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Wyszukujesz frazę "inferentialism" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
Tytuł:
Tradition as a Communication System. A Pragmatic Approach
Autorzy:
Grad, Paweł
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/600497.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
rationality
inferentialism
tradition
modernity
Opis:
A context of my paper is the debate on reason, tradition and traditional communities, in which this moral and epistemological issues were discussed as a part of general socio-philosophical theory of modernity. In particular I intend to locate my considerations in the context of formal-pragmatic theory of modern communicative rationality developed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. I will provide a competitive model of the rationality of tradition by applying a conceptual toolkit of pragmatically oriented analysis to explain practices connected with vocabulary of tradition. I argue that tradition as a communication system has a fully rational structure. My main claim is that communicative structure of tradition has a rational structure of language game. This structure includes defined principles of communication for members of closed tradition-grounded community and rule of inclusion for potential new members. Firstly I consider closely internal principles of communication within the framework of tradition contrasting them shortly with normative-deontic rules of the postenlightenment idea of pragmatic communication discussed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. After that I examine the rule of inclusion — the rule, which mediates between closed system of tradition-based community and his environment.
Źródło:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris; 2015, 30
1689-4286
Pojawia się w:
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Review of Paweł Grabarczyk’s "Directival Theory of Meaning: From Syntax and Pragmatics to Narrow Linguistic Content"
Autorzy:
Jamrozik, Antonina
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1797175.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:
directival theory of meaning
inferentialism
holism
molecularism
compositionality
Opis:
This paper is a review of Paweł Grabarczyk’s latest book, Directival Theory of Meaning: From Syntax and Pragmatics to Narrow Linguistic Content. I focus mostly on two concepts constitutive for the directival theory of meaning—that of linguistic trial and that of meaning directive. These two concepts, while ingeniously developed by Grabarczyk, are not free of problems and somewhat controversial assumptions. I start with describing the basis of Grabarczyk’s proposal, as well as of the historical background from which it originated. Then, I move on to the analysis of the notion of linguistic trial. After that I focus on the concept of meaning directive, criticising certain assumptions that come with it. The conclusion is that while Grabarczyk’s version of the directival theory of meaning is an interesting proposal, most of its shortcomings stem from the fact that for a theory that is supposed to work well on natural languages, too many examples pertain to artificial languages. Until an analysis of a natural language in the style of the directival theory of meaning is conducted, it is not possible to properly judge the value of this theory.
Źródło:
Studia Semiotyczne; 2021, 35, 1; 107-118
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:
Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Content and Meaning Constitutive Inferences
Autorzy:
Garcia-Arnaldos, Maria Dolores
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/973300.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:
meaning
conceptual role semantics
inferentialism
content
logical rules
Opis:
A priori theories of justification of logic based on meaning often lead to trouble, in particular to issues concerning circularity. First, I present Boghossian’s a priori view. Boghossian maintains the rule-circular justifications from a conceptual role semantics. However, rule-circular justifications are problematic. Recently, Boghossian (Boghossian, 2015) has claimed that rules should be thought of as contents and contents as abstract objects. In this paper, I discuss Boghossian’s view. My argumentation consists of three main parts. First, I analyse several arguments to show that in fact, Boghossian’s inferentialist solution is not fully satisfying. Second, I discuss the matter further, if one accepts that basic logical rules are constitutive of meaning, that is, they constitute the logical concepts and the content of a rule is an abstract object, then abstract objects-like, for example, rules-could be constitutive of meaning. The question is whether conceptual priority is in the judgment or in the object and what theory of content is pursued. Grasping content as a matter of knowing how a word or concept behaves in inferences is not completely explicative. Finally, I contend that rules come to exist as a result of certain kinds of mental action. These actions function as constitutive norms. Logical rules are not abstract objects but ideal. What one construes as norms or rules of content may involve idealization, but this is because we share a language.
