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Wyszukujesz frazę "moral (ethical) value" wg kryterium: Temat


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Tytuł:
Poetyka ewokacji (nie)uczciwości w opowiadaniu Człowiek, który zdemoralizował Hadleyburg Marka Twaina
The Poetics of Evoking (Dis)Honesty in the Short Story The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg by Mark Twain
Autorzy:
Garlej, Beata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2036518.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-15
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
honesty-dishonesty
axiological paradigm
aesthetically significant qualities
phaseality
the poetics of evocation
moral (ethical) value
“honesty” as a variation of good
Opis:
The article refers to the axiological paradigm of (dis)honesty (the notion taken from Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s analysis) capable of being one of the dedicated devices of the poetics of evocation. The point of reference for these theoretical reflections is Mark Twain’s short story entitled “The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg”. The writer’s presentation of the still up-to-date and relevant axiological paradigm of (dis)honesty is at the hub of the deliberations,which aim to ascertain what constitutes the origin of its uniqueness and the freshness of its display. Primarily with the help of the concept taken from Roman Ingarden’s “catalogue” of aesthetically valuable qualities (“the ‘novelty’ variant”), and also drawing on the philosopher’s reflections devoted to one of the two ontological dimensions of the construction of a literary work (phaseality), an attempt is made to identify the specificity of the epically visualised phenomenon of (dis)honesty, and determine the methodological character of the poetics of evocation, necessary for this purpose.
Źródło:
Przestrzenie Teorii; 2021, 35; 263-278
2450-5765
Pojawia się w:
Przestrzenie Teorii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Dlaczego nauka nie może być wolna od wartości
Why Science cannot be Value-free
Autorzy:
Lekka-Kowalik, Agnieszka
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015633.pdf
Data publikacji:
2004
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
nauka wolna od wartościowań
metoda naukowa
sądy wartościujące
wartości poznawcze
wartości moralne
„tłuste” pojęcia etyczne
dychotomia fakt/wartość
value-free science
scientific method
value judgements
cognitive values
moral values
„thick” ethical concepts
fact/value dichotomy
Opis:
Three arguments are developed to support this thesis: (1) Since there is no algorithm for making methodological decisions as to what theory should be accepted, what method should be used, etc, scientists have to pass judgements that are essentially evaluative. Those judgements belong to science. The attempt to save the ideal of value-free science by distinguishing value-free object language and value-laden metalanguage (in which those evaluative judgements would be formulated) does not work. For there are no reasons to expel the methodology of a given science from that science, and even if we made this move, we would finally come to the level of evaluative judgements, unless we accept regressus ad infinitum. (2) Even if the above distinction were tenable, this would not save the ideal of value-free science. For our language is full of the so-called „thick ethical concepts” that are both descriptive and evaluative. They are justifiably used at least in some sciences. We could exclude – by definition - such concepts from science, but this would result in expelling many legitimate disciplines from the realm of science. This would mean not that science was value--free but that we made it so. (3) The fact that scientific results are sometimes expressed by means of ethically thick concepts does not allow us to restrict values involved in science to epistemological values – moral values are involved as well. Moreover, apparently pure methodological concepts such as „good solution” or „sufficient evidence” seem to be also „ethically thick”. Such considerations allow us to draw a conclusion that science possesses intrinsic moral dimension, and separating the epistemic and moral points of view in discussions about science is unjustified.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2004, 52, 2; 275-293
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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