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Tytuł:
Partner Selection Using Reputation Information in n-player Cooperative Games
Autorzy:
Mariano, P.
Correia, L.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/308277.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
evolution of cooperation
multi-agent systems
n-player games
partner selection
reputation
Opis:
To study cooperation evolution in populations, it is common to use games to model the individuals interactions. When these games are n-player it might be di cult to assign defection responsibility to any particular individual. In this paper the authors present an agent based model where each agent maintains reputation information of other agents. This information is used for partner selection before each game. Any agent collects information from the successive games it plays and updates a private reputation estimate of its candidate partners. This approach is integrated with an approach of variable sized population where agents are born, interact, reproduce and die, thus presenting a possibility of extinction. The results now obtained, for cooperation evolution in a population, show an improvement over previous models where partner selection did not use any reputation information. Populations are able to survive longer by selecting partners taking merely into account an estimate of others' reputations.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2014, 4; 53-60
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Games with distorted information and self-verification of beliefs with applications to financial markets
Autorzy:
Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, Agnieszka
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/453471.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Szkoła Główna Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego w Warszawie. Katedra Ekonometrii i Statystyki
Tematy:
games with continuum of players
n-player dynamic games
Nash equilibrium
pre-belief distorted Nash equilibrium
subjective equilibrium
self-verifcation of beliefs
financial markets.
Opis:
In the paper we examine discrete time dynamic games in which the global state variable changes in response to a certain function of the pro_le of layers' decisions, called statistic, while the players form some expectations about its future values based on the history. Besides, there are also players' private state variables. A general model is built, encompassing both games with _nitely many players as well as games with in_nitely many players. This model extends the class of games with distorted information considered by the author in [20], in which there were no private state variables and there were much stronger assumptions about the statistic of players' decisions considered. The notions of pre-belief distorted Nash equilibrium (pre-BDNE), self-veri_cation and belief distorted Nash equilibrium (BDNE), de_ned already in [20], are applied to our wider class of games. The relations between Nash equilibria, pre-BDNE and BDNE are examined as well as the existence and properties of pre-BDNE. A model of a _nancial market { a simpli_ed stock exchange { is presented as an example. Pre-BDNE using threshold prices are proposed. One of further results in this example is potential self-veri_cation of fundamental beliefs and beliefs in in_nite speculative bubbles.
Źródło:
Metody Ilościowe w Badaniach Ekonomicznych; 2010, 11, 1; 254-275
2082-792X
Pojawia się w:
Metody Ilościowe w Badaniach Ekonomicznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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