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Wyszukujesz frazę "justice" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola


Tytuł:
Problem sprawiedliwości międzynarodowej
International Justice
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1876952.pdf
Data publikacji:
1976
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
In party I of the article the author attempts to present the relationship between justice and other values; Part II deals with the subjects of universal community; Part III discusses planes and forms of dispensing social justice. Nowadays international justice is mentioned besides traditional forms of justice, i. e. substitutional, distributional, social and legal. It seems to result from the birth of international community. All kinds of justice possess a common feature. Termed the principle of justice, it encourages granting what is lawfully due to other subjects as well as legalizing the right to achieve individual aims. Justice may be understood as moral competence, moral principle, social order founded upon the principle, and action which follows from respecting the law and duties. The author is essentially interested in justice as action. Being the realization of natural law, justice is moral action by means of which what is rightfully suum, cuique reddendi his is given to the other. It is also an activity through which man attains his own aims to which he is entitled. Justice is related to other values, such as truth, liberty and good (common). Just action must be founded upon the true knowledge of man, his dignity, equality, rights, duties, aims and tasks. It also implies liberty since any enforced action is not truly human and as such it can serve to realize neither action nor laws of both the individual and the community. Justice is also connected with good (common) which constitutes its subject, these are personal good i. e. integrated development, and instrumental one, i. e economic and cultural goods. In Part II the author attempts to present the subjects of laws and duties in the international community. He analyses theological, philosophical and sociological aspects of the problem, and lays down moral and legal norms that should be in face in the community. If we consider the philosophical and theological aspect, then it is possible to discuss the existence of universal (international) community; the sociological aspect implies merely the framework of such a community, while its full realization is still the postulate of the common good. The attitude of many authors, including the Code of International Morality which treats particular states as subjects of this community, cannot be maintained according to the notins of natural law. Already F de Vittoria proved that individuals and states constitute the subjects of this community, and at present the same opinion is expressed by many sociologists interested in international relations. It is worth adding that also international organizations and nations (ethnic minorities) are its subjects. The same subjects are the subjects of rights and duties in the universal (international) community. One should look for the foundations of legal force of the norms valid in the universal community in the value of an individual. The same natural law which determines the norms of conduct between particular citizens should also rule the relationships within the universal community. Natural rights of every national (state) community and other social groups result from the very nature of man and the demands of social life. As there exist mutual rights and duties of particular countries, their mutual relations should be founded upon the principle of justice. The author accepts J. Messner’s definition of international justice. He stresses the existence of two interrelated elements, suum cuique, and economic and cultural cooperation as in important factor of accomplishing the cuum. International justice is realized by means of varied cooperation rather, than sharing the their goods by the developed countries. The latter form can lead merely to the short- -lived satisfaction of the consumer’s needs. Although such equality is of a passive nature, it is necessary now. The teachings of bona superfluora formulated by Fathers of the Church, are extended by Populorum progressio from the individual plane to the international relations. Christian