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Wyszukujesz frazę "pretense" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
The Feigned Ignorance of Judas. Rhetorical Question from the Category interrogatio/ἐρώτημα in Matt 26:25
Autorzy:
Grochowski, Zbigniew
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2158364.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-12-21
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Tematy:
Judas
betrayal
misleading
pretense
rhetorical question
interrogatio/ἐρώτημα
Opis:
The article analyzes the utterance made by Judas in the Cenacle (1) in the context of his efforts to hand Jesus over to the chief priests (Matt 26:14–25). The fact that his question (Matt 26:25) includes the particle μήτι which assumes a negative response from the interlocutor (1–2) suggests that the disciple was unaware that he was betraying Jesus. Consequently, there is no shortage of positive opinions about Judas, expressed both in the past and today. Matthew’s narrative, however, says something different in this regard. The research problem is therefore seeking an answer to the question: how to interpret Judas’ words? The referenced various biblical translations (3.1) and claims of exegetes (3.2) quote the words of the apostles (Matt 26:22,25) and explain them in an ambiguous manner. The attempts to solve the problem shown in sections 2 and 3.1–2 do not provide a satisfactory conclusion. In the last section (4), the grammatical rules and narrative logic – which are clearly in contradiction – are supplemented with a rhetorical perspective, which leads to a definitive resolution of the dilemma. The synchronic approach applied to the pericope Matt 26:14–25 allows one to draw the conclusion that in Judas’ utterance one should identify a rhetorical question from the category interrogatio/ἐρώτημα whose function in Matt 26:25 is auferendae dissimulationis (“misleading pretense”). Many exegetes have decrypted Judas’ dishonest conduct, but it is only this article that precisely defines this rhetorical phenomenon.
Źródło:
Verbum Vitae; 2022, 40, 4; 1035-1054
1644-8561
2451-280X
Pojawia się w:
Verbum Vitae
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Social and Enactive Perspectives on Pretending
Autorzy:
Rucińska, Zuzanna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2206300.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Projekt Avant
Tematy:
pretending
pretense
enactivism
social cognition
perception
imagination
scripts
Opis:
This paper presents pretending as an enacted and fundamentally social activity. First, it demonstrates why we should think of pretense as inherently social. Then, it shows how that fact affects our theory in terms of what is needed in order to pretend. Standardly, pretense is seen as requiring a mechanism that allows one to bypass the ‘obvious’ response to the environment in order to opt for a symbolic response; that mechanism is imaginative and representational. This paper shows that the Enactive Account of Pretense reconsiders the idea that one needs to respond to an absent environment when pretending, proposing instead that socially constituted perceptual affordances for play allow for non-obvious ways of responding to the present environment. The enactive account of pretense suggests that one need not posit special cognitive pretense mechanisms and mental scripts in order to account for pretending, as available capacities for active perception and re-enactment of routines suffice. This paper concludes with suggestions for the kinds of cognitive skills that should be sought out to explain pretense
Źródło:
Avant; 2019, 10, 3
2082-6710
Pojawia się w:
Avant
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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