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Wyszukujesz frazę "Auctions" wg kryterium: Temat


Tytuł:
The appropriateness of electronic reverse auctions – an explanation from the incomplete contract theory and the resource dependence theory
Autorzy:
GELDERMAN, Cees J.
SEMEIJN, Janjaap
NAGEL, Bart Willem
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/529752.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Wyższa Szkoła Bankowa we Wrocławiu
Tematy:
Auctions
Procurement
Transactional relationships)
Other – electronic reversed auctions
Opis:
Despite the growing importance of electronic reversed auctions (ERAs) few empirical studies have explored the appropriateness of ERA usage. Most commonly, transaction cost theory has been used for these ERA-studies, relying on arguments that consider asset specificity as the primary explanation for organizational boundaries. We seek a more thorough explanation for perceived Electronic Reverse auctions (ERA) appropriateness, using multiple theoretical perspectives. This study includes insights and variables from the incomplete contract theory and the resource dependence theory. A conceptual model for ERA appropriateness was developed from the buyer perspective. This model was empirically validated using a survey of 176 purchasing professionals. The findings suggest a positive impact of buyer power on ERA appropriateness, while total interdependence does not appear to affect ERA appropriateness. The results further indicate that asset specificity stimulates ERA usage. ERA-minded purchasers consider ERAs as a tool for exploiting buyer power and for imposing relationship investments on suppliers. At the same time, variables related to collaboration do not appear to be important for ERA appropriateness from the perspective of the buyer. Suppliers are required to make relation-specific investments, but are not valued for their relational efforts. The novelty of this article Scholars have taken several approaches to investigate and to explain company’s sourcing decisions that include ERA use. We address an important gap in the literature by using the incomplete contract theory in combination with the resource dependence theory to provide a better understanding of buyers’ perceived ERA appropriateness.
Źródło:
Central and Eastern European Journal of Management and Economics (CEEJME); 2017, No. 1; 9-29
2353-9119
Pojawia się w:
Central and Eastern European Journal of Management and Economics (CEEJME)
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A Software Platform for Research on Auction Mechanisms
Autorzy:
Kamola, M.
Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz, E.
Malinowski, K.
Stańczuk, W.
Pałka, P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/307872.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
auctions
multi-commodity markets
Opis:
The platform for research on auction mechanisms is a distributed simulation framework providing means to carry out research on resource allocation efficiency mechanisms and user strategies. Both kinds of algorithms examined are completely user-defined. Interaction of algorithms is recorded and pre-defined measures for the final resource allocation are calculated. Underlying database design provides for efficient results lookup and comparison across different experiments, thus enabling research groupwork. A recognised, open and flexible information model is employed for experiment descriptions.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2011, 3; 38-46
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Mining online auction social networks for reputation and recommendation
Autorzy:
Morzy, M.
Wierzbicki, A.
Papadopoulos, A. N.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/970827.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
online auctions
reputation
recommendations
Opis:
Online auctions are quickly becoming one of the leading branches of e-commerce. Unfortunately, online auctions attract many fraudulent activities. Reputation systems are crucial for guaranteeing fairness of trade and reliability of service. Currently used reputation systems offer little protection from malevolent contractors. In this paper we present a new method for mining the reputation of sellers in online auctions. We devise two independent measures that assess reliability and questionability of sellers in parallel, leading to the concept of positive and negative reputation. To compute these measures we construct an S-graph which reflects the social linkage between sellers and buyers. We use both explicit and implicit feedbacks provided by auction participants, carefully identifying missing feedbacks that have been purposefully left out. Based on reputation estimates the community of online auction participants can detect misbehaving contractors and counteract fraud. Thus, the application of social information about reputation of contractors can be perceived as recommendations. Experimental evaluation of our proposal proves the feasibility and usefulness of the presented approach.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2009, 38, 1; 87-106
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pomiar krótko- i długookresowej efektywności mechanizmów aukcyjnych. Wyniki badań eksperymentalnych
Measurement of the Short and Long Run Efficiency of Auction Mechanisms. The Experimental Research
Autorzy:
Kuśmierczyk, Paweł
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/590362.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
Tematy:
Aukcje
Efektywność
Auctions
Effectiveness
Opis:
The optimality and the efficiency are the main criteria used in the evaluation process of auction mechanisms. The optimal auction maximizes auctioneer's surplus, whereas an efficient mechanism efficiently allocates the commodity traded in the auction. Quite often there is a tradeoff between the two criteria: an auction which is optimal has a limited efficiency, and the opposite, an auction that is efficient might lead to a lower auctioneer's surplus. In a short run it's the optimality that would be more crucial for the auctioneer, but in the long run the efficiency would become more and more important, promoting competition and innovations. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that experiments can serve as a useful tool in evaluating the auctions' efficiency. The paper presents the results of the experiments, aimed at analyzing the optimality and efficiency of the chosen reverse auction mechanisms, in case of the asymmetrical market with an entry cost. The mechanisms studied included the English auction, the first-price sealed-bid auction, the Japanese auction, and the Amsterdam auction. Out of them the highest value of auctioneer's surplus was reached in case of the first-price sealed-bid auction, and the most efficient mechanism was the English auction. Apart from that, the paper provides the results of the long run simulations, showing the positive effect of efficiency on the discounted sum of the auctioneer's surplus.(
Źródło:
Studia Ekonomiczne; 2014, 180 cz 2; 141-151
2083-8611
Pojawia się w:
Studia Ekonomiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A Framework for Evaluation of Communication Bandwidth Market Models
Autorzy:
Stańczak, W.
