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Tytuł:
Moral of the Novel: Rorty and Nussbaum on the Ethical Role of Literature
Autorzy:
Bednarski, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/985692.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-03-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
rorty
nussbaum
ethics
literature
novel
rawls
rancière
Opis:
This paper’s aim is to provide a new interpretation of Martha C. Nussbaum’s and Richard Rorty’s views on the ethical role of literature. I pursue this aim in a threefold manner. First of all, I shortly discuss and provide a critique of previous comparisons by other authors. Afterwards, based on the presented critique of other comparisons, I present concise summaries of their respective views. Finally, I propose a double context for interpreting and assessing their views together. The main claim of the paper is the following: despite several differences in their philosophical underpinnings, Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s views on literature can be interpreted together using the context of John Rawls and Jacques Rancière. This interpretation consists of showing how uncovering a shared Rawlsian characteristic of Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s views paves a way for explaining how literature actually does ethical work, using some concepts of Rancière. Such a contextual reading allows for both a more thorough understanding of their respective projects and assessing their shared shortcomings.
Źródło:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2020, 4, 4; 175-189
2544-302X
Pojawia się w:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Versions of Pragmatic Liberalism: from Rorty back to Dewey
Autorzy:
Dubniak, Zlatyslav
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1878393.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-09-25
Wydawca:
Fundacja Pro Scientia Publica
Tematy:
philosophy of pragmatism
Richard Rorty
John Dewey
historicism
naturalism
liberalism
Opis:
Aim. The aim of this study is to analyze and evaluate two versions of the theory of liberalism which emerged within the philosophical tradition of pragmatism: Richard Rorty’s “ironic liberalism” and John Dewey’s “renascent liberalism”. Methods. The study is based on: 1) comparative analysis, which shows the differences and points of contact between Dewey’s classical pragmatism and Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, in particular, between different versions of their liberal theories; 2) critical analysis, which made it possible to identify the shortcomings and advantages in the arguments of the above-mentioned philosophers. Results. The author analyzed Rorty’s and Dewey’s theories of liberalism in relation to their theories of reality, human specificity, and ethics. In this way, the specific liberal views of these American philosophers on such issues as the relationship between private and public, the main goals of politics, and the values of the social order were explicated. It allowed offering a thorough critique of Rorty’s “ironic liberalism”, and supporting of Dewey’s “renascent liberalism”. Conclusion. While Dewey saw the mission of liberalism in enabling individuals to improve their experience, Rorty insisted on the need for a liberal policy of providing the basic conditions for individual self-creation. The main disadvantage of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, and, in particular, “ironic liberalism”, was the exclusion from the philosophy of the modifying tools of human behavior, which were expressed by the concepts of “good” or “virtue”, in Dewey’s “renascent liberalism”. This circumstance necessitates a return from Rorty back to Dewey in the discussions on pragmatic liberalism. Key words: philosophy of pragmatism, Richard Rorty, John Dewey, historicism, naturalism, liberalism.
Źródło:
Journal of Education Culture and Society; 2021, 12, 2; 15-30
2081-1640
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Education Culture and Society
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Edukacja, wykształcenie, szkoła wyższa. Tradycja i wyzwania współczesności
Education, University Education. Tradition End Contemporary Challenges
Autorzy:
Kaute, Wojciech
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1417716.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Wyższa Szkoła Ekonomiczno-Humanistyczna w Bielsku-Białej
Tematy:
Aristotle
N. Machiavelli
Descartes
Th. Hobbes
J. Locke
modernity
post-modernity
R. Rorty
M. Gauchet
Opis:
The afterthought on education is the consideration of the world of culture – the world of values. European culture is based on Aristotle`s thought. This is his metaphysics. The change of this paradigm occurs at the treshold of Modernity (N. Machiavelli) and it is followed by the thought of the Descartes; cogito. Here, the starting point is I, an individual, who undertakes the economic activity (Th. Hobbes, J. Locke). In the post-time the world of an individual undergoes the act of disintegration (contingency; R. Rorty) which can be associated with the state of “reassurance” (M. Gauchet). Today, there is no clarity as to what „education” really is.
