling VMI policies (Torres & García-Díaz, 2018). It aims is to complement the studies and provide a comprehensive picture of the issue. Purpose of the article: The main objective of the contribution is to respond to the question whether the VMI system will be introduced between the supplier and customer. Methods: In the first phase, the matrix is analysed from the point of view of the game meaning and its limit parameters. The limit parameters are set taking into account the economic reality. The only examined states of the matrix are those where the result is not obvious. For the purposes of the contribution, we work with a 5-year period. A new software capable of calculating evolutionary focus and their stability is created. Sensitivity analysis is carried out for the individual parameters that affect the system behaviour. Findings & Value added: Value added is a complex description of the system and complementation of previous studies in this field. VMI is confirmed. The results obtained can be used for practical management, so that the managers are able to identify what the actual costs are and what the probability of introducing the system is. At the same time, they can identify the parameters that can be influenced by them and observe their impact on the shift of the system introduction probability.
Źródło:
Oeconomia Copernicana; 2019, 10, 2; 253-272
2083-1277
Pojawia się w:
Oeconomia Copernicana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Designing Auctions: A Historical Perspective
Autorzy:
Karpowicz, M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/307899.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
auctions
game theory
mechanism design
Opis:
Auction is a form of organization of competition that leads to the assignment and valuation of resources based on the information obtained from the competing agents. From the perspective of systems science it is a distributed resource allocation algorithm applied in the environment with information asymmetry, i.e., where the interconnected and interacting subsystems have different information about the system as a whole. This paper presents an overview of the historical development of mathematical theory underlying modern approach to auction design. Selected practical applications of the theory are also discussed.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2011, 3; 114-122
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
An Energy-Efficient Proactive Routing Scheme for MANET : Game Theoretical Approach of Forwarding with Selfish Nodes
Autorzy:
Sahnoun, A.
Habbani, A.
El Abbadi, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/963872.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
game theory
MANETs
energy efficiency
Opis:
In Mobile Ad-hoc Networks, nodes exchange packets with each other using intermediate nodes as relays. Since nodes in MANETs are battery powered, energy conservation is a crucial issue. Accepting relay all request may not be in the best interest of a node. But if many nodes prefer not to consume energy in relaying packets on behalf of others, the overall performance of routing in network will be influenced. In this paper we address the energyefficient routing problem in MANETs with selfish nodes. We modeled this problem as a game-theoretic constraint optimization; we defined the utility of each node as a weighted difference between a performance metric and some transmission costs. A motivate mechanism is proposed in order to induce nodes to forwarding cooperation. Each node independently implements the optimal equilibrium strategy under the given constraints. Simulation results by NS3 simulator show that our proposed approach can improve system performance in network lifetime and packet delivery ratio.
Źródło:
International Journal of Electronics and Telecommunications; 2017, 63, 4; 399-404
2300-1933
Pojawia się w:
International Journal of Electronics and Telecommunications
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On ”Games and Dynamic Games” by A. Haurie, J.B. Krawczyk and G. Zaccour
Autorzy:
Więcek, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/748451.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
Tematy:
game theory, dynamic games, equilibrium
Opis:
Although the title, ''Games and Dynamic Games"  of the new book by Alain Haurie, Jacek B. Krawczyk and Georges Zaccour suggests just another textbook on general game theory, with a little more stress made on dynamic aspect of games, the book appears to be something of novelty both in the scope and the treatment of the material. From the very first chapters of the book, it is clear that we will not be given another standard course of game theory, and that the dynamics of games will be the main issue. It starts with the simplest treatment of game dynamics, which is the extensive form of the game, and, having defined and explained the basic notions of static game theory, progresses to more complex dynamic models. Those start with deterministic repeated games, continue with variable state discrete time (or multistage) dynamic games and deterministic differential (that is, continuous time) games, and finish with stochastic models extending the ones presented before. Each part presents in a self-contained and comprehensive way, the main notions and solution concepts (such as open- and closed-loop strategies, Nash and correlated equilibria, subgame-perfectness, using threats to improve the performance of the equilibrium strategies) and theoretical results. It complements them with a number of economic applications, presented in detail. These applications relate to many fields of interest of economists, such as exploitation of renewable resources, environmental and energy issues, macroeconomics and finance. Each chapter ends with a set of excercices and a {\it game engineering} part, where a detailed presentation of a real-life application of some relevant game model is presented. Just this part is a novelty in the game-theoretic literature, as it shows to what extent the game-theoretic models can be applicable. Although the book presents the mathematical tools to model the situations of conflict in a rather rigorous way, it is clear that its target reader is someone with a background in economics or managemant science rather than mathematics. All the basic mathematical concepts used in the book are carefully explained, with those more complex ones (which appear in the latter chapters of the book) approached mainly through examples and intuitions. I believe this is a good decision of the authors, as in that way it makes the book really accessible to its potential readers. In fact, even though the tools (even those most advanced) of dynamic game theory have now been for many years used to model the economic interactions, surprisingly there has not been a single textbook addressed to more advanced students and researchers in economics and management science, presenting the state-of-art in the theory and applications of dynamic games in a comprehensive way. Those already existing required mathematical expertise well beyond what one could expect from typical economics/management students, and could not serve as textbooks for this type of readers. Moreover, those existing books concentrated without exception on some particular classes of dynamic games (such as differential games and their subclasses, stochastic games, repeated games). The book of Haurie, Krawczyk and Zaccour fills well the existing gap.Another important advantage of the book is its stress made not only on theoretical concepts and their adoption in real-life models, but on computation issues. The authors present a host of techniques to compute the solutions to the considered games either symbolically or numerically. They also provide information about software that can be used to solve similar games. Also the examples presented in game engineering sections are not abstract. They are based on real data, and issues of the credibility of the solutions obtained is discussed.The clarity of the exposition of often complicated topics is in general a big advantage of the book, although in latter chapters this clarity is sometimes unfortunatelly lost. The best example is the part about games over event trees with a confusing introduction concerning game with finite action sets and then the whole chapter concerning games with continuous ones. Also the last chapter, about stochastic-diffusion games, seems not very well conceived, as it jumps forth and back between an example and some more general considerations, leaving the reader confused about the generality of what is presented. These are certainly minor problems, but unfortunatelly there are other, more upseting issues. In general, it seems that the manuscript was not proofread carefully enough. The number of typos is enormous (the errata added to the book enumerates just a small fraction). Also some other faults, such as references to the colors on one of the figures, which is in black and white (p. 187), self-contradicting sentences like ''We use $\beta$ for a discount factor because we use $\beta$ to denote a strategy'' (p. 233), faults in references between chapters of the book (p. 372, footnote on p. 419) could have been easily eliminated if the book was properly proofread. What is worse though, is that there are also some more serious mistakes: one of the assumptions of the Kakutani fixed point theorem is missing, $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in Lemma 10.1 should be $A\epsilon$-equilibrium. And finally---it seems that most of the section 11.6.1 is missing from the manuscript. This significantly reduces the value of the book. Nevertheless, although I believe that all these errors should make the reader more cautious when reading the book, they do not unmake its main quality, which is acquainting all those interested in describing some real-life multi-agent economic situations in a rigorous way with the theory which provides the tools for doing it.
Źródło:
Mathematica Applicanda; 2013, 41, 1
1730-2668
2299-4009
Pojawia się w:
Mathematica Applicanda
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Minority Game and Quantum Game Theory
Gra Mniejszościowa I Kwantowa Teoria Gier
Autorzy:
Bolonek, Katarzyna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/906291.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
minority game
quantum game theory
Nash equilibrium
Opis:
Artykuł zawiera propozycje procedur kwantowania gier dobrze znanych w klasycznej teorii gier. Przedstawiono proste modele gier kwantowych. Jako pierwszy został omówiony dylemat więźnia zarówno w wersji klasycznej jak i kwantowej, który ma wiele praktycznych zastosowań w ekonomii, jednym z przykładów są oszustwa w porozumieniach kartelowych. Kolejnym modelem gry kwantowej jest kwantowa gra rynkowa opisana za pomocą kwantowego oscylatora harmonicznego. Jako ostatni został omówiony model kwantowej gry mniejszościowej.
This paper builds up on proposed convincing procedures telling how to quantize well-known games from the classical game theory. The thesis introduces some simple models of quantum games. At first, the prisoners’ dilemma in classical and quantum version is described. This simple model has many practical applications in economics, one example being frauds in cartel agreements. The next model of quantum game is the quantum market game, described with the help of the quantum harmonic oscillator. It is known that quantum algorithms may be thought of as the games between classical and quantum agents; therefore, as the last example the quantum minority game is introduced.
Źródło:
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica; 2009, 228
0208-6018
2353-7663
Pojawia się w:
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Some Thoughts on Michael Chwe’s „Jane Austen, Applied Game Theorist”
Autorzy:
Kamiński, Marek M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1198600.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
Jane Austen
game theory
decision theory
mating
Opis:
The article examines the decision-making components of Jane Austen’s six major novels as reconstructed in Michael Chwe’s book and his argument that Austen was a precursor of game theory. In her novels, Austen describes an abundance of strategic situations in the mating process within the British higher classes. Social constraints made mating within this world a tough game due to harsh punishments for failure, especially for women, and severe limitation on signaling interest or sympathy. Austen cleverly investigates this environment and reconstructs many aspects of strategic behavior that have their counterparts in formal concepts of game and decision theory. While she hasn’t made contributions to theory per se, she deserves being named a precursor of applied strategic thinking and an expert on a particular strategically sophisticated social environment.
Źródło:
Decyzje; 2018, 30; 63-74
1733-0092
2391-761X
Pojawia się w:
Decyzje
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Strategic option pricing
Autorzy:
Bieta, Volker
Broll, Udo
Siebe, Wilfried
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1837957.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-09-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Tematy:
option pricing
game theory
Nash equilibrium
Opis:
In this paper an extension of the well-known binomial approach to option pricing is presented. The classical question is: What is the price of an option on the risky asset? The traditional answer is obtained with the help of a replicating portfolio by ruling out arbitrage. Instead a two-person game from the Nash equilibrium of which the option price can be derived is formulated. Consequently both the underlying asset’s price at expiration and the price of the option on this asset are endogenously determined. The option price derived this way turns out, however, to be identical to the classical no-arbitrage option price of the binomial model if the expiration-date prices of the underlying asset and the corresponding risk-neutral probability are properly adjusted according to the Nash equilibrium data of the game.
Źródło:
Economics and Business Review; 2020, 6, 3; 118-129
2392-1641
Pojawia się w:
Economics and Business Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Silent-noisy duel with two kinds of weapon
Autorzy:
Trybuła, S.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/206839.pdf
Data publikacji:
2000
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
teoria gier
game theory
silent noisy duel
Opis:
In this paper the duel is solved in which Players I and II have two kinds of weapon, the first one with a single bullet, which Player can use when he wants, and the second one that can be used only when the distance between players is zero. Player I hears the shot of Player II, Player II does not hear the shot of Player I.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2000, 29, 4; 905-915
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
M&A Cooperative Games
Autorzy:
Nastych, Maria A.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/517130.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Instytut Badań Gospodarczych
Tematy:
game theory
coalitions
mergers
acquisitions
M&A
Opis:
Cooperative game theory instruments application to the corporate finance M&A research issues provide an ability to extend the field considered and conclusions obtained. The paper presents the M&A cooperative games modeling and its empirical implementation to analyze the airline strategic alliance as M&A deal.
Źródło:
Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy; 2014, 9, 1; 119-130
1689-765X
2353-3293
Pojawia się w:
Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Indirect control and power
Autorzy:
Bertini, C.
Mercik, J.
Stach, I.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/406544.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:
game theory
indirect control
corporations
power indices
Opis:
To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex prob-lem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure.
Źródło:
Operations Research and Decisions; 2016, 26, 2; 7-30
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:
Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Vehicle navigation in populated areas using predictive control with environmental uncertainty handling
Autorzy:
Skrzypczyk, K.
Mellado, M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/229599.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
motion planning
prediction
uncertainty handling
game theory
Opis:
This paper addresses the problem of navigating an autonomous vehicle using environmental dynamics prediction. The usefulness of the Game Against Nature formalism adapted to modelling environmental prediction uncertainty is discussed. The possibility of the control law synthesis on the basis of strategies against Nature is presented. The properties and effectiveness of the approach presented are verified by simulations carried out in MATLAB.
Źródło:
Archives of Control Sciences; 2017, 27, 2; 351-359
1230-2384
Pojawia się w:
Archives of Control Sciences
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Psychological Insights Into Decision‑Making
Autorzy:
Jankowska, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1195172.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie
Tematy:
decision‑making
heuristics
neuroeconomics
game theory
theory of mind
Opis:
This paper considers the widely approached problem of how individuals and groups make economic decisions. The author’s belief is that the answer to this question is highly interdisciplinary and lies not only in areas of study such as microeconomic theory and organisational behaviour, but also psychology, neuroscience and ethics. The author attempts to summarise a few chosen, existing models, which can help analyse both logical and psychological aspects of the process, and mentions a new, rising interdisciplinary field of neuroeconomics, which offers high potential for construction of new decision‐making models in the future.
Źródło:
Edukacja Ekonomistów i Menedżerów; 2016, 42, 4; 129-139
1734-087X
Pojawia się w:
Edukacja Ekonomistów i Menedżerów
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Game-Theoretic Approach to Bank Loan Repayment
Autorzy:
Paliński, A.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/375997.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza im. Stanisława Staszica w Krakowie. Wydawnictwo AGH
Tematy:
bank
loan
credit agreement
repayment
renegotiation
game theory
Opis:
This paper presents a model of bank-loan repayment as a signaling game with a set of discrete types of borrowers. The type of borrower is the return on an investment project. A possibility of renegotiation of the loan agreement leads to an equilibrium in which the borrower adjusts the repaid amount to the liquidation value of its assets (from the bank’s point of view). In the equilibrium, there are numerous pooling equilibrium points, with values rising according to the expected liquidation value of the loan. The article additionally proposes a mechanism forcing the borrower to pay all of his return instead of the common liquidation value of subset of types of the borrower. The paper contains also a simple numerical example explaining this mechanism.
Źródło:
Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services; 2015, 9, 1; 79-88
1896-8325
2300-7087
Pojawia się w:
Decision Making in Manufacturing and Services
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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