ethics always has stressed the universal appropriation of economic and cultural goods and the universal natural law entitling to their use. The idea of universal appropriation of mundane goods is of absolute and timeless value, independent of historical or social determinants and there is no need to verify it. Teachings of the Church concering the economic goods (ownership) and cultural are considered from the viewpoint of universal international community. The author stresses that scientific and technological as well as economic and cultural cooperation constitute the proper form of dispensing international justice. It is cooperation rather than aid since poverty and illiteracy cannot be abolished without the participation and effort of the developing countries themselves. They have to change their social and economic structures as well as the mentality of social groups. Cooperation but not aid demands changes in the structure of world economy. This is not only a moral postulate but also one resulting from the interests of both developed and developing countries. Individual national interests and universal interests are identical as nowadays common good of a particular state cannot be separated from the good of the whole family of men. Development and welfare of one nation at the same time both follow from and prompt welfare and development of other nations. Peace constitutes the common interest of all peoples of the world. The author thinks that to a certain extent the duty of developed countries to help the developing ones may follow the principle of restitution. It is a historical fact that the rich countries have achieved their present economic level by means of, among other things, colonial exploitation. International justice should be realized through: — respect of dignity of the human being, preservation of the rights of man as well as rights of nations and countries to existence and development;— cooperation in the field of science, technology, economy and culture;— proper and just, fixed prices of agricultural raw materials and products;— participation of the developing countries in the decisions concerning economic problems of the international community.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1976, 4; 19-40
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Aspects spatiaux de la qualite de vie et de la justice sociale
Autorzy:
Gorzelak, Grzegorz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1963946.pdf
Data publikacji:
1986-06-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Geografii i Studiów Regionalnych
Źródło:
Miscellanea Geographica. Regional Studies on Development; 1986, 2; 203-208
0867-6046
2084-6118
Pojawia się w:
Miscellanea Geographica. Regional Studies on Development
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Montaigne et La Bruyère critiques de la justice de leur temps - la question judiciaire
Montaigne i La Bruyere jako krytycy wymiaru sprawiedliwości - problem sądownictwa
Autorzy:
Christodoulou, Kyriaki
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1034984.pdf
Data publikacji:
1990
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Opis:
Postawą, jaką zajmują wobec problematyki wymiaru sprawiedliwości, zarówno Montaigne, jak i La Bruyère wyprzedzają swoje czasy. We fragmentach dzieł poruszających ten temat (Montaigne a Próby, a zwłaszcza Apologia Rajmunda Sebond i La Bruyère'a Charaktery, np. rozdział "Des esprits forts") nietrudno odnaleźć wspólne dla obu twórców wątki, choć Montaigne podchodzi do kwestii w sposób bardziej teoretyczny, filozoficzno-moralistyczny, zaś dla La Bruyère'a punktem wyjścia jest ptzede wszystkim obserwacja konkretnej rzeczywistości. Obaj oceniają system wymiaru sprawiedliwości nader krytycznie, podkreślając jego niedoskonałości i fakt, że jego siła opiera się przede wszystkim na zwyczaju; obaj bez ogródek mówią o przekupności sędziów; obaj wreszcie otwarcie, a nawet coraz ostrzej w miarę upływu czasu występują przeciw tak szeroko stosowanym w ich epoce torturom jako metodzie wymuszania zeznań. Montaigne stwierdza wręcz, że wszystko poza karą śmierci jest zwykłym' okrucieństwem, nie uzasadnionym ani z humanitarneУgo i ludzkiego, ani z psychologicznego punktu widzenia, zaś La Bruyère, opierając się na współczesnych sobie wypadkach, wykazuje, jak łatwo w gruncie rzeczy skazać na takiej podstawie człowieka zupełnie niewinnego.
Źródło:
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Litteraria; 1990, 26
0208-6085
Pojawia się w:
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Litteraria
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Metoda ustalania treści ustaw w demokratycznym państwie prawa. Refleksje na temat teorii sprawiedliwości Johna Rawlsa
La méthode de détermination des droits dans un état démocratique. Les réflexions au sujet de la théorie de la justice de John Rawls
Autorzy:
Moń, Ryszard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2106729.pdf
Data publikacji:
1992
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
Cet article est une réflexion critique de la théorie de la jusitce de J. Rawls. Il s'agit d'une possibilité de créer une éthique indépendente de la théologie et de la philosophie. L'argumentation de Rawls n'est pas toujours correcte du point de vue de la logique. La méthode de l'equilibrum reflectif qu'il propose est très intéressante. Elle montre comment on peut mettre en concordence des principes choisis théoriquement de notre sens de la justice. Elle anonce un problème qui est plus large, à savoir la nécessité d'une coordination permanente des normes théoriques et de notre sens du bien dans les situations concretes. En plus, la proposition de Rawls, celle des principes de la justice semble vaincre la dychotomie entre l'enrichessement des uns et la pauvreté des autres. Rawls est persuadé que cette nécessité n'existe pas. Ce qu'il propose est aussi intéressant dans la situation des réformes politiques et économiques en Pologne.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1992, 39-40, 2; 111-127
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Wolność, sprawiedliwość, prawda, miłość − program dla Polski
Freedom, Justice, Truth, Love − a Programme for Poland
Autorzy:
Gogacz, Mieczysław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2106758.pdf
Data publikacji:
1992
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
John XXIII contained his programme for the world in the title of the encyclical on peace. In it he recommended observing the truth, justice, love and freedom. When these recommendations are considered in their proper, anthropological context, the conclusion can be drawn that Christ and wisdom are a programme for the world, for every man, and hence for Poland. This conclusion may be justified by referring to the ontic structure of man as a person and to the main currents of Polish culture. Persons establish the relation of love with people and God which is expressed in humanism and religion. Owing to humanism as faithfulness to people, to their existence, truth and good, man acquires competence in being guided by wisdom. Owing to religion understood as real personal relationship with God, man becomes united with Christ through love, as it is only in Christ, in His person, that God renders Himself accessible to man. For this reason wisdom and Christ give us the most favourable connections: through wisdom − always with the truth and good, and through Christ with God. Clinging to humanism and religion is consistent with the tendencies and structure of the Polish culture. Our culture and at the same time history really started taking shape from the moment of Poland’s Christianization. The Christianization bound us in a real way with God by Christ’s sacramental power. In the field of this real connection with God our state and our Catholicism, as well as the history of Poland and Polish culture were developed by love towards God and people. In choosing wisdom and Christ people are aided by truth, justice, love and freedom. From realistic identification of people, their personal relations, the connections between man’s intellect and the truth as well as his will and the good, one can draw the conclusion that people’s and nations’ most precious good is wisdom and Christ, a just and interesting programme for Poland.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1992, 39-40, 1; 193-204
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Prestiż zawodu sędziego i społeczny wizerunek instytucji wymiaru sprawiedliwości
Prestige of the Judistary and the Social Image of Institutions of Administration of Justice
Autorzy:
Bielewicz, Antoni
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/699074.pdf
Data publikacji:
1995
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
zawód sędziego
zawody prawnicze
wymiar sprawiedliwości
wizerunek społeczny
badania sondażowe
judge
legal professions
justice
social image
survey
Opis:
In Poland, the level of social confidence in a profession results mainly from: qualifications necessary for the pursuit of that procession; respect for the values to which the profession is particularly related, which it is to serve and to protect; the social usefulness of that profession; the degree of responsibility involved in the tasks performed; the arduousness of work; the level of material profits derived; the extent of  power involved in the profession; tradition; social respect for the institutions in which persons pursuing that profession are employed; those persons’ professional, social and moral attitudes. From a comparative analysis of many research findings it follows that the legal professions rank relatively low in the hierarchy of prestige. Certain changes have been taking place in this respect during the  las 50 years; yet the legal profession still enjoys a rather low level of social acceptance which is rather astonishing: a lawyer  has all the traits valued by Polish society. In the period of Polish People’s Republic, the relatively low prestige of the legal profession resulted from the then valid doctrine, state policy, the system of  administration of justice, and the attitudes and conduct of judges, public prosecutors, and barristers, In Polish People’s Republic, the law was not an independent value. It was to support the “historical process” and serve not justice itself but rather “historical justice”. It became the tool of social engineering which was to create a new society. Statutory law was transformed into a comprehensively_ oriented instrument of political action ‒ a utilitarian means of government. The legislation was to implement a political, social and economic program imposed from above. There was a dramatic drop in the importance of law as the exponent of values. This was due to a loosening of its natural relation to the sense of morality and justice. A number of decrees and statutes were passed, usually according to the valid procedure but lacking inner justness; they were called law but were essentially utterly lawless in many cases. For this reason, the social sense of justness seldom followed from statutory law; instead, it existed outside of the  law so to say. The law-citizen relation included pathological elements. Most of the social experiences of contacts with law and its representatives were negative. The law seldom defended the citizen, especially against arbitrary  decisions of the authorities; it usually punished him. The regulatory functions of law yielded precedence to its repressive functions. The conception of unity of state pover ruled out all independence of the judiciary in Polish  People’s Republic. The courts were subordinated to the executive authority not only in terms of administration but also to a large extent in their jurisdiction. This resulted from the very procedure of appointing and removing judges; the wide discretion to remove judges; the organization of supervision over judicial decisions; the terms of office of the Supreme Court; the practice of guiding principles for the judiciary, issued by the Supreme Court and binding for all courts. Appointment of desired benches and selection of cases, changes of the benches during proceedings, requests for court files during proceedings, summons of judges to one Ministry or another, individual and organized pressure – all of these were by no means exceptional situations in the courts of Polish People’s Republic. Judicial independence ultimately depends on the judge himself. A part of judges compromised on the norms of professional ethics and on common morality. The actual numer of “obedient” judges is difficult to estimate today. Even if they were few, that was certainly enough for the people’s confidence in courts to be shaken. It would be wrong to believe that the above processes, phenomena and facts remained unnoticed by the people. Society were fully aware of the functions assigned to the law and tasks of the institutions of administration of justice. The opinion knew many examples of public prosecutors, judges and barristers departing from the basic norms of the code of professional ethics. The authorities themselves saw to it, publishing resolutions of the Supreme Court and providing extensive coverage of many trials. Thus social attitudes towards the law, institutions of administration of justice and their representatives eroded continuously. Society had no confidence in the effectiveness of recourse to the law in vindication of one’s claims; they fully realized whose interests the public prosecutor’s oflices and courts actually guarded. The prosecutors and judges were perceived chiefly as functionaries of state. Paradoxically, in a totalitarian system where violations of individual rights were a common everyday practice, the lawyer hardly helped the citizens. The social usefulness of the lawyers’ professional roles grew smaller, and so did their prestige. In coming years the prestige of the legal professions will no doubt go up. This will be a result of: a general consolidation of the role of law in the life of state and society; development of a new law-citizen relation; an increased regulatory function of the law; financial promotion of the legal professions; and improved social image of institutions of administration of justice. There is much to indicate that social regard for the legal professions will eventually reach the Western level. The proces of the Polish hierarchy of prestige of individual professions becoming “European” will inevitably result in its losing its former “proletarian” nature; this will be expressed in a drop in social regard for workers. Already going down today is the pristige of miners, and also of teachers. From 1987 till 1993, the proportion of respondents who declared the greatest regard for miners and teachers dropped by 14 and 4 points respectively. Thus the distance between a judge and a miner dropped by 26, and that between a judge and a teacher – by 16 points. The social image of judges and institutions of administration of justice is shaped by the Poles’ twofold experience: the still fresh memory of “the past” and the not yet really known “present day”. The past meant obedient judges; courts as an extension of the arm of power; sentences clashing with the sense of justice etc. The present day means rampant corruption; frustration: inner dysfunction of the system; lack of skill in resolving matters which the people see as self-evident. The public opinion have not yet fully developed a view on judges and the institutions of administration of justice. A half of respondents believe that courts do good service to society, one-fifth think the opposite, and another one-fifth have no standpoint on the matter. Thus actually two parallel images of courts operate in the social consciousness. Groups which perceive the reality through glasses of the past, so to say, seek yesterday in today’s courts. The future-oriented groups, instead, tend to define those institutions in the categories of the still distant tomorrow. For this reason, even a relatively not too controversial decision taken by the judicial authority brings about an avalanche of the gravest accusations, that of attempting to restore the past included. The psychological conflict is hardly to the court’s advantage: an image still lingers in the social subconscious which prevents society from honestly appraising their work. Also political circumstances are not too favorable for institutions of administration of justice. The active involvement of representatives of the law in resolution of disputes which the opinion define as political makes them party to the conflict in the eyes of society. Past experiences have shown how convenient a tool the court can be in political struggle. Also the Government’s activity bears on the social image of administration of justice. For one year now, the most vehemently criticized area of the Government’s work is its policy of “crime control”. It has been called ineffective by a half of society. An average citizen is convinced that the police, prosecutors, and courts are equally responsible for this situation. The condition of courts with which a large portion of society have contacts is hardly helpful in the building of those institutions’ prestige: dilapidated buildings in desperate need of repair; old worn out furniture; small, underqualified and underpaid and thus frustrated office staff. Added to this should be excessive bureaucracy, obscure procedures, distant time limits, high court fees, excessive fees charged by barristers. The courts have already started regaining social trust but the process is bound to be a slow one. Practically each and every slip of the judicial authority, eagerly pointed out by the media, may well reverse the emerging favorable trend in the attitude of public opinion. Social attitudes towards the courts are incomplete and based largely on emotions which is what makes them unstable. The emerging trend can be consolidated by e.g. closer contacts of the judicial community with society, established chiefly through the media. Yet the new image of Polish courts depends first and foremost on the success of the process of building of state ruled by law.
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 1995, XXI; 105-134
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Structure of Organs of Administration of Justice in Poland
Autorzy:
Zieliński, Adam
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2147525.pdf
Data publikacji:
1995-12-31
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
judiciary
justice
Polska
structure
world war
democratic state
socio-political conditions
Constitutional Tribunal
civil rights protection
public opinion
Supreme Court
change
socialist law
Źródło:
Contemporary Central and East European Law; 1995, 1-4; 59-70
0070-7325
Pojawia się w:
Contemporary Central and East European Law
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Wolność czy sprawiedliwość − fałszywa alternatywa
Freedom or Justice: A False Alternative
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1861022.pdf
Data publikacji:
1996
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
In the introduction the author refers to the documents of the CSCE. In these documents we read that the dignity of the human person is the highest value, and economic activity should respect and support it. The dignity of the human person underlies the norm of morality which says, persona est affirmanda propter se ipsam; it is also the basis of all human rights as well as of social freedom and justice. It is methodologically incorrect to state that there is contradiction between freedom and justice. The error here consists in the fact that the contradiction in individual interests or social groups is concealed behind those values, and two different, exclusive (liberal and Marxist) conceptions of freedom and justice are being compared. A social freedom takes place when all human rights are recognized and respected, whereas we deal with justice when these rights are efficiently and equally protected. These values constitute each other, therefore the alternative: freedom or justice is false. One cannot speak about freedom in the sphere of economy, if the partners do not exercise equal rights. The so-called free contracts are neither free nor just, if they are enforced by the partner who is economically more powerful. Contracts must be based on equal rights and the principle of natural law (ius cogens), pact sunt servanda. Various kinds of justice notwithstanding (commutative, distributive and social), justice is one. F.A. von Hayek wrote that "the expression social justice do not belong to the category of error, but to the category of nonsense, similarly as the expression morality of the stone". We may agree with the opinion of the Noble prize winner, however under one condition, namely that we fail to notice the difference between the behaviour of man and stone. The author is decidedly in favor of the priority of labour before the real capital, and views this priority in its ontic, genetic, functional and ethical