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    Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8
    Tytuł:
    Paradigms of Cognition in Security Sciences
    Autorzy:
    Glen, Andrzej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1375120.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020
    Wydawca:
    Wyższa Szkoła Policji w Szczytnie
    Tematy:
    mono-paradigmativity
    multi-paradigmativity
    complementarity
    ontological realism
    Opis:
    The article outlines difficulties related to the paradigm of cognition in security sciences, which have been generalised by asking about the paradigm that allows to study security of various entities and to obtain progress of knowledge about this fragment of reality. Then, a set of paradigms typical for the social sciences, disciplines: political and administrative sciences, international relations theory sub-discipline: security studies and management and quality sciences were analysed and evaluated using a system of hypothetical and assertion-deductive methods. The subject, time and spatial context of security of entities, the subject scope of security sciences and the ontological approach to the understanding of beings in the reality of security of entities were outlined. The usefulness of analysed and evaluated paradigms in cognition of security was assessed in this context. Finally, a complementary paradigm of cognition in security sciences was proposed and its usefulness in relation to multi-paradigmatic cognition was demonstrated.
    Źródło:
    Internal Security; 2020, 12(1); 9-21
    2080-5268
    Pojawia się w:
    Internal Security
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    O realistyczności założeń, falsyfikowalności hipotez i innych modernistycznych mitach współczesnej ekonomii
    The realism of assumptions, falsifiability of hypotheses and other modernist myths of contemporary economics
    Autorzy:
    Scheuer, Bartosz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/434729.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
    Tematy:
    methodology of economics
    philosophy of science
    economic crisis
    ontological realism
    modernism
    Opis:
    In the face of the global economic crisis, there are many opinions according to which economics as a science needs major rebuilding. Usually, it is emphasized that it should not be developed by involving the construction of formal, mathematical models but that there is a need to improve the “realisticness” of analysis. Based on the analysis of a dispute between P. Krugman and J.H. Cochrane it can be said that the arguments which appear during the debate on the crisis are not new and confusingly similar to those that already appeared in the 30s and 70s of the last century. It should also be noted that both: the supporters of “realisticness” of economic analysis, as well as representatives of the mainstream formalism treat this crisis as a confirmation of the correctness of their theories and evidence of the weakness of the concepts proposed by their opponents. The article is placed in relation to the thesis that all the arguments that have emerged in the debate on the state of the economic theory after the crisis, contrary to appearances, do not bring anything new to the economic discourse and cannot lead to any solutions of the theoretical dispute, because all arguments are based on the same philosophical foundations. In other words it can be said that the basic problem of modern economics should not be considered as a weakness of theory, but as a weakness of philosophy common to all participants of the discourse. First of all, in fact, the arguments coming from both sides of the dispute seem to assume that the ultimate and decisive test of any theory is its confrontation with experience, the “facts”, whereby the test is perceived in terms of the correspondence theory of truth. This means that both: economists, whose views on the nature of the theory are similar to those presented by P. Krugman, as well as their opponents, who, like J.H. Cochrane recognize that any theoretical concepts should meet fairly strict formal requirements and finally take the form of (usually mathematicised) model, assume that carrying out such a test is possible firstly, and secondly, that it boils down to a comparison of propositions that make up the model/theory (assumptions and predictions, or only prediction) with the reality whose components are independent of theory and processes of cognition.
    Źródło:
    Ekonomia - Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroclawiu; 2013, 4 (25); 64-76
    2080-5977
    Pojawia się w:
    Ekonomia - Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroclawiu
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Historia, widma i dekonstrukcja
    History, Spectres, and Deconstruction
    Autorzy:
    Kula, Artur
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2080785.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020
    Wydawca:
    Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
    Tematy:
    deconstruction
    Ethan Kleinberg
    French Theory
    hauntology
    ontological realism
    dekonstrukcja
    realizm ontologiczny
    widmontologia
    Nauki Humanistyczne i Społeczne
    Opis:
    This article is a review of Ethan Kleinberg’s Haunting History. For a Deconstructive Approach to the Past (Stanford, 2017). I focus on three issues related to that work. These are: historians’ attitude towards the deconstruction; the idea of ontological realism and its critique; the role of young historians in modern academia. This text is based not only on the book reviewed but also on its different analyses and ways it was used in other research. In the conclusion, I present how Haunting History can be used as an emancipatory tool by scholars who are starting their academic careers now.
    Źródło:
    Historyka studia metodologiczne; 2020, 50; 157-171
    0073-277X
    Pojawia się w:
    Historyka studia metodologiczne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czy naturalizm jest prawomocny?
    Is Naturalism Legitimate?
    Autorzy:
    Pobojewska, Aldona
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015776.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2003
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    naturalizm
    realizm ontologiczny
    realizm teoriopoznawczy
    paradygmat ontologiczny i mentalistyczny filozofii
    uwarunkowanie podmiotu poznania
    naturalizm jako postawa badawcza
    naturalism
    ontological realism
    epistemological realism
    ontological and mentalistic paradigms of philosophy
    conditioning of the subject of cognition
    naturalism as a research attitude
    Opis:
    Naturalism that I deal with is an approach towards the world, the man and the possibilities and methods of learning about the world. It maintains that there is an existential continuity of reality and this is a continuity of nature and not of other spheres of existence. A view formulated in this way silently accepts the assumptions of ontological realism and epistemological realism. Hence it becomes part of the ontological paradigm of philosophy. After Kant, that is after mentalistic (transcendentalistic) paradigm in philosophy came into being, the legitimacy of the ontological way of philosophising cannot be maintained. Is then naturalism – that at present experiences another revival – only a misunderstanding? Well, no. The limits of its validity – but not legitimacy – are set by science. Within its area it is obvious and useful, perhaps even indispensable. It is a type of unrealised research attitude by whose virtue a scientist treats the object of his studies as autonomously existing and one that can be objectively cognised. However, here he is supported not by theoretical arguments, but first of all by pragmatic and psychological-social ones.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2003, 51, 3; 173-185
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    On What Is Personally Appealing on Conceptual Relativism
    O tym, co jest osobiście atrakcyjne w relatywizmie pojęciowym
    Autorzy:
    Dancák, Daniel
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/29433412.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023
    Wydawca:
    Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
    Tematy:
    realism
    conceptual relativism
    the gap
    epistemological status
    ontological status
    personal appeal
    Opis:
    Conceptual relativism is not an attractive position. Surely, it has its ups and downs, but the ups are rarely mentioned. This article has no ambition to provide a resolute groundbreaking argument in favour of the conceptual realism. It only aims to reconstruct the very basis of the given position from the defendant’s point of view, while giving a bit of a personal (or existential if you will) touch to the whole topic.The personal element in question resides in the fact that there are incommensurable percepts, experiences, even worlds which all “feel” equally real to the subjects. This is something to what realism does not seem to be able to do justice without diminishing the ontological status of the “wrong” opinions, beliefs, etc., but this does not seem to go well with how we experience our “imperfect” realities. Conceptual relativists, however, are free from strictly distinguishing between correct and incorrect views on reality and, thus, they are able, if nothing else, to retain and appreciate the reality of our subjective worlds.
    Relatywizm pojęciowy nie jest atrakcyjnym stanowiskiem. Z pewnością ma swoje wzloty i upadki, ale wzloty są rzadko wspominane. Niniejszy artykuł nie ma ambicji dostarczenia zdecydowanego, przełomowego argumentu na rzecz realizmu pojęciowego. Jego celem jest jedynie zrekonstruowanie podstaw danego stanowiska z punktu widzenia oskarżonego, przy jednoczesnym nadaniu całemu tematowi nieco osobistego (lub egzystencjalnego, jeśli wolisz) akcentu. Element osobisty, o którym mowa, polega na tym, że istnieją niewspółmierne percepcje, doświadczenia, a nawet światy, które wszystkie "czują się" równie realne dla podmiotów. Jest to coś, czemu realizm nie wydaje się być w stanie oddać sprawiedliwości bez umniejszania ontologicznego statusu "błędnych" opinii, przekonań itp., ale nie wydaje się to dobrze współgrać z tym, jak doświadczamy naszej "niedoskonałej" rzeczywistości. Relatywiści pojęciowi są jednak wolni od ścisłego rozróżniania między poprawnymi i niepoprawnymi poglądami na rzeczywistość, a tym samym są w stanie, jeśli nie nic innego, zachować i docenić rzeczywistość naszych subiektywnych światów.
    Źródło:
    Philosophy and Canon Law; 2023, 9, 1; 1-15
    2450-4955
    2451-2141
    Pojawia się w:
    Philosophy and Canon Law
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    DWIE KONCEPCJE PRAWDY I DWIE WIZJE ŚWIATA
    TWO NOTIONS OF TRUTH AND TWO CONCEPTS OF THE WORLD
    Autorzy:
    Ziemińska, Renata
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488441.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    prawda
    realizm
    schemat T
    pakiet ontologiczny
    truth
    realism
    T-scheme
    ontological package
    Opis:
    There are two basic notions of truth (objectivism and subjectivism) connected with two understandings of the world (respectively, realism and idealism). Author claims, against deflationists, that the concept of truth is not metaphysically neutral. Tarski’s T-schema requires some metaphysical reading. Reading the schema from the left to the right, leads to realism. Reading the schema from the right to the left, leads to anti-realism. The concept of truth is the part of some ontological package deal or alethic network. There are two basic packages, competing since centuries, that focus on two poles in human cognition: subject and object.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2013, 61, 3; 29-41
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    „Twardy” problem realizmu metafizycznego i współczesny antyrealizm
    The “Hard” Problem of Metaphysical Realism and Contemporary Anti- Realism
    Autorzy:
    Judycki, Stanisław
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013061.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2009
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    realizm
    idealizm
    antyrealizm
    partycypacja
    zasada immanencji
    dowód ontologiczny
    realism
    idealism
    anti-realism
    participation
    principle of immanence
    ontological proof
    Opis:
    The aim of the article is to consider the problem of metaphysical realism that is defined as the thesis that there are objects that are independent of human consciousness. The problem was not solved by I. Kant, since he assumed, without a justification, that there are objects (“things in themselves”) that are the causes of human mental states. The author interprets the problem of metaphysical realism in the context of the so-called principle of immanence (“principle of consciousness”), according to which every entity (object) may be treated exclusively as a correlate of consciousness. The principle of immanence is the cause why even causal relations have to be treated as only certain data for the consciousness, and hence they may not be referred to by asserting that there is a factor that is the cause of states of human consciousness. Contemporary anti-realism, as the so-called conceptual realism, does not consider the problem of metaphysical realism in the context of the principle of immanence, and hence it is not a part of the traditional dispute on the existence of the (external) world. The author sees the solution to the problem of metaphysical realism in combining two arguments: in the reference to the ontological proof, which – via God’s veracity – is to “lead outside” the immanence of consciousness, and in the reference to the concept of participation in such a way that the human mind participates in God and it is Him that is the real entity (ens realissimum) that is referred to by the dispute about the existence of the world and the problem of metaphysical realism.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2009, 57, 1; 49-74
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    O niektórych problemach naturalizacji filozofii nauki na przykładzie sporu o realizm
    On Some Problems of Naturalizing the Philosophy of Science Exemplified on the Controversy about Realism
    Autorzy:
    Zeider, Paweł
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2012841.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2011
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    naturalizm metodologiczny
    filozoficzna interpretacja faktów naukowych
    spór realizm-antyrealizm
    rozumowanie abdukcyjne
    sukces nauki
    konwergentny realizm
    Naturalna Postawa Ontologiczna
    methodological naturalism
    philosophical interpretation of scientific facts
    realism-antirealism controversy
    abductive reasoning
    success of science
    convergent realism
    Natural Ontological Attitude
    Opis:
    The main purpose of the paper is analysis of some problems referred to methodological understanding of the process to naturalize philosophy of science. This process can be considered as justification of philosophical thesis by scientific facts, and also as application of the methods of justification, which are effective in natural sciences, to philosophy of science. These procedures are often called philosophical interpretation of scientific facts, and their methodological validity is taken under consideration. This problem is analysed on the two examples, which are related to realism-antirealism controversy. One of them is the final argument for scientific realism. The second is the Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitudes.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2011, 59, 2; 345-366
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-8 z 8

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