- Tytuł:
- Value Commensurability in Brightman and Scheler: Towards a Process Metaethics
- Autorzy:
- Hackett, J. Edward
- Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/451473.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2019-04-30
- Wydawca:
- Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
- Tematy:
-
Edgar Sheffield Brightman
Max Scheler
process metaethics
value rankings
value commensurability
table of values
phenomenological ethics
personalism
personalist ethics - Opis:
- In the following paper, both Max Scheler and Edgar Sheffield Brightman’s rankings of value are compared. In so doing, Brightman’s table of values is found wanting along the lines of Scheler’s value rankings. The reason is, in part, that Scheler’s ordering of preference and hierarchy of feelings more readily explain what Brightman’s account presupposes: affective intentionality. What is more, we can apply Brightman’s test of consistency to Scheler’s account and find it more desirable than how Brightman defines what values are in his A Philosophy of Religion (1940). Between both thinkers an account will emerge that can help clarify the commensurability of values in experience-based accounts of value in both thinkers. In doing so, a blended account reaches three conclusions about how each personalist might adopt points the other would have suggested to him. (1) Love is the process of coalescement in rough outlines; (2) The ordo amoris should reflect the rational coherence of Brightman’s more systematic laws; (3) And the demand of coherence means that phenomenology in Scheler becomes a system of idealistic metaphysics concerning values despite the fact that Brightman thinks the moral law system will hold phenomenologically regardless of which metaphysical interpretation of reality holds sway about values.
- Źródło:
-
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2019, 3, 1(7); 104-121
2544-302X - Pojawia się w:
- Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł