Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:

The nature and norms of scientific explanation: Some preliminaries

Autorzy:

Peña, Abel
Wright, Cory

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763410.pdf

Data publikacji:

2023

Wydawca:

Copernicus Center Press

Tematy:

scientific explanation
ontic conception of explanation
epistemic conception of explanation
nature of explanation
norms of explanation

Opis:

There are at least two deep and related debates about explanation: about its nature and about its norms. The aim of this special issue of Philosophical Problems in Science/Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce (ZFN) is to survey whether or not a consensus is at hand in these debates and to help settle what it can. The overarching foci are twofold: (i) the nature of scientific explanation, with special attention to the debate between ontic and epistemic conception of explanation, and (ii) the norms of scientific explanation, with special attention to so-called ‘ontic’ (or better, ‘alethic’) norms like truth and referential success and epistemic norms like intelligibility and idealized understanding. It called for advocates of various conceptions to articulate the current state of these debates. Researchers and scholars from around the globe—including Poland, Canada, Korea, The Netherlands, the United States, Greece, Austria, and Belgium—contributed. The special issue also attempts to provide an opening for new work on the norms of explanation, such as truth or model-based accuracy, information compression, abstraction, and generalization.

Źródło:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 5-17
0867-8286
2451-0602

Pojawia się w:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:

Dimensions of explanation

Autorzy:

Hochstein, Eric

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763416.pdf

Data publikacji:

2023

Wydawca:

Copernicus Center Press

Tematy:

evaluative dimension
communicative concept of explanation
representational concept of explanation
ontic conception of explanation
mechanistic explanation

Opis:

Some argue that the term “explanation” in science is ambiguous, referring to at least three distinct concepts: a communicative concept, a representational concept, and an ontic concept. Each is defined in a different way with its own sets of norms and goals, and each of which can apply in contexts where the others do not. In this paper, I argue that such a view is false. Instead, I propose that a scientific explanation is a complex entity that can always be analyzed along a communicative dimension, a representational dimension, and an ontic dimension. But all three are always present within scientific explanations. I highlight what such an account looks like, and the potential problems it faces (namely that a single explanation can appear to have incompatible sets of norms and goals that govern it). I propose a solution to this problem and demonstrate how this account can help to dissolve current disputes in philosophy of science regarding debates between epistemic and ontic accounts of mechanistic explanations in the life sciences.

Źródło:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 57-98
0867-8286
2451-0602

Pojawia się w:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:

Wyjaśnianie empiryczne a wyjaśnianie interpretacyjne działań politycznych
Empirical Explanation and Interpretive Explanation of Political Activities

Autorzy:

Czajowski, Andrzej

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1195288.pdf

Data publikacji:

2020

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

Tematy:

wyjaśnianie empiryczne
wyjaśnianie interpretacyjne
wyjaśnianie integralne
działania polityczne
naturalizm
antynaturalizm
wnioskowanie abdukcyjne / empirical explanation
interpretive explanation
integral explanation
political actions
naturalism
anti-naturalism
abductive reasoning

Opis:

Artykuł porządkuje kwestie dotyczące wyjaśniania zjawisk społecznych, przede wszystkim działań politycznych. W literaturze wymienia się trzy rodzaje wyjaśnień: wyjaśnienie przyczynowe, wyjaśnienie interpretacyjne (humanistyczne, rozumiejące) oraz wyjaśnienie integralne, łączące te dwa. Autor omawia rodzaje wyjaśniania, przy czym termin „wyjaśnianie przyczynowe” zastępuje terminem „wyjaśnianie empiryczne”. Następnie charakteryzuje działania polityczne i ich rezultaty jako przedmiot wyjaśniania. W ostatniej części, na dwóch przykładach analizuje praktykę wyjaśniania empirycznego i interpretacyjnego. W odniesieniu do przykładu wyjaśniania interpretacyjnego przywołuje wnioskowanie abdukcyjne, czyli wnioskowanie do najlepszego wyjaśnienia. W procesie interpretacji, przy braku niezbitych dowodów, nie da się potwierdzić prawdziwości żadnej z hipotez. Można je tylko uprawdopodabniać lub uatrakcyjniać. Biorąc pod uwagę niedoskonałości wyjaśniania empirycznego i interpretacyjnego, należy dążyć do stosowania ich komplementarnie.
The article arranges issues related to explaining social phenomena, primarily political activities. Three types of explanation are mentioned in the literature: a reason explanation, an interpretative explanation (humanistic, understanding) and an integral explanation combining these two. The author discusses the types of explanation, where he replaces the term “causal explanation” with the term “empirical explanation”. Then he characterizes political activities and their results as an object of explanation. In the last part, on two examples, he examines the practice of empirical and interpretive explanation. With reference to the example of interpretive explanation, he recalls abductive reasoning, i.e. inference to the best explanation. In the interpretation process, in the absence of irrefutable evidence, none of the hypotheses can be confirmed. They can only be enhanced or made more attractive. Considering the imperfections of empirical and interpretive explanation, one should strive to use them complementarily.

Źródło:

Teoria Polityki; 2020, 4; 43-60
2543-7046
2544-0845

Pojawia się w:

Teoria Polityki

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:

Understanding without Explanation: A Still Open Issue

Autorzy:

David-Rus, Richard

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2142959.pdf

Data publikacji:

2021-10-31

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii

Tematy:

scientific understanding
understanding without explanation

Opis:

This paper takes a stance in the debate concerning scientific understanding. It claims that the case for a specific type of understanding, understanding without explanation (UwE), is still open, despite the tendency in the current literature that might suggest otherwise. The paper begins by situating the distinction between an explanatory and non-explanatory understanding in the debate on understanding by introducing Lipton’s account of UwE. The paper then discusses the significance of Lipton’s proposals for the debate and argues that Kelp’s interpretation does not exhaust the challenge they pose to any theory of understanding. The paper then examines the best articulated critique of Lipton’s account provided by Khalifa and rejects it as inadequate. It ends by sketching out a list of positive reasons that support the continued examination of UwE.

Źródło:

Filozofia Nauki; 2021, 29, 3; 89-106
1230-6894
2657-5868

Pojawia się w:

Filozofia Nauki

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 5.

Tytuł:

Explanation, representation and information

Autorzy:

Karadimas, Panagiotis

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763413.pdf

Data publikacji:

2023

Wydawca:

Copernicus Center Press

Tematy:

scientific explanation
representation
optimization process
ontic conception of explanation
epistemic conception of explanation

Opis:

The ontic conception of explanation is predicated on the proposition that “explanation is a relation between real objects in the world” and hence, according to this approach, scientific explanation cannot take place absent such a premise. Despite the fact that critics have emphasized several drawbacks of the ontic conception, as for example its inability to address the so-called “abstract explanations”, the debate is not settled and the ontic view can claim to capture cases of explanation that are non-abstract, such as causal relations between events. However, by eliminating the distinction between abstract and non-abstract explanations, it follows that ontic and epistemic proposals can no longer contend to capture different cases of explanation and either all are captured by the ontic view or all are captured by the epistemic view. On closer inspection, it turns out that the ontic view deals with events that fall outside the scientists’ scope of observation and that it does not accommodate common instances of explanation such as explanations from false propositions and hence it cannot establish itself as the dominant philosophical stance with respect to explanation. On the contrary, the epistemic conception does account for almost all episodes of explanation and can be described as a relation between representations, whereby the explanans transmit information to the explanandum and that this information can come, dependent on context, in the form of any of the available theories of explanation (law-like, unificatory, causal and non-causal). The range of application of the ontic view thus is severely restricted to trivial cases of explanation that come through direct observation of the events involved in an explanation and explanation is to be mostly conceived epistemically.

Źródło:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 21-55
0867-8286
2451-0602

Pojawia się w:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 6.

Tytuł:

Mathematical Explanation as Part of an (Im)perfect Scientific Explanation: An Analysis of Two Examples

Autorzy:

Drekalović, Vladimir

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968646.pdf

Data publikacji:

2019-12-31

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii

Opis:

Alan Baker argues that mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science. There are several examples cited in the literature as solid candidates for such a role. We discuss two such examples and show that they are very different in their strength and (im)perfection, although both are recognized by the scientific community as examples of the best scientific explanations of particular phenomena. More specifically, it will be shown that the explanation of the cicada case has serious shortcomings compared with the explanation of the case of Königsberg’s bridges. We will argue that the latter is a perfectly reliable scientific explanation that employs mathematical reasoning whereas the former is not.

Źródło:

Filozofia Nauki; 2019, 27, 4; 23-41
1230-6894
2657-5868

Pojawia się w:

Filozofia Nauki

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 7.

Tytuł:

O PEWNEJ PRÓBIE OBRONY WYJAŚNIANIA TELEOLOGICZNEGO
ABOUT AN ATTEMPT TO DEFENSE THE TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

Autorzy:

Wróblewski, Zbigniew

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488168.pdf

Data publikacji:

2012

Wydawca:

Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL

Tematy:

teleologia
wyjaśnianie naukowe
wyjaśnianie teleologiczne
cele naukowe
antropomorfizm
teleology
scientific explanation
teleological explanation
scientific aims
anthropomorphism

Opis:

The aim of the article is to present the strategy of rehabilitation of the teleology in the conception of Robert Spaemann, Reinchard Löw and Hans Jonas. That strategy takes into account a few aspects: (1) the analysis of general conception of explanation in which the character of questions activating the process of explanation is taking into consideration, (2) the analysis of the conception of the teleological and causal explanations (according to the Hempel-Oppenheim model), (3) determination of the pragmatic background of the controversies concerning teleology, (4) determination of the domain and aims of teleological and causal interpretations.
Celem artykułu jest prezentacja strategii rehabilitacji teleologii w ujęciu: Roberta Spaemanna, Reincharda Löwa oraz Hansa Jonasa. Strategia ta uwzględnia kilka aspektów: (1) analizę ogólnej koncepcji wyjaśniania, w której jest uwzględniony charakter pytań uruchamiających proces wyjaśniania, (2) analizę koncepcji wyjaśniania teleologicznego i przyczynowego (według modelu Hempla- Oppenheima) (3) określenie pragmatycznego tła sporu o teleologię, (4) określenie domeny i celów interpretacji teleologicznych i przyczynowych.

Źródło:

Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2012, 60, 4; 339-359
0035-7685

Pojawia się w:

Roczniki Filozoficzne

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 8.

Tytuł:

Lepsze wyjaśnienie
Better Explanation

Autorzy:

Grobler, Adam

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965571.pdf

Data publikacji:

1996-06-01

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii

Opis:

Like most realistically oriented philosophers, I accept that the growth of explanatory power of cognitive system is a sign of the cognitive progress. In other words, I assumecertain version of the principle of „inference to the best explanation”. In the paper I propose a unified and more sophisticated criterion for the „betterness” of explanation, which is formulated in van Fraassen's terminology.

Źródło:

Filozofia Nauki; 1996, 4, 2; 111-119
1230-6894
2657-5868

Pojawia się w:

Filozofia Nauki

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 9.

Tytuł:

Wyjaśnianie antropiczne w kosmologii
Anthropic Explanation in Cosmology

Autorzy:

Turek, Józef

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013406.pdf

Data publikacji:

2006

Wydawca:

Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL

Tematy:

kosmiczne koincydencje
zasada antropiczna
wyjaśnianie antropiczne
cosmic coincidences
Anthropic Principle
anthropic explanation

Opis:

The main purpose of this article is to present the essence and the role of anthropic explanation in cosmology. This explanation was proposed during the time when there was no further possibility of finding the explanation of cosmic coincidences on the ground of contemporary scientific theories. This explanation relies on the recognition of the fact of the existence of a carbon life in the Universe as a factor which explains the Universe’s global characteristics, which are a requisite for appearance of life. The explanatory value of this explanation depends on the character of relations of the connections between the cosmic coincidences and the fact of the existence of life. In the case of the Weak Anthropic Principle this explanation has a character of simple tautology. In the case of the Strong Anthropic Principle, however, it is a philosophical explanation, whose cognitive value depends on both: the correctness of these principles and their logico-mathematical coherence with the cosmic coincidences.

Źródło:

Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2006, 54, 2; 267-298
0035-7685

Pojawia się w:

Roczniki Filozoficzne

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 10.

Tytuł:

Granice wyjaśnienia naukowego, część I
Limits of scientific explanation (I)

Autorzy:

Gorazda, Marcin

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690994.pdf

Data publikacji:

2012

Wydawca:

Copernicus Center Press

Tematy:

scientific explanation
naturalism
unity of science
philosophy of economics
complexity

Opis:

The purpose of the paper is to challenge one of the most important assumptions of the neo-positivists, namely the unity of science. The idea that all of the sciences, both natural and social, should have the same structure and should deploy similar methods is, after Grobler, called naturalism. I try to argue for anti-naturalism. An interesting example seems to be economics. It does not, however, demonstrate the success, similar to that achieved by natural sciences. Certain naturalistic explanations for this lack of success are reviewed and criticized in the paper. Firstly, complexity: at the beginning of this naturalistic argument, one encounters the problem of definition. Up to nine different notions of complexity are proposed and only a few of them are practically quantitative. Secondly, mathematics: in the natural sciences we explore mathematical theories in order to capture the regularities in the investigated phenomena and to include them in the corresponding equations. However, even if we do not have a perfectly corresponding mathematical model, regularities themselves can be observed. Wherever we do not have a good theory expressed in terms of exact mathematical equations, we should at least be able to judge the existence or non-existence of certain regularities on the basis of linear (statistical) or non-linear methods. Those methods, some of them extremely sophisticated, are being extensively applied in economics and in econometrics (the so called quantitative methods). The results are disappointing. The anti-naturalistic argumentation of Grobler is dealt with separately. Grobler names three anti-naturalistic arguments: complexity (as mentioned above), the free will of humans (which the author did not find interesting enough) and, finally, the reasoning which is called, ”inherent two-way interdependence”. Grobler maintains that we are able to work out a meta-theory which shall include both predictions and the possible impact of those predictions on the theory’s object. This proposal is rejected in the paper.

Źródło:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2012, 51; 41-75
0867-8286
2451-0602

Pojawia się w:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 11.

Tytuł:

A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation

Autorzy:

Povich, Mark

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763422.pdf

Data publikacji:

2023

Wydawca:

Copernicus Center Press

Tematy:

scientific explanation
philosophy of science
philosophy of mathematics
mathematical explanation
ontic conception
conventionalism

Opis:

Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, properties, structures, etc.) and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock, 2015; Povich, 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski, 2021).

Źródło:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 171-223
0867-8286
2451-0602

Pojawia się w:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 12.

Tytuł:

What are the limits of mathematical explanation? Interview with Charles McCarty by Piotr Urbańczyk

Autorzy:

McCarty, David Charles
Urbańczyk, Piotr

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691211.pdf

Data publikacji:

2016

Wydawca:

Copernicus Center Press

Tematy:

mathematics
logic
mathematical explanation
limits of explanation
mathematical proof
proof-core
intuitionism
constructivsim
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems
intuitionistics mathematics
classical mathematics
Axiom of Choice

Opis:

An interview with Charles McCarty by Piotr Urbańczyk concerning  mathematical explanation.

Źródło:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2016, 60; 119-137
0867-8286
2451-0602

Pojawia się w:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 13.

Tytuł:

Granice wyjaśnienia naukowego, część II
Limits of scientific explanation (II)

Autorzy:

Gorazda, Marcin

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690548.pdf

Data publikacji:

2013

Wydawca:

Copernicus Center Press

Tematy:

philosophy of science
scientific explanation
model theory
philosophy of mind
F. A. von Hayek

Opis:

The second part of the text is intended to deal with the anti-naturalistic argument of F.A. Hayek. To present it comprehensively, however, his theory of mind has to be outlined first. According to Hayek, the way in which we perceive the world is entirely grounded in the biological construction of our neural order and thus, from this perspective, he seems to be a naturalist. He excludes any non-natural properties of our cognition like e.g. transcendental free will. However, a closer look at the functioning of our biological apparatus of perception divulges certain inherent and internal restrictions. First of all, we notice that the neural order (biological construction of neurons) is in fact a very complex apparatus of classification and discrimination of sensory impulses. Impulses may come from reality which is outer to the neural order as well as from the inside. The apparatus of classification and discrimination of sensory impulses is not stable, but permanently dynamic. An unstoppable attack of sensations and relevant responses of the system creates new classification rules (neural connections) and demolishes those which have been inactive for a longer time. A system of those rules, existing in a particular time unit, forms a model of reality which imperfectly corresponds to the existing, transcendent reality. The final argument for anti-naturalism which is elucidated in the text is Hayek’s idea of what is explanation and where lie its limits. This idea can be reduced to the following quotation: “…any apparatus of classification must possess a structure of a higher degree of complexity that is possessed by an object which it classifies.” In other words: if our cognitive system is an “apparatus of classification”, and if an explanation means modeling, and if a complete explanation requires the explanation of the apparatus itself, then a complete explanation is not possible at all, as the apparatus, which has a certain level of complexity, cannot upgrade this level in order to explain itself. Hayek’s reasoning is generally approved yet it is emphasized, however, that it rests on very strong assumptions which are identified and named at the end of the text.

Źródło:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2013, 52; 53-106
0867-8286
2451-0602

Pojawia się w:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 14.

Tytuł:

Międzyosobowy poziom wyjaśniania umysłu i zdolności poznawczych
The Interpersonal Level of Explanation of Mind and Cognition

Autorzy:

Żuromski, Daniel

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/909305.pdf

Data publikacji:

2020-06-26

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii

Tematy:

the interpersonal level of explanation of mind
social mechanisms of mind transformation
the shared intentionality hypothesis
dialogic thinking
vygotsky’s theory
tomasello’s theory
mechanism-based explanation

Opis:

What is the influence of the social and (to a lesser extent) the cultural on mind and cognition? The question will concern: (i) the nature of the relation between what is social and cultural, on the one hand, and the mind, cognitive ability, and cognitive development on the other; (ii) aspects of the mind, cognitive ability, and cognitive development affected by what is social and cultural; (iii) processes in which what is social and cultural becomes a part of individual cognitive functioning. This paper attempts to provide a conceptual framework within which the above questions can be answered. In the literature concerning the explanation of mind and cognitive abilities, attention is drawn to the importance of distinguishing levels of explanation. One of such approaches to multi-level explanation of the mind and cognition is the distinction drawn by Daniel Dennett between the personal level of explanation (e.g., level of beliefs, desires) and the subpersonal level of explanation (e.g., neural or computational). The purpose of this article is to argue that - recognising that the social and the cultural are one of the constitutive conditions of mind and cognition - we should posit a third level: the interpersonal level of explanation (ILE). The reason for postulating ILE is that there are specific domains in which interpersonal interactions affect elementary cognitive abilities and processes, which may thus result in their transformation into higher cognitive abilities and processes. The entire group of such domains will be defined as ILE, and at the centre of its explanatory potential will be the different types and forms of the said transformation. One of the main research objectives pursued at the ILE is to identify and formulate a taxonomy of transformative features and processes. Two models of such processes will be presented: the Vygotsky model and the Tomasello model. In the final part of this paper, the basic methodological assumptions of the ILE will be presented: the relative autonomy of this level of explanation, multi-level analysis, and the mechanism-based explanation. These assumptions will also be used to formulate general theses of the ILE.

Źródło:

Filozofia Nauki; 2020, 28, 2; 47-74
1230-6894
2657-5868

Pojawia się w:

Filozofia Nauki

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 15.

Tytuł:

Odpowiedź dyskutantom
Reply to Disputants

Autorzy:

Grobler, Adam

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/553370.pdf

Data publikacji:

2013

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Instytut Filozofii

Tematy:

teoria inteligentnego projektu
argument probabilistyczny
wyjaśnienie intencjonalne
pseudowyjaśnienie
nadinteligencja
Intelligent Design
argument from low probability
intentional explanation
pseudo-explanation
superintelligence

Opis:

W odpowiedzi dowodzi się, po pierwsze, że argument probabilistyczny jest chybiony, o ile nie jest uzupełniony dodatkowymi przesłankami materialnymi. Po drugie, pokazuje się, że argumenty z laboratorium, organów szczątkowych i postulatu naśladowania przyrody w technice można odwrócić przeciw teorii inteligentnego projektu. Po trzecie, omówiona jest kwestia odróżniania artefaktów od obiektów naturalnych w kontekście wymogu wyjaśniania. Wreszcie, twierdzi się, że zaniedbanie ze strony zwolenników teorii inteligentnego projektu dyskusji na temat warunków, jakie musi spełnić autentyczne, a nie pozorne wyjaśnienie ściąga tę teorię bliżej fideizmu niż nauki.
In the reply it is argued, first, that the argument from low probability does not work in the absence of additional assumptions. Second, arguments from laboratory, vestigial structures, and imitating nature in technology are reversed against ID. Third, the question of telling artefacts from natural objects is discussed in the context of the search for explanation. Finally, the neglect of the requirements for an explanation to be non-vacuous on the part of ID theorists is said to drive ID towards fideism rather than science.

Źródło:

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy; 2013, 10; 65-72
2299-0356

Pojawia się w:

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 16.

Tytuł:

Dedukcyjno-nomologiczny model wyjaśniania Hempla a wyjaśnianie w naukach humanistycznych
The Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation of C. G. Hempel and the Explanation in Human Sciences

Autorzy:

Włodarczyk, Adam

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968253.pdf

Data publikacji:

2009-12-01

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii

Opis:

The starting point of the article is claim, that the well-known distinction between natural sciences as explaining and human sciences as interpreting made by W. Dilthey and distinction between idiographic and nomothetic sciences made by H. Rickert are both inadequate at present. Human sciences separate their research areas using logics and statistics and formulating many generalizations and even laws. So it can be argued that they can give explanations sensu stricto. First part of the article describes contemporary controversy naturalism-antinaturalism in formulation of M. Salmon, who presents the third middle way, that some human science as linguistics or evolutionary psychology can give causal explanations without appealing to human reasons as causes. This standpoint, however, can lead to reductionism and necessity of separating in each human science some kind of "scientific core", which seems to be undesirable. Second part of the article presents possible applications of the D-N model of explanation of C. G. Hempel in human sciences, which is connected with well-known controversy whether these sciences formulate any laws (especially history but also linguistics for example). Leaving out, however, this important question and accepting statement proposed by J. Such, that some generalizations can serve as a premises in D-N arguments, we can claim that some D-N explanations are possible also in human sciences.

Źródło:

Filozofia Nauki; 2009, 17, 4; 11-22
1230-6894
2657-5868

Pojawia się w:

Filozofia Nauki

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 17.

Tytuł:

Przyczynek do krytyki statystyczno-relewantnego modelu wyjaśniania naukowego
The case for critique of statistical relevance model of scientific explanation

Autorzy:

Gorazda, Marcin

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691122.pdf

Data publikacji:

2009

Wydawca:

Copernicus Center Press

Tematy:

Salmon Wesley
scientific explanation
statistical relevance model

Opis:

The statistical relevance model of scientific explanation was proposed by Wesley Salmon in 1971 as an interesting alternative to already existed models introduced by Hempel and supported by many other philosophers of science. The most important difference between the nomological models and statistical relevance model is that the latter tries not to use the very dubious term of 'law of nature'. The first part of the paper consists of the overview of the Salmon's model and of the main arguments which were raised by various authors against it. In the main part of the text all of those arguments which were meant to undermine the model are presented on an example taken from the economic practice. It is very popular among the economists and especially among valuation experts the so called 'statistical analysis of the market'. The main objective of the analysis is to discover all of the factors which influence the market value of the particular product, in other words to explain the market value of the product. The example was taken from the social science (economics) for purpose as one of the thesis in the paper is that, the SR model can work quite well in physics or chemistry, but it is dubious whether we can really deploy it in sciences which try to describe and explain the various phenomena of human activity and behavior. The final conclusions are: The practical deployment of the model in social sciences are problematic, as it is too idealistic and therefore it doesn't work properly. Against its initial presumption the model doesn't avoid the problem of laws of nature. Although the law of nature is not a required element of the explanans, it comes back at the stage of proposing the initial candidates for the relevant variables. The hypothesis on, which variables can be and which cannot be relevant to the explained phenomenon are constructed mostly according to the intuitively understood causal relationship founded on laws of nature. The important postulate of homogenous partition is in practice unachievable what causes that the explanation is bound with the enormous risk of a mistake. The risk is quantifiable and can be estimated, but the estimation is depended upon experience and intuition of a researcher.

Źródło:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2009, 45; 124-139
0867-8286
2451-0602

Pojawia się w:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 18.

Tytuł:

Moja autobiografia duchowa: powołanie teologa naturalnego
My Spiritual Autobiography: The Vocation of a Natural Theologian

Autorzy:

Swinburne, Richard

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/607356.pdf

Data publikacji:

2011

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

Tematy:

natural theology
scientific explanation
personal explanation
Christian doctrine
probability of truth

Opis:

The author describes his intellectual development and academic pursuits starting from his undergraduate studies at Oxford University in mid-1950s up to the present day, in the perspective of his attempts to resolve the conflict between a materialistically oriented scientific worldview and the worldview of traditional Christianity. In time, he came to recognize the conflict as a problem of distinguishing between levels of explanation or points of terminating an explanation. To deal with this problem adequately, he adopted as his own the program of natural theology laid down by St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae, where Aquinas provided good arguments in favor of the Christian doctrine taking as his starting point the most general phenomena of experience and using the best secular knowledge of his day. Thus Swinburne’s program of natural theology consisted in using the criteria used in modern natural science and historical inquiry for the probable truth of a suggested explanation, analyzed with the careful rigor of modern philosophy, to show the meaningfulness and probable truth of Christian theology. Scientific explanation explains phenomena in terms of prior states of affairs and natural laws; whereas personal explanation explains phenomena in terms of the powers and purposes of agents. Christian metaphysics explains the operation of scientific explanation in explaining why there are states of affairs at all and why the most fundamental natural laws have the character they do, in terms of the power and purposes of God, and in particular his purpose that humans should have a free choice of the kind of persons they are to be. Swinburne extends this model of explanation to show that our historical evidence about the life of Christ makes it very probable that Christ was (and so is) God Incarnate who rose from the dead.

