- Tytuł:
-
Dlaczego nauka nie może być wolna od wartości
Why Science cannot be Value-free - Autorzy:
- Lekka-Kowalik, Agnieszka
- Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015633.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2004
- Wydawca:
- Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
- Tematy:
-
nauka wolna od wartościowań
metoda naukowa
sądy wartościujące
wartości poznawcze
wartości moralne
„tłuste” pojęcia etyczne
dychotomia fakt/wartość
value-free science
scientific method
value judgements
cognitive values
moral values
„thick” ethical concepts
fact/value dichotomy - Opis:
- Three arguments are developed to support this thesis: (1) Since there is no algorithm for making methodological decisions as to what theory should be accepted, what method should be used, etc, scientists have to pass judgements that are essentially evaluative. Those judgements belong to science. The attempt to save the ideal of value-free science by distinguishing value-free object language and value-laden metalanguage (in which those evaluative judgements would be formulated) does not work. For there are no reasons to expel the methodology of a given science from that science, and even if we made this move, we would finally come to the level of evaluative judgements, unless we accept regressus ad infinitum. (2) Even if the above distinction were tenable, this would not save the ideal of value-free science. For our language is full of the so-called „thick ethical concepts” that are both descriptive and evaluative. They are justifiably used at least in some sciences. We could exclude – by definition - such concepts from science, but this would result in expelling many legitimate disciplines from the realm of science. This would mean not that science was value--free but that we made it so. (3) The fact that scientific results are sometimes expressed by means of ethically thick concepts does not allow us to restrict values involved in science to epistemological values – moral values are involved as well. Moreover, apparently pure methodological concepts such as „good solution” or „sufficient evidence” seem to be also „ethically thick”. Such considerations allow us to draw a conclusion that science possesses intrinsic moral dimension, and separating the epistemic and moral points of view in discussions about science is unjustified.
- Źródło:
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Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2004, 52, 2; 275-293
0035-7685 - Pojawia się w:
- Roczniki Filozoficzne
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł