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Wyszukujesz frazę "variable remuneration" wg kryterium: Temat


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Tytuł:
Polityka zmiennych składników wynagrodzeń w domach maklerskich
Policy on variable components of remuneration in brokerage houses
Autorzy:
Wieczorek, Agata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/570028.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:
variable components of remuneration
financial sector
brokerage houses
corporate governance
Opis:
Inefficient remuneration policies in the financial sector have been recognized as one of the main causes of the recent financial crisis. This is because it encouraged executives to take excessive risks, and focus on short-term results, which could bring high annual bonuses. The crisis was followed by a series of reforms of the regulation of executive remuneration policy at international and national levels. In Poland, the deepest changes in the executive remuneration policy took place in the banking sector. They resulted from the transfer by the Polish Financial Authority of regulations from the Directive of the European Parliament of 2010, to the Polish Resolutions of 4 October 2011, as well as from the implementation of the regulations from the Directive of the European Parliament of 2013 to the Polish Act of August of 2015. However, little is known about changes in regulations in other companies operating in the financial sector. The aim of this article is to present new regulations regarding remuneration policy of executives in brokerage houses. The study examines the extent to which brokerage houses operating in Poland have implemented new rules. The analysis shows that the variable components remuneration policy in brokerage houses is not widespread (it is not applied by about 40% of financial institutions or they do not provide any information). This may be due to the fact that the Ordinance of the Minister of Finance is the first of this type of regulations addressed to brokerages. Because of that, they may initially approach the concept of remuneration involving variable components with a certain distrust. However, we can assume that from year to year more and more brokerages will decide to use this policy.
Źródło:
Ekonomia XXI Wieku; 2016, 2 (10); 62-76
2353-8929
Pojawia się w:
Ekonomia XXI Wieku
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Akcje fantomowe jako element polityki zmiennych składników wynagrodzenia w polskim sektorze bankowym
Phantom stock plan as a variable component of compensation policy in the Polish banking sector
Autorzy:
Wieczorek, Agata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/569952.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:
phantom stocks
remuneration policy
banking sector
corporate governance
variable remuneration
Opis:
The ineffective executive compensation policy and excessive risk taking by managers in companies in the banking sector have been considered the main source of the outbreak of the recent financial crisis. These conclusions have led to new regulations which encourage companies to make executive remuneration dependent on the performance of the company in the long term, through the deferred portion of the salary. For this purpose a number of different financial instruments can be used, such as stocks, options and restricted stock, or increasingly used phantom stock plan. Phantom stock is a kind of compensation scheme which entitles its holder to receive a cash payment at a designated time in the future. Thanks to the fact that the amount of payment is linked mostly to the share price, the company can be confident that the actions of top executives will be aimed at achieving good performance over a long period of time. Moreover, this type of remuneration, compared to shares or stock options, does not necessitate the increase of the share capital since employees do not receive actual shares. Owing to these advantages phantom stock plans may become one of the basic elements of variable remuneration. This paper examines whether the Polish public banks use phantom stock plans to remunerate managers and to what extent the banks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange use phantom stock plans and what information about them they reveal. The analysis showed little interest in phantom stock plans which can be explained by the fact that the Polish public banks only since 2012 have been required to pay managers also through deferred variable remuneration. Some banks may be only in the process of introducing such plans, and therefore decided not to disclose details. For example Alior Bank, ING and PKO BP, have only mentioned this instrument of remuneration in their reports. In addition, ten banks had other long-term incentive plans which could discourage them from using this form of remuneration. Phantom stock plans as part of the variable remuneration of top executives in the Polish banking sector can be considered a new idea, taking into account the fact that the first information about their use appeared only in 2012. For this reason, it is not yet as popular as stock options. However, it can be assumed that this type of remuneration will gain in importance in the future which will improve the quality of bank disclosures.
Źródło:
Ekonomia XXI Wieku; 2015, 3 (7)
2353-8929
Pojawia się w:
Ekonomia XXI Wieku
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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