Temat: protokół kryptograficzny - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Is it possible to decide whether a cryptographic protocol is secure or not?
Autorzy:: Comon, H.
Shmatikov, V.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309417.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2002
Wydawca:: Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:: protokół kryptograficzny
kryptografia
bezpieczeństwo
cryptographic protocols
decision procedures
logic
security
Opis:: We consider the so called "cryptographic protocols" whose aim is to ensure some security properties when communication channels are not reliable. Such protocols usually rely on cryptographic primitives. Even if it is assumed that the cryptographic primitives are perfect, the security goals may not be achieved: the protocol itself may have weaknesses which can be exploited by an attacker. We survey recent work on decision techniques for the cryptographic protocol analysis.
Źródło:: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2002, 4; 5-15
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Analysis of cryptographic protocols using logics of belief: an overview
Autorzy:: Monniaux, D.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309415.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2002
Wydawca:: Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:: protokół kryptograficzny
kryptografia
cryptographic protocols
logics of belief
BAN
GNY
decidability
Opis:: When designing a cryptographic protocol or explaining it, one often uses arguments such as "since this message was signed by machine B, machine A can be sure it came from B" in informal proofs justifying how the protocol works. Since it is, in such informal proofs, often easy to overlook an essential assumption, such as a trust relation or the belief that a message is not a replay from a previous session, it seems desirable to write such proofs in a formal system. While such logics do not replace the recent techniques of automatic proofs of safety properties, they help in pointing the weaknesses of the system. In this paper, we present briefly the BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham) formal system [10, 11] as well as some derivative. We show how to prove some properties of a simple protocol, as well as detecting undesirable assumptions. We then explain how the manual search for proofs can be made automatic. Finally, we explain how the lack of proper semantics can be a bit worrying.
Źródło:: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2002, 4; 57-67
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: On some specification languages of cryptographic protocols
Autorzy:: Dudek, P.
Kurkowski, M.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/122012.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2010
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Humanistyczno-Przyrodniczy im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie. Wydawnictwo Uczelniane
Tematy:: cryptographic protocol
HLPSL language
VerICS system
protokół kryptograficzny
język HLPSL
system VerICS
Opis:: A key element of the security systems in computer networks are cryptographic protocols (CP). These protocols are concurrent algorithms used to provide relevant system security goals. Their main purpose is, for example, amutual authentication (identification) of communicating parties (users, servers), distribution of new keys and session encryption. Literature indicates numerous errors in protocol constructions. Thus, there is a need to create methods for CP specification and verification. In this paper, we investigate a problem of CP specification. The paper discusses the so-called Common Language - the simplest language of CP specification and HLPSL - a specification language used in the European verification project Avispa. Finally, we introduce PTL - the new language developed for CP specification which allows fully automatic verification.
Źródło:: Scientific Issues of Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa. Mathematics; 2010, 15; 121-130
2450-9302
Pojawia się w:: Scientific Issues of Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa. Mathematics
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:: Process calculi and the verification of security protocols
Autorzy:: Boreale, M.
Gorla, D.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309407.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2002
Wydawca:: Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:: protokół kryptograficzny
kryptografia
bezpieczeństwo
cryptographic protocols
Dolev-Yao model
observational equivalence
process calculi
spi calculus
Opis:: Recently there has been much interest towards using formal methods in the analysis of security protocols. Some recent approaches take advantage of concepts and techniques from the field of process calculi. Process calculi can be given a formal yet simple semantics, which permits rigorous definitions of such concepts as "attacker", "secrecy"" and "authentication". This feature has led to the development of solid reasoning methods and verification techniques, a few of which we outline in this paper.
Źródło:: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2002, 4; 28-39
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 5.

Tytuł:: CAPSL and MuCAPSL
Autorzy:: Millen, J.K.
Denker, G.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309409.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2002
Wydawca:: Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:: protokół kryptograficzny
kryptografia
bezpieczeństwo
CAPSL
MuCAPSL
cryptographic protocol specification
cryptographic protocol analysis
secure group communication
multicast
Opis:: Secure communication generally begins with a connection establishment phase in which messages are exchanged by client and server protocol software to generate, share, and use secret data or keys. This message exchange is referred to as an authentication or key distribution cryptographic protocol. CAPSL is a formal language for specifying cryptographic protocols. It is also useful for addressing the correctness of the protocols on an abstract level, rather than the strength of the underlying cryptographic algorithms. We outline the design principles of CAPSL and its integrated specification and analysis environment. Protocols for secure group management are essential in applications that are concerned with confidential authenticated communication among coalition members, authenticated group decisions, or the secure administration of group membership and access control. We will also discuss our progress on designing a new extension of CAPSL for multicast protocols, called MuCAPSL.
Źródło:: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2002, 4; 16-27
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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