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    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
    Tytuł:
    Racjonalność, konflikty i teoria gier w życiu i pracy Roberta J. Aumanna (Nagroda Imienia Nobla w Dziedzinie Ekonomii, 2005)
    Rationality, conflicts and game theory in the life and career of Robert J. Aumann (Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, 2005)
    Autorzy:
    Ostasiewicz, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/434018.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
    Tematy:
    Robert J. Aumann
    correlated equilibrium
    repeated games
    Folk Theorem
    Opis:
    Robert J. Aumann received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2005 for his work on conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis. The best known of his achievements is the concept of correlated equilibrium. He is also famous, not only among scientists, for his attempts to apply mathematical results to real political conflicts. The paper presents the sketch of main ideas of Aumann’s, including common knowledge and rationality, theorem considering Nash equilibria in iterated games, correlated equilibrium and theorem related to “agreeing to disagree”. There is also mentioned a very interesting problem of “how the Talmud divides an estate among creditors”, solved by Aumann. Moreover, the personal profile of Aumann is presented, as a man and as a political figure.
    Źródło:
    Śląski Przegląd Statystyczny; 2014, 12(18); 285-312
    1644-6739
    Pojawia się w:
    Śląski Przegląd Statystyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games
    Autorzy:
    Clempner, J. B.
    Poznyak, A. S.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/907787.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2011
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
    Tematy:
    punkt równowagi Lyapunova
    funkcja Lapunowa
    proces decyzyjny
    Lyapunov game
    Lyapunov equilibrium point
    best reply
    repeated games
    forward decision process
    Opis:
    We introduce the concept of a Lyapunov game as a subclass of strictly dominated games and potential games. The advantage of this approach is that every ergodic system (repeated game) can be represented by a Lyapunov-like function. A direct acyclic graph is associated with a game. The graph structure represents the dependencies existing between the strategy profiles. By definition, a Lyapunov-like function monotonically decreases and converges to a single Lyapunov equilibrium point identified by the sink of the game graph. It is important to note that in previous works this convergence has not been guaranteed even if the Nash equilibrium point exists. The best reply dynamics result in a natural implementation of the behavior of a Lyapunov-like function. Therefore, a Lyapunov game has also the benefit that it is common knowledge of the players that only best replies are chosen. By the natural evolution of a Lyapunov-like function, no matter what, a strategy played once is not played again. As a construction example, we show that, for repeated games with bounded nonnegative cost functions within the class of differentiable vector functions whose derivatives satisfy the Lipschitz condition, a complex vector-function can be built, where each component is a function of the corresponding cost value and satisfies the condition of the Lyapunov-like function. The resulting vector Lyapunov-like function is a monotonic function which can only decrease over time. Then, a repeated game can be represented by a one-shot game. The functionality of the suggested method is successfully demonstrated by a simulated experiment.
    Źródło:
    International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2011, 21, 2; 349-361
    1641-876X
    2083-8492
    Pojawia się w:
    International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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