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Wyszukujesz frazę "zero-sum game" wg kryterium: Temat


Tytuł:
A mixed duel under arbitrary motion and uncertain existence of the shot
Autorzy:
Trybuła, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1340659.pdf
Data publikacji:
1993
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Matematyczny PAN
Tematy:
zero-sum game
mixed duel
game of timing
Opis:
The purpose of the paper is to solve a mixed duel in which the numbers of shots given to the players are independent 0-1-valued random variables. The players know their distributions as well as the accuracy function P, the same for both players. It is assumed that the players can move as they like and that the maximal speed of the first player is greater than that of the second player. It is shown that the game has a value, and a pair of optimal strategies is found.
Źródło:
Applicationes Mathematicae; 1993-1995, 22, 1; 39-44
1233-7234
Pojawia się w:
Applicationes Mathematicae
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Random priority two-person full-information best choice problem with imperfect observation
Autorzy:
Porosiński, Zdzisław
Szajowski, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1208161.pdf
Data publikacji:
2000
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Matematyczny PAN
Tematy:
mixed strategy
best choice problem
zero-sum game
stopping game
Opis:
The following version of the two-player best choice problem is considered. Two players observe a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with a known continuous distribution. The random variables cannot be perfectly observed. Each time a random variable is sampled, the sampler is only informed whether it is greater than or less than some level specified by him. The aim of the players is to choose the best observation in the sequence (the maximal one). Each player can accept at most one realization of the process. If both want to accept the same observation then a random assignment mechanism is used. The zero-sum game approach is adopted. The normal form of the game is derived. It is shown that in the fixed horizon case the game has a solution in pure strategies whereas in the random horizon case with a geometric number of observations one player has a pure strategy and the other one has a mixed strategy from two pure strategies. The asymptotic behaviour of the solution is also studied.
Źródło:
Applicationes Mathematicae; 2000, 27, 3; 251-263
1233-7234
Pojawia się w:
Applicationes Mathematicae
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Sekwencyjna dwuosobowa gra konkurencyjna o sumie niezerowej
Sequential non zero sum two persons game
Autorzy:
Laskowski, S.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/317774.pdf
Data publikacji:
2006
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
gra konkurencyjna
rynek telekomunikacyjny
gra o sumie niezerowej
strategie gry
competitive game
telecommunications market
non zero sum two person game
game strategy
Opis:
Rozważono sytuacje decyzyjne danego gracza, dla ustalonych kolejności ruchów graczy. Wskazano na problem nieznanego charakteru kryterium gracza konkurencyjnego i niejednoznaczności jego odpowiedzi. Zaproponowano analityczne narzędzia wspomagające proces podejmowania decyzji.
Certain decision situations of one player have been analyzed for a fixed order of movements of both players. The problem of unknown character of the pay off function of the competitive player and ambiguity of his movement response has been shown. Analytical decision support tools have been proposed.
Źródło:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne; 2006, 3-4; 44-60
1640-1549
1899-8933
Pojawia się w:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Online learning algorithm for zero-sum games with integral reinforcement learning
Autorzy:
Vamvoudakis, K. G.
Vrabie, D.
Lewis, F. L.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/91780.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Społeczna Akademia Nauk w Łodzi. Polskie Towarzystwo Sieci Neuronowych
Tematy:
learning
online algorithm
zero-sum game
game
infinite horizon
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation
approximation network
optimal value function
adaptive control tuning algorithm
Nash solution
Opis:
In this paper we introduce an online algorithm that uses integral reinforcement knowledge for learning the continuous-time zero sum game solution for nonlinear systems with infinite horizon costs and partial knowledge of the system dynamics. This algorithm is a data based approach to the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation and it does not require explicit knowledge on the system’s drift dynamics. A novel adaptive control algorithm is given that is based on policy iteration and implemented using an actor/ disturbance/critic structure having three adaptive approximator structures. All three approximation networks are adapted simultaneously. A persistence of excitation condition is required to guarantee convergence of the critic to the actual optimal value function. Novel adaptive control tuning algorithms are given for critic, disturbance and actor networks. The convergence to the Nash solution of the game is proven, and stability of the system is also guaranteed. Simulation examples support the theoretical result.
Źródło:
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing Research; 2011, 1, 4; 315-332
2083-2567
2449-6499
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing Research
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Feedback saddle point equilibria for soft-constrained zero-sum linear quadratic descriptor differential game
Autorzy:
Musthofa, M. W.
Salmah, ---
Engwerda, J. C.
Suparwanto, A
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/964027.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
soft-constrained zero-sum linear quadratic differential game
feedback information structure
descriptor systems
Opis:
In this paper the feedback saddle point equilibria of soft-constrained zero-sum linear quadratic differential games for descriptor systems that have index one will be studied for a finite and infinite planning horizon. Both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a feedback saddle point equilibrium are considered.
Źródło:
Archives of Control Sciences; 2013, 23, 4; 473-493
1230-2384
Pojawia się w:
Archives of Control Sciences
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Modelling of decision support using the Stackelberg duopoly model to bimatrix hierarchical non-zero-sum game
Metoda otrzymywania elementów bimacierzy w hierarchicznej grze o sumie niezerowej za pomocą modelu duopolu Stackelberga
Autorzy:
Kałuski, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/321222.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Politechnika Śląska. Wydawnictwo Politechniki Śląskiej
Tematy:
gra o sumie niezerowej
bimacierz
planowanie
potrzeby materiałowe
kopalnia węgla kamiennego
non-zero sum game
bimatrix
planning
material requirement
hard coal mine
Opis:
In the work some problem receiving the elements of the bimatrix hierarchical non-zero sum game is presented. In this aim the Stackelberg duopoly model was used. To explain a proposed method the example concerning two mining enterprises output a coal is discussed.
W artykule rozważono metodę otrzymywania elementów bimacierzy hierarchicznej gry o sumie niezerowej za pomocą Modelu Duopolu Stackelberga. Zaproponowaną metodę zilustrowano na przykładzie dwóch przedsiębiorstw górniczych, rozwiązujących problem planowania i kontrolowania zapotrzebowania materiałowego.
Źródło:
Zeszyty Naukowe. Organizacja i Zarządzanie / Politechnika Śląska; 2013, 64; 111-119
1641-3466
Pojawia się w:
Zeszyty Naukowe. Organizacja i Zarządzanie / Politechnika Śląska
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Disturbance attenuation problem using a differential game approach for feedback linear quadratic descriptor systems
Autorzy:
Musthofa, M. W.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/229177.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
disturbance attenuation problem
zero-sum linear quadratic differential game
descriptor systems
feedback information structure
Opis:
This paper studies the H∞ disturbance attenuation problem for index one descriptor systems using the theory of differential games. To solve this disturbance attenuation problem the problem is converted into a reduced ordinary zero-sum game. Within a linear quadratic setting the problem is solved for feedback information structure.
Źródło:
Archives of Control Sciences; 2015, 25, 4; 445-462
1230-2384
Pojawia się w:
Archives of Control Sciences
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ JAKO KRYTERIUM OCENY SYSTEMU EKONOMICZNO-POLITYCZNEGO
Justice as the evaluation criterion economical and political system
Autorzy:
SKARŻYŃSKA, KRYSTYNA
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/546620.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie
Tematy:
justice
political cynicism
zero-sum game
distrust
social world as a threat
Opis:
Justice is a widely used evaluation criterion applied to both particular decisions and behaviours as well as to whole social, economic and political systems. The paper presents research results from the representative sample of adult Poles conducted in September 2014. The goal of the research was to investigate the relationships between different schemata of world perception and the evaluation of the justice of the current socio-economic system. The method of the data collection was computer assisted telephone interviews. The results indicate that the evaluations of justice of the political system are lower when: political cynicism is higher, interpersonal distrust is higher and when respondents held a stronger belief that the social world is full of uncontrollable danger. Also the lower evaluations of justice of the current system were accompanied by acceptance of aggression in politics. Socio-demographic variables were less correlated with the evaluations of the justice of the system then were psychological variables. Only age and educational level significantly but weakly differentiated the evaluations of justice.
Źródło:
Civitas et Lex; 2015, 1(5); 19-30
2392-0300
Pojawia się w:
Civitas et Lex
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Mediational Role of Relational Psychological Contract in Belief in a Zero-Sum Game and Work Input Attitude Dependency
Autorzy:
Adamska, Krystyna
Jurek, Paweł
Różycka-Tran, Joanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/430299.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-12-01
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
psychological contract
work input
zero-sum game belief
Opis:
The purpose of this study was to investigate the mediational role of relational psychological contract in social beliefs and work input attitude dependency. We analyzed data taken from employees (N = 258) in four different organizations operating in the Pomeranian market. A mediation analysis showed a strongly mediating role of psychological contract in the negative relationship between perception of life as a zero-sum game (BZSG) and work input. The motivational effect of the relational psychological contract, that is the role of job security, interesting work, a career in the company, opportunities for promotion and other HRM practices prevail over the significance of personal beliefs, especially when these are negative. If the company lacks the appropriate HRM systems then day-to-day social exchanges can be crucial in modifying the social beliefs of the employee.
Źródło:
Polish Psychological Bulletin; 2015, 46, 4; 579-586
0079-2993
Pojawia się w:
Polish Psychological Bulletin
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Game Theory in economics education
Autorzy:
Yevsyeyeva, Elena
Skafa, Olena
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/421389.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:
game theory
zero-sum game
economics education
mathematics for business and economics
Opis:
The article is devoted to the application of skills gained by students in Mathematics for Business and Economics to solve problems of the game theory. An application of the entry game analysis is considered. A real-life problem is described which consists of the application of the zero-sum game to an auction situation, followed by finding the optimal solution with respective recommendations.
Źródło:
Didactics of Mathematics; 2016, 13(17); 39-52
1733-7941
Pojawia się w:
Didactics of Mathematics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Bargain Diplomacy in the Syrian Crisis
Autorzy:
Abudayeh, Saad
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/624654.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej
Tematy:
diplomacy, zero sum game, Syria, Nusra Organization (Front).
Opis:
The Syrian crisis is different from other crisis in the region. There are two basic international players USA and Russia. AS well there are two basic regional players. From the beginning every one observed the huge media that the collapse of the regime is a matter of time. There was money, Arms, insurgents, media, and information which were used against Syria. But Syria survived. The pro Syria basic player Russia depended on several methods. Russia was clever in the diplomacy of bargains to save Syria mainly in the last summer and autumn, 2016.
Źródło:
Teka Komisji Politologii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych; 2017, 12, 1
1896-8279
Pojawia się w:
Teka Komisji Politologii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On the one-shot two-person zero-sum game in football from a penalty kicker’s perspective
Autorzy:
Ekhosuehi, V.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/406567.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:
linear programming
mixed strategy
penalty
kick
strategic game
two-person zero-sum game
Opis:
A penalty kicker’s problem in football has been modelled. The study took into consideration different directions in which the ball can be struck and goalkeepers’ success at defending shots. The strategic form of the game that can be used to predict how the kicker should optimally randomise his strategies has been modelled as a non-linear game-theoretic problem from a professional kicker’s viewpoint. The equilibrium of the game (i.e., the pair of mutually optimal mixed strategies) was obtained from the game-theoretic problem by reducing it to a linear programming problem and the two-phase simplex method was adopted to solve this problem. The optimal solution to the game indicates that the kicker never chooses to kick the ball off target, to the goalpost or to the crossbar, but rather chooses to kick the ball in the opposite direction to the one where the goalkeeper is most likely to successfully defend from past history.
Źródło:
Operations Research and Decisions; 2018, 28, 3; 17-27
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:
Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł

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