Źródło:
Polonia Journal; 2020, 12; 251-274
2083-3121
Pojawia się w:
Polonia Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Religion as a bond – a delusive hope of politics
Autorzy:
Grzybowski, Jacek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1070193.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-12-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
politics
religion
culture
Richard Rorty
postmodernism
Opis:
Politics is on the one hand an attempt to implement certain good, a desire for achieving agreed objectives, on the other hand – as Max Weber says – a simultaneous a#empt to avoid a particular evil. If in defining the notion of politics there are references to good and evil, purpose and desire, it has to include the non-political spheres – culture, axiology, religion. Mark Lilla argues that for decades we have been aware of the great and final separation that has taken place in Western Europe between political and religious life. This awareness implies a conviction, which is obligatory today in most countries and societies, that to separate politics from religion is a great achievement. For many thinkers and politicians this is an undisputed success from which the West learns to benefit while preparing other regions of the world for such separation. Therefore it seems that modern politics should be free from religious inspiration and temptation. On the other hand, many sociologists and political scientists show the vitality of religious attitudes, proving that in its deepest essence religion is an expression of human behaviour. Each person and each community always has an element of irreducibility which is an internal defence against reducing man to “here and now”, restricting his world to what is useful and usable. We experience that in man there is a natural opening to what is transcendent. Thus, if man is ever to achieve individual and social reconciliation with himself, he will always look for rational and moral meanings. This situation creates a platform for the emergence of a completely new a#itude in society and politics – to seek and pursue spirituality in a world without religion. Increasingly, the understanding of religion reveals itself in a wide etymological sense, sociological and ethnological: religare – “to connect”, “to bind”, “to build community ties”. Religion so understood would be a great solution to the dilemma of separation – the adoption of religion (bonds) without the doctrine, while ensuring social cohesion, strengthening the feeling of being together, maintaining a spiritual connection. Many thinkers are convinced that we cannot base social life only on fear, discipline and economy; we need a deeper and stronger foundations for Community Cohesion. But is such a project possible at all? Is politics becoming a place for the formation of relationships, education and conservation of values, a narrative space which tells citizens what is good and right and what is wrong and alien? Can it replace religion in its deepest essence – in its intimate sense of an exploration and discovery of transcendence? Will it not become a caricature of religion, and a caricature of politics, and ultimately a trap for freedom?
Źródło:
Studia Philosophiae Christianae; 2020, 56, S2; 237-258
0585-5470
Pojawia się w:
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Społeczne uzasadnienia dla ochrony praw jednostki
Social Justification for Protection of the Rights of the Individuals
Autorzy:
Srokosz, Jacek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1832906.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-05-14
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
prawa człowieka
solidaryzm
komunitaryzm
Rorty
społeczne uzasadnienie
human rights
Solidarism
Communitarianism
Social Justification
Opis:
W artykule przedstawione zostały koncepcje ochrony praw jednostki oparte na odwołaniu do pewnych procesów społecznych lub konkretnych uwarunkowań kulturowych. Przedstawione wizje ochrony jednostki (solidarystyczna, kommunitariańska oraz pragmatyczna Rorty’ego) odrzucały uzasadnienie ochrony praw człowieka oparte na legitymacji filozoficznej (oświeceniowy uniwersalizm praw jednostki) lub pozytywistycznej (treści aktów prawnych zawierające przepisy chroniące prawa człowieka). Wizja solidarystyczna podstawy dla ochrony praw jednostki widziała w rozwoju solidarności międzyludzkiej i komplikowania się więzów społecznych, skutkujących coraz większą indywidualizacją w ramach społeczeństwa. Komunitarystyczna koncepcja ochrony praw człowieka zakładała z kolei równowagę praw i obowiązków każdej jednostki w ramach wspólnoty, genezę ochrony praw jednostek widząc w postępującym rozwoju moralnym społeczeństwa. Natomiast pragmatyczna koncepcja Rorty’ego za podstawę ochrony praw jednostki w kulturze Zachodu uznawała osiągnięty stan bezpieczeństwa oraz współczucia w ramach życia społecznego, pozwalający na traktowanie Innego w taki sam sposób, jak członków własnej społeczności.
This paper presents the notion of the protection of the rights of the Individuals on the basis of certain social processes and cultural conditions. Solidaristic, Communitarian, and Rorty’s pragmatic visions of individual rights rejected the notion of its protection on the basis of philosophical legitimation (on the Enlightment's universalistic approach towards rights of the individuals) or positivistic (on the notion that the legal acts in themselves are the sole source of individual's rights). Solidaristic approach hinges heavily on inter-personal relations and ever increasing complexity of social interactions resulting in increase in person’s individualization within the society. Communitarian approach relies on the assumption of balance between individual's rights and obligation within the society. According to this view the origins of rights of the individuals lay in the moral progress of the society. According to the Rorty's pragmatic approach protection of the rights of individuals in the Western culture has been achieved due to sense security and sympathy developed in the social life. This in turns allow for every individual to be treated on the equal footing.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 2015, 43, 4; 59-72
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Contingency, the body and disgust: The case of ‘Margot’ by Michał Witkowski
Przygodność, ciało i wstręt. Przypadek „Margot” Michała Witkowskiego
Autorzy:
Wróblewski, Łukasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2088397.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
Contemporary Polish literature
the post-modern novel
contingency
the body
disgust
ironism
Michał Witkowski (b. 1975)
Julia Kristeva (b. 1941)
Richard Rorty (1931–2007)
anger
Michał Witkowski
„Margot”
przygodność
ciało
wstręt
afekt
świętość
gniew
Opis:
This article, focused principally on the exploration of contingency, the body and disgust in Michał Witkowski’s novel Margot, is also a polemic and a vindication of the book against the barrage of criticism it received from its reviewers. Most of them decided that Margot was a novel about nothing, a haphazard mix of sundry discourses devoid of any linear structure. In fact, several critics blamed the author of giving away both the narrative structure and the plot to capricious contingency. The article takes a fi rm stance against such charges and argues that contingency does not need to be seen as a fault at all. It lies at the heart of the novel and determines the actions of characters, but it plays as important a role in people’s lives outside fi ction. Analysing the ups and down of the main characters (Margot and Wadek Mandarynka), the article explains the function of emotions, the body, the characters’ language and their ideas of sacrum in the legitimization of contingency. A special role in this mechanism is played by disgust. Reactions of disgust are always contingent, or, as Julia Kristeva puts it the abject has the power to terrorize the subject to such extent that he can do nothing but to succumb to contingency. In working out the idea of the contingency of selfhood, the article also draws on Richard Rorty’s approach, and in particular his concept of ironism. The latter is used to classify the main character of Witkowski’s book as a consummate ironist, i.e. a person who tests different languages in which the world can be described in order to pursue his carnal desires. Finally, the article argues that in his novel Witkowski not only brings to light the fortuitous character of the postmodern identity but also creates a heterogeneous language to express it.
Źródło:
Ruch Literacki; 2019, 1; 61-76
0035-9602
Pojawia się w:
Ruch Literacki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Education as edification: Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatist philosophy of education
Autorzy:
Mirosław, Woźnica,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/892552.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-08-22
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
Rorty
edification
philosophy of education
ironist
neo-pragmatism
communication
hermeneutics
Opis:
Rorty draws from pragmatism, conversation, edification, and hermeneutics, but in spite of his reference to Dewey’s thesis on pragmatism, Rorty’s notion of ‘pragmatism’ is not offered as an idea of something that might fill the gaps left by slowly dying traditional philosophy. It is rather a more relaxed attitude of mind. He goes beyond the traditional notion of pragmatism and insists that the search should not focus on truth but on solidarity, in other words, what we as a group of people create and decide what is true. Truth, for Rorty, is a society’s exercise and agreement of what is true. It is achieved by discourse and not limited conversations. In order to educate a person as an individual who lives in a particular society with all the factors contributing to his/her growth, Rorty adopts a new word for education, namely edification, with its philosophical consequences. He draws on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer to explore the idea of ‘edification,’ a word Rorty uses to gloss Gadamer’s Bildung (education, self-formation) (Rorty 1979).
Źródło:
Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny; 2019, 64(2 (252)); 242-253
0023-5938
Pojawia się w:
Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Tyldy Tildena
Tilden’s Tildes
Autorzy:
Rajewska, Ewa
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1335629.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Richard Rorty
national heritage
Rita Felski
heritology
Freeman Tildmen
theory of interpretation
Umberto Eco
heritologia
teoria interpretacji
dziedzictwo narodowe
Opis:
Artykuł koncentruje się na koncepcji interpretacji dziedzictwa narodowego autorstwa Freemana Tildena z jego klasycznej pracy Interpreting Our Heritage (1957) (pol. przekład: Interpretacja dziedzictwa, 2019, przeł. Agnieszka Wilga), zaprezentowanej w świetle literaturoznawczych ujęć interpretacji pióra Richarda Rorty’ego (esej Ścieżka P/pragmatysty: Umberto Eco o interpretacji) oraz Rity Felski (Literatura w użyciu).
The article focuses on the concept of interpreting national heritage developed by by Freeman Tilden in his classic work Interpreting Our Heritage (1957), which is discussed in the wider critical context of literary interpretations developed by Richard Rorty in The Pragmatist’s Progress and Rita Felski in Uses of Literature.
Źródło:
Forum Poetyki; 2019, 18; 102-109
2451-1404
Pojawia się w:
Forum Poetyki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O współczesnych problemach z prawdą. Refleksje w świetle eseju Harry’ego G. Frankfurta O wciskaniu kitu (On Bullshit)
On Modern indifference to Truth. Some thoughts in the light of the essay On Bullshit by Harry G. Frankfurt
Autorzy:
Warzyński, Sylwester
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2035389.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-03-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
Harry G. Frankfurt
On bullshit
postprawda
wciskanie kitu
chrzanienie
prawda
metafizyka
Ryszard Rorty
pragmatyzm
On Bullshit
post-truth
bullshit
talking crap
truth
metaphysics
Richard Rorty
pragmatism
Opis:
This article is an attempt to present one of the vital features of modernculture, namely indifference to truth. In the context of proclaiming the expression “post-truth” the Word of the Year 2016, the author shows how thismodern indifference should be understood. It is explained by recalling theessay of Harry G. Frankfurt entitled On Bullshit. This short text presentsa certain characteristic trait of modern times, that is, a certain attitudeto truth typical of the contemporary man. What is interesting is that it isconvergent with the meaning of the very expression that has recently madesuch a spectacular career and became the Word of the Year.In the first part of the article the author presents the history of the term“post-truth”, its basic meaning and the context in which it was created andis now used. The term “bullshit” is then treated in a similar way. In the thirdpart of the article the main thoughts of Frankfurt’s essay are referred to. It ispointed out that this short essay, written already in the 1980s, proves to bestill valid up until today. For in his essay Frankfurt does not describe anypolitical reality, social or medial one, saturated with dishonesty, disinformation, lies and manipulation. He does not attempt to present various types of examples of “bullshit”. Instead, as befits a philosopher, he goes deeper and attempts to reach the essence of this phenomenon. In this way he draws an unusually accurate image of the modern man for whom truth has lost its significance, for whom there has grown between truth and lies – contrary to any logic – a whole sphere of bullshit, or otherwise post-truth. In the fourth part of the article the author points out the sources of such a situation. He talks about the rejection of the realistic, classical way of understanding truth and, in relation to it, about turning away from reality, that is from facts.In the last part the author explains that in modern times in place ofreality (as an important point of reference) the criterion of coherence anddemocratic consensus has been introduced, or – what fits well into theculture of “bullshit” – the criterion of practicality and usefulness. Insteadof thinking in terms of objective order, it is therefore proposed that oneshould think and act in terms of subjectively perceived advantages. At thispoint the author refers to Richard Rorty’s philosophical conception andshows that Rorty’s end of philosophy, the abandonment of the search forthe ultimate foundations of cognition, for the discovery of truth, for thedominant idea of „contingency” and usefulness, and his „language games”are all excellent illustrations of what a man of the era of post-truth, the eraof indifference to truth, nourishes.
Źródło:
Collectanea Theologica; 2017, 87, 3; 135-162
0137-6985
2720-1481
Pojawia się w:
Collectanea Theologica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/653156.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
stakeholder theory
pragmatism
facts and values
Freeman
Rorty
Opis:
Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory-which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics-are mainly connected to the questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions, he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism that in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. These assumptions contain a false dilemma, taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, because of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.
Źródło:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym; 2018, 21, 7; 75-84
1899-2226
2353-4869
Pojawia się w:
Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Providing orientation by philosophizing at school. Phenomenological and postmodern validity claims
Autorzy:
Philipp, Thomas,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/892186.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-11-15
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
orientation
phenomenology
postmodernism
philosophy at school
Heidegger
Merleau-Ponty
Lévinas
Lyotard
Rorty
Opis:
In liberal societies it seems to be important to provide orientation by philosophizing at school. We are used to doing this by discussing classic ethics with our students. Here, skills like rational argumentation can be trained. It is the universal rationality that can be applied to different ethical issues and, thus, provide orientation. When it comes to this learning objective phenomenology and postmodernism are mostly not expected to provide assistance. Phenomenology might be seen as just dealing with perception whereas postmodernism is under suspicion for contributing to indecision, arbitrariness and relativism. In this article I will try to outline the potentials of phenomenology and postmodernism in the field of orientation. In the tradition of Husserl’s ‘epoché’ we can let students discover the perspective of a first person and what it means to be a ‘self’. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have not only described a certain closeness to the world which can be described as ‘dwelling’ of a lived body. They have also delineated elements of a new ‘postmetaphysical’ and at the same time ‘prehermeneutical’ metaphysics. All this can help to open the depth of self, life, and world. Postmodern thinkers claim a plurality of truths. By this means, these theories can encourage self-empowerment. At the same time, authors like Lévinas (responsibility for the other), Lyotard (the sublime), and Rorty (solidarity) describe new ways of openness towards the world which are not founded by any primal truth and thus provide orientation.
Źródło:
Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny; 2018, 63(3 (249)); 150-161
0023-5938
Pojawia się w:
Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Spór o rozumienie pojęcia dziejów efektywnych w filozofii hermeneutycznej i postmodernizmie
Спор о понимании понятия эффективной истории в герменевтической философии и постмодернизме
A Dispute About the Way of Understanding Effective History in Hermeneutic Philosophy and Postmodernism
Autorzy:
Sznajder, Paweł
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/497598.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Stowarzyszenie Filozofów Krajów Słowiańskich
Tematy:
Гадамер
Рорти
Ваттимо
история
традиция
интерпретация
Gadamer
Rorty
Vattimo
dziejowość
tradycja
interpretacja
history
tradition
interpretation
Opis:
Статья является результатом исследования отношений между герменевтической философией Ханса-Георга Гадамера и постмодернизмом, представленным Джанним Ваттимо и Ричардом Рорти. В тексте анализируется понятие истории (Geschichte), особое внимание уделяется ее эффективному влиянию на автора, текст, интерпретатора и традицию, происходящее в гер-меневтическом диалоге (слияние горизонтов). Постмодернистской, конструктивистской интерпретации этого процесса, в которой опущена истина текста, противопоставляется универ-салистская концепция, в которой интерпретация понимается как процесс поиска логоса в диалоге.
The article is a result of a research on the relations between the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the postmodernism represented by Gianni Vattimo and Richard Rorty. The author analyses the notion of history (Geschichte) and its effective influence on an author, a text, an interpretator and a tradition in the hermeneutical dialogue (the fusion of horizons). The article opposes the postmodern, constructivistic approach, in which the truth of a text is made known to the universalistic conception in which an interpretation is understood as the process of searching for logos in a dialogue.
Źródło:
ΣΟΦΙΑ. Pismo Filozofów Krajów Słowiańskich; 2018, 18; 75-89
1642-1248
Pojawia się w:
ΣΟΦΙΑ. Pismo Filozofów Krajów Słowiańskich
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Cognitive Innovation, Irony and Collaboration
Autorzy:
Punt, Michael
Denham, Susan L.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/985731.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Projekt Avant
Tematy:
cognitive innovation
collaboration
creativity
irony
Richard Rorty
Opis:
What seems clear from the experiences of researchers in CogNovo is that the concept of cognitive innovation offered a new vocabulary, and thus a clear space, within which creativity could be explored free from the baggage of prior conflicting definitions. The concept was, from its inception, intrinsically ironic in the sense that Richard Rorty developed the term. Although initially we did not fully appreciate the potential this offered, approaching creativity under the rubric of cognitive innovation led to novel ideas that would not have emerged if we had taken a more conventional discipline-led approach. One example was expressing creativity as a mathematical function and as a media form in a parallel text. The absurdity of describing a process of such complexity in this form did not pass us by. However, this self-conscious irony, not a common rhetorical strategy in the sciences, clarified our understanding of cognitive innovation as a recursive function that allowed us to express a continuity between the basic life processes of exploration, innovation and the construction of the self, and the social and cultural ramifications of these processes; creativity. It led us to conclude that cognitive innovation furnishes a view of the self as a dynamic entity, for whom reality and novelty are contingent on one’s current state, both of which can change and be changed, and offers a means for enhancing the rigor of the current debate on what counts as creative. It also reveals the value of irony in not disavowing the inevitability of multiple perspectives and prospectives on reality, and consequently offers a way to avoid unnecessary reductivism. In this paper, we will argue, as we take the insights of CogNovo forward, that irony offers a hitherto unappreciated strategy for collaborative research.
