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    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
    Tytuł:
    Wilhelm Ockham i Tomasz Bradwardine o wolnej woli Boga i człowieka
    William Ockham and Thomas Bradwardine on God’s and Human Free Will
    Autorzy:
    Jung, Elżbieta
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488738.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    Wilhelm Ockham
    Tomasz Bradwardine
    wolna wola
    wolny wybór
    determinizm
    Wiliam Ockham
    Thomas Bradwardine
    free will
    free choice
    determinism
    Opis:
    Artykuł przedstawia czternastowieczną dyskusję teologiczną dotyczącą problemu Bożej i ludzkiej wolnej woli. Jego głównymi bohaterami są Wilhelm Ockham i Tomasz Bradwardine. W swym opus magnum zatytułowanym O sprawie Boga przeciw Pelagianom... Bradwardine przywołuje dyskusję między św. Augustynem a Pelagiuszem dotyczącą wolnej woli, wolnego wyboru i predestynacji. Siebie uważa za augustynika, natomiast Ockhama oskarża o poglądy semipelagiańskie. W artykule przedstawiam opinie obydwu angielskich teologów, umieszczając je w kontekście Bradwardine’a krytyki semipelagianizmu.
    The paper deals with the fourteenth century theological discussion on the God’s and human free will. The dramatis personae are William of Ockham and Thomas Bradwardine. In his opus magnum entitled De causa Dei contra Pelagianum... Bradwardine recalls a quarrel between St. Augustine and Pelagius concerning free will, free choice and predestination. Considering yourself as the true Augustinian, Bradwardine accuses Ockham of being the Pelagian. The paper presents opinions of both English theologians against the background of Bradwardine critics of semi-pelagianism.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2017, 65, 3; 127-149
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Jak być sprawiedliwym? Ryszarda Kilvingtona komentarz do Etyki Arystotelesa
    How To Be Righteous? Richard Kilvington’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics
    Autorzy:
    Jung, Elżbieta
    Michałowska, Monika
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013170.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2008
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    Ryszard Kilvington
    średniowiecze
    etyka
    Arystoteles
    filozofia XIV wieku
    Richard Kilvington
    Middle Ages
    ethics
    Aristotle
    the philosophy of 14th century
    Opis:
    The article presents Richard Kilvington’s interpretation of Aristotle’s views on the concept of justice. Richard Kilvington was a fourteenth century philosopher and theologian who commented on various Aristotle’s works including Nicomachean Ethics. Kilvington’s commentary on Nicomachean Ethics was composed in 1325-1326 at Oxford University. It contains, among others, a question Utrum iustitia sit virtus moralis perfecta, which is devoted to the concept of justice. In his investigations Kilvington always uses logic as a major analytical tool, and mathematics as a method to discuss the issues and settle between opposite points of view, which is common for Kilvington’s commentaries. These techniques allow him to indicate all the contradictions in Aristotle’s analyses. Kilvington’s concept of justice clearly points to twofold order: horizontal and vertical. In the horizontal one Kilvington’s distinguishes the virtue of absolute justice that is a perfect model for all kinds of justice. In the vertical one he presents a model of a just man that is such a man who is ‘perfectly harmonious’. He also indicates the order of justice existing in the world, visible in human relationships, and regulated by three kinds of justice viz. compensatory, distributive and political. Kilvington’s investigations complete Artistotle’s opinions on justice, however they remain in the field of Aristotelian analyses and his concept of morality implemented in society. In this question Kilvington consistently separates the supernatural order and the order of natural reason, and, in his ethics, he never refers to theological issues concerning the relation between God and created world, which was uncommon for medieval theoretical practice.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2008, 56, 2; 117-129
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Rachunek nieskończonościowy: Ryszard Swineshead i Godfryd Wilhelm Leibniz
    Autorzy:
    Jung, Elżbieta
    Podkoński, Robert
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2103019.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
    Tematy:
    Ryszard Swineshead
    G.W. Leibniz
    rachunek nieskończonościowy
    filozofia przyrody
    oksfordzcy Kalkulatorzy
    Opis:
    W swojej korespondencji z Janem Wallisem z 1697 roku Leibniz z uznaniem wypowiada się o najbardziej znanym dziele powstałym w szkole oksfordzkich Kalkulatorów, a mianowicie Księdze kalkulacji. Ryszard Swineshead, autor tego traktatu, znany powszechnie jako Kalkulator, na jego kartach podsumowuje i dopełnia wysiłku swoich poprzedników zmierzającego ku matematyzacji scholastycznej filozofii przyrody. Podstawowym narzędziem jest tutaj rachunek proporcji zaczerpnięty z Elementów Euklidesa, ale oksfordzcy Kalkulatorzy wypracowują także swoisty rachunek nieskończonościowy, wynikający z zaakceptowania Arystotelesowskiej koncepcji kontinuum. Mimo że w dziełach Leibniza i Swinesheada odnajdujemy rozumowania na pierwszy rzut oka bardzo podobne, to jednak nie mogą one stanowić dostatecznej podstawy dla twierdzenia, że Leibniz wykorzystywał, czy chodźby inspirował się Księgą kalkulacji dokonując swoich odkryć naukowych. Po pierwsze, mamy do czynienia z tylko dwoma fragmentami, co do których możemy mówić o uderzającym podobieństwie. Po drugie, każdy z tych myślicieli, tworząc w zupełnie innej atmosferze naukowej, wykorzystywał narzędzia matematyczne w fizyce w innym celu. Ryszard Swineshead nie potrafił wyjść poza granice filozofii przyrody wyznaczone przez Arystotelesa i nauka ta była dla niego celem samym w sobie, bez jakchkolwiek odniesień do praktyki czy nauk wytwórczych. Jeśli więc Leibniz inspirował się Księgą kalkulacji, to tylko w tym sensie, że odnajdował w niej pomysły i rozumowania analogiczne do swoich własnych.
    Źródło:
    Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria; 2016, 4; 219-228
    1230-1493
    Pojawia się w:
    Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Arystoteles na nowo odczytany. Ryszarda Kilvingtona „Kwestie o ruchu”
    Autorzy:
    Jung, Elżbieta
    Wojtczak, Hanna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/books/44308309.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Opis:
    The impulse to this book was a question that I was asked after my talk on God and science in the Middle Ages, whether I was able to give a positive answer to the problem, which I had signalled in my previous book Między filozofią przyrody a nowożytnym przyrodoznawstwem. Ryszard Kilvington i fizyka matematyczna w średniowieczu, namely that I did not know what medieval science had been and what respect it had to the modern science. I have decided that the best way to answer that question is to show the readers on the example of one of the medieval texts dealing with physics and, more specifically, one of the fourteenth century commentaries to Aristotle’s Physics. My choice, with regard to my long standing interest in Richard Kilvington, was obvious. I decided to present a Polish translation of his Question on motion along with a monograph. The main purpose of this study is to verify, through detailed analyses, the commonly accepted view about the revolutionary character of the new theory of motion invented and developed by the members of the so-called school of Oxford Calculators, which was founded by Richard Kilvington and Thomas Bradwardine. The book consists of two parts. The first one presents results of research concerning Richard Kilvington’s biography and dating of his works, a description of his four questions on motion, methods he used in philosophy of nature, and his theories set against the background of two famous fourteenth century thinkers: William of Ockham and Thomas Bradwardine. The second part presents a Polish translation of Kilvington’s four questions – a result of his lectures on Aristotle’s Physics. These questions are: 1) Whether an active potency exceeds a passive potency of a body in motion; 2) Whether a quality takes degrees of more and less; 3) Whether a simple body can move equally fast in a plenum and a vacuum; 4) Whether that which has changed in the moment when it has first changed, is in that to which it has changed. Richard Kilvington was born in the beginning of the fourteenth century in the village of Kilvington in Yorkshire. He studied at Oxford, where he became Master of Arts (1324/1325) and then Doctor of Theology (ca. 1335). His academic career was followed by a diplomatic and ecclesiastical one. It culminated in his service as Dean of St. Paul’s Cathedral in London. Along with Richard Fitzralph, Kilvington was involved in the battle against mendicant friars almost until his death in 1361. Except for a few sermons, all of Kilvington’s known works stem from his lectures at Oxford. His philosophical works, the Sophismata and Quaestiones super De generatione et corruptione, both composed before 1325, were the result of lectures given as a Bachelor of Arts; his Quaestiones super Physicam (Questions on motion) composed in 1325/26 and Quaestiones super Libros Ethicorum composed in 1326/1332 come from the period he was a Master of Arts; finally, he composed eight questions on Peter Lombard’s Sentences at the Faculty of Theology before 1335. One of the most notable achievements of Kilvington’s theory is his awareness of the different levels of abstraction involved in the problem he analyzes. Although his account frequently proceeds secundum imaginationem in the direction of “speculative physics”, it never renounces empirical verification. Nevertheless, Kilvington ponders questions, which would never arise as a result of direct observation, since the structure of nature can only be uncovered by highly abstract analyses. Such abstractions, however, arise from genuine realities and cannot contradict them. He sees physics and mathematics as complementary, i.e., as two different ways of describing natural phenomena. Reality provides the starting point for the more complicated mental constructions, which in turn make it comprehensible. While mathematics is the proper way to solve the problems, logic remains the most convenient way to pose them. These different methods together guarantee the objective and demonstrative character of the natural sciences. On the one hand, Kilvington never abandons the realm of Aristotelian physics or rejects the principles laid down in his natural philosophy. But on the other, his tendency to combine mathematics and physics frequently led him beyond Aristotle’s theories to seek solutions to many paradoxes which resulted from Aristotelian principles. Kilvington pointed to two different conditions which have to be met: one referring to the everyday use of language, which describes real, physical phenomena; and another referring to the formal, i.e. logico-mathematical, language that deals with the questions in the realm of speculative, i.e., mathematical, physics. Like a great many Oxford thinkers of the period, Kilvington is convinced that mathematics is useful in any branch of scientific inquiry that deals with measurable subjects. He makes a broad use of the most popular fourteenth century calculative techniques to solve not only physical but also ethical and theological problems. Three types of calculations can be found in Kilvington’s Quaestions on motion. The most predominant is the measure by limits, i.e., by the first and last instants beginning and ending a continuous process, and by the intrinsic and extrinsic limits of capacities of passive and active potencies. The second type of calculation, by a latitude of forms, covers processes in which accidental forms or qualities are intensified or diminished, e.g., in the distribution of such natural qualities as heat or whiteness. Finally, the third type of calculation is more properly mathematical and employs a new calculus of compounding ratios in order to measure the speed of local motion. Although Kilvington subscribes to the general Aristotelian principles of motion, he follows Ockham in accepting substance and quality as the only two kinds of really existing things. Beyond doubt, Kilvington follows Ockham’s understanding of the works of the Philosopher. He explains the reality of motion in terms of the mobile subject and places, qualities, and quantities it acquires successively. Consequently, Kilvington is mostly interested in measuring local motion in terms of its actions or causes, the distance traversed and time consumed, rather than in the “intensity” of its speed. It is his analysis of local motion that places Kilvington among the 14th-century pioneers who considered the problem of motion with respect to its cause (tamquam penes causam), corresponding to modern dynamics, and with respect to its effect (tamquam penes effectum), corresponding to modern kinematics. In his first question, Kilvington, while debating the problem of setting boundaries to capacities or potencies involved in active/passive processes, presents many theories of his colleagues, as well as the Aristotelian and Averroenian solutions of the problem. He articulates most of the issues, which were at stake, and poses questions that influenced the solutions of later Calculators. Kilvington’s most interesting and original idea in the theory of motion concerns the new rule of motion, which relates forces, resistance and speeds in motion and shows that the proper way of measuring the speed of motion is to describe its variations by the double ratio of motive force (F) and resistance (R). In order to produce a mathematically coherent theory, he insists (in agreement with Euclid’s definition from the fifth book of the Elements) that a proper double proportion is the multiplication of a proportion by itself. Kilvington’s function makes it possible to avoid a serious weakness of Aristotle’s theory, which cannot explain the mathematical relationship of F and R in a motion with a speed of less than 1. Local motion considered in its dynamic aspect, i.e., when speed is proportional to the ratios of Fs to Rs, describes the changes of speed, i.e., the accelerate motion. Local motion considered in its kinematic aspect describes the changes of speed with regard to time and traversed distance, and it describes both uniform and uniformly difform motion. Like William of Ockham, Kilvington is convinced that a motion is nothing else than an individual thing in motion. Therefore, speed has to be measured by distances, i.e., latitude of a quality (formal distance) or quantity traversed, and such traversals take time unless the speed is infinitely great. In his questions he considers all sorts of motion, which can occur both in a medium and in a void. Although he holds that the vacuum does not exist in nature, he is nevertheless convinced, contrary to Aristotle, that neither logic nor nature exclude a possible existence of a vacuum. Moreover, using a new rule of motion it is possible to show that a motion in a vacuum would be temporal for both mixed and simple bodies. Ockham’s influence is also confirmed in Kilvington’s considerations of qualitative changes, which was also one of the most frequently discussed issues in the 14th century. Kilvington is convinced that two main Ockhamist principles, namely particularist ontology and economy of thinking, suffice to explain all qualitative changes, such becoming white or cold. Since a quality is a real thing, it is enough to conclude that in the process of becoming hot a body possesses the same quality, which changes from one extreme, i.e., coldness to the other, i.e., hotness. Such terms as the “latitude of a form”, “degree of coldness” etc. are nothing else but sincategorematic terms, which we use to describe qualitative changes. In reality, there are only substances and qualities, the only existing permanent things, while the remaining eight Aristotelian categories serve only to describe various aspects of an individual thing in the outside reality. Kilvington’s teaching on natural philosophy was influential both in England and on the Continent. His Quaestiones de motu were well known to the next generation of the Oxford Calculators and influenced also such prominent Parisian masters as Nicole Oresme and John Buridan. It was Thomas Bradwardine, however, who was the most renowned beneficiary of Kilvington’s work, so much that until recently he was called the Founder of the Oxford Calculators’ School,. The analysis of dispersal of new ideas of mathematical physics point strongly at Kilvington as their primary source. In his famous Treatise on proportions in motion (the best know medieval treatise presenting a new rule of motion) Bradwardine incorporated almost one half of Kilvington’s first and third questions on motion. Extolling of Bradwardine’s treatise by his followers and modern historians of medieval science and swift oblivion of Kilvington’s work were caused by the fact that Bradwardine treatise was a manual for students following the rules for this type of work, i.e., dividing material in chapters, which present general rules based on a theory of proportion, while Kilvington’s questions are the result of his lecturing; one can easily notice that some parts of them are students’ reportata, so their text is difficult in reading. In the present book I reiterate the opinion expressed in my previous book that medieval science was a specific phenomenon of the medieval culture. It can hardly be compared with modern science and its views of the world are clearly incompatible with the modern ones. In its history, medieval science took the Aristotelian course, thoroughly explored that framework exposing its paradoxes and weakness and reached the point, where it was no longer able to overcome the lingering doubt. Its story is finished, so each historian of science is free to write his or her own tale about it. In my opinion, Richard Kilvington, even though he abandoned Aristotle’s prohibition of metabasis, which does not allow to use mathematics as a proper language for physics, and invented a few new methods, still strove to overcome the difficulties and the numerous aporiae of Aristotelian physics, showing how we should properly understand the Philosopher.
    Prezentowana książka jest efektem wieloletnich badań dotyczących wyjątkowego okresu w historii nauki średniowiecznej, mianowicie początków fizyki matematycznej. Składają się na nią dwie części: monografia, w której autorka odpowiada na pytanie, czy czternastowieczna fizyka matematyczna, inspirowana nominalistyczną filozofią Wilhelma Ockhama, doprowadziła do zerwania z jakościową fizyką Arystotelesa już w wieku czternastym, oraz tłumaczenie „Kwestii o ruchu” Ryszarda Kilvingtona -jednego z twórców szkoły Oksfordzkich Kalkulatorów. W swoich kwestiach Kilvington podejmuje analizę zagadnienia zmian, rozumianych, zgodnie z definicją Arystotelesa, jako ruch przestrzenny, zmiany jakościowe oraz ilościowe w ujęciu nominalistycznym, czyniąc matematykę właściwym językiem opisu przyrody. Jakiego rodzaju są te „obliczenia" i jakie dzięki nim osiągamy rezultaty, Czytelnik dowie się z lektury obydwu części tej książki.
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Książka
    Tytuł:
    Rodowód nauki nowożytnej
    The Origins of Modern Science
    Autorzy:
    Jung-Palczewska, Elżbieta
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/941643.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    1998
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Opis:
    The main characteristic of modern science is that its new theories contain the old ones as their particular cases. In this respect, one can speak of "modern" science only since 17th century discoveries of Galileo, Kepler and Descartes. Yet, one can find certain traits of the modern scientific mode of thinking as early as in 14th century; they include interest in the practical use of science, introduction of experiment and mathematical method. Late medieval science was powerfully influenced by the doctrines of Aristotle, who found the essence of scientific pursuit in establishing the causes of the phenomena observed in the world in the inductive process of abstraction, which has three main stages of generalization: physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. In physics the solutions were hinged on the concept of natural directions and the belief that uniform motion requires permanent application of power. The foundations of Aristotelean physics were first questioned in the 14th century. Duns Scotus and Wiliam of Ockham critically discussed the doctrine of induction, originating the shift of interest towards observation. Peter of Abano started the theory of experiment. Some criticism came from the theologians, who questioned certain limitations of the Aristotelean frame of mind. The main subject of controversy was the concept of vacuum, discussed especially with the reference to motion. Here the Aristotelean standpoint was criticised from the positions of atomism and Platonism by a number of scholars starting from Robert Grosseteste, through Giles of Rome and Nicholas of Autrecourt, to Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno. Other controversial problems included plurality of the worlds, privileged positions in the universe, circular motion of the earth. Here an important contribution was made by Nicolas Copernicus. Another group of scholars, which helped to overcome Aristoteleanism, was the so-called Merton school of Oxford. Their new theories of motion, which distinguished between its kinematic and dynamic aspects, quickly spread through Europe and are said to have influenced Galileo. Yet another source of inspiration was found by Galileo in the views of the nominalist school of Paris, notably Nicholas of Oresme and John Buridan. By reaping the benefit of their innovations and overcoming their deficiencies Galileo was able to lay foundations for the modern science, first fully formulated by Newton.
    Źródło:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica – Aesthetica – Practica; 1998, 12
    0208-6107
    2353-9631
    Pojawia się w:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica – Aesthetica – Practica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Szkotyzm w Polsce
    Scotism in Poland
    Autorzy:
    Gensler, Marek
    Jung-Palczewska, Elżbieta
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/941641.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    1998
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Opis:
    During the 15th century the Cracow University had become a major intellectual centre in central Europe. It was especially important in educating lawyers and administrators for the Polish-Lithuanian state as well as the higher clergy: as a result, special stress was put on legal and theological studies. The faculty of Liberal Arts (Philosophy), though less prized, also took part in the intellectual life of the Latin Europe, becoming home to representatives of most philosophical schools of the late Middle Ages. Scotism was one of the last medieval schools to arrive in Cracow. It was introduces there by Michael Twaróg of Biestrzyków, who studied the doctrines of scotism in logic and metaphysics. His main source was not Duns Scotus, however, but his pupils and followers, notably Antonius Andreae, whose "Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicae" was a book widely read in Cracow since 1489. Antonius' solutions on the division of sciences, the subject-matter of metaphysics, the concept of being, etc. were accepted also by Nicholas of Michałowice, Martin Kulap of Tarnowiec, John of Głogów, and John of Stobnica. Some of them tried to combine some scotist ideas with philosophical views of other schools. In logic, the solutions associated with scotism started appearing in Cracow s little earlier – in 1470s – but their influence was weaker than in metaphysics. Again, they were mostly coming from the works of Scotus's followers of the 14th and early 15th century. The group of Cracow logicians influences by scotist opinions included John of Głogów, Michael of Wrocław, Nicholas of Giełczewo and Michael od Biestrzyków, who tried to combine the views of Scotus with those of Peter of Spain in his commentary on "Parva naturalia". Philosophy of nature was the discipline in which the influence of scotism was felt last and least. It is found mostly in the works of John of Stobnica – especially in his commentary on "Parvulus philosophiae naturalis" (1498) – and Simon of Leśniewo, John's pupil, who wrote glossa to the commentary.
    Źródło:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica – Aesthetica – Practica; 1998, 12
    0208-6107
    2353-9631
    Pojawia się w:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica – Aesthetica – Practica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

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