- Tytuł:
- Sāṃkhya on the Validity (prāmāṇya) and Invalidity (aprāmāṇya) of Cognition
- Autorzy:
- Łucyszyna, Ołena
- Powiązania:
- https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2035891.pdf
- Data publikacji:
- 2022-01-14
- Wydawca:
- Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Kultur Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych PAN
- Tematy:
-
Sāṃkhya
means of valid cognition (pramāṇa)
validity (prāmāṇya) and
invalidity (aprāmāṇya) of cognition (jñāna)
intrinsic (svatas) validity
extrinsic (paratas) invalidity - Opis:
- One of the well-known polemics of Indian thought, in which many darśanas participated, is concerned with the problem of the validity (prāmāṇya) and invalidity (aprāmāṇya) of cognition (jñāna). The problem has two main aspects: the origination and ascertainment of validity and invalidity. Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha and other external sources attribute to Sāṃkhya (a tradition of thought recognising the authority of the Vedas) the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, and many researchers hold that this view is Sāṃkhyan. In this article, I reconstruct the Sāṃkhya view on validity and invalidity of cognition on the basis of classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya texts, that is, all extant Sāṃkhya texts from Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhyakārikā to Aniruddha’s Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti. I come to the conclusion that the Sāṃkhya view is different from the view attributed to Sāṃkhya. According to Sāṃkhya texts, validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic in terms of both origination and ascertainment.
- Źródło:
-
Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia; 2021, 34; 145-176
0860-6102 - Pojawia się w:
- Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia
- Dostawca treści:
- Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł