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Tytuł:
Typy i charakter działań wojennych Cesarstwa Chińskiego
Military operations of the Chinese Empire: their types and characteristics
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1992216.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Opis:
Wars waged by the Chinese Empire, or civil wars within it, differ significantly from those waged in Europe, owing to differences in the sphere of ideology, predominantly Confucian, and historical realities. There are also cultural differences related to the prevailing attitudes to war, struggle and the use of force. The study presents several of them. Rebellion against a “morally discredited” dynasty, which already lost her “Mandate of Heaven” (to re-establish moral order in China and in the world). Re-establishment of “order in the world” by China as the leading Middle State. “Punishment of usurpers” carried out during the division of the Empire (since there could be merely one legitimate Son of Heaven, all other rulers, who pretended to be independent Sons of Heaven, were considered “usurpers”). Civil wars: “legitimate rebellion against discredited power holders” and “re-establishment of order” on the side of the state authorities. Invasions by the Empire to conquer new lands or enlarge the sphere of its influence (most often to subdue neighbouring states and reduce their status to a vassal country) The author briefly outlines the “borderlands”, which the Empire wanted to control when it was strong. He also analyses the social, economic and ideological reasons, why in the Empire prevailed isolationist policy and the expansion was carried out merely on a limited scale, mostly to the neighbouring states and lands.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2016, XIX; 11-41
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zmiany stosunku do Mao Zedonga w Chinach współczesnych i jego kult religijny
Changing attitudes towards Mao Zedong in the PRC and his religious cults
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2010991.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Opis:
The paper outlines changing attitudes towards Mao since 1976 up to 2015, as an important part of political and ideological transformations in the PRC. The study is based on the author’s personal talks with numerous Chinese of different social standing during these years. Some essential party documents, interesting research by other scholars and internet sources have been employed here as well. The point of departure constitutes a comparison of Mao and Stalin and their political and social roles respectively in the PRC and in the Soviet Union. The author puts an emphasis on cultural differences between the two societies. The author points out that the political and ideological cult of Mao as a Great Helmsman and Great Teacher started to fade away before his death (September 9, 1976). The turning point constituted the death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976. Then, during mass celebrations commemorating him at the Tiananmen Square, Maoist “revolutionary” policy had been criticised in public for the first time and the new myth of the Prime Minister as “great patriot taking care of the state and of the people” was born. The new nationalistic spirit was manifested in opposition to “internationally minded” revolutionary policy, which caused suffering of the Chinese people. Immediately after the funeral of Mao, in the beginning of October, the radical Maoists, who predominated at that time, were arrested in a particular coup d’etat, and the so-called Gang of Four lost power. The moderate Maoists, who ruled the country, tried to preserve the cult of Mao, but within the ruling elite and the society critical attitudes to the Maoist policy were on the rise. It was combined with increasing nationalism and the cult of Zhou at the grass root level. In 1978, a new period started; both the people and the cadres on the grass root level initiated reforms, even those dismantling of the Maoist system (including the people’s communes at the countryside). The “walls of democracy” appeared in the cities, and the critical evaluation of the past concerned the Maoist heritage. The new leaders including Deng Xiaoping led a “silent de-maoisation”: the destruction of Mao monuments, his quotations in public places, etc. Moreover, they presented Mao as a great politician, who committed serious mistakes, and whose heritage could be analysed and criticised under the heading “Mao was a man not a god”. On the other hand, they struggled against “excessive criticism” towards Mao as harmful to the state and destabilising the society. At the end of the 1980s, new tendencies started to appear. The new market economy already changed life of the ordinary Chinese. On the one hand, new super-rich, and on the other the “new poor” appeared side by side with sharp economic differences between cities, villages, and regions. The new “money first” mentality prevailed, whereas moral values and human attitudes faded away. Under the new system of “wild capitalism”, the interest in the Maoist heritage could be seen among the older people and youngsters as well in opposition to the new official “market and motherland” ideology. Mao at this stage had been imagined first of all as a great “national leader”. The paper also analyses the evolution of Mao Zedong Mausoleum towards an “Ancestral Hall of Revolution”. The author analyses various religious and mystical aspects of the cults of Mao in the framework of the “folk religion”, starting with his veneration as a God of Safe Travel up to the Tutelary God Granting Prosperity to the Nation and Tranquillity to the People. Chinese authorities have to take under consideration such phenomena and adapt their policies to new social expectations. In this field, one could see the fundamental contradiction between the ruling elite educated in the tradition of the Western Enlightenment and the Chinese people much more bounded by their civilisation.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2015, XVIII; 9-66
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Azja Południowo-Wschodnia jako region historyczno-kulturowy (I)
Southeast Asia as a regional community – its historical and cultural characteristics (part I)
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2028944.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Opis:
The author outlines the principal geographical and climatic features of the region and against this background he indicates its cultural characteristics. High differentiation constitutes its main feature. During the last two millennia the local cultures and states have been shaped by all major civilisations: Chinese (Vietnam and some ethnic groups on the mainland), Indian (Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Champa, island empires), Islamic (Malay Peninsula and the islands), the Western (in its Spanish, French, British, Dutch, Portuguese and American versions). There were present all colonial European powers, and in addition to them the USA and Japan. One may also find there all major world religions. Two countries are in practice Catholic (Philippines and East Timor), whereas in Vietnam Catholic presence is very strong. In both respects, cultural and religious, the native heritage also remains vivid. One of the particular features of the region is the division into two “worlds”: of the mountains/hills and of the lowlands/valleys/deltas. In the symbolic sphere the first was identified with fi re, whereas the second with water (or with birds and dragons/snakes). The presence of water was also a real phenomenon of a great significance: it determined the style of life, production of food, types of houses and of dress, even customs and mentality. Mountains offered entirely different conditions that determined another style of life. The relations between societies of “water” and of “mountains” were very complex: determined by mutual fears and attraction; they could consider themselves “brothers”, and fight one with another. Their separation, notwithstanding various bounds, is remarkable. Hills played an important role in local religious life and in images of political power (the figure of the Mountain-King, lingas, stupas, etc.). Enormous ethnic and linguistic differentiation was related to various types of production practised there side by side. One can find there food gatherers, primitiveshifting and sedentary cultivators (now new industrial and post-industrial sectors have been added). Each of these essential economies determined density of population per square km, types of social organisation, and the level of “openness” of individual cultures and their capacity to absorb alien groups. Thus we find there national or semi-national communities numbering millions, ethnic groups that could be counted by thousands, and other counted by dozens. Particular geographic conditions allowed them to co-exist in separation, although sometimes at a close distance. This resulted in a particular mosaic of languages divided into several major groups, although the borders of the region in this respect, to the north and to the west are unclear. Therefore, on the one hand, we find there enormous differentiation of individual groups and almost extreme isolation of many of them, and on the other – an exceptional range of inter-regional trade and communication by the sea (involving the coast and islands). One could even state that the Southeast Asia was a pioneer of globalisation and of pluralistic societies.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2002, V; 9-32
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Cechy szczególne Rewolucji Xinhai i jej paradoksy
Particular Character of the Xinhai Revolution and its Paradoxes
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2022378.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Opis:
The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 constitutes a turning point in Chinese history: it put an end to the native imperial system, and introduced to China a Western republican system instead, together with the new Han-Chinese nationalism (also inspired by the West). Unfortunately, the experiment of an accelerated westernization failed, as it happened in post-colonial Africa and in numerous post-Soviet republics. The state collapsed and China suffered from chaos, poverty, and even more brutal oppression by foreign powers. The successful re-building of the state had been initiated only in 1949 under the Communist regime. The new political course initiated in 1978 was to some extent close to that outlined by Sun Yat-sen: national solidarity was propagated instead of class struggle and economic development of China instead of the “world revolution”. National aims, including unification of all Chinese territories, have been adopted, and accelerated westernization was combined with a return to some national traditions. The great emphasis was put on building up new modern infrastructure and borrowing modern science and technology from the West, whereas Western political ideas were treated with suspicion. One could also notice some Sun Yat-sen’s influences in the contemporary Chinese foreign policy. The author compares the Xinhai Revolution with the French Revolution referring to some of R. Bin Wong’s concepts, but he also adds other differences. He indicates that instead of „the right versus the left cleavage”, the main controversy in China concerned the attitude towards native heritage and westernization. He also analyses the transformation of traditional identities and the evolution of a new nationalism.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2011, XIV; 31-48