Pałka, P.
Lubacz, J.
Toczyłowski, E.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309142.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
auctions
bandwidth trading
resource allocation
Opis:
The article presents a method of analysis of market-based models for resource allocation in communication networks. It consists of several stages: classification of a market model, generation of input data, data adaptation to a tested model, test calculations and, finally, presentation and interpretation of results. A set of general criteria to assess various models has been proposed. Tests are run using dedicated computer applications, data is stored in open XML-based format originated in the multicommodity market model. Network topologies are derived from the SNDlib library.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2010, 2; 52-60
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Designing Auctions: A Historical Perspective
Autorzy:
Karpowicz, M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/307899.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
auctions
game theory
mechanism design
Opis:
Auction is a form of organization of competition that leads to the assignment and valuation of resources based on the information obtained from the competing agents. From the perspective of systems science it is a distributed resource allocation algorithm applied in the environment with information asymmetry, i.e., where the interconnected and interacting subsystems have different information about the system as a whole. This paper presents an overview of the historical development of mathematical theory underlying modern approach to auction design. Selected practical applications of the theory are also discussed.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2011, 3; 114-122
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Bidding languages for auctions of divisible goods
Autorzy:
Kaleta, M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/206521.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
bidding languages
auctions
market mechanism design
Opis:
Bidding languages are well-defined for combinatorial auctions. However, the auctions of divisible goods are quite common in practice. In contrast to combinatorial auctions, the feasible volumes of the offers are continuous in the case of divisible commodities. Such auctions are called continuous auctions. In the paper we introduce three families of bidding languages for continuous auctions. They are based on the concepts derived from the combinatorial auctions. We generalize the language families based on goods, bids, and some mixture of both of them, to the continuous case. We also analyze fundamental properties of the new languages. Simple examples, reflecting the complementarity and substitutability, are provided with exemplary representations in different languages.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2012, 41, 4; 799-816
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Model for Balancing Aggregated Communication Bandwidth Resources
Autorzy:
Pałka, P.
Kołtyś, K.
Toczyłowski, E.
Żółtowska, I.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309024.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
aggregation
auctions
bandwidth market
multicommodity trade
Opis:
In this paper we present a multicommodity bandwidth exchange model for balancing aggregated communication bandwidth resources (BACBR) that allows us to aggregate similar offers. In this model offers submitted to sell (or buy) the same, similar, or equivalent network resources (or demands for end-to-end connections) are aggregated into single commodities. BACBR model is based on the balancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT) model. It requires much less variables and constraints then original BCBT, however the outcomes need to be disaggregated. The general model for disaggregation is also given in the paper.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2009, 3; 43-49
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Quantitative analysis of internet auctions advertising features: an empirical study
Autorzy:
Wojciechowski, A.
Warczynski, P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205589.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
on-line auctions
price effectiveness
bidder behaviour
Opis:
Internet auction sites are trading platforms with huge number of visitors who may become customers. On-line auctions allow users to buy and sell products without geographical borders, as in majority of cases ordered products are delivered by surface mail. The aim of the study was to collect substantial amount of data describing on-line auctions in a variety of attributes, and customer behaviour. We provide quantitative arguments in the discussion on effectiveness of promotional features used in on-line auctions. Experimental survey showed that almost 2/3 of the total number of observed auctions were indexed in five top (out of 23) product categories. Noticeable difference in sale effectiveness was observed for particular days of week and hours of auction termination. On Saturdays and Sundays the chance to terminate an auction with transaction was 17.72% and 19.46%, respectively, while on Tuesdays – Orly 14.29%. The highest ratio of successful auction-transaction against total number of auctions ending within particular hour occurred between 19:00 and 22:00. Our approximation of job lot transactions showed that it was a common practice among bidders to buy more than one product form one seller. In the reference period about 25% of all transactions could be qualified as job-lot ones. A miniature image displayed by auction title appeared the cheapest and most price effective form of advertising an auction while promoting on action site main page was the most effective in increasing visits/displays (by 2341%), yet, the high price of this advertising feature may pay back only if customers’ visits turn into transactions.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2012, 41, 4; 851-865
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Sprzedaż mocy przesyłowych infrastruktury energetycznej w drodze aukcji, a bezpieczeństwo energetyczne RP
Auctioning the transmission capacities of energy infrastructure and energy security of the Republic of Poland
Autorzy:
Smyrgała, Dominik
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/527013.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Collegium Civitas
Tematy:
pipeline capacity
grid capacity
auctions
energy security
Opis:
The article discusses the issue of energy infrastructure capacity auctions as a tool of improving the energy security of Poland. It argues that the experiences from foreign markets clearly indicate that this method of capacity allocation may be an effective way of providing the energy supply precisely where it is needed or generating extra funds for further infrastructure development.
Źródło:
Securitologia; 2013, 2(18); 29-38
1898-4509
Pojawia się w:
Securitologia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł

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