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Tytuł:
A communication network routing problem: Modeling and optimization using non-cooperative game theory
Autorzy:
Dubey, Sapana P.
Kedar, Ganesh D.
Ghate, Suresh H.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1838181.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:
communication network
routing problem
game theory
focal points
Nash equilibrium
Pareto optimal solution
sieć komunikacyjna
teoria gier
punkt ogniskowy
równowaga Nasha
Opis:
We consider a communication network routing problem wherein a number of users need to efficiently transmit their throughput demand in the form of data packets (incurring less cost and less delay) through one or more links. Using the game theoretic perspective, we propose a dynamic model which ensures unhindered transmission of data even in the case where the capacity of the link is exceeded. The model incorporates a mechanism in which users are appropriately punished (with additional cost) when the total data to be transmitted exceeds the capacity of the link. The model has multiple Nash equilibrium points. To arrive at rational strategies, we introduce the concept of focal points and get what is termed focal Nash equilibrium (FNE) points for the model. We further introduce the concept of preferred focal Nash equilibrium (PFNE) points and find their relation with the Pareto optimal solution for the model.
Źródło:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2021, 31, 1; 155-164
1641-876X
2083-8492
Pojawia się w:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A game theoretical study of generalised trust and reciprocation in Poland. I. Theory and experimental design
Autorzy:
Markowska-Przybyła, U.
Ramsey, D.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/406367.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:
experimental game theory
Bayesian equilibrium
trust
reciprocation
eksperymentalna teoria gier
równowaga Bayesa
zaufanie
wzajemność
Opis:
Although studies using experimental game theory have been carried out in various countries, no such major study has occurred in Poland. The study described here aims to investigate generalised trust and reciprocation among Polish students. In the literature, these traits are seen to be positively correlated with economic growth. Poland is regarded as the most successful post-soviet bloc country in transforming to a market economy but the level of generalised trust compared to other postcommunist countries is reported to be low. This study aims to see to what degree this reported level of generalised trust is visible amongst young Poles via experimental game theory, along with a questionnaire. The three games to be played have been described. Bayesian equilibria illustrating behaviour observed in previous studies have been derived for two of these games and the experimental procedure has been described.
Źródło:
Operations Research and Decisions; 2014, 24, 3; 59-76
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:
Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A process algebraic form to represent extensive games
Autorzy:
Gheibi, O.
Ramezanian, R.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205871.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
extensive games
Nash equilibrium
process theory
process algebra
Opis:
In this paper, we introduce an agent-based representation of games, in order to propose a compact representation for multi-party games in game theory. Our method is inspired by concepts in process theory and process algebra. In addition, we introduce an algorithm whose input is a game in the form of process algebra (proposed in this paper) and as an output, the algorithm finds the Nash equilibrium of the game in linear space complexity.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2015, 44, 1; 129-148
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Analysis of Ineffectiveness Arising in “Investor-government” Relations
Autorzy:
Sokolovskyi, Dmytro B.
Sokolovska, Olena V.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/417302.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-09-15
Wydawca:
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
investors
Pareto-optimality
modeling
Game Theory
Nash equilibrium
Government
economic behavior
Opis:
Purpose: This article deals with the problem of forming Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing designed to reduce risks in investment activity. Methodology: Considering the interdependent type (nature) of interactions between related parties, game theory tools were used to model such interactions. Much attention was directed to search for� parameters of interaction leading to certain Nash equilibriums in pure strategies. The formal results obtained with the model were verified by statistical analysis. Findings: Analysis showed that the rational behavior of related parties can lead to unexpected results. Powerful investors will aim to work in socially-oriented economies, whereas primarily small investors will operate in most liberal economies with a�minimum tax burden but with a�higher level of risk. As for governments’ behaviors, the images are the same: small economies tend to liberalize their tax systems and to secure investment faster than powerful ones. Empirical verification based on statistical data of groups of countries generally confirmed the conclusions. These formal and logical conclusions were from statistical analysis of 124 countries divided into 5 groups: OECD countries, post-socialist countries, Latin American countries, APAC countries and ACP countries. Provided that the more powerful ones are covered economies, there was stronger interdependence between the size of economies and tax burden and also between total investment and tax burden, where this dependence is positive. Originality: The results obtained used Nash equilibriums in pure strategies as models of behavioral norms to define behaviors of related parties and also to explain assumptions concerning the behaviors of investors and government.
