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Wyszukujesz frazę "mentalism" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Does Science Progress Towards Ever Higher Solvability Through Feedbacks Between Insights and Routines?
Autorzy:
Marciszewski, Witold
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/561316.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:
Algorithm
arithmetic
axiom
axiomatic formalized theory
concept
decidability
feedback
insight (intuition)
mathematics
mechanism
mentalism
oracle
problem
problem-solving
progress
routine procedure
science
solvability
Opis:
The affirmative answer to the title question is justified in two ways: logical and empirical. (1) The logical justification is due to Gödel’s discovery (1931) that in any axiomatic formalized theory, having at least the expressive power of PA (Peano Arithmetic), at any stage of development there must appear unsolvable problems. However, some of them become solvable in a further development of the theory in question, owing to subsequent investigations. These lead to new concepts, expressed with additional axioms or rules. Owing to the so-amplified axiomatic basis, new routine procedures like algorithms, can be reached. Those, in turn, help to gain new insights which lead to still more powerful axioms, and consequently again to ampler algorithmic resources. Thus scientific progress proceeds to an ever higher scope of solvability. (2) The existence of such feedback cycles – in a formal way rendered with Turing’s systems of logic based on ordinal (1939) – gets empirically supported by the history of mathematics and other exact sciences. An instructive instance of such a process is found in the history of the number zero. Without that insight due to some ancient Hindu mathematicians there could not arise such an axiomatic theory as PA. It defines the algorithms of arithmetical operations, which in turn help intuitions; those, in turn, give rise to algorithmic routines, not available in any of the previous phases of the process in question. While the logical substantiation of the point of this essay is a well-established result of logico-semantic inquiries, its empirical claim, based on historical evidences, remains open for discussion. Hence the author’s intention to address philosophers and historians of science, and to encourage their critical responses.
Źródło:
Studia Semiotyczne; 2018, 32, 2; 153-185
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:
Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rogera Sperry’ego teoria świadomości
Roger Sperrys theory of consciousness
Autorzy:
Bremer, Józef
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690952.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
emergent interactionism
unity of consciousness
macro- and micro-determination
mentalism
mind-body problem
theories of emergence
downward causation
supervenience
Opis:
Roger W. Sperry (1913–1994) received the Nobel Prize for Physiology in 1981 for his outstanding scientific achievements in connection with the study of people with severed brain commissures. Sperry linked the results of his research to philosophical considerations pertaining to the conscious mind of human beings and its place in the natural sciences. He was interested in the philosophical question of whether or not the severing of the cerebral hemispheres constituted a violation of the unity of consciousness. Sperry’s explanatory account of mind-body (mind-brain) interaction forms part of a broadly construed theory of emergent interactionism – one that also purports to guarantee the unity of consciousness. In this article, I first present an intellectual profile of Sperry, outlining the evolution of his philosophical-scientific analyses. I then outline the emergence and flourishing of theories of emergence, along with the elements essentially associated with them. Using this as a basis, I go on to consider Sperry’s account of emergent interaction more closely, focusing on his understanding of downward causation. In conclusion, I show how his theory corresponds to a version of emergent interactionism, and seek to address some criticisms leveled against it. I also aim to establish how far this theory can be said to answer the question of the conscious character of mental states.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2017, 63; 133-166
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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