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Wyszukujesz frazę "ontic conception" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
Explanation, representation and information
Autorzy:
Karadimas, Panagiotis
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763413.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
scientific explanation
representation
optimization process
ontic conception of explanation
epistemic conception of explanation
Opis:
The ontic conception of explanation is predicated on the proposition that “explanation is a relation between real objects in the world” and hence, according to this approach, scientific explanation cannot take place absent such a premise. Despite the fact that critics have emphasized several drawbacks of the ontic conception, as for example its inability to address the so-called “abstract explanations”, the debate is not settled and the ontic view can claim to capture cases of explanation that are non-abstract, such as causal relations between events. However, by eliminating the distinction between abstract and non-abstract explanations, it follows that ontic and epistemic proposals can no longer contend to capture different cases of explanation and either all are captured by the ontic view or all are captured by the epistemic view. On closer inspection, it turns out that the ontic view deals with events that fall outside the scientists’ scope of observation and that it does not accommodate common instances of explanation such as explanations from false propositions and hence it cannot establish itself as the dominant philosophical stance with respect to explanation. On the contrary, the epistemic conception does account for almost all episodes of explanation and can be described as a relation between representations, whereby the explanans transmit information to the explanandum and that this information can come, dependent on context, in the form of any of the available theories of explanation (law-like, unificatory, causal and non-causal). The range of application of the ontic view thus is severely restricted to trivial cases of explanation that come through direct observation of the events involved in an explanation and explanation is to be mostly conceived epistemically.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 21-55
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
Autorzy:
Povich, Mark
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763422.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
scientific explanation
philosophy of science
philosophy of mathematics
mathematical explanation
ontic conception
conventionalism
Opis:
Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, properties, structures, etc.) and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock, 2015; Povich, 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski, 2021).
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 171-223
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The nature and norms of scientific explanation: Some preliminaries
Autorzy:
Peña, Abel
Wright, Cory
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763410.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
scientific explanation
ontic conception of explanation
epistemic conception of explanation
nature of explanation
norms of explanation
Opis:
There are at least two deep and related debates about explanation: about its nature and about its norms. The aim of this special issue of Philosophical Problems in Science/Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce (ZFN) is to survey whether or not a consensus is at hand in these debates and to help settle what it can. The overarching foci are twofold: (i) the nature of scientific explanation, with special attention to the debate between ontic and epistemic conception of explanation, and (ii) the norms of scientific explanation, with special attention to so-called ‘ontic’ (or better, ‘alethic’) norms like truth and referential success and epistemic norms like intelligibility and idealized understanding. It called for advocates of various conceptions to articulate the current state of these debates. Researchers and scholars from around the globe—including Poland, Canada, Korea, The Netherlands, the United States, Greece, Austria, and Belgium—contributed. The special issue also attempts to provide an opening for new work on the norms of explanation, such as truth or model-based accuracy, information compression, abstraction, and generalization.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 5-17
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Dimensions of explanation
Autorzy:
Hochstein, Eric
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763416.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
evaluative dimension
communicative concept of explanation
representational concept of explanation
ontic conception of explanation
mechanistic explanation
Opis:
Some argue that the term “explanation” in science is ambiguous, referring to at least three distinct concepts: a communicative concept, a representational concept, and an ontic concept. Each is defined in a different way with its own sets of norms and goals, and each of which can apply in contexts where the others do not. In this paper, I argue that such a view is false. Instead, I propose that a scientific explanation is a complex entity that can always be analyzed along a communicative dimension, a representational dimension, and an ontic dimension. But all three are always present within scientific explanations. I highlight what such an account looks like, and the potential problems it faces (namely that a single explanation can appear to have incompatible sets of norms and goals that govern it). I propose a solution to this problem and demonstrate how this account can help to dissolve current disputes in philosophy of science regarding debates between epistemic and ontic accounts of mechanistic explanations in the life sciences.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 57-98
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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