aspect. That priority is bound with the so-called human capital. The capital being man himself, his health, talents, education, professional qualifications and developed morality. Human capital has been given priority before the capital of things. Human capital is largely made up of labour and is expressed through labour. In the province of economy the highest rank should be given to creative and full of initiative work. Work is a personal, moral, cultural, social, religious and economic value, and for this reason man is entitled to this value, that is to work and to work with initiative. He is also entitled with the right to education, formation and health care. Such rights are social rights. It is critical for the economic development of the country to recognize and realize those rights, and it is also an expression of justice. The right to initiative is closely bound with the right to possess private property. It is important for the economic development of the country to respect the right to participation, for it promotes initiative "from below". Political and economic democracy takes shape when freedom and social rights are being put into practice.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1996, 24, 1; 63-94
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Antyczna idea sprawiedliwości
The Ancient Idea of Justice
Autorzy:
Kowalczyk, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1860457.pdf
Data publikacji:
1998
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The idea of justice was mainly the subject matter of Plato and Aristotle. Plato's works (The Republic, The Laws, The Gorgias) allows us to distinguish twofold elements in his conception of justice: ethical and socio-political. The former elements bear the objective-universal character. They are as follows: 1) justice as giving everybody what they rightly deserve, 2) the distinction between commutative justice (based on a mathematical equality), and distributive justice (based on a mere proportional equality). Now the socio-political elements of the Platonic conception of justice are connected with the approval of an authoritarian model of the state. Aristotle, while discussing the idea of justice mainly in the fifth book of his Nicomachean Ethics, distinguished two kinds of justice: general and particular. General justice, being man's internal righteousness, contains other moral virtues. Particular justice denotes a respect for the principles of equality in social relations. Following Plato, Aristotle distinguished commutative justice and distributive justice; the former is realized, for instance, in the act of purchase-sale, the latter in the relationships between the state and its citizens. The Roman thinkers applied the Greek idea of justice to the sphere of law. It was, above all, Ulpianos who did it. He defined justice as a permanent will to give everybody what they deserve.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1998, 26, 1; 171-179
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Co to znaczy „sprawiedliwość”?
What Does „Justice” Mean?
Autorzy:
Kleszcz, Ryszard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965482.pdf
Data publikacji:
1999-03-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The paper presents three essential meanings of the notion of „justice”: (1) justice as a feature of human acts, (2) justice as a feature of human beings, and (3) justice as a feature of the structure of distribution. The second part of the paper shows that justice as value may be in conflict with other values such as benevolence or honesty.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 1999, 7, 1-2; 31-41
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Regulacje prawne w armiach NATO
Autorzy:
Palus, Janusz.
Przyjemski, Stanisław M.
Powiązania:
Wojsko i Wychowanie 1999, nr 5, s. 112-122 ; nr 6, s. 99-103 ; nr 7, s. 102-108 ; nr 8, s. 99-105 ; nr 9, s. 95-100 ; nr 10, s. 92-97 ; nr 1, s. 115-124 ; nr 2, s. 144-156 ; nr 3, s. 86-90 ; nr 6, s. 126-132 ; nr 1, s. 127-132 ; nr 4, s. 140-147 ; nr 6, s. 119-125 ; nr 3, s. 114-119 ; nr 5, s. 136-143
Data publikacji:
1999
Tematy:
Prawo karne wojskowe
Postępowanie dyscyplinarne
Sądownictwo wojskowe
Military justice
Military penal law
Disciplinary measures
Opis:
Cz. (1), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych USA.
Cz. (2), Ochrona porządku prawnego w Bundeswhrze.
Cz. (3), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych Królestwa Hiszpanii.
Cz. (4), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych królestwa Hiszpanii.
Cz. (5), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych Królestwa Danii.
Cz. (6), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych Republiki Tureckiej.
Cz. (7), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych Wielkiej Brytanii.
Cz. (8), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych Kanady.
Cz. (9), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach Republiki Greckiej.
Cz. (10), Ochrona porządku prawnego w armiach NATO.
Cz. (11), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych Królestwa Holandii.
Cz. (12), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych Republiki Włoskiej.
Cz. (13), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych Wielkiego Księstwa Luksemburg.
Cz. (14), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych Republiki Węgierskiej.
Cz. (15), Ochrona porządku prawnego w siłach zbrojnych Republiki Portugalii.
Dostawca treści:
Bibliografia CBW
Artykuł

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