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    Wyświetlanie 1-9 z 9
    Tytuł:
    Superweniencja psychofizyczna
    Autorzy:
    Kurek, Łukasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/429130.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2011
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
    Tematy:
    supervenience
    mind-body problem
    explanation
    intentionality
    Jaegwon Kim
    causation
    Opis:
    The aim of this article is two-fold. First, a critical presentation of the concept of supervenience is carried out. In this context, three basic types of supervenience are presented: weak, strong, and global. It is argued that the most useful types of supervenience are its strong, and global versions. Second, a broader analysis of the usefulness of supervenience is undertaken. It is argued that it is a very „flexible” concept, which allows for a variety of different solutions to the philosophical issue of the mind. However, the aforementioned flexibility can be limited by additional philosophical assumptions. Moreover, supervenience allows to augment traditional philosophical investigations concerning the mind with results of empirical findings of such sciences as psychology, or neuroscience. In this context it is argued that supervenience is a „third way” in the philosophical study of the mind.
    Źródło:
    Semina Scientiarum; 2011, 10
    1644-3365
    Pojawia się w:
    Semina Scientiarum
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Paradoks Kripkensteina a nieredukcyjny materializm
    Kripkenstein’s paradox and nonreductive materialism
    Autorzy:
    Wawrzyniak, Jan
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/437150.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
    Tematy:
    Donald Davidson; Saul Kripke; mental properties; anomalous monism; supervenience
    Opis:
    The main aim of this article is to pose and consider the following question: Does the reasoning that led to Kripkenstein’s sceptical paradox undermine all versions of materialism, including nonreductive materialism? First, I present other versions of materialism in the philosophy of mind. Then I point out that, according to nonreductive materialists, one can neither define mental properties in terms of physical properties nor derive psycho‑physical laws from the laws of physics. The presently‑understood thesis of materialism is confined by the following claim: the same distribution of physical properties entails the same distribution of mental properties. In other words, the mental properties supervene upon physical properties. This account then leads to the following formulation of the main question: Assuming that Kripkenstein is right, do mental properties supervene upon physical properties? Taking into account that answering this question requires a discussion of the notions of supervenience and Kripkenstein’s paradox, I devote two parts of my paper to these topics. The conclusion which I reach is as follows: If the reasoning that led to Kripkenstein’s paradox is correct, mental properties can only globally supervene upon physical properties, and consequently no version of materialism can be empirically justified.
    Źródło:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2015, 5, 2; 457-475
    2083-6635
    2084-1043
    Pojawia się w:
    ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Warunki emergencji biologicznej w świetle sporu emergentyzm–redukcjonizm
    Conditions of the Biological Emergence in the Light Of Debate between the Reductionism and the Emergentism
    Autorzy:
    Dziadkowiec, Jakub
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013065.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2009
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    emergencja biologiczna
    emergentyzm
    redukcjonizm
    superweniencja
    życie
    biological emergence
    emergentism
    reductionism
    supervenience
    life
    Opis:
    The relation of emergence allows to understand life as a key emergent quality for the biology. We find number of examples of emergent phenomena in the chemistry and in the biology. However, there is a lack of a clear explication of understanding both the emergence and its biological exemplification. Conditions of the biological emergence, which are formulated in the current literature, help to fill that gap and to provide a satisfying definition of that relation. At the same time it throws a new light on the debate for a research paradigma between the reductionism and the emergentism. After a time of underlying differences, today the main attention is given to their likeness and possibilities for cooperation of those two apprehensions.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2009, 57, 1; 5-27
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Józefa Życińskiego koncepcja ewolucyjnego emergentyzmu
    Autorzy:
    Pabjan, Tadeusz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/669215.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
    Tematy:
    emergentism
    supervenience
    evolutionary emergentism
    Joseph Życiński
    emergentyzm
    superweniencja
    ewolucyjny emergentyzm
    Józef Życiński
    Opis:
    Emergetism is a theory which explains the mechanism of evolutionary development of nature by stipulating that in complex natural systems on the higher levels of complexity there appear some functions and properties that can not be reduced to and accounted for by functions and properties of the lower levels of complexity. It is therefore the theory of emergence – which stands for some special way the complex systems arise (emerge) from a multiplicity of their relatively simply components. The idea of evolutionary emergentism appears in the philosophical writings of Joseph Życiński in the context of a discussion on the possibility of creating a interpretation of evolutionary processes in which biological theory of evolution could be combined in a coherent way with a theological doctrine about God, the creator of the universe. This paper presents the main ideas and opinions Życiński formulated about this theory; the first part of it contains some basic characterization of emergetnism, the second one compares the notions of emergence and of supervenience; the third one concerns some theological interpretation of this two notions.
    Źródło:
    Tarnowskie Studia Teologiczne; 2012, 31, 2
    2391-6826
    0239-4472
    Pojawia się w:
    Tarnowskie Studia Teologiczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Naturalizm ontologiczny a rola superweniencji w ewolucji biologicznej
    Ontological Naturalism and the Role of Supervenience in Biological Evolution
    Autorzy:
    Życiński, Józef
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015794.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2003
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    emergentyzm
    ewolucja
    naturalizm
    superweniencja
    teizm
    wszechświat
    emergentism
    evolution
    naturalism
    supervenience
    theism
    univers
    Opis:
    To overcome the traditional opposition between the methodological and the ontological naturalism, in the paper the notion of supervenience is proposed as an explanatory category which facilitates developing a version of nonreductionist emergentism. This category helps to understand the so called teleonomy (resp. quasi-finality) studied in modern biology and eliminates the traditional opposition between the causal and the teleological interpretation of nature. Analytical distinctions, dependent on supervenient aspects of nature, facilitate new interpretive patterns for biological evolution and make groundless many simplified patterns accepted in philosophical interpretation of evolutionism.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2003, 51, 3; 7-18
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Odmiany emergencji w zastosowaniu do ontologii umysłu
    Varieties of emergence: With applications to the ontology of mind
    Autorzy:
    Poczobut, Robert
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015966.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2002
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    metafizyka
    ewolucjonizm
    emergencja
    redukcja
    superweniencja
    świadomość
    umysł
    metaphysics
    evolutionism
    emergence
    reduction
    supervenience
    consciousness
    mind
    Opis:
    Emergentism is (a) an ontological doctrine about how the phenomena of this world are organized into autonomous emergent levels and (b) a metascientific thesis about the nature of relationship between basic physics and special sciences (such as biology, psychology and sociology). Claims involving emergent properties (laws and regularities) are now rife in discussions of non-linear dynamics, connectionist modelling, chaos theory, complexity studies and ontology of mind. According to R. Spencer-Smith there are three major concepts of emergence, which might be termed: (a) epistemic emergence, (b) interactional emergence, and (c) radical emergence. The author of the paper distinguishes and discusses two kinds of radical emergence − autocreational and actualizational emergence. The second notion leads directly to a form of dual-aspect theory in ontology of mind. In this case the notion of a causally closed (purely) physical world makes no sense because even micro-events have proto-mental properties. A metaphysical theory of this sort provides a conceptually coherent middle road between Cartesian dualism and materialist monism.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 403-427
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czy potrzebna nam teoria fundamentalna? Refleksje na temat teorii świadomości Davida Chalmersa
    Is the Fundamental Theory Necessary? Remarks on the David Chalmers Theory of Consciousness
    Autorzy:
    Hohol, Mateusz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691052.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2011
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    cognitive science
    consciousness
    mind
    philosophy of mind
    qualia
    supervenience
    philosophy of science
    David Chalmers
    Opis:
    The article presents a survey of the fundamental theory of consciousness according to David Chalmers. In order to examine these issues the following actions are taken. In the first part, the philosophical and cognitive-scientific views of David Chalmers are summarized in detail. Particular attention is paid to the following issues: the distinction between the easy and hard problem of consciousness, the nature of qualia, supervenience, as well as the arguments against the reductive accounts of consciousness. The elements of the structure of Chalmers’ fundamental theory: e.g., the principle of structural coherence, the principle of organizational invariance and the principle of double aspects of information are presented. Also, the problems of the relationship between mind and quantum mechanics are analyzed. In the second part, Chalmers’ theory of consciousness is challenged and criticized in three areas: cognitive science, philosophy of science and philosophy of physics. In the summary, the reply to the question in the title of the article is suggested.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2011, 49; 3-45
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Rogera Sperry’ego teoria świadomości
    Roger Sperrys theory of consciousness
    Autorzy:
    Bremer, Józef
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690952.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    emergent interactionism
    unity of consciousness
    macro- and micro-determination
    mentalism
    mind-body problem
    theories of emergence
    downward causation
    supervenience
    Opis:
    Roger W. Sperry (1913–1994) received the Nobel Prize for Physiology in 1981 for his outstanding scientific achievements in connection with the study of people with severed brain commissures. Sperry linked the results of his research to philosophical considerations pertaining to the conscious mind of human beings and its place in the natural sciences. He was interested in the philosophical question of whether or not the severing of the cerebral hemispheres constituted a violation of the unity of consciousness. Sperry’s explanatory account of mind-body (mind-brain) interaction forms part of a broadly construed theory of emergent interactionism – one that also purports to guarantee the unity of consciousness. In this article, I first present an intellectual profile of Sperry, outlining the evolution of his philosophical-scientific analyses. I then outline the emergence and flourishing of theories of emergence, along with the elements essentially associated with them. Using this as a basis, I go on to consider Sperry’s account of emergent interaction more closely, focusing on his understanding of downward causation. In conclusion, I show how his theory corresponds to a version of emergent interactionism, and seek to address some criticisms leveled against it. I also aim to establish how far this theory can be said to answer the question of the conscious character of mental states.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2017, 63; 133-166
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-9 z 9

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