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Wyszukujesz frazę "Auctions" wg kryterium: Temat


Tytuł:
The appropriateness of electronic reverse auctions – an explanation from the incomplete contract theory and the resource dependence theory
Autorzy:
GELDERMAN, Cees J.
SEMEIJN, Janjaap
NAGEL, Bart Willem
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/529752.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Wyższa Szkoła Bankowa we Wrocławiu
Tematy:
Auctions
Procurement
Transactional relationships)
Other – electronic reversed auctions
Opis:
Despite the growing importance of electronic reversed auctions (ERAs) few empirical studies have explored the appropriateness of ERA usage. Most commonly, transaction cost theory has been used for these ERA-studies, relying on arguments that consider asset specificity as the primary explanation for organizational boundaries. We seek a more thorough explanation for perceived Electronic Reverse auctions (ERA) appropriateness, using multiple theoretical perspectives. This study includes insights and variables from the incomplete contract theory and the resource dependence theory. A conceptual model for ERA appropriateness was developed from the buyer perspective. This model was empirically validated using a survey of 176 purchasing professionals. The findings suggest a positive impact of buyer power on ERA appropriateness, while total interdependence does not appear to affect ERA appropriateness. The results further indicate that asset specificity stimulates ERA usage. ERA-minded purchasers consider ERAs as a tool for exploiting buyer power and for imposing relationship investments on suppliers. At the same time, variables related to collaboration do not appear to be important for ERA appropriateness from the perspective of the buyer. Suppliers are required to make relation-specific investments, but are not valued for their relational efforts. The novelty of this article Scholars have taken several approaches to investigate and to explain company’s sourcing decisions that include ERA use. We address an important gap in the literature by using the incomplete contract theory in combination with the resource dependence theory to provide a better understanding of buyers’ perceived ERA appropriateness.
Źródło:
Central and Eastern European Journal of Management and Economics (CEEJME); 2017, No. 1; 9-29
2353-9119
Pojawia się w:
Central and Eastern European Journal of Management and Economics (CEEJME)
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Mining online auction social networks for reputation and recommendation
Autorzy:
Morzy, M.
Wierzbicki, A.
Papadopoulos, A. N.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/970827.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
online auctions
reputation
recommendations
Opis:
Online auctions are quickly becoming one of the leading branches of e-commerce. Unfortunately, online auctions attract many fraudulent activities. Reputation systems are crucial for guaranteeing fairness of trade and reliability of service. Currently used reputation systems offer little protection from malevolent contractors. In this paper we present a new method for mining the reputation of sellers in online auctions. We devise two independent measures that assess reliability and questionability of sellers in parallel, leading to the concept of positive and negative reputation. To compute these measures we construct an S-graph which reflects the social linkage between sellers and buyers. We use both explicit and implicit feedbacks provided by auction participants, carefully identifying missing feedbacks that have been purposefully left out. Based on reputation estimates the community of online auction participants can detect misbehaving contractors and counteract fraud. Thus, the application of social information about reputation of contractors can be perceived as recommendations. Experimental evaluation of our proposal proves the feasibility and usefulness of the presented approach.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2009, 38, 1; 87-106
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pomiar krótko- i długookresowej efektywności mechanizmów aukcyjnych. Wyniki badań eksperymentalnych
Measurement of the Short and Long Run Efficiency of Auction Mechanisms. The Experimental Research
Autorzy:
Kuśmierczyk, Paweł
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/590362.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
Tematy:
Aukcje
Efektywność
Auctions
Effectiveness
Opis:
The optimality and the efficiency are the main criteria used in the evaluation process of auction mechanisms. The optimal auction maximizes auctioneer's surplus, whereas an efficient mechanism efficiently allocates the commodity traded in the auction. Quite often there is a tradeoff between the two criteria: an auction which is optimal has a limited efficiency, and the opposite, an auction that is efficient might lead to a lower auctioneer's surplus. In a short run it's the optimality that would be more crucial for the auctioneer, but in the long run the efficiency would become more and more important, promoting competition and innovations. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that experiments can serve as a useful tool in evaluating the auctions' efficiency. The paper presents the results of the experiments, aimed at analyzing the optimality and efficiency of the chosen reverse auction mechanisms, in case of the asymmetrical market with an entry cost. The mechanisms studied included the English auction, the first-price sealed-bid auction, the Japanese auction, and the Amsterdam auction. Out of them the highest value of auctioneer's surplus was reached in case of the first-price sealed-bid auction, and the most efficient mechanism was the English auction. Apart from that, the paper provides the results of the long run simulations, showing the positive effect of efficiency on the discounted sum of the auctioneer's surplus.(
Źródło:
Studia Ekonomiczne; 2014, 180 cz 2; 141-151
2083-8611
Pojawia się w:
Studia Ekonomiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A Software Platform for Research on Auction Mechanisms
Autorzy:
Kamola, M.
Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz, E.
Malinowski, K.
Stańczuk, W.
Pałka, P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/307872.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
auctions
multi-commodity markets
Opis:
The platform for research on auction mechanisms is a distributed simulation framework providing means to carry out research on resource allocation efficiency mechanisms and user strategies. Both kinds of algorithms examined are completely user-defined. Interaction of algorithms is recorded and pre-defined measures for the final resource allocation are calculated. Underlying database design provides for efficient results lookup and comparison across different experiments, thus enabling research groupwork. A recognised, open and flexible information model is employed for experiment descriptions.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2011, 3; 38-46
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Designing Auctions: A Historical Perspective
Autorzy:
Karpowicz, M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/307899.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
auctions
game theory
mechanism design
Opis:
Auction is a form of organization of competition that leads to the assignment and valuation of resources based on the information obtained from the competing agents. From the perspective of systems science it is a distributed resource allocation algorithm applied in the environment with information asymmetry, i.e., where the interconnected and interacting subsystems have different information about the system as a whole. This paper presents an overview of the historical development of mathematical theory underlying modern approach to auction design. Selected practical applications of the theory are also discussed.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2011, 3; 114-122
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A Framework for Evaluation of Communication Bandwidth Market Models
Autorzy:
Stańczak, W.
Pałka, P.
Lubacz, J.
Toczyłowski, E.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309142.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
auctions
bandwidth trading
resource allocation
Opis:
The article presents a method of analysis of market-based models for resource allocation in communication networks. It consists of several stages: classification of a market model, generation of input data, data adaptation to a tested model, test calculations and, finally, presentation and interpretation of results. A set of general criteria to assess various models has been proposed. Tests are run using dedicated computer applications, data is stored in open XML-based format originated in the multicommodity market model. Network topologies are derived from the SNDlib library.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2010, 2; 52-60
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Bidding languages for auctions of divisible goods
Autorzy:
Kaleta, M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/206521.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
bidding languages
auctions
market mechanism design
Opis:
Bidding languages are well-defined for combinatorial auctions. However, the auctions of divisible goods are quite common in practice. In contrast to combinatorial auctions, the feasible volumes of the offers are continuous in the case of divisible commodities. Such auctions are called continuous auctions. In the paper we introduce three families of bidding languages for continuous auctions. They are based on the concepts derived from the combinatorial auctions. We generalize the language families based on goods, bids, and some mixture of both of them, to the continuous case. We also analyze fundamental properties of the new languages. Simple examples, reflecting the complementarity and substitutability, are provided with exemplary representations in different languages.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2012, 41, 4; 799-816
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Model for Balancing Aggregated Communication Bandwidth Resources
Autorzy:
Pałka, P.
Kołtyś, K.
Toczyłowski, E.
Żółtowska, I.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309024.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
aggregation
auctions
bandwidth market
multicommodity trade
Opis:
In this paper we present a multicommodity bandwidth exchange model for balancing aggregated communication bandwidth resources (BACBR) that allows us to aggregate similar offers. In this model offers submitted to sell (or buy) the same, similar, or equivalent network resources (or demands for end-to-end connections) are aggregated into single commodities. BACBR model is based on the balancing communication bandwidth trade (BCBT) model. It requires much less variables and constraints then original BCBT, however the outcomes need to be disaggregated. The general model for disaggregation is also given in the paper.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2009, 3; 43-49
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Quantitative analysis of internet auctions advertising features: an empirical study
Autorzy:
Wojciechowski, A.
Warczynski, P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205589.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
on-line auctions
price effectiveness
bidder behaviour
Opis:
Internet auction sites are trading platforms with huge number of visitors who may become customers. On-line auctions allow users to buy and sell products without geographical borders, as in majority of cases ordered products are delivered by surface mail. The aim of the study was to collect substantial amount of data describing on-line auctions in a variety of attributes, and customer behaviour. We provide quantitative arguments in the discussion on effectiveness of promotional features used in on-line auctions. Experimental survey showed that almost 2/3 of the total number of observed auctions were indexed in five top (out of 23) product categories. Noticeable difference in sale effectiveness was observed for particular days of week and hours of auction termination. On Saturdays and Sundays the chance to terminate an auction with transaction was 17.72% and 19.46%, respectively, while on Tuesdays – Orly 14.29%. The highest ratio of successful auction-transaction against total number of auctions ending within particular hour occurred between 19:00 and 22:00. Our approximation of job lot transactions showed that it was a common practice among bidders to buy more than one product form one seller. In the reference period about 25% of all transactions could be qualified as job-lot ones. A miniature image displayed by auction title appeared the cheapest and most price effective form of advertising an auction while promoting on action site main page was the most effective in increasing visits/displays (by 2341%), yet, the high price of this advertising feature may pay back only if customers’ visits turn into transactions.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2012, 41, 4; 851-865
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Sprzedaż mocy przesyłowych infrastruktury energetycznej w drodze aukcji, a bezpieczeństwo energetyczne RP
Auctioning the transmission capacities of energy infrastructure and energy security of the Republic of Poland
Autorzy:
Smyrgała, Dominik
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/527013.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Collegium Civitas
Tematy:
pipeline capacity
grid capacity
auctions
energy security
Opis:
The article discusses the issue of energy infrastructure capacity auctions as a tool of improving the energy security of Poland. It argues that the experiences from foreign markets clearly indicate that this method of capacity allocation may be an effective way of providing the energy supply precisely where it is needed or generating extra funds for further infrastructure development.
Źródło:
Securitologia; 2013, 2(18); 29-38
1898-4509
Pojawia się w:
Securitologia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Postępowania prekwalifi kacyjne jako pierwszy etap udziału w aukcjach OZE
The pre-qualification proceeding as the fi rst stage of the renewable energy sources auction
Autorzy:
Trupkiewicz, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/927081.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-04
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
RES supporting system
RES auctions
prequalifi cation procedures
Opis:
The paper describes the legal grounds of prequalifi cation proceedings allowing certain categories of energy producers to participate in the Polish auction system, and thus to create a new system responsible for supporting the development of renewable energy sources (RES). These procedures are of administrative proceedings character but are modifi ed by specifi c legal provisions under the RES regulations. The legislator diff erentiated between two types of these procedures. Although they diff er in specifi c legal provisions, they both pursue to achieve common targets that will subsequently contribute to a speedy development of the RES plants in Poland. Among the main objectives of the prequalifi cation proceeding, the necessity of the regulatory authority to obtain the basic information about the RES installation project must be mentioned. This information not only allows to check the legitimacy of the accession to the RES auctions system but also allows to check the investment documentation of the project, and consequently implement and start the RES installation on time as prescribed by the law. In the initial period, the measures taken by the RES are to be aimed at eliminating form the auction these energy producers who could theoretically win the RES auction but would not, due to legal, technical or fi nancial reasons manage to complete the investment (build and start up the RES installation) within the time prescribed. This would not only impede a competitive conduct of the RES auction but would also prevent realisation of the EU climate and energy policy due to the failure to produce enough electricity to meet the required volume contracted for each new RES installations according the RES auctions.
Źródło:
Studia Prawa Publicznego; 2017, 1 (17); 101-121
2300-3936
Pojawia się w:
Studia Prawa Publicznego
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
An approximation algorithm for multi-unit auctions: numerical and subject experiments
Autorzy:
Takahashi, S.
Izunaga, Y.
Watanabe, N.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/406625.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:
multi-unit auctions
approximation algorithm
experiment
algorytm aproksymacyjny
eksperyment
Opis:
In multi-unit auctions for a single item, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism (VCG) attains allocative efficiency but suffers from its computational complexity. Takahashi and Shigeno thus proposed a greedy based approximation algorithm (GBA). In a subject experiment there was truly a difference in efficiency rate but no significant difference in seller’s revenue between GBA and VCG. It is not clear in theory whether each bidder will submit his or her true unit valuations in GBA. We show, however, that in a subject experiment there was no significant difference in the number of bids that obey “almost” truth-telling between GBA and VCG. As for individual bidding behavior, GBA and VCG show a sharp contrast when a human bidder competes against machine bidders; underbidding was observed in GBA, while overbidding was observed in VCG. Some results in a numerical experiment are also provided prior to reporting those observations.
Źródło:
Operations Research and Decisions; 2018, 28, 1; 95-115
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:
Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A scribal error in the Gnomon: A proposed correction to BGU V 1210
Autorzy:
Lewis, Juan P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/16729111.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Fundacja im. Rafała Taubenschlaga
Tematy:
Gnomon
imperial slaves
vicarii
public auctions
bona damnatorum
SC Claudianum
Opis:
This article proposes a correction to line 242 of papyrus BGU V 1210, the Gnomon of the Idios Logos. Substituting the accusative for the dative οὐικαρίοις, the vicarii of imperial slaves become objects of the infinitive κθᾶσται rather than the group to which the prohibition to buy things apply. Thus, instead of reading lines 241 and 242 separately, as it has traditionally been done, the two lines must be read together as two parts of a set of regulations. They limit the actions of imperial slaves, that is the Kαισαριανοῖ of line 241, who are barred from buying goods auctioned off by the fiscus, purchasing vicarii, and marrying freedwomen. Read together, the two lines can be interpreted as a measure limiting imperial slaves’ opportunities to increase their peculium by either taking advantage of the confiscation of private property by the fiscus or buying vicarii.
Źródło:
The Journal of Juristic Papyrology; 2022, 52; 103-111
0075-4277
Pojawia się w:
The Journal of Juristic Papyrology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rodzaje aukcji na wytwarzanie energii elektrycznej z odnawialnych źródeł energii w świetle przepisów ustawy o odnawialnych źródłach energii
Types of auction involving electric energy produced from renewable sources in the light of the provisions of the Act on renewable energy sources
Autorzy:
Kosiński, Eryk
Trupkiewicz, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/927307.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-04
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
electric energy
renewable sources of energy (RSE)
RSE auctions
RSE support system
Opis:
After an analysis of certain legal texts, the authors have established that under Polish law the President of the Energy Regulatory Offi ce may conduct 56 diff erent types of auctions for generators of the electric energy from renewable sources (RSE). For each individual RSE installation complying with the RES parameters a separate auction may be carried. One RSE installation may take part in several RSE auctions provided it satisfi es the parameters of each individual installation. These parameters concern both the premises connected with the start-up process (the commencement of the production of electric energy) of a given installation and the premises of technical nature such as carbon dioxide emission or the level of the installation capacity used, as well as premises of a subjective character regarding individual producers participating in the auction. A detailed analysis of all types of RSE auctions described in the Act of 20 February 2015 on renewable sources of energy allows to determine which types of installation may take part in individual actions. However, of key importance from the point of view of the possibility of a RSE auction to be carried are secondary regulations which allow the Council of Ministers to determine individual types of RSE auctions in which the volume of energy, subject of the auction, will be made available. Consequently the Council of Ministers which runs the State policy within the area of RSE has become essentially responsible not only for the possibility of conducting an RSE auction, but also for the implementation of the EU climate and energy policy which is also binding upon Poland.
Źródło:
Studia Prawa Publicznego; 2017, 3 (19); 51-68
2300-3936
Pojawia się w:
Studia Prawa Publicznego
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zastosowanie teorii szarych systemów do przewidywania przyszłych ofert składanych na aukcjach pierwszej ceny poprzez pryzmat modelu szarego GM(1,1)
Application of Gray System Theory to Model the First-Price Auction
Autorzy:
Barczak, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/587238.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
Tematy:
Aukcje
Metody ekonometryczne
Prognozowanie
Szeregi czasowe
Auctions
Econometric methodology
Forecasting
Time-series
Opis:
This paper presents the possibility of applying the theory of gray systems, with particular emphasis on the model GM (1,1) in the modeling of the first price auction. The paper presents the properties of the model GM (1,1) for the ultrashort time series representing the bid made by the participants at the first price auction. An analysis of the residuals simulation model based on the length of the time series and forecasting capabilities based on gray model GM (1,1). The analysis shows that with the decreasing the number of observations in time series (short time series) decreases the expost forecast error. This property is very important in modeling the course of the auction and in particular predicting possible future offerings. Model GM (1,1) can be considered in applications for masterpieces auctions.
Źródło:
Studia Ekonomiczne; 2013, 146; 7-18
2083-8611
Pojawia się w:
Studia Ekonomiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł

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