Temat: sexual autonomy - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Stealthing – karalność zdjęcia prezerwatywy bez wiedzy partnerki
Stealthing: criminal liability for non-consensual condom removal
Autorzy:: Głuchowski, Michał
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2137579.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2022-09-30
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:: stealthing
non-consensual condom removal
rape
deception
sexual autonomy
Istanbul Convention
prezerwatywa
zgwałcenie
podstęp
wolność seksualna
autonomia seksualna
konwencja stambulska
Opis:: Stealthing, czyli potajemne zdjęcie prezerwatywy przez mężczyznę bez zgody partnerki, różni się od typowego przestępstwa zgwałcenia, gdyż pokrzywdzona wyraża zgodę na współżycie, tyle że z zabezpieczeniem. Mimo to współżycie bez prezerwatywy nie jest objęte zakresem zgody na obcowanie płciowe z jej użyciem, gdyż stanowi inny rodzaj czynności seksualnej. Przemawiają za tym fizyczna bariera przed intymnością, inny stan psychiczny w trakcie współżycia wynikający z większego ryzyka ciąży i zarażenia chorobą weneryczną, różnica doznań fizycznych i waga przywiązywana do użycia prezerwatywy przez wiele osób. Stealthing wypełnia znamiona zgwałcenia z użyciem podstępu (art. 197 § 1 k.k.), ale pod warunkiem, że sprawca działał z podjętym z góry zamiarem. W przypadku decyzji podjętej w trakcie współżycia zdjęcie przezerwatywy będzie jedynie naruszeniem nietykalności cielesnej (art. 217 § 1 k.k.).
Condom removal without sexual partner’s knowledge and consent, popularly termed “stealthing”, differs from a typical rape in that the partner consents to the intercourse, although only with protection. Still, in this case, sexual consent does not encompass an intercourse without a condom, as it as an act of a different nature than the protected intercourse. This view is justified as follows: a condom constitutes a physical barrier against intimacy; the partners might be in a different mental state during the intercourse due to the increased risk of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases; condoms alter the physical sensation; and finally, condom usage is a material prerequisite of an intercourse to a significant proportion of the general public. Stealthing amounts to rape by deception pursuant to Art. 197(1) of the Polish Criminal Code, but only if, at the beginning of the sexual act, the perpetrator already intends to remove the condom later. If he spontaneously decides to remove the condom during the intercourse, then he is merely liable for breach of personal inviolability under Art. 217(1) of the Polish Criminal Code.
Źródło:: Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny; 2022, 84, 3; 99-116
0035-9629
2543-9170
Pojawia się w:: Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Tytuł:: Zgwałcenie. Gdy termin nabiera nowej treści. Pozorny brak zmian i jego skutki
Rape : When an Old Term Acquires a New Meaning. A Consequence of False Sameness
Autorzy:: Płatek, Monika
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/698782.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2018
Wydawca:: Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:: zgwałcenie
przestępstwo zgwałcenia w kodeksie karnym z 1997
zgwałcenie w Konwencji antyprzemocowej
autonomia seksualna
wolność seksualna
Konwencja antyprzemocowa
Konwencja CEDAW
wyrok ETPCz M.C. v. Bułgaria
rape
sexual autonomy
sexual freedom
Art. 197 of the Polish Criminal Law
Istanbul Convention (CETS210)
Art. 36 of CETS210
CEDAW Convention
ECHR M.C. v. Bulgaria
Istanbul Convention
Polish Criminal Law
Opis:: The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combatting violence againstwomen and domestic violence (further: CETS210, Istanbul Convention, Anti-violenceConvention) became part of the Polish legal system on 1 August 2015. The IstanbulConvention incorporates a specific legal provision on rape, namely Art. 36 CETS210.It states that the Parties should take the necessary legislative or other measures toensure that the intentional conduct described in Art. 36 CETS210 is criminalised.Article 36.1a CETS210 states that rape takes place when engaging in non-consensualvaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual nature of the body of another person withany bodily part or object.Rape is respectively regulated in Art. 19 7 of the Polish Criminal Code 1997 (further,k.k.). However, the context of Art. 197 k.k. significantly differs from the wordingof Art. 36 CETS. Whereas Art. 36 CETS protects freedom, autonomy and sexualautonomy of the person, Art. 197 k.k. protects merely sexual freedom combined withprotecting the social customs. In order to establish the presence of rape, one needs toprove the presence of violence, psychological aggression and/or deception. Protectingsocial customs implies an additional burden because it allows evaluating the behaviourof the victim rather than the one of the perpetrator. The Istanbul Convention is orientedon eager elimination of violence against women and domestic violence. Therefore, itestablishes that the Parties should take the necessary measures to promote changesin the social and cultural patterns and behaviour of women and men with a view toeradicating prejudice, customs, traditions and all other practices which are based onthe idea of the inferiority of women or stereotyped roles for women and men (Art.12.1 CETS210). It is within this line that rape regulation should follow.The question that is tackled in this article is as follows: to what extent doesthe difference in the legal description of the act of “rape”, and the difference in protectedvalues by legal provision in Art. 36 CETS210 and in Art. 197 k.k. make an ontologicaland normative difference? Are they not possible to be reconciled? Or, is the meredifference in the words describing what “rape” not an obstacle to achieving the goalsexpected by Art. 36 CETS210?The problem is not an artificial one especially in view of the fact that the Polishlegislators did not amend the text of Art. 197 k.k. upon the ratification of CETS210. It would suggest that the Polish legislator was of the opinion that there is no definitedifference between Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. The text examines what happen eswhen an old term acquires new meaning.Is Art. 197 k.k. despite the lack of amendments filling the value required by Art.36 CETS210? Or, is the sameness expected by the Polish legislator false? By demonstratingvital differences in the protected values and the action required establish ingthe presence of the rape, I call for amendments to fulfill the state legal obligations toobserve the Istanbul Convention.The article deals with the ontological difference in the legal concept behind the textof Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. While Art. 197 k.k. is built on the concept of sexualfreedom, Art. 36 CETS is developed on the concept of sexual autonomy. I elaborateon that.The changes in the protected values incorporated in Art. 36 CETS210 lead toabandoning the concept of sexual freedom established in Art. 197 k.k. and adoptingthe concept of sexual autonomy. While the former concept of sexual freedom, asin Art. 197 k.k., uses violence, psychological aggression and/or deception to establishthe presence of rape, for sexual autonomy as defined in Art. 36 CETS210 the line iscrossed where the consent was not present. While sexual freedom limits freedom to torefusal, sexual autonomy demands the presence of consent. Not violence, aggressionor deception, but the lack of consents matters.The term and concept of sexual autonomy was first explored by the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights in the landmark European Court of Human Right (furtherECHR) judgment M.C. v. Bulgaria (No. 39272/98). The case is thoroughly analysedto further illuminate the difference between the two concepts behind the differentapproaches to defining “rape”.The article, however, starts with an in-depth introduction to the goal of the IstanbulConvention, which is to place the issue of rape in a proper perspective. Apart froma criminological analysis of the concept of rape, the article discusses the values protectedby, respectively, Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. and compares the similarities andactual differences. A similar examination is related to the description of “rape” in Art.36 CETS and Art. 197 k.k. Last but not least, the subject is evaluated, taking the Polishcriminal dogmas into consideration.The conclusion of the examination leaves no room for assuming that Art. 197 k.k.fulfills the requirement stipulated by Art. 36 CETS210. It is, therefore necessary, toamend Art. 197 k.k.
Źródło:: Archiwum Kryminologii; 2018, XL; 263-325
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:: Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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