Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

Wyszukujesz frazę "Poznyak, A. S." wg kryterium: Autor


Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
Negotiating transfer pricing using the Nash bargaining solution
Autorzy:
Clempner, J. B.
Poznyak, A. S.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/330210.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:
negotiated transfer pricing
Nash bargaining
tax avoidance
corporate taxation
zagadnienie przetargowe Nasha
unikanie podatku
opodatkowanie przedsiębiorstw
Opis:
This paper analyzes and proposes a solution to the transfer pricing problem from the point of view of the Nash bargaining game theory approach. We consider a firm consisting of several divisions with sequential transfers, in which central management provides a transfer price decision that enables maximization of operating profits. Price transferring between divisions is negotiable throughout the bargaining approach. Initially, we consider a disagreement point (status quo) between the divisions of the firm, which plays the role of a deterrent. We propose a framework and a method based on the Nash equilibrium approach for computing the disagreement point. Then, we introduce a bargaining solution, which is a single-valued function that selects an outcome from the feasible pay-offs for each bargaining problem that is a result of cooperation of the divisions of the firm involved in the transfer pricing problem. The agreement reached by the divisions in the game is the most preferred alternative within the set of feasible outcomes, which produces a profit-maximizing allocation of the transfer price between divisions. For computing the bargaining solution, we propose an optimization method. An example illustrating the usefulness of the method is presented.
Źródło:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2017, 27, 4; 853-864
1641-876X
2083-8492
Pojawia się w:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games
Autorzy:
Clempner, J. B.
Poznyak, A. S.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/907787.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:
punkt równowagi Lyapunova
funkcja Lapunowa
proces decyzyjny
Lyapunov game
Lyapunov equilibrium point
best reply
repeated games
forward decision process
Opis:
We introduce the concept of a Lyapunov game as a subclass of strictly dominated games and potential games. The advantage of this approach is that every ergodic system (repeated game) can be represented by a Lyapunov-like function. A direct acyclic graph is associated with a game. The graph structure represents the dependencies existing between the strategy profiles. By definition, a Lyapunov-like function monotonically decreases and converges to a single Lyapunov equilibrium point identified by the sink of the game graph. It is important to note that in previous works this convergence has not been guaranteed even if the Nash equilibrium point exists. The best reply dynamics result in a natural implementation of the behavior of a Lyapunov-like function. Therefore, a Lyapunov game has also the benefit that it is common knowledge of the players that only best replies are chosen. By the natural evolution of a Lyapunov-like function, no matter what, a strategy played once is not played again. As a construction example, we show that, for repeated games with bounded nonnegative cost functions within the class of differentiable vector functions whose derivatives satisfy the Lipschitz condition, a complex vector-function can be built, where each component is a function of the corresponding cost value and satisfies the condition of the Lyapunov-like function. The resulting vector Lyapunov-like function is a monotonic function which can only decrease over time. Then, a repeated game can be represented by a one-shot game. The functionality of the suggested method is successfully demonstrated by a simulated experiment.
Źródło:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2011, 21, 2; 349-361
1641-876X
2083-8492
Pojawia się w:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria using the extraproximal method: Convergence analysis and implementation details for Markov chains games
Autorzy:
Trejo, K. K.
Clempner, J. B.
Poznyak, A. S.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/329722.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:
extraproximal method
Stackelberg games
convergence analysis
Markov chains
implementation
gry Stackelberga
analiza zbieżności
łańcuchy Markowa
Opis:
In this paper we present the extraproximal method for computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria in a class of ergodic controlled finite Markov chains games. We exemplify the original game formulation in terms of coupled nonlinear programming problems implementing the Lagrange principle. In addition, Tikhonov's regularization method is employed to ensure the convergence of the cost-functions to a Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium point. Then, we transform the problem into a system of equations in the proximal format. We present a two-step iterated procedure for solving the extraproximal method: (a) the first step (the extra-proximal step) consists of a “prediction” which calculates the preliminary position approximation to the equilibrium point, and (b) the second step is designed to find a “basic adjustment” of the previous prediction. The procedure is called the “extraproximal method” because of the use of an extrapolation. Each equation in this system is an optimization problem for which the necessary and efficient condition for a minimum is solved using a quadratic programming method. This solution approach provides a drastically quicker rate of convergence to the equilibrium point. We present the analysis of the convergence as well the rate of convergence of the method, which is one of the main results of this paper. Additionally, the extraproximal method is developed in terms of Markov chains for Stackelberg games. Our goal is to analyze completely a three-player Stackelberg game consisting of a leader and two followers. We provide all the details needed to implement the extraproximal method in an efficient and numerically stable way. For instance, a numerical technique is presented for computing the first step parameter (λ) of the extraproximal method. The usefulness of the approach is successfully demonstrated by a numerical example related to a pricing oligopoly model for airlines companies.
Źródło:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2015, 25, 2; 337-351
1641-876X
2083-8492
Pojawia się w:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Pedogenic process on eluvium-diluvium solid carbonate rocks
Proces kształtowania się gleb na skałach wapiennych
Autorzy:
Kyrylchuk, A.
Poznyak, S.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/905889.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej
Opis:
The article is dedicated to the problem of pedogenic process on eluvium-diluvium solid carbonate rocks and investigation of the formation peculiarities of morphogenetic characteristics of Rendzinas (Rendzic Leptosols, WRB, 2007) under the influence of ligneous and herbaceous agricultural vegetative formations.
Źródło:
Polish Journal of Soil Science; 2013, 46, 2
0079-2985
Pojawia się w:
Polish Journal of Soil Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

    Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies