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Wyszukujesz frazę "error as intentional" wg kryterium: Temat

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    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
    Tytuł:
    Pierre Klossowski. L’acte créateur de l’écrivain-peintre
    Autorzy:
    Klettke, Cornelia
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/20874623.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Gdański. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego
    Tematy:
    simulation
    error as intentional
    unique sign
    incommunicable phantasm
    simulacre
    erreur voulue
    signe unique
    fantasme incommunicable
    Opis:
    Klossowski, who had originally started as a religious seeker of truth in his younger years, will – after his « reversal » – feel himself invested with the role of a « heretic » struggling with the libidinous search for truth. Even as the creator of a perverted metaphysics, he remains a seeker of the revelation of being, now in the role of the divine « adversary » who, thrown back on himself, tends to imitate a religious mystic. The divine is replaced by the whispers of the demon, which Klossowski experiences as « la complicité d'une force "démonique" » in the creation of his artworks. The Diana myth becomes a parable for the act of artistic creation. Sexuality, understood as the primordial ground of creative force that shapes the signe unique, the phantasm, shifts metaphysics to « phantasmaphysics » (Foucault), in which the mystery of the divine is exposed as a delusion (Wahnbild).
    Źródło:
    Cahiers ERTA; 2023, 33; 139-157
    2300-4681
    Pojawia się w:
    Cahiers ERTA
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Wyrok Sądu Metropolitalnego w Katowicach (c. Sobański) z 06.12.2005 r. z tytułu błędu co do przymiotu osoby wprost i zasadniczo zamierzonego
    Autorzy:
    Sobański, Remigiusz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/663253.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2006
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    małżeństwo
    błąd zamierzony
    błąd co do przymiotu osoby
    marriage
    intentional error
    quality of person
    error as to the quality of person
    Źródło:
    Ius Matrimoniale; 2006, 17, 11; 185-190
    1429-3803
    2353-8120
    Pojawia się w:
    Ius Matrimoniale
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Artykuł 28 § 1 k.k. po nowelizacji z dnia 20 lutego 2015 r. Uwagi na temat konieczności oddzielania strony podmiotowej czynu zabronionego od winy
    Autorzy:
    Zbigniew, Jędrzejewski,
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902838.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
    Tematy:
    prohibited act
    mens rea
    intentional character of an offence
    unintentional character of an offence
    guilt
    act committed while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of an prohibited act
    Opis:
    The object of analysis is the amended art. 28 § 1 of the Penal Code, which stipulates that „whoever commits an act while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of an prohibited act, shall not commit a crime”. The new regulation of 28 § 1 of the Penal Code is the next attempt to statutorily define the concept of an offence based on the methodology of a strict separation of the object of evaluation from the evaluation itself, that is, primarily a radical separation of mens rea of a prohibited act from guilt. Therefore, the authors of the change have consistently attempted to eliminate all normative attributes from the scope of „recklessness” and „negligence”. This is a result of the view that assumes a pure descriptive character of the set of criminal offence features (Ger. „Tatbestand”) including subjective features (offences of intentional and unintentional character). In this context, acts committed while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of a prohibited act exclude guilt, however the fulfilment of the features of criminal acts of unintentional character is limited to the fulfilment of objective features (a consequence of the concept of the unintentional character of an offence as a plain negation of intent). The negative wording of art. 1 § 3 of the Penal Code, the objective and general interpretation of the term found in art. 9 § 2 „could have foreseen” (a transfer of the so-called objective foreseeability to the category of objective attribution) and the concept of committing an act while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of a prohibited act excluding guilt lead, in the area of unintentional character of an offence, to the presumption of guilt on the basis of the fulfilling only the objective features of a criminal act. The author of the article demonstrates the inaccuracy of this argument for a strictly descriptive character of the features of a prohibited act, and in particular the features of intent (intentional character of an offence). The object of intent (a feature of a criminal offence) has a evaluative character (evaluation), therefore determining intent can generally constitute a premise for accepting guilt (intended), unless the circumstance of excluding guilt exceptionally occurs. In the case of an unintentional character of an act, such a relation does not occur, and the guarantee functions (the rule of positive establishment of the perpetrator’s guilt) thus require subjective (specific and individual evaluation) interpretation of the premise „could have foreseen” found in art. 9 § 2 of the Penal Code.
    Źródło:
    Studia Iuridica; 2016, 65; 25-40
    0137-4346
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Iuridica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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