- Tytuł:
-
Dlaczego prawda jest (nie)definiowalna
Why Is Truth (In)Definable - Autorzy:
- Cieśliński, Cezary
- Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/909546.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2005-03-01
- Wydawca:
- Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
- Tematy:
-
definition of truth
tarski a.
truth - Opis:
- The aim of this paper is to consider the question about the reasons of the indefinability of truth. We note at the start that a formula with one free variable can function as a truth predicate for a given set of sentences in two different (although related) senses: relative to a model and relative to a theory. By methods due to Alfred Tarski it can be shown that some sets of sentences are too large to admit a truth predicate (in any of the above senses); the limit case being the set of all sentences. The key question considered by us is: what does "too large" mean, i.e. which exactly sets of sentences don't have a truth predicate. We give a partial answer to this question: a set of sentences K has a truth predicate in an axiomatizable, consistent theory T iff for some natural number n, all the sentences belonging to K are equivalent (in T) to Sn sentences. Here the notion of a "too large" set receives a clear and definite sense. However, the case of a model-theoretic truth predicate seems to be more complicated: this second problem we leave as open, indicating only some possible directions of future research.
- Źródło:
-
Filozofia Nauki; 2005, 13, 1; 15-23
1230-6894
2657-5868 - Pojawia się w:
- Filozofia Nauki
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł