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    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
    Tytuł:
    Droga do Transcendencji w filozofii starożytnej. Doświadczenie mistyczne czy dialektyka?
    Path to Treanscendence in Ancient Philosophy. Mystical Experience or dialectic?
    Autorzy:
    Gajda-Krynicka, Janina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1048318.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016-07-04
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    filozofia starożytna
    doświadczenie mistyczne
    transcendencja
    dialektyka
    religia
    kulty misteryjne
    poznanie
    Platon
    Arystoteles
    ancient philosophy
    mystical experience
    transcendenece
    dialectic
    religion
    mystery cults
    cognition
    Plato
    Aristotele
    Opis:
    Zadaniem tego artykułu jest określenie, czy jest możliwe odnalezienie w starożytnej filozofii takich form mistycznego doświadczenia, w których człowiek, prowadzony przez Boga, jest w stanie dostąpić wglądu w Jego istotę i kontemplować najwyższego Boga. Punktem wyjścia analiz jest definicja doświadczenia mistycznego sformułowana przez M. Gogacza, a następnie uzupełniana przez prace I. Andrzejuka. Definicja ta mówi o wiedzy zdobytej per raptum, jak to wyraża Tomasz z Akwinu. To z tej perspektywy są badane fenomeny, takie jak grecka religia, ryty misteryjne oraz pogańskie rozumienie boga/boskości/transcendencji. Analiza prowadzi do wniosku, że grecka filozoficzna wizja transcendencji nie stwarza miejsca na zaistnienie możliwości otrzymania wiedzy na temat Pierwszego Bytu w ramach mistycznego doświadczenia. Staje się to możliwe jedynie w filozofii chrześcijańskiej.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Chrześcijańska; 2016, 13; 7-36
    1734-4530
    2450-0399
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Chrześcijańska
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Metra quaedam Archipoetae
    Autorzy:
    Gajda-Krynicka, Janina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1954292.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2003
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    Archipoeta
    Reinald von Dassel
    Fryderyk I Barbarossa
    topika
    confessio
    recusatio
    Arch-poet
    Reinald of Dassel
    Frederick I Barbarossa
    topic
    Opis:
    The paper focuses on one of the most eminent poets of the twelfth century. He is called Arch-poet (vates vatum) because we do not know his real name. Only nine poems have been preserved to date, and they can be found in the codes of Götingen and Brussels. The Corpus Archipoetae contains poems addressed to the poet’s patron Reinald of Dassel, arch-chancellor of Frederick I Barbarossa and archbishop of Cologne. One may assume that the poems that have been preserved make up only a part of the poet’s writing. They have been selected and preserved with respect to the person of the Chancellor of the Empire. They can be included within the genre of occasional poetry, almost each of them contains some kind of request of support. This fact, however, does not deprive them of any poetic value or overshadow the great talent, erudition, and individuality of the poet. The preserved poems contain personal hints, so that we can re-construct five years from the life of Arch-poet, his relationship with the patron and protector, his education, and also his unusually interesting personality and individuality.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Humanistyczne; 2003, 51, 3; 85-106
    0035-7707
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Humanistyczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Logos: dyskurs czy dowód? Postaci dialektyki platońskiej
    Logos: Discourse or Reason? The Forms of Platonic Dialectics
    Autorzy:
    Gajda-Krynicka, Janina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013139.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2008
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    kwestia platońska
    dialektyka
    metoda dialektyczna
    procedura synoptyczna
    procedura hipotetyczna
    procedura diairetyczna
    Platonic question
    dialectic
    the method of dialectic
    collection
    hypothesis
    division
    Opis:
    The problem discussed in the study is part of the polemics connected with the so-called “Platonic question,” to be precise, it seeks to prove that the so-called two Platonic “critiques” of the writing/text (Plato’s Phaedrus, 275c ff., Letter VII 341c ff.) are not sufficient evidence that, according to Plato, dialectic procedures to discover and know the first forms of being may be realised only in a sensu stricto dialogue, in the act of living speech, and they cannot be fixed in a writing/text. On the basis of the Platonic descriptions of dialectic procedures three forms of dialectic skill (διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη) have been distinguished: synoptic dialectics, which is always a kind of propedeuctics of research in the form of ordering the results of sense perception in sets and trying to find in them a criterion of possibility for this ordering in the form of something one; hypothetical dialectics that calls for a thesis whose object is the ontic status of this one, where it is, and how to verify this thesis in a reliable manner; and diairetic dialectics that allows to elicit from the most general concept some definitions of concrete objects. By analysing the descriptions of dialectic procedures in Platonic texts, numerous statements of the Philosopher himself in the mouth of Socrates, or the Guest of Elea, we may conclude whether these procedures are carried out exclusively in the philosopher’s intellect, and Platonic dialogues are their written form “for voices,” or else they have, among other things, didactic purposes.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2008, 56, 2; 43-58
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Pitagorejski model ustroju doskonałego
    Pythagorean Model Of the Perfect Political System
    Autorzy:
    Gajda-Krynicka, Janina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1953971.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2004
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    utopia
    państwo doskonałe
    ustrój polityczny
    sprawiedliwość
    Platon
    pitagoreizm
    pitagoreizm hellenistyczny
    arche-zasada
    miara
    proporcja
    Archytas
    Okellos z Leukanii
    Hippodamos z Miletu
    Zaleukos
    Charondas
    Theagenes
    Euryfamos z Metapontu
    Utopia
    perfect state
    political system
    justice
    Plato
    Pythagoreanism
    Hellenistic Pythagoreanism
    arche-principle
    measure
    proportion
    Ocellus Leucanus
    Hippodamus of Miletus
    Zaleucus
    Euryphamus of Metapontum
    Opis:
    In history of philosophy the origin of the first plans of the perfect political system, called an ideal one, or – from the time Thomas More’s Utopia was published – a utopian one, is usually associated with Plato’s philosophy in which the model of the perfect state has its justification in a transcendent principle of reality: in The State – in the supersensible world of ideas; in Laws – in the world of the principles that are inaccessible to the sensual inspection, i.e. ἀρχαί. However, already Aristotle’s testimony points to the fact that the perfect state was written about long before the times of Plato. Studies of the Pythagorean philosophy that originated before Plato, allow the statement that its followers saw the imperfection of the political systems that they knew, and also they knew its causes, which they perceived in infringement by political structures of the principle of universal justice that is omnipresent in the universe. The first plans of the perfect system must have been originated already in the first, so-called old Pythagorean union; however, the state of the writings by the Pythagorean philosophers does not allow their detailed reconstruction. On the basis of fragments and the doxographic evidence that are preserved and recognized as authentic we can only infer that they thought that the state-polis as a microcosmos in its structure should imitate the structure of the universe – the model and pattern of perfection for all beings constituting the universe, which can be reduced first of all to the conviction that in all the aspects of its functioning it should be subjected to the measure, harmony and proportions determined by universal justice. We find a confirmation of such a conception of the perfect system in the collection of the so-called Pythagorean apocryphal works preserved to our times – works that were written towards the end of the 4th or at the beginning of the 3rd century B.C., and popularized under the names of “old” Pythagoreans (like Charondas, Zaleukos, Archytas of Tarentum, Ocellus, Hippodamus of Miletus, Aresas, Diotogenes, Sthenidas, Ecphantus, Euryphamus of Metapontum), transmitted by late philosophers and compilers, like Porphyrius, Iamblichus or Stobaeus. Since the standpoints of various researchers as to the dating and origin of those writings differ from one another, it should be accepted that they were written either as imitations of the old-Pythagorean writings that have not been preserved, or they developed, according to Pythagorean teaching on the principles and the universe, findings included in the so-called Πυϑαγορικὰ ὑπομνήματα. Among those apocryphal works we find a lot of writings explicitly or implicitly devoted to the question of the perfect political system: the very form of politeia, the authority, status and obligations of the ruler, laws and their sources, the status and obligations of citizens, education, ethical and moral norms. All these writings share acceptance of a definite model for the perfect system: it is the universe and its structure. According to the old-Pythagorean teaching about two principles-ἀρχαί, the universe consists of the rational principle containing proportion and measure (πέρας), and the principle devoid of this measure and proportion (ἄπειρον). In the structure of the universe the rational principle puts its measure and proportion on the irrational principle – which is manifested in the proper numerical relations, in the harmony of oppositions, in the equilibrium of coming into existence and disappearance of all the beings the universe consists of, as well as in the eternal existence and invariability of the very universe. Disturbance of the proper proportions of the structure causes its disintegration. The authors of the pseudo-Pythagorean writings perceive the causes of political upheavals and falls of states in such disturbances of the proper proportions and relations in the field of polis. Hence the perfect political system is one that in the micro scale imitates the correctness of the structure of the universe, which should be manifested in proper relations between the ruler or the authority and the citizens, and in passing proper laws that should be a “translation” of the law of universal justice into the language of human decisions in citizens’ ethical and moral actions. Hence Pythagorean apocryphal works are a proof that long before Plato philosophers wrote about the perfect political system.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Humanistyczne; 2004, 52, 3; 55-96
    0035-7707
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Humanistyczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The Propedeutic of the Theory of Judgment in Ancient Philosophy from the Sophists to Plato’s Theaetetus
    Autorzy:
    Gajda-Krynicka, Janina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/665185.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
    Tematy:
    judgment, logos, truth/aletheia, falsehood/pseudos, opinion/doksa, referential function of language, predicative function of language
    Opis:
    In the ancient epistemology, precisely stated definition of judgment (axioma) appears only in the 3rd century B.C. It was formulated by Chrysippus of Soli, the founder of the Stoic logic. However, on the other hand, the analysis of the extant utterances in which the knowledge had been objectified since the first Greek thinkers, allows us to state that the evolution of the theory of judgment was a long process. In this development, Greek epistemology had to deal with a number of problems connected with the object of the judgment –– knowledge, with the form of its objectification –– predication, and also with the predicates of the true and false judgment –– categories of “truth” (aletheia) and “falsehood” (pseudos). The first definition of the false judgement (logos pseudes) and the true judgment (logos alethes) can be found only in the late dialogue of Plato, Sophist, which delivers precisely established terminology of the theorem. Yet, such a definition could be formulated only when Greek epistemology re-defined the scope of the meaning of the key terms-concepts, aletheia and pseudos. The term-concept aletheia was identified with the term-concept being, functioning in the ontological-axiological sphere. On the other hand, pseudos did not mean false in the sense of negating the truth, but something, which is different than truth, is its imperfect copy. Thus, the pre-Platonic philosophy has not yet formulated the terminology in which predication of something inconsistent with the actual state of being, with the truth, could be verbalized. Often to express such a form of predication, a phrase “to utter things, which are not” was used. The other problem was connected with –– characteristic ofthe Greek language –– dual function of the verb to be/einai, which included both existential and truthful function. Accordingly, every utterance, in which the predicate was the verb einai or its derivates, was ex definitione a true predication –– “it spoke beings (things, which are).” In such a situation, there was noneed in epistemology to precisely define judgment as such, and to state the conditions which the true judgment hadto meet. The problem is definitely solved by Plato in his dialogue Theaetetus, in which the philosopher defines the object of the judgment, which is knowledge (however, its object is not stated yet) and introduces the project of verification of the utterances/opinion, thanks to which an opinion ––doxa can reach the status of judgment ––logos. An opinion needs to be verified with the dialectical procedures.
    Źródło:
    Folia Philosophica; 2019, 42, 2; 21-45
    1231-0913
    2353-9445
    Pojawia się w:
    Folia Philosophica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Pismo/tekst a dialektyka w filozofii platońskiej
    Writing/Text versus Dialectic in Platonic Philosophy
    Autorzy:
    Gajda-Krynicka, Janina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1954287.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2003
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    Platon
    dialektyka
    dialektyka synoptyczna
    dialektyka hipotetyczna
    dialektyka diairetyczna
    tekst
    pismo
    idee
    relacje
    metheksis
    mimesis
    parousia
    Plato
    dialectic
    synoptic dialectic
    hypothetical dialectic
    diaretic dialectic
    text
    writing
    ideas
    relations
    methexis
    Opis:
    The study seeks to take a stance in the ongoing discussions on the Platonic philosophy. The subject-matter of the debate is the status of writings in the Platonic philosophy, and to be more precise, to find an answer to the question whether Platonic writings are a reliable source for the re-construction of a “true” Plato’s philosophy. There are two schools: the Tübingen School and the Milan School, which have formulated the so-called “new paradigm” in which to interpret Plato. This paradigm assumes that in the Philosopher’s dialogues we shall not find, explicitly, his “true” knowledge about principles, the one that was lectured in the Academy. The paradigm uses two key arguments, the so-called Platonic “criticisms of the writing” (Faidros, Letter VII), according to which the “true” philosophy, carried out in a living dialectic discourse with a partner or disciple, may not be fixed in the form of writing. The study sought to verify evaluations of particular excerpts from Platonic writings as a criticism of the writing/text, especially the part of the Letter VII. The point is also to reconstruct Platonic dialectic: synoptic dialectic whose point of departure is αἴσqησις (sense perception). This dialectic makes one approve of the necessity of some general concepts understood as models (παραδείγματα). The author defines this dialectic as hypothetical (ὑπόqεσις), for it leads to assume the ontic status of those models understood as transcendent beings. Now, the diaretic (διαίρεσις) dialectic studies general concepts and leads to the definition of individual objects. The analysis of Platonic dialectic on the basis of the writings from the Middle Academy and the Late Academy makes us conclude that dialectic procedures may be realized only in the philosopher's mind, within the area of thinking, in the area of pure concepts, to which the words of discourse, as signs, may only refer. For a discourse is carried on in words which – as the philosopher states in the Kratilos – cannot reflect “the truth of things.” The philosopher-dialectician therefore has no partner. The course and outcomes of a dialectic procedure may be fixed in writing both for didactic, propedeuctic, or protreptic purposes, and such is the purpose of Platonic writings.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Humanistyczne; 2003, 51, 3; 29-38
    0035-7707
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Humanistyczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

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