Temat: proleptic - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Pośmiertne interesy osoby
Posthumous interests of a person
Autorzy:: Jędrczak, Stanisław
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/18653979.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2018
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:: nastawienie osobowe
interesy
prawa podmiotowe
proleptyczny
ante mortem
personal stance
interest
personal wrights
proleptic
Opis:: Does the interest of a person go beyond the limits of her life? In the article we advocate the realistic view, proclaiming that interests of a person continues even after her death. In contemporary philosophy the realistic view of the post-mortem interests, already outlined by Aristotle, had been delivered by Joel Feinberg. The paper associates an ontological thread with a moral philosophy and general reflection on the notion of a person. Developing the Timothy Chappell’s idea, we introduce the term of personal stance, which is an aspect of the proleptic nature of the concept of a person. Since personal stance includes also a dead person, she belongs to the primary moral constituency. This fact clarifies our concern for the posthumous fate. Lastly, we argue that in the light of private law posthumous interests are to be understood as personal rights.
Źródło:: Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris; 2018, 43, 4; 94-122
1689-4286
Pojawia się w:: Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Responsibility – an Anthropological Outline
Autorzy:: Stanisław, Jędrczak,
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902637.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2020-03-08
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:: proleptic view on personhood
responsibility
pseudo-Diodorian modality
freedom of will
consensus
guilt
proleptyczna koncepcja osoby
odpowiedzialność
modalność pseudo-Diodorowa
wina
Opis:: In the article, I try to present an outline of the theory of responsibility. Its double root – based on the logical distinction between criterion and testimony – is derived from Abelard’s anthropology of action and the theory of personhood developed by Timothy Chappell. Initially, I discuss the metaphysical difficulties related to the problem of freedom (especially linked with determinism). Afterwards, following Abelard, I try to indicate an anthropological justification of punishment based on guilt. The last part of the paper is devoted to the attempt to enter the free will into a broader view of Chappell’s theory. The aim of the work is to prepare the ground for future studies on the proleptic notion of personhood and its further application within the philosophy of law.
Źródło:: Studia Iuridica; 2019, 82; 131-148
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:: Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

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