Źródło:

Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne; 2011, 25; 239-268
0209-3472

Pojawia się w:

Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 19.

Tytuł:

Is There a Uniform Explanation for Strawsonian Contrast Cases?

Autorzy:

Vecsey, Zoltán

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/964779.pdf

Data publikacji:

2018-12-31

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii

Opis:

Strawson once observed that sentences containing non-referring definite descriptions tend to elicit different types of intuitive responses from language users. While some of these sentences elicit a sense of squeamishness, others elicit a robust sense of falsity. Strawson explained this type of response difference in terms of presupposition and topicality. In the last decades, Strawson’s approach has been often criticized on the ground that it cannot provide a uniform explanation forall possible occurrences of non-referring definites. In this paper, I examine two recent Strawson-inspired projects and argue that they also fall short of providing a uniform explanation of the data. In the final section, I briefly delineate an alternative approach, which seems to have greater explanatory power than its rivals.

Źródło:

Filozofia Nauki; 2018, 26, 4; 29-47
1230-6894
2657-5868

Pojawia się w:

Filozofia Nauki

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 20.

Tytuł:

Quantum Interpretations and Scientific Explanation in Paradigmatic Quantum Experiments

Autorzy:

Maleeh, Reza

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968733.pdf

Data publikacji:

2017-12-01

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii

Opis:

In this paper, I discuss two different formalisms of quantum mechanics, i.e. the orthodox and the de Broglie–Bohm formalisms, as explanations of the interference pattern observed in the doubleslit experiment. I evaluate the explanations provided by these two formalisms on the basis of Hempel’s DN model of scientific explanation, showing that both formalisms can sufficiently explain the phenomenon. However, once the interpretations associated with the two formalisms come into play, the sufficiency of the DN model’s evaluation of the explanations becomes questionable. Whereas the Copenhagen interpretation, associated with the orthodox quantum formalism, would evaluate the DN model as sufficient, Bohm’s interpretation, associated with the de Broglie–Bohm formalism, would not. Bohm’s interpretation would require descriptions containing relevant metaphysical relations to be included in the explanans. The DN model does not contain such a requirement. Then, Strevens’s kairetic account of explanation will be introduced as an alternative model of scientific explanation. The kairetic account allows for descriptions of relevant metaphysical relations to be included in the explanans. I argue that the proponents of both interpretations will accept the evaluation provided by Strevens’s kairetic account as sufficient. This highlights the role of quantum interpretations in modeling scientific explanation of quantum phenomena in two ways: (1) in determining the relevant explanans of the model of explanation, and (2) in evaluating models of explanation by virtue of evaluating the relevancy of their explanans or by evaluating whether the requirements of a model are fulfilled in the context of an interpretation.

Źródło:

Filozofia Nauki; 2017, 25, 4; 5-30
1230-6894
2657-5868

Pojawia się w:

Filozofia Nauki

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 21.

Tytuł:

Putting the Terror Management Theory to Work: Exploration and Explanation

Autorzy:

Rak, Joanna

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2019108.pdf

Data publikacji:

2021-03-31

Wydawca:

Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek

Źródło:

Polish Political Science Yearbook; 2021, 1 (50); 177-180
0208-7375

Pojawia się w:

Polish Political Science Yearbook

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 22.

Tytuł:

Wyjaśnianie i przewidywanie w bioelektronice
Explanation and Prediction in Bioelectronics

Autorzy:

Waszczyk, Maciej

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1918535.pdf

Data publikacji:

2020-11-16

Wydawca:

Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL

Opis:

The author presents a philosophical analysis of bioelectronics in aspects of its scientific aims and functions, i.e explanation and prediction. Bioelectronics is considered a border-line branch of natural sciences, and may be defined as the area of the applications of methods and concepts of the physical and applied electronics to living systems. The research work in this area has a horizontal and developing structure of explanations which runs from the basic good corroborated coexistential and statistic levels to the higher ones. Although explanations on these latter levels involve many models and hypotheses (what is typical for the new and developing sciences), they present a higher epistemological and logical standard, as bioelectronics explains life fenomena on the lowest existence level of biosystems. Bioelectronics abounds with prognostic suggestions pertaining both to empirical tests in itself and in other sciences.

Źródło:

Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1996, 44, 3; 145-176
0035-7685

Pojawia się w:

Roczniki Filozoficzne

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 23.

Tytuł:

The role of categorization in understanding

Autorzy:

Piłat, Robert

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/703064.pdf

Data publikacji:

2017

Wydawca:

Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN

Tematy:

categorization
understanding
explanation
hermeneutics

Opis:

In this article, I am examining the role of categorization in understanding. The problem arises from well-known distinction between explanation and understanding, which has been for a century pursued in hermeneutic tradition. Categorization belongs to explanatory endeavor and its role in understanding is unclear. In order to delimit the scope of inquiry I am focusing on the weakest kind of categorization, so called categorization ad hoc. I am examining the hypothesis to the effect that categorization plays its role in hermeneutic circle as some sort of pre-understanding. Eventually, however, I reject this hypothesis. It is because it leads to hermeneutic paradox: The notion of pre-understanding has a meaning only in the context of full-fledged understanding, which is an unattainable ideal. Such ideal cannot be used as a personal criterion of the quality of one’s understanding. There is a tension between the feeling of understanding and the scarcity of personal means to justify this feeling. I am suggesting that similar, albeit weaker effect occurs also in more elaborate, scientific categorizations. What is really wrong in the passage from categorization to understanding is some form of self-understanding: We do not know whether we understand better, or at all when we put some categorical order onto our experience. We do not seem to have the required meta-understanding.

Źródło:

Nauka; 2017, 3
1231-8515

Pojawia się w:

Nauka

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 24.

Tytuł:

Wyjaśnić to podać model przyczynowy
Explanation and Causal Models

Autorzy:

Kawalec, Paweł

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015641.pdf

Data publikacji:

2004

Wydawca:

Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL

Tematy:

model DN
model przyczynowy
naturalizm
wyjaśnianie
C. G. Hempel
W. C. Salmon
P. Kitcher
S. Nowak
J. Woodward
causal model
naturalism
explanation

Opis:

A survey of the modern theories of explanation leads us to conclude that it is J. Woodward's conterfactual approach that seems to set out a promising agenda for setting up a satisfactory model of explanation. Such a model would need to come to terms with two stipulations, i.e. to reflect causal asymmetry and be empirically adequate. To meet the latter I modify the counterfactual model of explanation to require a class of observationally equivalent (Bayesian) causal models instead of the true causal model. For in most cases empirical adequacy of causal models, i.e. their identifiability and consistency with observed distributions, would neither grant the stronger conclusion Woodward embeds in his conterfactual account of explanation nor license metaphysical naturalism.

Źródło:

Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2004, 52, 2; 241-266
0035-7685

Pojawia się w:

Roczniki Filozoficzne

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 25.

Tytuł:

Wyjaśnienie epistemicznego efektu Knobea
Explanation of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect

Autorzy:

Paprzycka, Katarzyna

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965435.pdf

Data publikacji:

2016-09-01

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii

Opis:

On the omissions account, in Knobe’s harm case people attribute an intentional omission, which is linguistically expressed as if it were an intentional action. I extend the omissions account to the epistemic side-effect effect. In the harm case, there is a salient knowledge claim (knowledge of a possible harmful consequence) that is relevant to the intentionality of the omission. In assenting to the claim that the chairman knew that the environment would be harmed, people endorse the claim that the chairman knew that a possible harmful consequence of his action was that the environment would be harmed. Such a claim is independent from the predictive claim that the chairman knew that the environment would be harmed; which explains why people assent to the knowledge claim even in the slight chance of harm conditions.

Źródło:

Filozofia Nauki; 2016, 24, 3; 117-133
1230-6894
2657-5868

Pojawia się w:

Filozofia Nauki

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 26.

Tytuł:

Superweniencja psychofizyczna

Autorzy:

Kurek, Łukasz

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/429130.pdf

Data publikacji:

2011

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie

Tematy:

supervenience
mind-body problem
explanation
intentionality
Jaegwon Kim
causation

Opis:

The aim of this article is two-fold. First, a critical presentation of the concept of supervenience is carried out. In this context, three basic types of supervenience are presented: weak, strong, and global. It is argued that the most useful types of supervenience are its strong, and global versions. Second, a broader analysis of the usefulness of supervenience is undertaken. It is argued that it is a very „flexible” concept, which allows for a variety of different solutions to the philosophical issue of the mind. However, the aforementioned flexibility can be limited by additional philosophical assumptions. Moreover, supervenience allows to augment traditional philosophical investigations concerning the mind with results of empirical findings of such sciences as psychology, or neuroscience. In this context it is argued that supervenience is a „third way” in the philosophical study of the mind.

Źródło:

Semina Scientiarum; 2011, 10
1644-3365

Pojawia się w:

Semina Scientiarum

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 27.

Tytuł:

Deliberation and Automaticity in Habitual Acts

Autorzy:

Douskos, Christos

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/781205.pdf

Data publikacji:

2018

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

Tematy:

habit
deliberation
automaticity
action explanation

Opis:

Most philosophers and psychologists assume that habitual acts do not ensue from deliberation, but are direct responses to the circumstances: habit essentially involves a variety of automaticity. My objective in this paper is to show that this view is unduly restrictive. A habit can explain an act in various ways. Pointing to the operation of automaticity is only one of them. I draw attention to the fact that acquired automaticity is one outgrowth of habituation that is relevant to explanation, but not the only one. Habituation shapes our emotional and motivational make up in ways that affect deliberation itself. Hence mentioning a habit might be indispensable in explaining an act which nevertheless ensues from deliberation. The view that habitual acts are direct responses to the circumstances implies an impoverished conception of habit, which fails to do justice to its rich explanatory potential in theoretical and pre-theoretical contexts, as well as to its role in the history of philosophy.

Źródło:

Ethics in Progress; 2018, 9, 1; 25-43
2084-9257

Pojawia się w:

Ethics in Progress

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 28.

Tytuł:

A scientific explanation and understanding of epistemological issues in tourism research (a study based on the theories of Kurt Lewin and John Tribe)

Autorzy:

Alejziak, Wiesław

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/627883.pdf

Data publikacji:

2019

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego

Tematy:

tourism
tourism research
theory
typology
explanation
understanding
prediction
epistemology

Opis:

The article presents the essence as well as various models of academic explanation and the explanatory value of understanding, indicating their usability and limitations as regards understanding why and how tourism functions. Particular attention has been paid to the epistemological dimension of tourism research, as well as its new directions. The author has referred to two models concerning the epistemological aspects of tourism research where the focal point is the category of ‘truth about tourism’. These have been presented in two articles by John Tribe.

Źródło:

Turyzm; 2019, 29, 2; 1-18
0867-5856
2080-6922

Pojawia się w:

Turyzm

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 29.

Tytuł:

Rozumienie dowodu matematycznego a zagadnienie wyjaśnienia w matematyce
The Notion of Mathematical Proof and the Problem of Explanation in Mathematics

Autorzy:

Wójtowicz, Krzysztof

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690770.pdf

Data publikacji:

2015

Wydawca:

Copernicus Center Press

Tematy:

philosophy of mathematics
mathematical proof
explanation in mathematics
explanatory proofs
mathematical intuition

Opis:

In the article, I present two possible points of view concerning mathematical proofs: (a) the formal view (according to which the formalized versions of mathematical proofs reveal their “essence”); (b) the semantic view (according to which mathematical proofs are sequences of intellectual acts, and a form of intuitive “grasp” is crucial). The problem of formalizability of mathematical proofs is discussed, as well as the problem of explanation in mathematics – in particular the problem of explanatory versus non-explanatory character of mathematical proofs. I argue, that this problem can be analyzed in a fruitful way only from the semantic point of view.

Źródło:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2015, 58; 89-114
0867-8286
2451-0602

Pojawia się w:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 30.

Tytuł:

Intuitive explanations of mathematical ideas

Autorzy:

Pogonowski, Jerzy

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791043.pdf

Data publikacji:

2020-01-27

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie

Tematy:

mathematical intuition
understanding in mathematics
intuitive explanation

Opis:

This short note is devoted to the role played by intuitive explanations in mathematical education. We provide a few examples of such explanations. They are related to: verbal commentaries, perception, physical models. We recall also some examples of internal explanations, inside mathematics itself.

Źródło:

Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia ad Didacticam Mathematicae Pertinentia; 2018, 10; 123-137
2080-9751
2450-341X

Pojawia się w:

Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia ad Didacticam Mathematicae Pertinentia

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 31.

Tytuł:

English animal zero plurals. A new explanation

Autorzy:

Berezowski, Leszek

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2032521.pdf

Data publikacji:

2020

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Wrocławski. Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT – Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo Oświatowe

Tematy:

number
English animal zero plural

Opis:

The paper explores English animal zero plurals using data culled from the BNC and argues that the rarely discussed pattern is motivated by a cognitive factor. Specifically, it is argued that the use of the zero plural mirrors the inability to individuate referents in their natural habitat, i.e. the inability to distinguish between particular individuals. In nouns designating aquatic creatures the inability is rooted in the fact that human eyesight is able to penetrate the water surface only to a very limited extent, which makes animals that live underwater and do not surface practically invisible (e.g. They caught lots of herring vs. They observed a pod of whales). In the case of land animals and birds the inability is due to the fact that some animals live in large groups, which thwarts distinguishing particular specimens (e.g. They watched a herd of wildebeest / a covey of quail vs. They spooked a couple of grizzly bears). It is further shown that the zero plural pattern is the most widespread in generic contexts (e.g. There are about 2,700 species of snake), which accords well with the explanation argued for in the paper as species are mental constructs that can be readily talked about but are invisible to the naked eye.

Źródło:

Beiträge zur allgemeinen und vergleichenden Sprachwissenschaft; 2020, 9; 7-27
2657-4799

Pojawia się w:

Beiträge zur allgemeinen und vergleichenden Sprachwissenschaft

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 32.

Tytuł:

Poznanie, rozumienie i wyjaśnienie naukowe jako wyznaczniki użyteczności badań społecznych
Cognition, understanding and scientific explanation as determinants of the utility of social research

Autorzy:

Plewka, Czesław

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1790740.pdf

Data publikacji:

2021

Wydawca:

Towarzystwo Wiedzy Powszechnej w Szczecinie

Tematy:

nauka
naukowe rozumienie i naukowe wyjaśnianie
science
scientific understanding and scientific explanation

Opis:

Nauka - spełniając swoje trzy podstawowe funkcje: deskryptywną, eksplanacyjną i prognostyczną - ma na celu dostarczanie takiej wiedzy naukowej, która może być zweryfikowana. Wiedza taka pomaga zrozumieć i wyjaśnić badane zjawiska empiryczne oraz cechy lub zachowania rzeczy, procesów i idei, którymi zajmuje się określona dziedzina. Owo poznanie, zrozumienie i wyjaśnienie jest możliwe tylko wtedy, gdy jest prowadzone zgodnie z przyjętymi w nauce procedurami metodologicznymi. Warunek ten może być spełniony jedynie przez badaczy/naukowców, którzy dysponują rzetelną wiedzą i umiejętnościami jej obiektywnego wykorzystania w praktyce. W niniejszym artykule podjęto próbę przybliżenia i scharakteryzowania istoty niektórych modeli naukowego rozumienia i wyjaśniania, wskazując na ich użyteczność oraz ograniczenia wykorzystania w naukach społecznych.
Science - fulfilling its three basic functions: descriptive, explanatory and predictive - aims to provide such scientific knowledge that can be verified. Such knowledge helps to understand and explain the researched empirical phenomena and the characteristics or behavior of things, processes and ideas that are dealt with in a specific field. This knowledge, understanding and clarification is possible only when it is carried out in accordance with scientifically accepted methodological procedures. This condition can be met only by researchers / scientists who have reliable knowledge and skills to use it objectively in practice. This article attempts to introduce and characterize the essence of some models of scientific understanding and explanation, pointing to their usefulness and limitations use in social sciences.

Źródło:

Edukacja Humanistyczna; 2021, 1, 44; 31-44
1507-4943

Pojawia się w:

Edukacja Humanistyczna

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 33.

Tytuł:

Miłość w czasach nowoczesności. Nowe ujęcie socjologiczne (recenzja z: Eva Illouz, Why Love Hurts. A Sociological Explanation)
Love in Modern Times: A New Sociological Approach (review of: Why Love Hurts. A Sociological Explanation by Eva Illouz)

Autorzy:

Stasińska, Agata

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/427761.pdf

Data publikacji:

2014

Wydawca:

Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN

Źródło:

Studia Socjologiczne; 2014, 4(215); 295-303
0039-3371

Pojawia się w:

Studia Socjologiczne

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 34.

Tytuł:

Reprezentacjonizm a wyjaśnianie mechanistyczne w kognitywistyce
Representationalism and Mechanistic Explanation in Cognitive Science

Autorzy:

Gładziejewski, Paweł

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966595.pdf

Data publikacji:

2013-12-01

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii

Opis:

There is a growing consensus that explanation in cognitive science is a form of mechanistic explanation. According to this view, explaining a cognitive capacity of a system consists in describing a mechanism responsible for it, where a mechanism is understood as a collection of appropriately organized, functionally specified, interacting components. The article employs a mechanistic view on cognitive scientific explanation in order to discuss the problem of the status of mental representations as explanatory posits invoked by cognitive scientists. The article argues that mechanistic outlook on the problem of mental representations enables one to formulate explicit conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for a given explanation to be legitimately representational. Furthermore, the article develops the thesis that there is (at least) one notion of mental representation that meets these conditions. This notion is based on understanding mental representations as internal models or simulations, where representing is based on structural resemblance relation holding between the vehicle of representation and what is represented.

Źródło:

Filozofia Nauki; 2013, 21, 4; 51-77
1230-6894
2657-5868

Pojawia się w:

Filozofia Nauki

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 35.

Tytuł:

Counterpoint in Explanation of Originative Apprehension

Autorzy:

Ewbank, Michael

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507486.pdf

Data publikacji:

2016-09-30

Wydawca:

International Étienne Gilson Society

Tematy:

originative apprehension
Thomas Aquinas
cognition
being
judgment
abstraction

Opis:

Originative apprehension often has been examined in recent decades in light of Aquinas’ reflections. Yet there has not always been agreement in regard to what constitutes such, often due to different emphases given by interpreters to aspects of St. Thomas’ analyses articulated in different contexts. Arguably, it is possible to reconcile certain seemingly divergent important interpretations by reflecting on an important, yet somewhat recessive, theme that Thomas adverted to sparingly throughout his career in utilizing analyses of predecessors to forge his own synthesis to explain cognition in terms of being that is centered on the reciprocal priorities of judging and concomitant incomplex abstracting.

Źródło:

Studia Gilsoniana; 2016, 5, 3; 465-489
2300-0066

Pojawia się w:

Studia Gilsoniana

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 36.

Tytuł:

Ewolucja poglądów Ernesta Nagla na wyjaśnianie
Evolution of Views of Ernest Nagel on Explanation

Autorzy:

Wołk, Tomasz

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2106649.pdf

Data publikacji:

1990

Wydawca:

Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL

Opis:

The paper presents the changes in views of one of the creators of the law-covering model. I distinguish and discuss five periods in which Nagel’s works on explanation were published:1. Formulation of his primary views /1934-1943/2. Studies on reduction /1949-about 1952/.3. Analysis of functional explanations /1953/.4. Comprehensive view on explanation /1957-1961/. /4.1/ I distinguish three stages in Nagel’s explication of the notion of explanation: In the first one /4.1.1/, explanation is treated as an answer to the question "why?". In the second one /4.1.2/, Nagel tries to sketch the possible contexts of explanation by examples. In the third stage /4.1.3/ Nagel groups the examples in four types of explanation. I complete that explication by general requirements for the explanations /4.2/. I discuss the classifications of explanations /4.3/ and the deductive model, probabilistic, genetics and functional explanations /4.4-4.7/ and a theory as a system of explanations /4.9; some aspect of the instrumentalism/.5. Defence and modifications of his previous views /1968-1977/.6. In recapitulation I collect persistent views of Nagel /6.2/: /I/ There are not radically differences between domains of science. /2/ Explanation is an answer to the question /in general: "why?"/. The deductive model is an ideal of explanation. /6.3/ Some of Nagel’s are subject to change: /I/ The Nagel’s publications past 1961 także "history of science" into account. /2/ They are three phases of Nagel’s views on reduction and teleological explanation: /a/ first view /1949-1953/; /b/ second view /1957-1961/; it is the development of /a/; /c/ third view /1968-1977/; that view has thesis incompatible with /a/ and /b/; third view of teleology has more continuations than third view of reduction. /6.4/ The paper postulates /I/ a study of basis views of Nagel, /2/ analysis of changes of views of philosophers which are related to Nagel, /3/ a study of problem of change of scientific end philosophical views.

Źródło:

Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1990, 37-38, 3; 183-206
0035-7685

Pojawia się w:

Roczniki Filozoficzne

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 37.

Tytuł:

Proces wyjaśniania a rewizja wiedzy na przykładzie odkrycia zjawiska kardioprotekcji
Explanation Process and Knowledge Revision in the Light of Discovery of Cardioprotection Phenomenon

Autorzy:

Rzepiński, Tomasz

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2012844.pdf

Data publikacji:

2011

Wydawca:

Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL

Tematy:

wyjaśnianie przez wyszczególnienie
hipotezy abnormalne
rewizja wiedzy
kardioprotekcja
explanation by specyfication
abnormic hypotheses
knowledge revision
cardioprotection

Opis:

The purpose of the present paper is to analyze the knowledge revision that occurred in the process of explanation an abnormal phenomenon in cardiology. S. Bromberg’s description of abnormic laws will provide the point of departure for the present analysis. It will be shown here that in the example the revision of knowledge resulted in formulating an abnormic law that deviated from the empirical law in cardiology. T. Kuipers’ and A. Wisniewski’s ideas of explanation by specyfication will be used for reconstructing the example in question   

Źródło:

Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2011, 59, 2; 277-299
0035-7685

Pojawia się w:

Roczniki Filozoficzne

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 38.

Tytuł:

The ontic-epistemic debates of explanation revisited: The three-dimensional approach

Autorzy:

Gim, Jinyeong

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763418.pdf

Data publikacji:

2023

Wydawca:

Copernicus Center Press

Tematy:

mechanistic explanation
scientific representation
explanatory norms
Wesley Salmon

Opis:

After Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical stance on explanation in the 1980s, the ontic-epistemic debate of scientific explanations appeared to be resolved in the philosophy of science. However, since the twenty-first century, this debate has been rekindled among philosophers who focus on mechanistic explanations. Nevertheless, its issues have evolved, necessitating scrutiny of the new trends in this debate and a comparison with the original controversy between Carl Hempel and Salmon. The primary objective of this paper is to elucidate three categorical dimensions in the ontic-epistemic debates, spanning from the original to the recent controversies. Subsequently, it will explore why the conception of explanation is linked to representations, what conditions are necessary for linguistic expressions to be explanatory, and what roles norms play in explanation. Consequently, contrary to the common stereotype, it will be argued that mechanistic explanations are more likely to be epistemic rather than ontic.

Źródło:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 99-169
0867-8286
2451-0602

Pojawia się w:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 39.

Tytuł:

Ontic or epistemic conception of explanation: A misleading distinction?

Autorzy:

Oleksowicz, Michał

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763439.pdf

Data publikacji:

2023

Wydawca:

Copernicus Center Press

Tematy:

new mechanical philosophy
mechanistic explanation
ontic
epistemic
explanatory norms
explanatory constraints

Opis:

In this paper, I discuss the differences between ontic and epistemic conceptions of scientific explanation, mainly in relation to the so-called new mechanical philosophy. I emphasize that the debate on conceptions of scientific explanation owes much to Salmon’s ontic/epistemic distinction, although much has changed since his formulations. I focus on the interplay between ontic and epistemic norms and constraints in providing mechanistic explanations. My conceptual analysis serves two aims. Firstly, I formulate some suggestions for recognising that both sets of norms and constraints, ontic and epistemic, are necessary for scientific theorising. Secondly, I emphasize that there are multiple dimensions involved in scientific explanation, rather than clear-cut alternatives between ontic and epistemic aspects. I conclude with a general observation that although contextual aspects of explanations are unavoidable, the epistemic-relativity of our categories, explanations and models can in fact be compatible with their objectivity. Instead of making hastily drawn ontological implications from our theories or models, we should carefully scrutinize them from the ontic-epistemic perspective.

Źródło:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 259-291
0867-8286
2451-0602

Pojawia się w:

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 40.

Tytuł:

Integrating cognitive (neuro)science using mechanisms

Autorzy:

Miłkowski, Marcin

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/632625.pdf

Data publikacji:

2016

Wydawca:

Projekt Avant

Tematy:

theoretical integration
mechanistic explanation
LTP
interfield theories
constraint-satisfaction.

Opis:

In this paper, an account of theoretical integration in cognitive (neuro)science from the mechanistic perspective is defended. It is argued that mechanistic patterns of integration can be better understood in terms of constraints on representations of mechanisms, not just on the space of possible mechanisms, as previous accounts of integration had it. This way, integration can be analyzed in more detail with the help of constraint- satisfaction account of coherence between scientific represen-tations. In particular, the account has resources to talk of idealizations and research heuristics employed by researchers to combine separate results and theoretical frameworks. The account is subsequently applied to an example of successful integration in the research on hippocampus and memory, and to a failure of integration in the research on mirror neurons as purportedly explanatory of sexual orientation.

Źródło:

Avant; 2016, 7, 2
2082-6710

Pojawia się w:

Avant

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 41.

Tytuł:

Zbroja legnicka czy zbroje legnickie - próba wyjaśnienia = Liegnitz suit of armour or Liegnitz suits of armour - an attempt of explanation
Liegnitz suit of armour or Liegnitz suits of armour - an attempt of explanation

Autorzy:

Cieśla, Mariusz (1964- ).

Data publikacji:

2015

Wydawca:

Racibórz : Wydawnictwo i Agencja Informacyjna WAW Grzegorz Wawoczny

Tematy:

Zbroja 15-16 w.
Zbiory
Zbroja

Opis:

Bibliogr. s. 55-59.

Dostawca treści:

Bibliografia CBW

/5

Książka

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Skocz do pozycji: 42.

Tytuł:

Four fundamental methodological problems of landscape geography

Autorzy:

Ostaszewska, Katarzyna
Mikulska, Małgorzata

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2028870.pdf

Data publikacji:

2004-06-01

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Geografii i Studiów Regionalnych

Tematy:

physical geography
geoecology
landscape geography
methodology
explanation

Opis:

Fundamental methodological problems of geography as a science have been identified by Chojnicki (1999) in the following list: goal of research, separate character of research, expected results, and form of scientific explanation. This article presents methodological standpoints taken be landscape geographers towards the above problems, which proved to be as diverse as in the case of the human geography. The article highlights negative consequences of such state of affairs.

Źródło:

Miscellanea Geographica. Regional Studies on Development; 2004, 11; 13-17
0867-6046
2084-6118

Pojawia się w:

Miscellanea Geographica. Regional Studies on Development

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 43.

Tytuł:

Czystość czy zmaza? Czy jest sens łączyć rozumienie z wyjaśnianiem w antropologii i interpretatywnej socjologii?
Purity or Danger? Is It Useful to Combine Understanding with Causal Explanation in Cultural Anthropology and Humanistic Sociology?

Autorzy:

Pawliszak, Piotr

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/623004.pdf

Data publikacji:

2016-11-30

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego

Tematy:

rozumienie
wyjaśnianie
maksymalna interpretacja
konsiliencja
understanding
explanation
maximal interpretation
consilience

Opis:

Dwie ostatnie dekady są okresem kryzysowych przeobrażeń w tych obszarach nauk społecznych, w których dokonuje się jakościowych, interpretatywnych analiz kultur. W ramach rozpowszechnionej tendencji do nieskrępowanego łączenia paradygmatów z czasem pojawił się także, częściowo opozycyjny wobec niego, nurt zmierzający do łączenia elementów humanistyki i nauk przyrodniczych, w szczególności rozumienia i wyjaśniania. Nie reprezentuje on jednak znanej z historii tendencji do podporządkowania humanitas wymogom scientia, lecz szuka nowej równowagi pomiędzy nimi i teoretycznych podstaw do integracji pozwalającej na wytwarzanie bardziej ugruntowanej wiedzy, a także umożliwiającej lepsze przewidywanie i refleksyjną kontrolę życia społecznego. Jest to zadanie szczególnie istotne w sytuacji późnonowoczesnego dynamicznego rozrostu coraz bardziej złożonych systemów społeczno-technologiczno-ekologicznych generujących nowe ryzyka i możliwości. W eseju, za pomocą narzędzi z obszaru analizy dyskursu i socjologii oraz filozofii wiedzy, zostaje podjęta analiza kilku kluczowych teoretycznych założeń, na których może być ufundowana integracja. Przedstawiono również propozycję połączenia procedury interpretacji i wyjaśniania w koncepcji „maksymalnej interpretacji”, a także próbę wyjaśnienia tendencji, która ją zrodziła i jej interpretacji w kategoriach teorii kulturowej Mary Douglas.
For the two last decades cultural social sciences have been facing critical methodological transformation. The widespread tendency in qualitative research to mingling and synthesizing differing interpretive paradigms has been recently confronted with a venture to integration of science and the humanities. This current is not a plain revitalization of historical tendency to submit interpretive methods to scientific explanation of social life, but is seeking a new theoretical base to establish a balance between hermeneutic and causal analysis. This essay discusses different theoretical concepts of the relationship between hermeneutic interpretation and causal explanation. It introduces a concept of “maximal interpretation” devised inside the strong program of cultural sociology as a procedure of unified interpretive-causal analysis of historical events, and analyzes this innovation with theoretical lenses of grid-group theory.

Źródło:

Przegląd Socjologii Jakościowej; 2016, 12, 4; 6-23
1733-8069

Pojawia się w:

Przegląd Socjologii Jakościowej

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 44.

Tytuł:

Simplicity and the form of grammars

Autorzy:

Chomsky, Noam

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1818884.pdf

Data publikacji:

2021

Wydawca:

Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Podstaw Informatyki PAN

Tematy:

simplicity
explanation
evaluation
grammar
faculty of language
learnability
evolvability
externalization

Opis:

The goal of theory construction is explanation: for language, theory for particular languages (grammar) and for the faculty of language FoL (the innate endowment for language acquisition). A primitive notion of simplicity of grammars is number of symbols, but this is too crude. An improved measure distinguishes grammars that capture genuine properties of language from those that do not. The theory of FoL must meet the empirical conditions of learnability (under extreme poverty of stimulus), and evolvability (given the limited but not insignificant evidence available). Recent work provides promising insights into how these twin conditions may be satisfied.

Źródło:

Journal of Language Modelling; 2021, 9, 1; 5--15
2299-856X
2299-8470

Pojawia się w:

Journal of Language Modelling

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 45.

Tytuł:

Towards a proverbial explanation of political instability in independent Nigeria

Autorzy:

Aremu, Johnson Olaosebikan

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1182946.pdf

Data publikacji:

2016

Wydawca:

Przedsiębiorstwo Wydawnictw Naukowych Darwin / Scientific Publishing House DARWIN

Tematy:

political instability
proverbs
corruption
nigeria
ethnicity

Opis:

The challenge of political instability in Nigeria has defied all solutions till date. The National Youth Service Scheme introduced in 1973 and the Federal Character principle entrenched in the Constitution since 1979, among others, have failed to engender peace and stability in the polity. Judging from this, this paper offers a possible explanation for the seeming failure of all efforts to combat the monster of political instability in Nigeria since independence. Given the fact that most Nigerian leaders and commoners alike are always quick in reverting to some proverbs to rationalize their actions or inactions; five of the most widely acclaimed causes of political instability in Nigeria were examined vis-à-vis some selected Yoruba proverbs. This was done against the backdrop of a Yoruba proverb: Owe lesin oro, oro lesin owe; b’oro ba sonu, owe la fi n waa. (“A proverb is like a horse: when the truth is missing, we use a proverb to find it”). A thorough analysis reveals that political instability in Nigeria has its philosophical foundations well entrenched in the spirit of selected Nigerian proverbs and concludes that political stability may continue to elude the country as long as citizens indulge in hiding under the cover of the letters and spirit of selected Nigerian proverbs to perpetrate evil in governance.

Źródło:

World Scientific News; 2016, 49, 2; 307-320
2392-2192

Pojawia się w:

World Scientific News

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 46.

Tytuł:

Charakterystyka systemów dekodowania sygnału w mechanistycznej teorii wyjaśnień
Signal Decoding Systems in the Mechanistic Theory of Explanation

Autorzy:

Rzepiński, Tomasz

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967239.pdf

Data publikacji:

2014-09-01

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii

Opis:

The article discusses the mechanistic account of explanation and uses it to pro-pose a novel description of signal decoding systems (SDS) that occur in living or-ganisms. The considerations are based on examples taken from the field of immu-nology. The results may be used in the analysis of decoding systems in computer sci-ence.

Źródło:

Filozofia Nauki; 2014, 22, 3; 81-104
1230-6894
2657-5868

Pojawia się w:

Filozofia Nauki

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

/5

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Skocz do pozycji: 47.

Tytuł:

O konstytutywnej współzależności wyjaśniania i identyfikowania czynności konwencjonalnych
On the constitutive correlation between the identification and intentional explanation of conventional acts

Autorzy:

Bogucki, Olgierd

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/692820.pdf

Data publikacji:

2019

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

Tematy:

theory of law
intentional explanation
conventional acts
concept of an act
causalism
anti-causalism
teoria prawa
wyjaśnianie intencjonalne
czynności konwencjonalne
pojęcie czynu
kauzalizm
antykauzalizm

Opis:

The article examines the specific correlation (interdependence) between the identification and intentional explanation of conventional acts (in particular, legally significant conventional acts). The author describes this interdependence as ‘constitutive’ because in this case intentional explanation plays a constitutive role for the identification of a conventional act. This can be expressed through the formula: ‘person P performed conventional act CA1’ only if ‘person P performed conventional act CA1 because person P was driven by the intention to perform conventional act CA1.’ The article analyses the logical and argumentative structure of the abovementioned correlation. On the basis of the analysis, the author claims that a constitutive correlation indicates that a relevant intention should be perceived as an element of the act itself (in contrast to the view adopted in the theory of conventional acts) and that verification rules relevant for the given act exist alongside the constitutive rules. Recognizing the relevant intention as an element of the conventional act stands in opposition to causalism, which treats intentions as the causes of actions.
Artykuł dotyczy specyficznej współzależności między identyfikacją a intencjonalnym wyjaśnianiem czynności konwencjonalnych (w szczególności prawnie doniosłych czynności konwencjonalnych). Autor charakteryzuje tą współzależność jako „konstytutywną”, ponieważ odgrywa ona konstytutywną rolę przy identyfikacji danej czynności konwencjonalnej. Można wyrazić to formułą: „osoba O dokonała czynności konwencjonalnej CK1” tylko wtedy, gdy „osoba O dokonała czynności konwencjonalnej CK1, ponieważ osoba O kierowała się intencją dokonania czynności konwencjonalnej CK1”. W artykule analizowana jest logiczna i argumentacyjna struktura wskazanej współzależności. W świetle dokonanej analizy autor uznaje, że konstytutywna współzależność skłania do traktowania odpowiedniej intencji jako elementu samej czynności konwencjonalnej (w przeciwieństwie do poglądu przyjmowanego w teorii czynności konwencjonalnych) oraz postulowania istnienia, obok reguł konstytutywnych, właściwych dla danej czynności reguł weryfikacji. Uznanie odpowiedniej intencji za element czynności konwencjonalnej przemawia zaś przeciwko kauzalizmowi, traktującemu intencje jako przyczyny zachowań.

Źródło:

Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny; 2019, 81, 2; 51-65
0035-9629
2543-9170

Pojawia się w:

Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 48.

Tytuł:

Struktury wyjaśniania statystycznego. Warunek istotności statystycznej w analizie podgrup randomizowanych badań klinicznych
The Structures of Statistical Explanation: Statistical Relevance Condition in Subgroup Analysis of Randomized Clinical Trials

Autorzy:

RZEPIŃSKI, Tomasz

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488657.pdf

Data publikacji:

2018-06

Wydawca:

Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL

Tematy:

wyjaśnianie statystyczne
warunek istotności statystycznej
badania biomedyczne
analiza podgrup
statistical explanation
statistical relevance condition
clinical studiem
subgroup analysis

Opis:

Przedmiotem analizy podjętej w artykule jest procedura wyjaśniania statystycznego. Dla potrzeb prowadzonych rozważań omówiony został szczególny typ badań biomedycznych, jakim jest analiza podgrup randomizowanych badań klinicznych. Pokazane zostało, że poprawności wyjaśnień statystycznych nie można ustalić, analizując wyłącznie strukturę eksplanansu, jak jest to przyjmowane w modelu istotności statystycznej (R-S), zaproponowanym przez W. Salmona. Procedura wyjaśniania statystycznego jest zatem, w przeciwieństwie do pozostałych form wyjaśniania, zależna od procedur badawczych stanowiących podstawę formułowania twierdzeń statystycznych.
The subject of analysis undertaken in the article is the procedure of statistical explanation. For this purpose a specific type of biomedical study, so called subgroup analysis of randomized clinical trials (SA), was discussed. It was shown that the validity of statistical explanations can not be determined by analyzing only the structure of explanation, as is the case in the statistical significance model (S-R) proposed by W. Salmon. Therefore, the statistical explanatory procedure is, in contrast to the other explanatory forms, dependent on the research procedures underlying the formulation of statistical theorems.

Źródło:

Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2018, 66, 2; 65-86
0035-7685

Pojawia się w:

Roczniki Filozoficzne

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 49.

Tytuł:

DNA a pochodzenie życia. Informacja, specyfikacja i wyjaśnienie
DNA and the Origin of Life: Information, Specification, and Explanation

Autorzy:

Meyer, Stephen C.

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/553388.pdf

Data publikacji:

2006

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Instytut Filozofii

Tematy:

informacja
wyspecyfikowana złożoność
adekwatność przyczynowa
wnioskowanie do najlepszego wyjaśnienia
konieczność
przypadek
inteligentny projekt
information
specified complexity
causal adequacy
inference to the best explanation
necessity
chance
intelligent design

Opis:

Niniejszy esej jest oceną rywalizujących wyjaśnień pochodzenia informacji koniecznej do zbudowania pierwszej komórki żywej. Dokonanie tej oceny wymagało będzie określenia, co biologowie rozumieją przez termin informacja w zastosowaniu do makrocząsteczek biologicznych. Jak wielu badaczy zauważyło, „informacja” może oznaczać kilka teoretycznie odmiennych pojęć. W niniejszym eseju postaram się usunąć tę wieloznaczność i dokładnie określę, jakiego rodzaju informacji badacze pochodzenia życia muszą wyjaśnić „powstanie”. Najpierw należy scharakteryzować informację zawartą w DNA, RNA i białkach jako eksplanandum (fakt wymagający wyjaśnienia), a następnie ocenić skuteczność rywalizujących klas wyjaśnień pochodzenia informacji biologicznej (czyli rywalizujących eksplanansów). W części I postaram się wykazać, że biologowie molekularni stosowali termin informacja konsekwentnie w odniesieniu do łącznych właściwości złożoności i funkcjonalnej specyficzności lub specyfikacji. W części II ocenię rywalizujące rodzaje wyjaśnień pochodzenia wyspecyfikowanej informacji biologicznej, koniecznej do wytworzenia pierwszego układu żywego. Część II obejmie także krytykę adekwatności przyczynowej teorii ewolucji chemicznej, opartych na „przypadku”, „konieczności” i na mieszance tych dwu. W konkludującej części III zawrę sugestię, że zjawisko informacji rozumianej jako wyspecyfikowana złożoność wymaga radykalnie odmiennego ujęcia eksplanacyjnego. Będę w szczególności argumentował, że nasza aktualna wiedza na temat sił przyczynowych nasuwa hipotezę inteligentnego projektu jako lepsze, bardziej adekwatne przyczynowo wyjaśnienie powstania wyspecyfikowanej złożoności (zdefiniowanej tak informacji), występującej w dużych molekułach biologicznych, takich jak DNA, RNA i białka.
This essay will evaluate competing explanations for the origin of the information necessary to build the first living cell. To do so will require determining what biologists have meant by the term information as it has been applied to biomacromolecules. As many have noted, „information” can denote several theoretically distinct concepts. This essay will attempt to eliminate this ambiguity and to determine precisely what type of information origin-of-life researchers must explain „the origin of.” What follows will first seek to characterize the information in DNA, RNA, and proteins as an explanandum (a fact in need of explanation) and, second, to evaluate the efficacy of competing classes of explanation for the origin of biological information (that is, the competing explanans). Part I will seek to show that molecular biologists have used the term information consistently to refer to the joint properties of complexity and functional specificity or specification. Part II will evaluate competing types of explanation for the origin of the specified biological information necessary to produce the first living system. Part II will critique the causal adequacy of chemical evolutionary theories based on „chance,” „necessity,” and the combination of the two. A concluding part III will suggest that the phenomenon of information understood as specified complexity requires a radically different explanatory approach. In particular, I will argue that our present knowledge of causal powers suggests intelligent design as a better, more causally adequate explanation for the origin of the specified complexity (the information so defined) present in large biomolecules such as DNA RNA, and proteins.

Źródło:

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy; 2005-2006, 2-3; 133-215
2299-0356

Pojawia się w:

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 50.

Tytuł:

Dlaczego reprezentacje nie trzymają się modeli dynamicznych?

Autorzy:

Korbak, Tomasz

Powiązania:

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/637828.pdf

Data publikacji:

2014

Wydawca:

Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

Tematy:

philosophy of cognitive science, dynamical explanation, representation, cognitive models, Clark, van Gelder

Opis:

Why representations don't stick with dynamic models?In this paper I investigate thesis, embraced by proponents of dynamicism in cognitive science, that mind is not representational and explanation of cognition can go without representations. This claim has received serious criticism from cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind, who accuse dynamical explanation of being satisfying only for a narrow class of simple cognitive phenomena. Thus, genuine, representation-free explanation of cognition will always be incomplete. I espouse another strategy and present two arguments saying that the language of pure dynamical systems theory is not rich enough to define any nontrivial notion of representation. If I am right, then at least these phenomena dynamical explanation deals well with are not representational and representation talk can in no way help us understand them

Źródło:

Rocznik Kognitywistyczny; 2014, 7
1689-927X

Pojawia się w:

Rocznik Kognitywistyczny

Dostawca treści:

Biblioteka Nauki

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