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    Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8
    Tytuł:
    Fizykalistyczny panpsychizm
    Physicalist Panpsychism
    Autorzy:
    STRAWSON, Galen
    Jarocki, Jacek
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488471.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018-03-26
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    panpsychizm
    fizykalizm
    materializm
    filozofia umysłu
    panpsychism
    physicalism
    materialism
    philosophy of mind
    Opis:
    W najogólniejszym sformułowaniu panpsychizm to pogląd, który głosi, że wszystko jest umysłem lub świadomością. Mimo że stanowisko to ma długą tradycję i staje się coraz popularniejsze we współczesnej debacie, wciąż ma ono wielu przeciwników. Celem tego artykułu jest dowiedzenie, że panpsychizm stanowi najlepsze metafizyczne wyjaśnienie natury tego, co stanowi ostateczne tworzywo rzeczywistości. Jest to zarazem odmiana fizykalizmu, zgodnie z którą doświadczenie (doświadczeniowość) jest budulcem wszystkich konkretnie istniejących przedmiotów.
    Rougly speaking, panpsychism is the view, that everything is mind or have consciousness. Although the view has a long and venerable tradition, and becomes more and more popular in the contemporary debate, it still has many opponents. The aim of this article is to prove that panpsychism is the best metaphysical account of the nature of the ultimate stuff of reality. At the same time, it is a kind of physicalism, according to which experience (experientiality) is the fundamental stuff of all concrete objects.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2018, 66, 1; 181-205
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Swinburne on Physicalism and Personal Identity
    Autorzy:
    Snowdon, Paul
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791255.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-03-18
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    Swinburne
    physicalism
    entailments
    privileged access
    personal identity
    Simple View
    Reductionist View
    Opis:
    In chapter 2 Swinburne rejects physicalism for two reason. The first is that it is committed to entailments that do not exist. It is suggested that this reason is questionable both because there is no persuasive reason to deny there are such entailments, and also no reason to think that physicalism has such entailments. The second reason is that the mental involves privileged access by the subject and physical features do not allow privileged access. It is proposed that the physical does in fact permit privileged access. In chapter 3 Swinburne defends the Simple View of personal identity. The reasoning is very complex and rich, but it is proposed that Swinburne has not really shown that a reductionist account cannot be correct.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2021, 69, 1; 11-21
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Why Can´t We Regard Robots As People?
    Autorzy:
    Schmiljun, André
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/781211.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    artificial people
    moral agency
    non-reductive physicalism
    materialism
    ends in themselves
    animals
    Opis:
    With the development of autonomous robots, one day probably capable of speaking, thinking and learning, self-reflecting, sharing emotions, in fact, with the raise of robots becoming artificial moral agents (AMAs) robot scientists like Abney, Veruggio and Petersen are already optimistic that sooner or later we need to call those robots “people” or rather “Artificial People” (AP). The paper rejects this forecast, due to its argument based on three metaphysical conflicting assumptions. Firstly, it is the idea that it is possible to precisely define persons and apply the definition to robots or use it to differentiate human beings from robots. Further, the argument of APs favors a position of non-reductive physicalism (second assumption) and materialism (third assumption), finally producing weird convictions about future robotics. Therefore, I will suggest to follow Christine Korsgaard’s defence of animals as ends in themselves with moral standing. I will show that her argument can be transmitted to robots, too, at least to robots which are capable of pursuing their own good (even if they are not rational). Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant delivers an option that allows us to leave out complicated metaphysical notions like “person” or “subject” in the debate, without denying robots’ status as agents.
    Źródło:
    Ethics in Progress; 2018, 9, 1; 44-61
    2084-9257
    Pojawia się w:
    Ethics in Progress
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    From Here to Theology: Response to Joshua Farris
    Autorzy:
    Priest, Stephen
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/26917594.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023-12-31
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Tematy:
    Being
    conditioning
    consciousness
    de-conditioning
    determinism
    existence
    God
    mind
    now
    philosophy
    physicalism
    science
    self
    soul
    theology
    Opis:
    Joshua Farris usefully applies my distinction between conditioned and de-conditioned philosophy to some limits of science, and the disclosure of the soul. It is argued that further de-conditioning is conducive to answering the profound philosophical questions: What is it to be now?, and What is it to be? but these answers are only adequate when they entail the existence of God. It follows that physicalism, determinism, and naturalism are false, and that science (knowingly or unknowingly) presupposes theology.
    Źródło:
    Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2023, 7, 4; 5-13
    2544-302X
    Pojawia się w:
    Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Nature and necessity in Aristotle’s "Physics"
    Autorzy:
    Olesiak, Jarosław
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/431143.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    ancient philosophy
    metaphisycs
    teleology
    hypothetical necessity
    nature
    physicalism
    Arystoteles
    filozofia starożytna
    metafizyka
    teleologia
    imperatyw hipotetyczny
    natura
    fizykalizm
    Opis:
    In Physics II.8 Aristotle claims that the type of necessity found in natural processes is not simple necessity as the ancient physicalists maintained, but hypothetical necessity. The article first considers the textual context within which this issue arises. Then it examines two basic elements of Aristotle’s conceptual apparatus, nature and necessity. It considers his understanding of nature as an inner source of activity and calls attention to the ontological problem of the location of this source within the very entity whose source it is. Next, it examines the various sorts of necessity that Aristotle distinguishes, identifies the sense of necessity that is at work in the ancient physicalist account of natural coming to be, and contrasts it with the hypothetical necessity he proposes. It points out that there remains the unresolved problem of Aristotle’s use in the natural domain of the simple necessity that he elsewhere explicitly reserves to the realm of the unchanging and eternal.
    Źródło:
    Studia Philosophiae Christianae; 2015, 51, 1; 55-73
    0585-5470
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Philosophiae Christianae
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Zagadnienie redukcjonizmu w filozofii biologii
    The Issue of Reductionism in the Philosophy of Biology
    Autorzy:
    Luc, Joanna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690572.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    reductionism
    antireductionism
    eliminativism
    physicalism
    philosophy of biology
    complex systems
    Opis:
    The aim of this article was to present one of the methods of reconciling of epistemological antireductionism and ontological physicalism, which explains differences between sciences, through an ontological picture of the most general structure of reality. The main thesis held that accepting this perspective allows us to achieve the above-mentioned reconcilement. First, the main arguments for and against physical reductionism, were described before the ontological assumptions were presented; then the assumptions was analysed in the light of this ontological construction as well as some facts from the fields of methodology and the history of natural sciences. Finally, some conclusions were drawn from the presented vision. They were connected with the epistemological status of analogy and methodological postulate of simplicity.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2013, 52; 179-201
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Non-Reductive Physicalism for AGI
    Autorzy:
    Bołtuć, Piotr (Peter)
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31234175.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
    Tematy:
    Machine consciousness
    non-reductive physicalism
    non-reductive machine consciousness
    creature consciousness
    non-reductive consciousness
    complementary philosophy
    Wissenschaftslehre
    two-tier physicalism
    Opis:
    Creature consciousness provides a physicalist account of the first-person awareness (contra Rosenthal). I argue that non-reductive consciousness is not about phenomenal qualia (Nagel’s what it is like to feel like something else); it is about the stream of awareness that makes any objects of perception epistemically available and ontologically present. This kind of consciousness is central, internally to one’s awareness. Externally, the feel about one’s significant other’s that “there is someone home” is quite important too. This is not substance dualism since creature consciousness and functional consciousness are both at different generality levels of physicalism. Surprisingly, pre-Hegel philosophy of pure subject is more fitting with the current engineering approach than analytical phenomenalism. The complementary view of subjectand object-related perspectives, may come from Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre; but here it is placed, securely within the physicalist paradigm. It is essential to the Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness, which helps us understand under what general conditions a machine would be first-person conscious, but when it is merely functionally conscious.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia i Nauka; 2022, 10, zeszyt specjalny; 33-48
    2300-4711
    2545-1936
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia i Nauka
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Philosophy as a Theory over Theories
    Autorzy:
    Bołtuć, Piotr (Peter)
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31233694.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
    Tematy:
    Philosophy as paradigm building
    physicalism over the current sciences
    Opis:
    We view philosophy as paradigm setting: largely, spread over leading sciences of the epoch, as well as the main developing technologies, and even socio-economic and managerial patterns. This is, obviously, a “regulatory definition,” not quite a descriptive one. We examine whether it is the science of sciences, or the science over the sciences. Thus, it is not quite a meta-science. Our point is not to view philosophy as a methodology of science, or as its maid (ancilla). Philosophy is viewed as the pinnacle of the sciences, providing them with ontological and axiological meanings. Here is one proposed definition: Philosophy is built upon the sum of general theories of all leading sciences (broadly understood); it is a theory based on this sum. The aim of philosophy so defined is to stipulate and approximate veridical worldviews, rooted in the strongest available background, which is largely the background provided by the sciences, but not quite limited to what is scientifically provable at a given point in time—this last clause is due to temporary limitedness of any science, always existing at a given time-slice. Thus, limited dependency on any principles, not only factual statements. As we know from Albert Einstein’s relativity theories and other scientific revolutions, both factual statements and higher-level principles, are always already inductively questionable, e.g., through inference to the best explanation following pragmatic, context dependent, criteria of what counts as “the best” of explanations. We also question the intuitive requirements of physicalism that are crucial to Daniel Stoljar’s thesis that physicalism cannot be properly defined. In contrast to the broadly scientistic predilection beneath the approach in the main bulk of this article we also need and require a philosophical focus on the human existential condition, which is complementary to, and not contradictory with, the above definition of philosophy. The proposed approach may be viewed as an Enlightenment approach, aware of its strengths and limits; thus, with a post-Enlightenment zing.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia i Nauka; 2023, 11; 7-22
    2300-4711
    2545-1936
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia i Nauka
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8

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