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    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
    Tytuł:
    Programy skupu aktywów Europejskiego Banku Centralnego w dobie kryzysu zadłużeniowego w strefie euro
    European Central Bank’s asset purchase programs in the age of the debt crisis in the Eurozone
    Autorzy:
    Grabowski, Wojciech
    Stawasz, Ewa
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/970384.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Tematy:
    euro area sovereign debt crisis
    asset purchase programs
    eurozone sovereign debt crisis
    AIC
    kryzys w strefie euro
    programy pomocowe EBC
    kryterium informacyjne Akaike
    Opis:
    The aim of the article is to analyse the effectiveness of the asset purchase programs implemented by the European Central Bank during the sovereign debt crisis of some euro area countries (i.e. Securities Markets Programme i Outright Monetary Transactions). We examine how those programs translate into changes in sovereign bond yields. With the aid of the Akaike information criterion we conclude that the impact of the Outright Monetary Transactions was more durable.
    Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza skuteczności programów skupu aktywów, które Europejski Bank Centralny wprowadził w odpowiedzi na kryzys zadłużeniowy części gospodarek strefy euro – tj. programów Securities Markets Programme i Outright Monetary Transactions. W artykule badana jest trwałość efektów wprowadzenia tych dwóch programów, mierzonych zmianą rentowności obligacji skarbowych. Wykorzystując kryterium informacyjne Akaike, dochodzimy do wniosku, że oddziaływanie programu Out-right Monetary Transactions było dłuższe niż programu Securities Markets Programme.
    Źródło:
    Ekonomia Międzynarodowa; 2013, 004; 5-21
    2082-4440
    2300-6005
    Pojawia się w:
    Ekonomia Międzynarodowa
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Debt Reduction in the Eurozone
    Autorzy:
    Sawicki, Janusz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/953225.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2011-08-31
    Wydawca:
    Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie. Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych
    Tematy:
    sovereign debt crisis
    bailout
    debt reduction
    eurozone
    peripheral countries
    Opis:
    When the Greek crisis exploded in the spring of 2010 the eurozone countries collected funds to refinance Greece’s debt in order to stave off a banking crisis. Later Ireland and Portugal asked for similar eurozone assistance. Because refinancing (bailout) was not sufficient to enable these peripheral countries to solve their debt problems, they agreed to implement austerity programs so that they could use eurozone countries’ public funds. But these austerity measures, even if politically affordable, will not suffice. It is exceedingly possible that the peripheral countries will not outgrow their problems and will be unable to return to capital markets at their pre-crisis levels. Their debt-to-GDP as well as debt services-to-income ratios are likely to grow and additional debt reorganization programs including debt reduction (haircut) will be required. At the heart of the issue is the potential impact of a reduction of the peripheral economies’ debt on the monetary financial institutions of all European Union countries. As a result of the restructuring and partial debt reduction, banks may need to receive public support. To address these problems a new solution in the form of the European Stability Mechanism (EMS) has been proposed. It is expected to change the way in which the eurozone functions. However, the EMS idea is based on the same philosophy as the existing bailout instruments. It does not address the equal treatment and moral hazard issues, while the conditionality programs proposed so far have not softened the adverse impact of the growing debt burden on the economic performance of the debt-laden countries. The entire European Union financial system is at risk and remains vulnerable as long as the refinancing mechanisms are not supported by debt restructuring and reduction. Debt managers do not seem to know how to draw on past experience and so ad hoc measures prevail. To effectively manage that kind of debt reorganization, the European Union should create the necessary procedures to efficiently address the economic future of all heavily indebted economies. The EU should also be prepared politically to accept the costs of debt reduction or of a fundamental reorganization of the eurozone.
    Źródło:
    Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics; 2011, 249, 7-8; 1-20
    2300-5238
    Pojawia się w:
    Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Competition Law and State Aid for Failing Banks in the EU and its Specific Implications for CEE Member States
    Autorzy:
    Blazsek, Virag
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/530389.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016-12-31
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
    Tematy:
    EU Competition Law
    Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
    financial crisis
    State aid
    bank bailouts
    Eurozone
    sovereign debt
    European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
    Opis:
    The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the long-run however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.
    Les sauvetages bancaires consécutifs à la crise financière mondiale de 2008 ont été soumis à l'approbation préalable de la Commission européenne (CE), l'autorité de la concurrence de l'Union européenne. Les CE étaient réticentes à rejeter les efforts de sauvetage dirigés contre les banques défaillantes et ont donc approuvé de manière cohérente toutes les demandes présentées par les États membres. Sur les vingt premières banques européennes, la CE a autorisé des aides d'État au moins douze entités. Dans ce contexte le document souligne l'évolution progressive de l'interprétation des règles de l'UE en matière d'aides d'État, les « règles temporaires et extraordinaires » introduites à partir de la fin de 2008 et l'extension de la catégorie « sans aides d’État ». Les changements susmentionnés montrent que la CE elle-même a dévié des lois pertinentes de l'UE afin de sauver systématiquement d'importantes banques en Europe et de rétablir leur stabilité financière. L'article soutient que les plans de sauvetage bancaire et les plans de sauvetage bancaire de l'État ont eu des effets différents sur les structures du marché et sur le bien-être des consommateurs dans les zones de la zone euro et hors zone euro, principalement dans les segments orientaux de l'Union européenne. En tant que tel, il est soutenu qu'ils sont incompatibles avec le marché commun européen. Bien que les CE aient essayé de minimiser les distorsions de concurrence créées par la jurisprudence susmentionnée, principalement par l'application du principe d'exception et des mesures de compensation différentes, ces efforts ont été au moins partiellement infructueux. Les paquets massifs d'aides d'État, le traitement préférentiel des banques les plus importantes ou systématiquement importantes par le biais des mécanismes d'aide de l'UE - presque aucun d'Europe centrale et orientale (CEE) - ont entraîné une distorsion de concurrence sur le marché commun. Cela est dû principalement à la priorité accordée à la stabilité du secteur financier et de l'euro. Le document fait valoir que les aides d'État pour les banques en faillite peuvent avoir eu des effets positifs importants à court terme, comme la promotion de la stabilité du système bancaire et de l'euro. Toutefois, à long terme, elle a contribué à l'endettement souverain sans précédent en Europe et a contribué à accroître l'instabilité économique et politique de l'UE, en particulier dans son segment d'Europe centrale et orientale le plus vulnérable.
    Źródło:
    Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies; 2016, 9(14); 145-158
    1689-9024
    2545-0115
    Pojawia się w:
    Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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