Źródło:
Avant; 2017, 8
2082-6710
Pojawia się w:
Avant
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Teoria interesariuszy a neopragmatyzm
Stakeholder Theory and Neopragmatism
Autorzy:
Soin, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/468674.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
teoria interesariuszy
neopragmatyzm
fakty i wartości
Freeman
Rorty
stakeholder theory
neopragmatism
facts and values
Opis:
Celem artykułu jest uporządkowanie zarzutów, jakie – zdaniem autora – należy postawić próbom powiązania teorii interesariuszy z neopragmatyzmem w wersji Rorty’ego. Przedmiotem krytyki jest zwłaszcza stanowisko R. Edwarda Freemana, jednego z głównych autorów i popularyzatorów teorii interesariuszy, który – skądinąd zgodnie z filozoficzną modą – w końcu lat dziewięćdziesiątych porzucił dość szeroko rozpowszechnioną kantowską wersję uzasadnienia teorii interesariuszy na rzecz jej wykładni neopragmatycznej. Dyskutowane zarzuty wynikają wprost ze specyfiki neopragmatycznego ujęcia kwestii prawdy, a także relacji między faktami i wartościami, w szczególności z odrzucenia korespondencyjnej koncepcji prawdy oraz zatarcia różnicy między opisem i normą. Przesadne uogólnienia i fałszywe alternatywy, na jakich opierają się tego rodzaju rozstrzygnięcia, podważają opisowy sens teorii interesariuszy. W rezultacie powiązania z neopragmatyzmem teoria interesariuszy traci jednak również swoje praktyczne zalety, stając się arbitralną narracją niezdolną do uporania się z problemami jej normatywnego zastosowania i dlatego z reguły maskującą rzeczywiste stosunki władzy.
The goal of this article was to sort out the accusations that must be made against attempts to connect stakeholder theory with neopragmatism in Rorty’s version. The main subject of criticism is the stand of R. Edward Freeman, one of the main authors and popularizers of stakeholder theory who – in accordance with philosophical fashion – at the end of the 90s, rejected popular Kantian version of substantiation of stakeholder theory, choosing its neopragmatic interpretation. Discussed accusations result directly from specificity of neopragmatic perspective of the issue of truth, as well as of relations between facts and values, especially from rejection of correspondence concept of the truth and blurring the difference between description and norm. Exaggerated generalizations and false alternatives that such settlements are based on undermine descriptive meaning of stakeholder theory. As a result of connection with neopragmatism, stakeholder theory is also losing its practical values, becoming narration unable to deal with the problems of its normative application and hiding real relations of power.
Źródło:
Prakseologia; 2017, 159; 83-106
0079-4872
Pojawia się w:
Prakseologia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
What Kind of Politics Do We Need? Toward Freedom as Responsibility in Habermas’s and Rorty’s Visions of Democracy
Autorzy:
Kilanowski, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1996909.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-06-30
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Tematy:
pragmatism
Habermas
Rorty
democracy
responsibility
freedom
Opis:
Isaiah Berlin said that it is part of the human condition to make choices between absolute values. Obviously, this choice cannot be easy. To be well informed, it has to be made in full awareness of the contingency of our criteria. This ability to make choices between absolute values in the light of contingencies is what distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian, says Berlin, following Joseph Schumpeter. Similar ideas can be found in the philosophy of Richard Rorty, who believes that our liberal societies create more people who understand the contingencies of their vocabularies, but at the same time are still faithful to them. He calls this “freedom as acknowledgement of contingency.” This freedom is bound by the existence of a plurality of voices, which does not mean that it is bound by the existence of chaos. In such a spirit, Jürgen Habermas emphasizes the fact that in spite of the plurality of contingent views, we can find a unity of reason. In spite of plurality of views, we can still come to an agreement thanks to dialogue. The close analysis of Rorty’s and Habermas’s philosophy allows us to see that they share a common stance: thanks to disenchantment of the world, as Rorty says, or thanks to decentralization of the world, as Habermas says. Both are seeing such stance as a precondition to use our freedom in a way to be more tolerant, more open to dialogue and responsible for it. Further analysis allows us to see that there is a possibility to present a new understanding of the notion of freedom – freedom conceived as responsibility.
Źródło:
Kultura i Edukacja; 2017, 2(116); 50-68
1230-266X
Pojawia się w:
Kultura i Edukacja
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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