- Tytuł:
- Price-based coordinability in hierarchical systems with information asymmetry: a comparative analysis of Nash equilibrium conditions
- Autorzy:
-
Karpowicz, M. P.
Malinowski, K. - Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/206529.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2013
- Wydawca:
- Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
- Tematy:
-
Nash equilibrium, coordination asymmetric information
optimization - Opis:
- The well-known problem of price-based coordinability is studied for the case of a multi-agent system in which information regarding the goals of the interacting subsystems is asymmetric. The paper illustrates how the uniform-price-based coordination rulet may create incentives to anticipate the values of coordination signals and, thus, why the coordinability condition cannot be satisfied under asymmetric information. For this purpose a comparison is given of Nash equilibrium outcomes that are reachable individually by priceanticipating agents in two noncooperative games. These games are induced by the uniform-price-based coordination mechanism and are referred to as payment-bidding auction and demand-bidding auction. The analysis presented shows that in the games considered some of the agents may improve payoffs and allocations by applying the price-anticipating bidding strategies. However, the payment-bidding auction cannot be strictly dominated by the demand-bidding action with respect to the resource allocation levels individually received by each agent. The derived results of theoretic considerations are illustrated by numerical examples.
- Źródło:
-
Control and Cybernetics; 2013, 42, 1; 85-110
0324-8569 - Pojawia się w:
- Control and Cybernetics
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł