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Wyszukujesz frazę "mechanistic explanation" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
Tytuł:
The ontic-epistemic debates of explanation revisited: The three-dimensional approach
Autorzy:
Gim, Jinyeong
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763418.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
mechanistic explanation
scientific representation
explanatory norms
Wesley Salmon
Opis:
After Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical stance on explanation in the 1980s, the ontic-epistemic debate of scientific explanations appeared to be resolved in the philosophy of science. However, since the twenty-first century, this debate has been rekindled among philosophers who focus on mechanistic explanations. Nevertheless, its issues have evolved, necessitating scrutiny of the new trends in this debate and a comparison with the original controversy between Carl Hempel and Salmon. The primary objective of this paper is to elucidate three categorical dimensions in the ontic-epistemic debates, spanning from the original to the recent controversies. Subsequently, it will explore why the conception of explanation is linked to representations, what conditions are necessary for linguistic expressions to be explanatory, and what roles norms play in explanation. Consequently, contrary to the common stereotype, it will be argued that mechanistic explanations are more likely to be epistemic rather than ontic.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 99-169
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Integrating cognitive (neuro)science using mechanisms
Autorzy:
Miłkowski, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/632625.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Projekt Avant
Tematy:
theoretical integration
mechanistic explanation
LTP
interfield theories
constraint-satisfaction.
Opis:
In this paper, an account of theoretical integration in cognitive (neuro)science from the mechanistic perspective is defended. It is argued that mechanistic patterns of integration can be better understood in terms of constraints on representations of mechanisms, not just on the space of possible mechanisms, as previous accounts of integration had it. This way, integration can be analyzed in more detail with the help of constraint- satisfaction account of coherence between scientific represen-tations. In particular, the account has resources to talk of idealizations and research heuristics employed by researchers to combine separate results and theoretical frameworks. The account is subsequently applied to an example of successful integration in the research on hippocampus and memory, and to a failure of integration in the research on mirror neurons as purportedly explanatory of sexual orientation.
Źródło:
Avant; 2016, 7, 2
2082-6710
Pojawia się w:
Avant
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Ontic or epistemic conception of explanation: A misleading distinction?
Autorzy:
Oleksowicz, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763439.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
new mechanical philosophy
mechanistic explanation
ontic
epistemic
explanatory norms
explanatory constraints
Opis:
In this paper, I discuss the differences between ontic and epistemic conceptions of scientific explanation, mainly in relation to the so-called new mechanical philosophy. I emphasize that the debate on conceptions of scientific explanation owes much to Salmon’s ontic/epistemic distinction, although much has changed since his formulations. I focus on the interplay between ontic and epistemic norms and constraints in providing mechanistic explanations. My conceptual analysis serves two aims. Firstly, I formulate some suggestions for recognising that both sets of norms and constraints, ontic and epistemic, are necessary for scientific theorising. Secondly, I emphasize that there are multiple dimensions involved in scientific explanation, rather than clear-cut alternatives between ontic and epistemic aspects. I conclude with a general observation that although contextual aspects of explanations are unavoidable, the epistemic-relativity of our categories, explanations and models can in fact be compatible with their objectivity. Instead of making hastily drawn ontological implications from our theories or models, we should carefully scrutinize them from the ontic-epistemic perspective.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 259-291
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Dimensions of explanation
Autorzy:
Hochstein, Eric
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763416.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
evaluative dimension
communicative concept of explanation
representational concept of explanation
ontic conception of explanation
mechanistic explanation
Opis:
Some argue that the term “explanation” in science is ambiguous, referring to at least three distinct concepts: a communicative concept, a representational concept, and an ontic concept. Each is defined in a different way with its own sets of norms and goals, and each of which can apply in contexts where the others do not. In this paper, I argue that such a view is false. Instead, I propose that a scientific explanation is a complex entity that can always be analyzed along a communicative dimension, a representational dimension, and an ontic dimension. But all three are always present within scientific explanations. I highlight what such an account looks like, and the potential problems it faces (namely that a single explanation can appear to have incompatible sets of norms and goals that govern it). I propose a solution to this problem and demonstrate how this account can help to dissolve current disputes in philosophy of science regarding debates between epistemic and ontic accounts of mechanistic explanations in the life sciences.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 57-98
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The False Dichotomy Between Causal Realization and Semantic Computation
Autorzy:
Miłkowski, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/600600.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
physical computation; semantic account of computation; mechanistic account of computation; mechanistic explanation; causal realization
Opis:
In this paper, I show how semantic factors constrain the understanding of the computational phenomena to be explained so that they help build better mechanistic models. In particular, understanding what cognitive systems may refer to is important in building better models of cognitive processes. For that purpose, a recent study of some phenomena in rats that are capable of ‘entertaining’ future paths (Pfeiffer and Foster 2013) is analyzed. The case shows that the mechanistic account of physical computation may be complemented with semantic considerations, and in many cases, it actually should.
Źródło:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris; 2017, 38 (3)
1689-4286
Pojawia się w:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Modelling interactive computing systems: Do we have a good theory of what computers are?
Autorzy:
Martin, Alice
Magnaudet, Mathieu
Conversy, Stéphane
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31804107.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
philosophy of computing
models of computation
interactive computing
computing mechanism
computational mechanistic explanation
Opis:
Computers are increasingly interactive. They are no more transformational systems producing a final output after a finite execution. Instead, they continuously react in time to external events that modify the course of computing execution. While philosophers have been interested in conceptualizing computers for a long time, they seem to have paid little attention to the specificities of interactive computing. We propose to tackle this issue by surveying the literature in theoretical computer science, where one can find explicit proposals for a model of interactive computing. In that field, the formal modelling of interactive computing systems has been brought down to whether the new interaction models are reducible to Turing Machines. There are three areas where interaction models are framed. The comparison between TMs and interactive system models is at stake in all of them. These areas are namely some works on concurrency by Milner, on Reactive Turing Machines, and on interaction as a new computing paradigm. For each of the three identified models, we present its motivation, sum up its account for interaction and its legacy, and point out issues regarding the understanding of computers. The survey shows difficulties for epistemologists. The reason is that these analyses focus on the formal equivalence between interactive models of computation and classic ones. Such a project is different from addressing how a computing machine can be interactive: in other words, which mechanisms allow it.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2022, 73; 77-119
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

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