Temat: voting game - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Orders of criticality in voting games
Autorzy:: Dall'Aglio, M.
Fragnelli, V.
Moretti, S.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/406289.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2016
Wydawca:: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:: voting game
blackmailing power
semivalue
Opis:: The authors focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this purpose, the classical notion of the criticality of players has been ex-tended, in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition thanks to collusion with other players.
Źródło:: Operations Research and Decisions; 2016, 26, 2; 53-67
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:: Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: The Conception of Blocking Power as a Key to the Understanding of the History of Designing Voting Systems for the EU Council
Autorzy:: Sozański, Tadeusz
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/494257.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2014-12-15
Wydawca:: Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:: voting game EU Council
voting power, blocking coalition
blocking power
EU Council
Opis:: Unlike the classical approach to voting power, the approach presented in this paper makes a distinction between a voter's winning and blocking power and relates the latter kind of power to the number of small-size minimal blocking coalitions the voter can form with other voters. It is shown that the concept of blocking sheds light on the designing of voting systems for EU Council of Ministers from the very beginning to the Lisbon treaty
Źródło:: Decyzje; 2014, 22; 5-46
1733-0092
2391-761X
Pojawia się w:: Decyzje
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: The toy model with two strong players in a weighted voting game
Autorzy:: Tomski, Andrzej
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/747503.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2014
Wydawca:: Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
Tematy:: two strong players in a weighted voting game, optimal quota, normal approximation
model-zabawka z dwoma silnymi graczami, indeks Penrose`a-Banzhafa, próg optymalny, aproksymacja normalna
Opis:: Celem niniejszego artykułu jest porównanie szczególnego typu wyborczego modelu-zabawki z wynikami uzyskanymi przy pomocy metod aproksymacji normalnej przez Słomczyńskiego i innych w poprzednich pracach. Dla tego celu skonstruowaliśmy model, w którym zostaje oszacowany próg optymalny dla większości kwalifikowanej. Próg optymalny jest to próg, który minimalizuje różnicę między siłą głosu członka ciała decyzyjnego, mierzoną za pomocą (znormalizowanego) indeksu Penrose'a-Banzhafa, a jego wagą głosu. Wprowadzamy model 'Francja-Niemcy' z dwoma silnymi graczami, w którym każdy z nich jest c>1 razy silniejszy od reszty i szacujemy próg optymalny w przypadku c=2. Sprawdzamy, że te wyniki są zgodne z oszacowaniem uzyskanym z aproksymacji normalnej, gdzie szukany próg jest punktem przegięcia krzywej gęstości rozkładu normalnego.
The aim of this article is to compare a specific toy voting model with the results derived from the normal approximation techniques by Słomczyński et al in the previous papers. For this purpose we have constructed a model in which the optimal quota for the qualified majority has been estimated. The optimal quota is set in such a way that the voting power of each member of the voting body, measured by the (normalised) Penrose-Banzhaf index, is proportional to its voting weight. We present the ‘France-Germany’ model of two strong players each of which is c > 1 times stronger than each of the others and we estimate the quota in the case of c = 2. We check that these results are consistent with a formula derived from the normal approximation, where the quota we are looking for is the inflection point of the density function for this distribution.
Źródło:: Mathematica Applicanda; 2014, 42, 2
1730-2668
2299-4009
Pojawia się w:: Mathematica Applicanda
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:: ``A Mathematical Look at Politics” by E. Arthur Robinson, Jr., Daniel H. Ullman
Autorzy:: Mercik, Jacek W.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/748443.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2013
Wydawca:: Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
Tematy:: voting procedures, social choice function, divisor methods, game, conflict, Nash equilibrium, weighting voting, privileges
Opis:: The 460-page book “A Mathematical Look at Politics” (E. Arthur Robinson, Jr. and Daniel H. Ull-man. A mathematical look at politics. CRC Press–Taylor and Francis Group, Boca Raton, FL, 2011. ISBN: 978-1-4398-1983-8) written by Arthur Robinson and Daniel Ullman [1] consists of four chapters (the descriptions of the chapters are given in parenthesis): I --- Voting (the two candidate case, social choice functions, criteria for social choice, which methods are good?, Arrow’s theorem, variations on a theme), II --- Apportionment (Hamilton’s Method, Divisor Methods, Criteria and Impossibility, the Method of Balinski and Young, Choosing a Divisor Method, History of Apportionment in the United States), III --- Conflict (Strategies and Outcomes, Chance and Expectation, Solving Zero-Sum Games, Conflict, Nash Equilibria, the Prisoner’s Dilemma) and chapter IV --- the Electoral College (Weighted Voting and Privileges). At the end of each chapter there are problems and exercises. Finally, solutions to the exercises and problems, bibliography and index are at the end. Recommendations for instructors are also presented at the end of the preface. In the preface, one may find the declaration of the Authors that this book focuses on mathematical reasoning about politics rather than on mathematics:-- Is there a good way to choose winners of elections?-- Is there a good way to apportion congressional seats?-- Is there a good way to make decisions in situations of conflict and uncertainty?The book offers an alternative textbook to the usual mathematics courses for liberal arts students seeking to meet a general education requirement in mathematics or quantitative reasoning. What makes this book mathematical is not numbers or formulas, but rather reasoning. The book requires rather little background in mathematics or political science. Some experience with the American system of government is assumed.
Źródło:: Mathematica Applicanda; 2013, 41, 2
1730-2668
2299-4009
Pojawia się w:: Mathematica Applicanda
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 5.

Tytuł:: Computing power indices for weighted voting games via dynamic programming
Autorzy:: Staudacher, Jochen
Kóczy, László Á.
Stach, Izabella
Filipp, Jan
Kramer, Marcus
Noffke, Till
Olsson, Linuss
Pichler, Jonas
Singer, Tobias
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2099634.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2021
Wydawca:: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:: cooperative game theory
power indices
weighted voting games
dynamic programming
minimal winning coalitions
Opis:: We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of dynamic programming. We survey the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices and point out how these approaches carry over to related power indices. Within a unified framework, we present new efficient algorithms for the Public Good index and a recently proposed power index based on minimal winning coalitions of the smallest size, as well as a very first method for computing the Johnston indices for weighted voting games efficiently. We introduce a software package providing fast C++ implementations of all the power indices mentioned in this article, discuss computing times, as well as storage requirements.
Źródło:: Operations Research and Decisions; 2021, 31, 2; 123--145
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:: Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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