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Wyszukujesz frazę "transitional model" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
Fuzzy quality analysis of web services implemented in virtualised environment
Autorzy:
Walkowiak, T.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2069094.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Morski w Gdyni. Polskie Towarzystwo Bezpieczeństwa i Niezawodności
Tematy:
virtualization
web service
quality
availability
state-transitional model
fuzzy number
Opis:
The paper describes the quality analysis of web services implemented in virtualised environment. It takes into account the reliability and performance aspects of software and hardware elements of the web service. The presented state-transitional model considers the reconfiguration process to maintain the continuity of business services. The reconfiguration is based in on the redeployment of virtual machines so for some time the system operates in a degraded state. Author propose two quality measures based on the web service availability and maximum handled requests calculated at each of degradation levels. Moreover, authors proposed to model the web service reliability parameters by fuzzy numbers. A method for calculating fuzzy membership functions of quality measures are also presented.
Źródło:
Journal of Polish Safety and Reliability Association; 2015, 6, 2; 147--152
2084-5316
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Polish Safety and Reliability Association
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Głosowanie ekonomiczne w Polsce: koniec modelu tranzycyjnego?
Economic voting in Poland: the end of transition model
Autorzy:
Wojtasik, Waldemar
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/514703.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Śląski. Wydział Nauk Społecznych
Tematy:
economic voting
retrospective voting
prospective voting
transitional model
polish parliamentary elections
Opis:
Research on economic voting in Poland have been carried out from the beginning of the democratic transformation, focusing on isolating and testing of the transition model specific to the countries of Central Europe. Its differentiating feature is a novel way of simultaneously joining the retrospective and prospective motivations in the behavior of voters, compared to the conventional model present in consolidated democracies. The purpose of the present article is to attempt to determine the relationship between the two types of electoral motivations identified above in the parliamentary elections, starting with the election of 1991 and ending with the 2011 elections. Based on analysis and constructive criticism of findings of other researchers and own research, the presented paper evidences that the validity of applying the transitional odel in the study of economic voting in Poland has been exhausted, as the prospective motivation is nowadays predominant in the decisions of voters.
Źródło:
Political Preferences; 2013, 6; 101-118
2449-9064
Pojawia się w:
Political Preferences
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A model of strategic preemption: Why do post-communists hurt themselves?
Autorzy:
Kamiński, Marek M.
Nalepa, Monika
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/494249.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014-06-15
Wydawca:
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
East Central Europe
lustration
transitional justice
agenda setting
setter model
Opis:
Why do political actors pass legislation that seemingly hurts them? Lustration laws limit access to public offi ce of the ancien regime's collaborators and hurt members of post-communist parties in East-Central Europe. So why has lustration in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria been passed when post-communist parties held parliamentary majorities? Why did the postcommunist party in Romania switch from no-lustration to pro-lustration after the 1992 elections? We explain this phenomenon by electoral timing and rules of procedure in legislatures. Specifi cally, we develop an agenda-setter model with a fi nite number of parties, imperfect information, and multiple potential medians. Our main argument can be summarized as follows: Suppose that the Postcommunists do not introduce any lustration bill and then lose proposal power in elections. If Anti-communists come to power, they are sure to introduce a harsher bill, and the median of the legislature may prefer such a bill to a no-bil status quo. Post-communists can prevent such a scenario by implementing a mild bill themselves. If they manage to appease the new parliamentary median, they will block a harsher bill that would be implemented after they lose power. Additional results show how electoral perspectives and uncertainty affect and modify this typical scenario. We test our model with an exhaustive analysis of all cases from East- Central Europe that meet our assumptions that a Postcommunist party is in power and no lustration bill is already in force.
Źródło:
Decyzje; 2014, 21; 31-65
1733-0092
2391-761X
Pojawia się w:
Decyzje
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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