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Religijność wietnamska: tradycyjny kult duchów opiekuńczych wspólnoty wiejskiej a państwo
Vietnamese religiosity: the traditional cult of tutelary spirits in village communes and the state
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2023442.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Opis:
The author indicates the present renaissance of all the forms of religiosity after the doi moi reforms, indigenous and of foreign origins. The study is based on the author’s field work in Vietnam at the end of the 1970’s and his analysis of the “temple books” collected by the colonial French authorities. The authors compares this Vietnamese material with Chinese cults and religious practices, and – on the other hand – briefly outlines the present situation of religious cults with the “socialist” period and in detail analyses their state on the village level in the last centuries of the monarchy. As the principal forms of the Vietnamese religiosity the author outlines the following cults and rites: 1) The “Three Teachings” – Confucianism, Taoism and Zen Buddhism; 2) Sino-Vietnamese cults – adapted from China (as the Chinese cult of Mazu, of the Prince Guan, Xuan Wu, etc.); 3) The Vietnamese cults of saints (thanh), in particular of the “national heroes” (anh hung), worshipped in the dinh temple; 4) Cults of the local tutelary spirits (most of the village cults belongs to this category) also worshipped in dinh; 5) The cult of the ancestors; 6) The state cults celebrated by the ruler; 7) Beliefs and practices related to the mysterious forces – benevolent or malignant (such as astrology, geomancy, oracles, the use of amulets, etc. In addition the author indicates that these cults and rites involves first of all various communities, not individuals as in the West, and instead western priests the rites are usually performed by the heads or representatives of the communities: of the family, of the community or of the state. One can find there the anthropocentric not the western theocentric orientation (this is common to all the countries of the Confucian-Buddhist civilization). Moreover, the orthopraxy not the western orthodoxy prevails in Vietnam as in the region, hence religious rites and practices are essential there, not beliefs, so important in the West. The rites serve first of all to preserving/restoring order and harmony in the family, in the village or in the region/the state. Therefore the deep religiosity is usually missing and the rites have mainly social functions. The author describes the traditional Vietnamese village commune as a semiautonomous village-state (with its own complex bureaucracy) that could be compared with the Mediterranean city-states. Hence, following the Vietnamese historians, the author characterizes the Vietnamese monarchy as a kind of federation of such village communes. In this respect Vietnam differs significantly from the Chinese Empire, where the state was much stronger. Village communes constituted the fundamental entity of the political and social order in the Vietnamese monarchy and these traditions influenced political culture in Vietnam. The author presents the village communes’ tutelary spirits – thanh huang: their types, character, ranks and functions. He indicates that this deity corresponds to the Chinese “tutelary deity of a city” – cheng huang, and indicates all together 14 types of such Vietnamese deities (with numerous examples). The author indicates the difficulties related to such surveys in the field and in archives, first of all related to the “temple taboo” (hen) and its relation to the state policy. The strengthening of the state in the 2nd millennium involved increasing control of the village cults and the resistance of the local communities, which protected their original cults with taboo and other measures. In this way the old cults that contradicted the newly propagated Confucian values and norms often could be preserved. The author outlines the complex interrelations of the village communes and the state in the last centuries of the Vietnamese monarchy in detail with references to various examples of villages and their correspondence with the Ministry of Rites. He concludes that a significant autonomy of village communes was preserved until the end of the independent Vietnamese monarchy in the religious aspect, which was certainly essential to the Confucian type of state.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2009, XII; 138-171
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Religijność chińska – uwagi o innej cywilizacji
The Chinese religiosity – remarks on a different civilisation
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2025999.pdf
Data publikacji:
2003-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Opis:
The author considers “religiosity” as a universal social phenomenon, whereas “religion” constitutes its particular, cultural form. The study presents particular characteristics of the Chinese religiosity and its essential differences with the Mediterranean religions. The five “constitutional” religions in PRC are presented (Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, and the Catholic and Protestant Churches), as well as the officially registered religions in Taiwan. The author outlines changing attitudes to them and their contemporary development. He indicates great variations in the estimations of their “believers”, and points out the difficulties in “counting” of so called “believers into Chinese religions”. He concludes that the majority of the Chinese practice something that is located beyond these “official”, or “institutionalised” religions, i.e. “popular beliefs”. In some respects they even more resemble our Western religions than the official Chinese “three teachings” (Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism). In his opinion, all our Western categories and notions related to “religions” appear inadequate to the Chinese religiosity, although the local Westernised elite tries to apply them. Among principal characteristic of the Chinese religiosity one can enumerate the absence of the division into sacred and profane, so fundamental to the Indo-Europeans and to the peoples of Mediterranean civilisations, and to their very concept of religion. Therefore, in China “religion” cannot be defined as “the sphere of sacredness or related to sacredness”, and distinguished from the “profane”. Émile Durkheim’s concepts, inherited by Mircea Eliade, appear inadequate to the social realities where everything is sacred-and-profane, although in different degree, and everything could possess greater or smaller, invisible, but not „supernatural” „powers”. The author points out a particular heritage of the three Mediterranean monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) that shaped the Western notions of “religion”. Their common characteristics are outlined, such as a “community of believers”, temples as “sacred places”, “a sacred day of a seven-day week”, the struggle between forces of Good and of the Evil, particular status of “humans” as “God’s creatures”, and a particular relations between God and Man, the eternal truth of God’s words (that allows the distinction of “heretics” and “pagans”), the concept of “metaphysics”, of “spiritual beings”, of “supranatural”, and of transcendence, etc. In addition, these “religions” constituted a very noble sphere, and “priests” – a particular elite. The author indicates that in China religious affairs enjoyed much less respect, and each community was religious-and-profane. Their heads usually maintained relations with community’s protective spirits (considered its “particular members”!) and represented it vis-á-vis the “outside world” – social-and-spiritual. From the family to the state all structures were semi-religious, and all performed similar functions: administrative, managerial, religious, and educative. Therefore even today the separation of the state from the religious affairs and from moral education of the population – is truly difficult. The differences are even deeper. In the West believing in some revealed, sacred truths is essential, so orthodoxy is central for its religions. In East Asia, on the other hand, right practice is most essential, whereas various concepts were allowed or propagated, side by side. Therefore orthopraxy is central to its religiosity. Moreover, the followers of the monotheistic religions concentrate their attention on God, and they threat gods with a similar attention and respect, thus their worldview is theocentric. In Chinese religiosity the human beings were central, so the anthropocentric worldview predominated there. There were no “ontological gulfs” between man, God and other spiritual beings, and animals or objects. All “beings/objects” are matarial-and-spiritual/energetical, human beings are divided into numerous “ontological categories” – lower and higher. So they could reach higher forms of existence, including gods and god-type levels, or descend to “lower” forms (which not necessarily appear “lower” to the Chinese). So called “teachings” (jiao) indicate how humans could reach higher ontological forms, whereas other popular religious-type practices help them to obtain prosperity, longevity, and happiness. The Yin-Yang dualism was of complementary nature, nor antagonistic, as the struggle of Evil against God, forces of Darkness against Light. Therefor the concept of “mission” and of “holy struggle” were alien, instead the concept of harmony was presented as the main principle of the universe, and the idea of adapting to the natural order was promoted. The educated scholars and administrators constituted a Chinese elite, not noble warriors and clergy, as among the Indo-Europeans. However, some elementary Indo-European and Mediterranean influences could be detected in China, and their concepts become known to a certain degree through Buddhism, Manicheism and Islam. The Western religious systems are “closed”, i.e. the communities of believers are “closed”, the pantheons, truths, rites, temples, etc. all are “closed”, or “restricted”. On the other hand, in China all of them are “open”: a “worshiper” could at the morning study Confucian books, at the afternoon visit a Taoist temple, and for funerals of his grandma invite Buddhist monks, a Catholic priest and a rabbi, if he resides near by. He could erect a temple to any spirit he likes, even to a hero of a novel, and he could establish particular rites to him, and such cult could be diffused and eventually approved by the state. Even a living person could be worshipped and become a “tutelary spirit”. Almost each figure could be put on an altar at every temple, so they usually are syncretic. The “temples” are not “sacred”, but could serve to various social purposes. Everybody could enter every temple, every time he liked, and for various purposes, or do not enter any of them. There was no “clergy”, nor organised “churches”, etc. In addition to personified powers the Chinese acknowledged existence of innumerable invisible forces of the universe, belonging to its natural order. They could not be “worshipped”, but one had adapt one’s actions to them. It was the sphere of “pseudo-sciences”, like geomancy, astrology, the Yin-Yang and the Five Elements, fortune-telling, characteristics of time-space “sectors”, etc. Therefore there is no boundary between “religion” and civic or political life, hence “religion” could not be distinguished and separated there. The practices that resemble mostly our religion were disdained by the Chinese elite, and considered the “superstitions” of uneducated folk. Gu Hongmin (1857-1928) seems to be right indicating that this elite cultivated and propagated a kind of “religion of good-citizenship” that constituted the superior level of the Chinese “religiosity” but was “religious” in its approach, not in its contents or forms. Hence the Chinese religiosity is a very complex phenomenon, and the Western categories often obscure its nature and its multiple functions.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2003, VI; 7-67
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Jiang Zemin
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2035507.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2001, IV; 140-151
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O metodologicznych trudnościach badania i opisywania Chin
Some methodological difficulties in studying and analysing China
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1955856.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Tematy:
honne
Yoshio Sugimoto
Karl-Heinz Pohl
Heilmann
Axial Age
Multiple Modernities
clash of civilizations
Chiny
reformy Denga
metodologia
eurocentryzm
Fukuyama
Huntington
Eisenstadt
religia
prawa człowieka
demokracja
wolność
państwo chińskie
autorytaryzm
Opis:
The study presents various factors which obstacles adequate description and analysis of Chinese realities in Western scholarly literature. The first factor presented in the article is the psychological mechanism of a “mirror”. As Lynn T. White suggested, since the 17th century, that Westerners look at China not through a ‘window’ but through a ‘mirror’, in which their own fears or most treasured ideals are refl ected, not China itself. Hence their descriptions of China refl ect first of all their state of mind. Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen add to this metaphor another one, that of a procrustean bed. According to these authors, contemporary Western scholars procede like ancient Procrustes who made his captives fit his bed cutting their too long limbs or stretching these too short, in order to adapt Chinese realities to the Western schemes. Sebastian Heilmann and Matthias Stepan in order to explain Western mistaken views of China and expectations presented six wrong assumptions concerning developments in China. Their list is controversial, but it is true that on the Western side there are numerous wrong assumptions concerning China and other Asian states. Thus the Chinese realities are described in a wrong way, and the predictions of future developments are also false. The Author put an emphasis on scientific categories and terms elaborated in Europe and the States and considered “universal”, which, however, are not adequate to the Chinese realities. Hence their use results in falsification of descriptions and makes previsions based on them – groundless. He distinguishes two essential kinds of categories and terms borrowed from the West but inadequate to the Chinese realities. The first constitutes the terms which significance does not fit to the Chinese realities, as “language”, “religion”, historical epochs such as “antiquity”, “,Middle Ages”, etc. The second constitutes the terms which meanings involve cultural values. Many of them are difficult to translate into Chinese and they acquire different meanings in the context of Confucian heritage. The Author analyses from this perspective: “human rights”, “democracy” and “freedom”. Western scholars are also often mislead by Chinese sources. The study indicates another factor, which facilitates great misunderstandings. According to the cultural norm of the Confucian civilisation there is a “proper façade” presented in public, behind which there are hidden “internal realities”. Of course, such differences could be detected in each culture, but in highly ritualistic Confucian civilisation this distinction is essential, and both parts constitute “complex realities”, whereas Westerners presume that the façade constitutes a whole and complete reality. The Author presents as an example centralised, unitary Leninist state in Chin that is – in his opinion merely a false “public image”, whereas in reality there operate more or less innumerable quite autonomous units, which in fact are not subordinate. Under such circumstances all decisions must be consulted and negotiated among them, like in a federal system, although it does not operate formally. The Westerners also misleads themselves considering their peculiar civilisation as “universal”, whereas there are various civilisations, which will not amalgamate during the modernisation processes. Hence various societies function and change in their own ways, different from the western schemes and expectations. The study indicates that the West still predominates and presents its civilisation as universal. However, its predomination faces growing resistance and numerous scholars recognise the existence of numerous civilisations, which will also develop in the future. The author enumerates the most significant concepts such as “dialogue among civilisations and cultures” adopted by the United Nations in 1989, Huntington’s warning against imposing western norms on other civilisations, which may result in their ‘clashes’, the concept of the Axial Age, of Multiple Modernities, and so on. The road to an equal status of all civilisations is long and tortuous. The elaboration of universal scientific categories and principles is even more difficult, and it is, perhaps, a task for future generations of Asian scholars.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2019, XXII; 50-78
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O cywilizacji zachodniej, chińskiej i dialogu międzykulturowym. Anna Czajka, Kultura jako rozmowa. Problemy porozumienia międzykulturowego i międzyreligijnego, Wydawnictwo UKSW, Warszawa 2020, ss. 241.
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1955880.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2020, XXIII; 215-220
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zachodni indywidualizm a konfucjańska apoteoza grupy i tożsamości grupowej
Western individualism versus Confucian apotheosis of community and group identity
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1955906.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Tematy:
Confucian civilisation
Western civilisation
individualism
group identity
Cywilizacja konfucjańska
cywilizacja zachodnia
indywidualizm
wspólnotowość
Opis:
The study presents one of the fundamental differences between Western and Confucian civilisations: individualistic western interpretation of self versus Confucian group-self (we-self) and group identity. The study starts with Hong Kong scholars’ opinions: which western concepts are entirely alien to Chinese tradition. According to them, an individual is not treated there as the highest value nor has attributed ‘innate dignity’, as in the West. Equality is rejected, because all social relations are based there on a hierarchical order. The concepts and ideals of individual autonomy, of self-direction, freedoms and rights had also been unknown there, like many other western concepts, since they have Christian and Greek-Roman roots. The author subscribes to F.W. Mote’s conclusion that there is a ‘cosmological gulf’ between Chinese and western civilisations. The author considers right Qian Mu’s opinion that the creation of social, human nature of each individual is a fundamental concept of Chinese civilisation, hence the state is treated as a kind of one gigantic school, in which all citizens are considered ‘pupils’, and all ‘chiefs’, from father to emperor, as respected ‘tutors’. The principle of maintaining harmony and unity excludes various partial visions and different personal political options since consensus is required and individual criticism, in particular towards all ‘authorities’ is condemned. The study presents various explanations and concepts of ‘Confucian self’ (Chinese, Japanese and Korean), among them ‘group self’, ‘contextual self’, ‘enlarged’ and primitive ‘small self’, ‘multiple self’, self as a ‘centre of relationships’, ‘dependent personality’, ‘sacredness of group life’, the idea of group unity ‘being one in soul and body’, etc. The author presents in detail Roger T. Ames’ concept of Confucian self as ‘focus-in-the-field’ indicating that it explains well the different social position of individuals, which could vary from ‘small’ and insignificant to ‘gigantic’. The study outlines as well the religious Chinese context of such concepts. Owing to such an emphasis on group and not personal self, it is difficult to understand properly and adapt the fundamental western political concepts such as human rights and liberal democracy since they serve autonomous individuals lacking in East Asia. The study outlines the education process and the essential concepts of how children have to be educated in the Confucian tradition. These realities change, of course, but slowly and merely partially, since the traditional concepts still serve well social needs and efficient modernization. In the end, the author indicates a broader cultural context in which such concepts of self could operate. For instance, Confucian tradition glorifies harmony, accord and maintaining consensus, whereas it condemns struggle, quarrels and open criticism of others, in particular of authorities. Western individual protests and criticism challenge this approach. When the Christian concepts of brotherhood, love of one’s neighbour and equality were lacking, and all other communities in the same country are treated as ‘alien’ and ‘potentially harmful’, it was difficult to form national identity and solidarity. Moreover, under such circumstances, wide interests and engagement in politics of the state could not appear. Hence ‘culturalism’, based on group cultural identity, instead of nationalism evolved. The western individualistic spirit of adventure, traveling, seeking something new was also lacking, on the contrary, the Confucian ideal was to live together with one’s family in a native village/community. This cultural and social context is an obstacle to this day to the adaptation of western institutions and values related to individual.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2020, XXIII; 36-76
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Obrazy Chin na Zachodzie: nie ufać obiegowym stereotypom
Images of China in the West: do not Trust Common Stereotypes
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2021065.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Opis:
F. Mote’s thesis that Chinese civilisation differs in the most fundamental aspects from Western civilisation explains to a certain extent why it is so difficult to comprehend China. This is clearly exemplified by, for instance, the patterns of change. In the West, as A. Toynbee indicates, it is the principle of substitution that predominates, i.e. old customs, fashions and ideas are substituted by the new ones. In China, on the other hand, it is the principle of juxtaposition that predominates, i.e. new elements are added to the old ones and function side by side. According to Soviet archaeologists, this difference has been visible since the end of the Palaeolithic Age and it concerns the entire East Asian region. It results, as A.C. Graham points out, in particular syncretism in intellectual life, where a thesis promoted by the opposition is not rejected as wrong but presented as “partial” and included into a broader context. This allows the Chinese to maintain consensus and avoid controversies, which are avoided. It is also manifested in politics; in 1912, a representative of the imperial court was invited to the rostrum at the first military parade of the Republic at the Tiananmen Square. In a similar way, in 1949, the last commander of the Guomindang forces was invited to the rostrum at the Tiananmen Square to assist them in their first military parade to celebrate victory. Nobody would have acted in such a way during the French or the Bolshevik Revolution. Numerous Chinese intellectuals have noticed this difference. When facing such complex realities, a Western observer is usually perplexed, and makes wrong conclusions as his/her mind uses the archetype of Good fighting against Evil to eliminate it, or the New fighting against the Old. Meanwhile, since ancient times, the Chinese mind has adopted a scheme of complementary dualism, like Yin and Yang, which consists in complementing, rather than fighting, one another. Hence, the process of transformation in China differs significantly from that in Central Europe, where the New system has substituted the Old system, and the Western capitalist and political model has triumphed. The Westerners usually believe that their civilisation and concepts are universal. Meanwhile, the Asians are rather reluctant in adopting a similar view although they are willing to adopt some of its most useful aspects. In this way, as S.N. Eisenstadt points out, various modernities evolve. Lynn T. White introduces an enlightening metaphor. According to him, since the seventeenth century, the Westerners have looked at China through a mirror, in which they usually see their own dreams or fears rather than what really exists in China. Consequently, the images of China diffused in the West reflect mostly the states of the Western souls rather than changing and complex “true China”.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2014, XVII; 47-66
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Generał Aung San – twórca niepodległości Birmy
General Aung San – the Father of Burma’s Independence
Autorzy:
Gawlikowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2022431.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Opis:
The author presents General Aung San (1915-1947) as a dedicated fighter for independence and through his complicated biography outlines the crucial period of Burma’s history: the end of the British colonial rule. The paper also presents the cultural differences that complicated Burmese-British relations. It appears that Aung San’s nationalist spirit had been already shaped in his childhood. He became famous as a student leader during his education at Rangoon University in the 1930’s. In 1938 he had been elected the Secretary General of the most significant nationalist force: the Association We-Burmese (Do-Bama Asi-Ayone). On the one hand he was involved in lawful political activity, on the other he tried to acquire weapons by all possible means to start an armed struggle for independence. He created numerous political organizations of different political orientation (including the Communist Party of Burma). Eventually he arrived in Japan, where he received military training. In 1941, with the help of Japanese agents, he was able to create the Burma Independence Army in Thailand, which entered Burma together with the Japanese troops in 1942. His co-operation with the Japanese forces was tortuous and painful, but he served as the Minister of War in their puppet Burmese Government. When it became obvious that the Allies will win, he established contacts with them and in August 1944 founded the Anti-Fascist Organisation. On March 27, 1945 he started an anti-Japanese uprising to help the British forces entering the country. At the end of the war his relations with the British authorities were very complex: the civil administration wanted to arrest him and bring him to justice as a war criminal, but the military commanders appreciated his help and wanted to collaborate with him and his Burmese forces. The second approach prevailed and in 1946 he headed the Burmese colonial government under the British Governor. In January 1947 he successfully negotiated Burma’s independence in London. The famous Panglong Agreement reached with the leaders of national minorities in February constituted another success of his. In April his party won the majority in the elections to the Constitutional Assembly and Aung San started his work on the constitution. In July, during feverish preparations for independence, he was assassinated together with six other members of the government. U Nu, his old friend and political successor completed his task of building up the independent state. The present military junta constitutes the first Burmese government, which does not respect General Aung San much owing to the prodemocratic activities of Aung San Suu Kyi, his daughter.
Źródło:
Azja-Pacyfik; 2010, XIII; 44-64
1643-692X
Pojawia się w:
Azja-Pacyfik
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-50 z 68

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