Źródło:
Studia Semiotyczne; 2019, 33, 1
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:
Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Badania nad językowym obrazem świata a semantyka filozoficzna: w poszukiwaniu pokrewieństw
Linguistic worldview studies and philosophical semantics: quest for compatibility
Autorzy:
Mirocha, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/29431125.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Przyrodniczo-Humanistyczny w Siedlcach
Tematy:
językowy obraz świata
semantyka językoznawcza
semantyka filozoficzna
inferencjalizm semantyczny
linguistic semantics
philosophical semantics
semantic inferentialism
linguistic worldview
Opis:
The goal of the paper is to determine the relation between theoretical presuppositions of linguistic worldview studies (LWS) and heterodox strains of philosophical semantics, as well as the connection with the semantic prerequisites of other schools of text linguistics, in particular corpus linguistics. Semantic consequences of the concept of defining in the LWS are presented. It is claimed that they do not pose great constrains on philosophical semantics (e.g. while the concept of stereotype developed by Hillary Putnam needs to be accepted, semantic externalism does not follow). It is proved that LWS are compatible with the concept of meaning-as-use, particularly with semantic inferentialism, as developed by Robert Brandom and Jaroslav Peregrin. The paper also considers the ontological status of meaning reconstructions proposed in the framework of the LWS, as an answer to critiques originating in more traditionalist or minimalist approaches to semantics. It is demonstrated that similar issues occur in other strains of text linguistics, for instance, in corpus linguistics. However, the paper claims that methodological precision and proper choice of a text corpus guarantee results satisfying from the perspective of empirical linguistics.
Źródło:
Conversatoria Linguistica; 2023, 15; 51-66
1897-1415
Pojawia się w:
Conversatoria Linguistica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
W poszukiwaniu źródeł filozoficznego myślenia na gruncie koncepcji Roberta Brandoma i Michaela Tomasello
Searching for the Origins of Philosophical Thinking on the Basis of the Concepts of Robert Brandom and Michael Tomasello
Autorzy:
Żuromski, Daniel
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/952099.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie
Tematy:
pojęciowa natura filozofii
inferencjalizm semantyczny
pragmatyzm co do treści pojęciowej
intencjonalność dzielona
myślenie jako współdziałanie psychologia ewolucyjna
conceptual nature of philosophy
semantic inferentialism
pragmatism about conceptual content
shared intentionality
thinking as cooperation
evolutionary psychology
Opis:
Głównym celem niniejszych rozważań jest połączenie trzech idei. Po pierwsze, idei filozofii jako posiadającej charakter pojęciowy w szerokim sensie, której autonomiczną dziedziną badań są pojęcia, a którą będziemy określać mianem filozofii jako działalności pojęciowej. Po drugie, idei głoszącej zgodnie z inferencjalizmem semantycznym Roberta Brandoma, iż źródłem pojęciowości czy też treści pojęciowej jest praktyka społeczna, której modelem jest gra w podawanie i pytanie o racje. Po trzecie, psychologicznej koncepcji podstawowych zdolności poznawczych leżących u podstaw praktyki społecznej, ge nerującej treść pojęciową, czyli hipotezy dzielonej intencjonalności oraz koncepcji myślenia jako współdziałania Michaela Tomasello.
The main idea of the presented considerations is the combination of three ideas: firstly, the idea of philosophy as having a conceptual nature in a broad sense, and containing the autonomous field of inquiry, which are concepts, and which we will call philosophy as a conceptual activity. Secondly, the idea that the origin of the conceptuality or conceptual content is a social practice whose model is the idea of a game of giving and asking for reasons, i.e. Robert Brandom’s semantic inferentialism. Thirdly, the psychological concept of basic cognitive abilities, underlying the social practice, which generates the conceptual content – the game of giving and asking for reasons, i.e. Michael Tomasello’s hypothesis of shared intentionality, and his conception of thinking as a form of cooperation.
Źródło:
Humanistyka i Przyrodoznawstwo; 2017, 23; 57-70
1234-4087
Pojawia się w:
Humanistyka i Przyrodoznawstwo
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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