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Tytuł:
Superweniencja psychofizyczna
Autorzy:
Kurek, Łukasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/429130.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II w Krakowie
Tematy:
supervenience
mind-body problem
explanation
intentionality
Jaegwon Kim
causation
Opis:
The aim of this article is two-fold. First, a critical presentation of the concept of supervenience is carried out. In this context, three basic types of supervenience are presented: weak, strong, and global. It is argued that the most useful types of supervenience are its strong, and global versions. Second, a broader analysis of the usefulness of supervenience is undertaken. It is argued that it is a very „flexible” concept, which allows for a variety of different solutions to the philosophical issue of the mind. However, the aforementioned flexibility can be limited by additional philosophical assumptions. Moreover, supervenience allows to augment traditional philosophical investigations concerning the mind with results of empirical findings of such sciences as psychology, or neuroscience. In this context it is argued that supervenience is a „third way” in the philosophical study of the mind.
Źródło:
Semina Scientiarum; 2011, 10
1644-3365
Pojawia się w:
Semina Scientiarum
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Idea emergencji – zarys ogólny
The Idea of Emergence – an Overview
Autorzy:
Maziarka, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690570.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
emergence
emergentism
dynamic systems
causality
mind-body problem
downward causation
Opis:
This article has an introductory character and systematizes the topic. It introduces the idea of emergence which is currently enjoying something of a renaissance and aims to bring order to the terminology associated with this idea. The article concerns the very beginning of the formation of emergentism and its intuitive understanding. It also presents the main concepts of representative authors of emergentism (S. Alexander, CL Morgan, Ch. D. Broad) as well as the numerous characteristics of emergence (synchronic and diachronic emergence, weak and strong emergence). The article concludes with a systematization of meanings and contexts in which the concept of emergence occurs.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2013, 52; 131-177
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Dialogical concept of consciousness in L.S. Vygotsky and G.H. Mead and its relevance for contemporary discussions on consciousness
Autorzy:
Koczanowicz, Leszek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/430161.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Tematy:
consciousness
dialogue
activity theory
cultural concept of consciousness
mind-body problem
Opis:
In my paper I show the relevance of cultural-activity theory for solving the puzzles of the concept of consciousness which encounter contemporary philosophy. I reconstruct the main categories of cultural-activity theory as developed by M.M. Bakhtin, L.S. Vygotsky, G.H. Mead, and J. Dewey. For the concept of consciousness the most important thing is that the phenomenon of human consciousness is consider to be an effect of intersection of language, social relations, and activity. Therefore consciousness cannot be reduced to merely sensual experience but it has to be treated as a complex process in which experience is converted into language expressions which in turn are used for establishing interpersonal relationships. Consciousness thus can be accounted for by its reference to objectivity of social relationships rather than to the world of physical or biological phenomena.
Źródło:
Polish Psychological Bulletin; 2011, 42, 2; 65-70
0079-2993
Pojawia się w:
Polish Psychological Bulletin
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Ne sutor ultra crepidam. Kazimierz Twardowski o filozofii i nauce
Ne sutor ultra crepidam. Kazimerz Twardowski on philosophy and science
Autorzy:
Brożek, Anna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690740.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
classification of sciences
mind-body problem
philosophy of science
Kazimerz Twardowski
Opis:
Kazimierz Twardowski is the father of the modern Polish analytical philosophy. One of the most important stamp of this philosophical style is referring - in philosophical investigations - to achievements and methods of natural sciences. The article analyses this plot in Kazimierz Twardowski's philosophical works. It contains, in particular, a reconstruction of Twardowski's views concerning the classification of sciences, the methodological status of philosophy and psychology and the mind-body problem. Some not commonly known facts concerning the sources of Twardowski's interests in philosophy and science are mentioned.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2010, 46; 3-31
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Evo-Devo and its Epigenetics— “A New Biology for Psychology”? The Case of Inheritance of the Attachment Style
Autorzy:
Grabizna, Adrianna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/42568100.pdf
Data publikacji:
2024
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
Evo-Devo
epigenetics
extended inheritance
transgenerationality
attachment style
dualism
mind-body problem
Opis:
The Evolutionary Developmental Biology (in abbreviation Evo-Devo) gains in popularity among psychologists. It would be a “synthesis of development and evolution” which would finally allow a rapprochement of psychology and biology. The Evo-Devo redefines epigenetics and opposes it to the (alleged) genetic determinism, genetic reductionism and preformationism of the Modern Synthesis (MS), proposes the concept of the extended inheritance and a mechanism of inheritance of acquired characters, which are claimed to be (neo-) Lamarckian, fuses the three questions separated by the MS: the origin of variation, fate of variation and inheritance of variation. These points of the Evo-Devo’s programme particularly resonate with psychologists’ expectations: genes alone do not explain the question of transgenerationality, the ontogeny of the attachment, e.g. early experience with caregivers (e.g. separation and loss) have a long-term effects on adult development can span a person’s lifetime, can even span generations. However, in the paper I show that the inheritance of acquired characters is indeed impossible, that Lamarck never proposed a theory of the inheritance of acquired characters and that it is a confusion rather than fusion to link the question of the origin of variation, the question of development and the one of inheritance. If the Evo-Devo is so appealing to psychologists, it is not because there is “a new biology for psychology.” I show that psychologists’ attitude towards monism was ambivalent and such was the relationship between psychology and biology. The paper is a standpoint of a philosopher of biology interested in psychology.
Źródło:
Filozofia i Nauka; 2024, 12; 167-188
2300-4711
2545-1936
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia i Nauka
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem relacji umysł-ciało w emergentyzmie Samuela Alexandra
The Mind-Body Problem in Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism
Autorzy:
Fornal, Marzena
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/18653982.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
emergencja
brytyjski emergentyzm
Samuel Alexander
problem umysł-ciało
emergence
British Emergentism
mind-body problem
Opis:
Wśród współczesnych filozofów umysłu dominuje przekonanie, że klasyczny emergentyzm dążył do utworzenia całościowego systemu metafizycznego niejednokrotnie dopuszczając istnienie nie fizycznych czynników czy sił. To przekonanie, klasyfikujące brytyjski emergentyzm, jako stanowisko stojące w sprzeczności z powszechnie przyjmowaną współcześnie tezą o domknięciu przyczynowym świata fizycznego, przyczynia się do całkowitej jego dyskredytacji we współczesnych debatach nad problemem umysł-ciało. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zaprezentowanie metafizyki umysłu Samuela Alexandra, jednego z czołowych przedstawicieli wymienionego wyżej stanowiska filozoficznego oraz analiza jego współczesnych interpretacji. Główną tezą pracy jest twierdzenie, że zaproponowane przez Alexandra rozwiązanie problemu umysł-ciało, można z powodzeniem przenieść na grunt współczesnych rozważań w ramach tak zwanego nieredukcyjnego fizykalizmu.
Among contemporary philosophers of mind prevails a view that the representatives of Classical Emergentism such as Samuel Alexander sought to create a comprehensive metaphysical system which frequently allowed existence of non-physical elements or forces. Such view, classified British Emergentism as a position contrary to commonly accepted thesis of the Completeness of Physics, contributes to discrediting it in mind-body problem debates. The main aim of this paper is to present Samuel Alexander’s metaphysics of mind and analyze its present interpretations. The primary thesis is the claim, that solution of the mind-body problem proposed by Alexander is applicable on the ground of contemporary considerations within the framework of so called Non-reductive Physicalism.
Źródło:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris; 2018, 43, 4; 71-93
1689-4286
Pojawia się w:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Embodied mind and phenomenal consciousness
Autorzy:
Venieri, Maria
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/437293.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii
Tematy:
philosophy of mind
cognitive process
embodied cognition
mind–body problem
alva noë
evan thompson
susan hurley
Opis:
In recent years, a central debate in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science concerns the role of the body in perception and cognition. For many contemporary philosophers, not only cognition but also perception is connected mainly with the brain, where the processing of input from the senses takes place; whereas for the proponents of ‘embodied cognition’ other aspects of the body beyond the brain, including the environment, play a constitutive role in cognitive processes. In terms of perception, a new theory has emerged which stresses perception’s active character and claims that the embodied subject and the environment, with which it interacts, form a dynamic system. Supporters of ‘enactive perception’ such as Susan Hurley and Alva Noë maintain that the physical substrate or the supervenience basis of perceptual experience and phenomenal consciousness may include besides the brain and the nervous system other bodily and environmental features. Yet, it will be argued in this paper that the interaction between the subject and the environment forms a system of causal relations, so we can theoretically interfere in the causal chains and create hallucinations, which cannot be distinguished from veridical perception, or a virtual reality as in the film Matrix (1999). This kind of argument and its related thought experiments aim to stress the primacy of the brain in determining phenomenal states, and show that the body and certain interactions with the environment have a causal, but not a constitutive or essential role, in forming phenomenal consciousness.
Źródło:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal; 2015, 5, 1; 9-24
2083-6635
2084-1043
Pojawia się w:
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Bertranda Russella koncepcja monizmu neutralnego
Bertrand Russell’s conception of neutral monism
Autorzy:
Jarocki, Jacek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1622188.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Tematy:
neutral monism
metaphysics
mind-body problem
Bertrand Russell
consciousness
problem umysł/ciało
metafizyka
monizm neutralnym
świadomość
Opis:
The metaphysical view of Bertrand Russell, called neutral monism, is not widely known today, although its impact on the contemporary debate over mind-body problem is clearly visible. The aim of this paper is to answer the question: what was Russell’s neutral monism? Firstly, I present the views of Russell’s predecessors – Ernst Mach and William James. Then, I discuss Russell’s own thought which can be divided into three phases. The initial phase is the rejection of neutral monism (mainly because of Russell’s commitments to epistemology). The second phase – I call it the first neutral monism – appears in The Analysis of Mind, where he proposes a deflationary theory of the object and the subject. The last, third phase – called the second neutral monism, initiated in 1927 in The Analysis of Matter and An Outline of Philosophy – introduces the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Finally, I suggest that the agnostic metaphysics of Russell is too reductive for a dualist and too mysterious for a materialist. However, it might be also true that Russell’s view is more epistemological than metaphysical, and the frames of (misleading) Cartesian dictionary of mind/matter may be too narrow for neutral monism to be pertinently interpreted.
Źródło:
Analiza i Egzystencja; 2016, 33; 69-88
1734-9923
2300-7621
Pojawia się w:
Analiza i Egzystencja
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Angel in “the Cartesian theatre” – Aquinas and the mind-body problem
Autorzy:
Stępień, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1035632.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-10-30
Wydawca:
Akademia Katolicka w Warszawie
Tematy:
Św. Tomasz z Akwinu
dualizm substancjalny
Teatr Kartezjański
St Thomas Aquinas
mind-body problem
Cartesian theatre
Opis:
One of the solutions of the mind-body problem, which returns to the philosophical discussion on consciousness is the “soul hyphotesis”. Existence of the soul can clear the “explanatory gap”, but it brings yet another problems in explanation of how consciousness works. The magiority of those issues exist because of very specific understanding of the mind-body relations in Cartesian way as two separated substances. Some of the schoars propose to overlap the Cartesian approach by returning to the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas. This article shows that in the writings of Aquinas we can find exact analogy of the Cartesian view of the body-soul relations in the description of how immaterial angel assums the body. For Aquinas angel exist and acts in assumed human body in the very same way as Descartes describes the soul acting in human body, and angel’s mode of perception is similar to what is usually called as “the Cartesian theatre”. For Aquinas angel in assumed body cannot perfom any human action, it only pretends to perform it, because it operates bodily organs as the form, which is not united with this specific body. St Thomas explanation of the relation of body and soul in human being relies on the claim of unity of body and soul, which together are one substance. Such approach was even called biological, because of the stress on the role which body plays in human actions. Therefore Aquinas proposition could be perceived the way of overcoming the dualism and removing some of the dilemas which are linked with “soul hypothesis” understood in traditional way.
Źródło:
Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne; 2018, 31, 3; 66-79
0209-3782
2719-7530
Pojawia się w:
Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
DWA OBRAZY ŚWIATA: MANIFESTUJĄCY SIĘ I NAUKOWY
THE MANIFEST AND SCIENTIFIC IMAGES OF THE WORLD
Autorzy:
Bremer, Józef
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488743.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
obraz manifestujący się
obraz naukowy
problem umysł – ciało
redukcjonizm
neuronauka
manifest image
scientific image
mind-body problem
reductionism
neuroscience
Opis:
The article below consists of two parts. In the longer first one, we present the salient features of Sellars’ conception of the manifest and scientific images of the world, and seek to determine the ways in which these two elements may be said to be related to one another. On the basis of this, we then point out one of the sources of the contemporary mind-body problem. In the shorter second part, we outline a variety of philosophical and neuroscientific proposals for resolving the issue of the relationship between our everyday intuitive understanding of what the mental states of a person amount to and their brain states as described in strictly scientific terms.
Niniejszy artykuł składa się z dwóch części. W pierwszej, dłuższej charakteryzujemy W. Sellarsa rozumienie manifestującego się i naukowego obrazu świata (manifest and scientific image) oraz określimy typy zachodzących pomiędzy nimi zależności. Na przykładzie tej charakterystyki wskażemy na jedno ze źródeł współczesnego problemu umysł - ciało. W drugiej części, krótszej omówimy kilka typowych - filozoficznych i neuronaukowych - propozycji rozwiązań kwestii zależności pomiędzy potocznie rozumianymi stanami mentalnymi osoby a naukowo opisywanymi stanami jej mózgu.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2012, 60, 1; 27-49
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem mind-body w świetle Tomaszowej koncepcji hylemorfizmu
Mind-body problem in the light of Aquinas’s conception of hylomorphism
Autorzy:
Zembrzuski, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2075807.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
problem umysł-ciało
hylemorfizm
jedność duszy i ciała
Tomasz z Akwinu
mind-body problem
hylomorphism
unity of the soul and body
Thomas Aquinas
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to approach the mind- body problem in the context of philosophy of Aquinas, especially in the context of his understanding of hylomorphism. Disproportion between the issues of the philosophy of mind and Thomas's position are not to the extend which would unable us to see at the variety of questions from his perspective discussed nowadays by philosophers. On the contrary, Thomas' stance might be an attractive solution with regard to positions already fixed (established)- materialism and dualism. What follows in this paper are four issues: the problem of causative interaction between soul and body, the question of cognition of other senses, the issue of personal identity, and at least, the issue of qualia. All these questions, contemporary discussed, find their answers in Aquinas' explanation which points out the most proper understanding of human being, which is defining a human being as a person.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2018, 7; 159-176
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rogera Sperry’ego teoria świadomości
Roger Sperrys theory of consciousness
Autorzy:
Bremer, Józef
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690952.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
emergent interactionism
unity of consciousness
macro- and micro-determination
mentalism
mind-body problem
theories of emergence
downward causation
supervenience
Opis:
Roger W. Sperry (1913–1994) received the Nobel Prize for Physiology in 1981 for his outstanding scientific achievements in connection with the study of people with severed brain commissures. Sperry linked the results of his research to philosophical considerations pertaining to the conscious mind of human beings and its place in the natural sciences. He was interested in the philosophical question of whether or not the severing of the cerebral hemispheres constituted a violation of the unity of consciousness. Sperry’s explanatory account of mind-body (mind-brain) interaction forms part of a broadly construed theory of emergent interactionism – one that also purports to guarantee the unity of consciousness. In this article, I first present an intellectual profile of Sperry, outlining the evolution of his philosophical-scientific analyses. I then outline the emergence and flourishing of theories of emergence, along with the elements essentially associated with them. Using this as a basis, I go on to consider Sperry’s account of emergent interaction more closely, focusing on his understanding of downward causation. In conclusion, I show how his theory corresponds to a version of emergent interactionism, and seek to address some criticisms leveled against it. I also aim to establish how far this theory can be said to answer the question of the conscious character of mental states.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2017, 63; 133-166
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Przeciw dualizmowi psycho-fizycznemu. Analiza i porównanie stanowisk Johna Searle'a i George'a Lakoffa
Against psycho-physical dualism. An Analysis and comparison of George Lakoff's and John Searle's accounts
Autorzy:
Milewski, Daniel
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691106.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
John Searle
George Lakoff
Rene Descartes
mind-body problem
biological naturalism
embodied mind
cognitive metaphor
first-person ontology
philosophy of mind
philosophy of cognitive science
Opis:
This paper discusses John Searle’s biological naturalism and George Lakoff’s embodied mind hypothesis. These theories are presented as examples of a certain part of the philosophy of mind that breaks with the tradition launched by Descartes. In both cases, the break from this tradition is indicated to be a radical one as the theories argue not only against Cartesian dualism - the basic philosophical categories utilized by Descartes are being questioned. This attempt of departure from distinctions that seem to form a great part of the contemporary philosophy of mind may stand for a chance to provide a new perspective for some old philosophical problems.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2014, 56; 57-92
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Hylemorficzna jedność radości: ujęcie Awicenny i św. Tomasza z Akwinu
Autorzy:
Płotka, Magdalena
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2078876.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-30
Wydawca:
Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
Tematy:
emocje
radość
przyjemność
psychologia filozoficzna
Awicenna
św. Tomasz z Akwinu
hylomorphism
mind-body problem
emotion
joy
pleasure
Thomas Aquinas
Avicenna
Opis:
The aim of the paper is to deal with the problem of emotion in the context of medieval discussion on mind-body problem. The paper focuses particularly on joy and pleasure (delectatio, gaudium) as an example of intersection of mental and corporeal emotional phenomena in Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas. Both Aquinas’s treatise of the passions of the soul in the Summa Theologiae and parallel works and Avicenna’s philosophical and medical works reflect the problem of the way in which the unity of the person, soul and body, is experienced and displayed in emotion. Firstly, it has to be said that although an ‘emotion’ (passio) can be considered as an unified state of mind, neither Thomas nor Avicenna considered ‘emotion’ in this way. Rather, they recognized ‘emotion’ as a set of components, of bodily involvement, intentionality, objectivity, behavioral suggestions, even a sense of ecstasy, etc. Both Avicenna and Aquinas consider joy as a conglomerate of corporeal and mental elements. Avicenna argues, that emotions of the soul, such as joy, pain, fear and anger, are also called the emotions of the spirit, since they are accompanied by cardiac and spiritual changes, as he says in De medicinis cordialibu. Analogically, Aquinas distinguishes in STH Prima Secundae formal and material aspect of emotion: the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate (STH, I-II, q. 44, a. 1, co.:) So, a central issue of my paper is the question how they could think the various mental and physiological features of emotion of joy together. Although they both refer to Aristotle’s psychology, their answers seem to differ significantly. The difference is about the specific role of estimation in the plane of sensual and intellectual cognition. For Thomas estimation is definitely sensual cognitive power; however Avicenna argues that estimation takes part in the intellectual evaluation of the objects intended. Also, there is a different account of intellectual emotion. Whereas Thomas says that emotion is a result of cognition and inasmuch there are sensual and intellectual cognition, there are accordingly sensual and intellectual emotions (passions and affection), Avicenna introduces the power of estimation which is affective evaluation for both sensual and intellectual cognition. So, one could say that Thomas elaborates two theories of emotion (theory of affection is not compatible with the theory of passions), whereas Avicenna develops an unitary theory of emotion.
Źródło:
Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2019, 8; 61-72
2300-1976
Pojawia się w:
Rocznik Tomistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Two Anthropological Errors according to Karol Wojtyła
Dwa błędy antropologiczne według Karola Wojtyły
Autorzy:
Reimers, Adrian J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2034992.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-03-15
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
materializm
nauka
empiryzm
moralność
utylitaryzm
filozofia świadomości
dusza
świadomość
problem umysł-ciało
metafizyka
materialism
science
empiricism
morality
utilitarianism
philosophy of consciousness
soul
consciousness
mind-body problem
metaphysics
Opis:
Throughout his philosophical writings and, indeed, into his papacy, Karol Wojtyła addresses and warns against two common errors in modern philosophy. The first is the reduction of our concept of reality to materialistic premises. In Love and Responsibility, he distinguishes the “biological order”, which is the order studied according to the canons of biological sciences, from the “order of being,” which is the order of reality knowable to metaphysics. This confusion leads to misunderstanding in ethics. The second error is complementary to the first and consists in what Wojtyła calls the “hypostatization of consciousness,” which is the reduction of personal experience entirely to the contents of consciousness. The historical roots of this error trace back to Descartes and his identification of himself as a “thinking thing,” whose body is simply an extended 3-dimensional solid in space and time. Both errors arise from a neglect or even a rejection of metaphysics, without which it is impossible to give an adequate account of the human being.
W swoich pismach filozoficznych, nawet w tych z okresu pontyfikatu, Karol Wojtyła odnosi się do dwóch powszechnych błędów we współczesnej filozofii i ostrzega przed nimi. Pierwszy polega na sprowadzeniu naszego pojęcia rzeczywistości do przesłanek materialistycznych. W książce Miłość i odpowiedzialność odróżnia „porządek biologiczny”, który jest porządkiem badanym według reguł nauk biologicznych, od „porządku bytu”, który jest porządkiem rzeczywistości, który poznaje metafizyka. To zamieszanie prowadzi do nieporozumień w etyce. Drugi błąd dopełnia pierwszy i polega na tym, co Wojtyła nazywa „hipostatyzacją świadomości”, czyli sprowadzeniem osobistego doświadczenia całkowicie do treści świadomości. Historyczne korzenie tego błędu sięgają Kartezjusza i jego postrzegania siebie jako „rzeczy myślącej”, której ciało jest po prostu rozszerzonym trójwymiarowym ciałem stałym w przestrzeni i czasie. Oba błędy wynikają ze zignorowania, a nawet odrzucenia metafizyki, bez której nie można adekwatnie opisać istoty ludzkiej.
Źródło:
Roczniki Teologiczne; 2022, 69, 3; 37-47
2353-7272
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Teologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 17

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