Źródło:
Management and Business Administration. Central Europe; 2015, 3; 47-70
2084-3356
Pojawia się w:
Management and Business Administration. Central Europe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Applying Game Theory To North Korea-China relations
Autorzy:
Levi, Nicolas
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/451637.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Euroregionalnej im. Alcide De Gasperi w Józefowie
Tematy:
institutional limitations
Nash Equilibrium
international relations
game theory
theoretical approach
ograniczenia instytucjonalne równowaga Nasha
stosunki międzynarodowe
teoria gier
ujęcie teoretyczne
Opis:
Relations between North Korea and China are not improving on political matters since 2006, when North Korea started to do regular nuclear attempts. In order to explain the nature of relations between these both countries, I propose to apply the framework of Game theory. These concepts and the notion of risk dominance will be used to describe the general diplomatic strategy between North Korea and China and to account for North Korea’s constant provocations. A situation of the Game theory called the Nash Equilibrium will be applied to suggest policy lines specifically after the stronger provocations of the North Korean state. At conclusive remarks, some limitations toward Game theory on its application on relations between China and North Korea will be suggested.
Stosunki polityczne między Koreą Północną a Chinami nie poprawiają się od 2006 r., kiedy północnokoreańskie władze rozpoczęły regularne próby jądrowe. Aby wyjaśnić naturę stosunków między tymi dwoma państwami, proponuję zastosować ramy teorii gier. Te pojęcia, w tym dominacja i ryzyko, będą używane do opisania ogólnej strategii dyplomatycznej obu państw we wzajemnych stosunkach. Będziemy również uwzględniać skale prowokacji Korei Północnej. Równowaga Nasha, czyli profil strategii teorii gier, zakłada optymalną strategię każdego gracza i będzie opisana w poniższym artykule, biorąc pod uwagę stosunki między oboma państwami. Zakończenie artykułu będzie dotyczyć ograniczenia teorii gier dotyczącej jej stosowania w relacjach między Chinami a Koreą Północną.
Źródło:
Journal of Modern Science; 2017, 33, 2; 35-366
1734-2031
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Modern Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Assessment of the historical policy mixes for Poland using the game approach
Autorzy:
Kruś, L.
Woroniecka-Leciejewicz, I.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205620.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
game theory
economic modeling
policy-mix
decision analysis
Nash equilibrium
Pareto optimality
Opis:
The study here presented pertains to the analysis of mutual interactions of the monetary and fiscal policies in the case of Poland. The historical policies carried out during different periods of time and their economic effects are compared with the possible strategies, obtained from the analysis of the proposed monetaryfiscal game. In the study, the methods of non-cooperative game theory are combined with macroeconomic modeling. The respective game is formulated for monetary and fiscal authorities as players. Strategies of these players refer to the respective instruments of their policies: the real interest rate and the budget deficit in relation to GDP. Payoffs include inflation and GDP growth, respectively. The payoffs are calculated using a recursive macroeconomic model estimated for the Polish economy. The model describes influences of the instruments of the monetary and fiscal policies on the state of the economy. The best response strategies, the Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality are analyzed. Changes of the policies towards the more restrictive or more expansive ones and their effects in comparison to the historically applied are discussed. This is performed for two different time periods – the time of recovery after 2004 and the time of the global financial crisis after 2008.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2018, 47, 3; 277-300
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Berge equilibrium in discontinuous games
Autorzy:
Deghdak, M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/206586.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
Berge equilibrium
game theory
discontinuous games
abstract games
Opis:
In this paper we consider some classes of abstract discontinuous games, for which the games possessing essential Berge equilibrium are the generic case. We extend the essential Berge equilibrium result from Deghdak (2014) to general abstract games.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2014, 43, 3; 439-448
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Cooperative games with incomplete information for Secondary Base Stations in cognitive radio networks
Autorzy:
Martyna, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/308673.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
Bayesian equilibrium
cognitive radio networks
game theory
wireless communication
Opis:
Cognitive radio (CR) technology is considered to be an effective solution for enhancing overall spectrum efficiency. Using CR technology fully involves the providing of incentives to Primary Radio Networks (PRNs) and revenue to the service provider so that Secondary Base Stations (SBSs) may utilize PRN spectrum bands accordingly. In this paper, a cooperative games with incomplete information for SBSs in a CR network is presented. Each SBS can cooperate with neighboring SBSs in order to improve its view of the spectrum. Moreover, proposed game-theory models assume that the devices have incomplete information about their components, meaning that some players do not completely know the structure of the game. Using the proposed algorithm, each SBS can leave or join the coalition while maximizing its overall utility. The simulation results illustrate that the proposed algorithm allows us to reduce the average payoff per SBS up to 140% relative to a CR network without cooperation among SBSs.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2013, 3; 106-111
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Etyka biznesu a naganne powszechne praktyki
Business Ethics and Common Blameworthy Practices
Autorzy:
Kucharski, Jarosław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/469070.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
blameworthy practices
business ethics,
orruption
game theory
Pareto’s optimum
Nash equilibrium
fairness
Opis:
The aim of this article is to examine how a businessman, who takes care about moral considerations should behave in some situations, in which some blameworthy common practices are present. There is a dilemma between efficiency (or even continuing existence) of business on one side and moral considerations on the other. The proposition formulated by R. M. Green is analyzed and criticized. The „everyone is doing it” argument is rejected., as well as the requirements coming from moral absolutism. In the end an argument based on writings of T. Carson, J. G. Dees and P. C. Crampton, which shows the proper way of moral behaviour where such dilemmas are met, is presented.
Źródło:
Prakseologia; 2009, 149; 241-252
0079-4872
Pojawia się w:
Prakseologia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Gleichgewichte auf den Transport-, Verkehrs- und Logistikmärkten
Equilibria in the transport, transport and logistics markets
Autorzy:
Witte, H.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/134334.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Tematy:
equilibrium
equilibrium theory
equilibrium models
inequilibrium models
transport market
równowaga
teoria równowagi
modele równowagi
modele nierówności
rynek transportowy
Opis:
Die traditionelle Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts ist nicht erfolgreich bei der Realisierung von Marktgleichgewichten. Das Hauptargument gegen die traditionelle Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts ist die normalerweise getroffene Annahme einer unrealistischen reinen Konkurrenz. Eine realistische Idee ist die moderne Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts. Diese Interpretation benötigt keine unrealistischen Annahmen und kein hohes mathematisches Verständnis. Die moderne Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts führt zu totalen quantitativen und wertorientierten Marktgleichgewichten. Alle drei Teilmärkte (Waren, Geld und Arbeitsmarkt) befinden sich im Gleichgewicht, wenn alle auf diesen Märkten tätigen Wirtschaftseinheiten im Gleichgewicht sind. Der Vorteil der modernen Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts ist, dass es keine Utopie, sondern eine „Topia“ ist. Die Erkenntnis führt zur Überwindung von Wirtschaftskrisen und zu einem stetig wachsenden Wohlstand trotz weltweit geringer Ressourcen. Die einzige Bedingung, um die moderne Interpretation des wirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichts zu realisieren, ist der Wille, etwas zu verändern. Es ist möglich, die moderne Interpretation des Gleichgewichts für Transport- und Logistikmärkte zu verwenden.
The traditional interpretation of economic equilibrium is not successful in realizing market equilibria. The main argument against the traditional interpretation of economic equilibrium is the normally made assumption of unrealistic pure competition. A realistic idea is the modern interpretation of economic equilibrium. This interpretation needs no unrealistic assumptions and no high level of mathematic understanding. The modern interpretation of economic equilibrium leads to total quantitative- and valuebased market equilibria. All three partial markets (the goods, the money and the labor market) are in equilibrium, when all economic units acting on these markets are in equilibrium. The advantage of the modern interpretation of economic equilibrium is that it is no utopia but a “topia”. The realization leads to overcome economic crises and to steady growing welfare in spite of worldwide low resources. The only condition to realize the modern interpretation of economic equilibrium is the will to change something. It is possible to use the modern interpretation of equilibrium for transport and logistic markets.
Źródło:
Problemy Transportu i Logistyki; 2017, 38, 2; 15-25
1644-275X
2353-3005
Pojawia się w:
Problemy Transportu i Logistyki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
How Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma Can Support Negotiations
Autorzy:
Szopa, Marek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/430038.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:
game theory
quantum game
prisoner’s dilemma
Nash equilibrium
Pareto optimal solutions
Opis:
Decision-making by the two negotiating parties is simulated by a prisoner’s dilemma game. The game is formulated in a quantum manner, where players strategies are unitary transformations of qubits built over the basis of opposite decision options. Quantum strategies are correlated through the mechanism of quantum entanglement and the result of the game is obtained by the collapse of the resulting transformed state. The range of strategies allowed for quantum players is richer than in case of a classical game and therefore the result of the game can be better optimized. On the other hand, the quantum game is save against eavesdropping and the players can be assured that this type of quantum arbitration is fair. We show that quantum prisoner’s dilemma has more favorable Nash equilibria than its classical analog and they are close to the Pareto optimal solutions. Some economical examples of utilizing quantum game Nash equilibria are proposed.
Źródło:
Optimum. Economic Studies; 2014, 5(71)
1506-7637
Pojawia się w:
Optimum. Economic Studies
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Meanders of the Theory of Social Choice
Autorzy:
Sosnowska, Honorata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/942373.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie
Tematy:
theory of general equilibrium
microeconomics
theory of social choice
Źródło:
Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology; 2010, 1, 1; 187-191
2081-9633
Pojawia się w:
Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Methodological Remarks on Anti-equilibrium by Janos Kornai
Metodologiczne uwagi na temat Anti-equilibrium Janosa Kornaia
Autorzy:
Musialik, Rafał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/22616474.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:
general equilibrium theory
neoclassical economics
methodology of economics
centrally planned economies
teoria równowagi ogólnej
ekonomia neoklasyczna
metodologia ekonomii
gospo-
darki centralnie planowane
Opis:
The subject of this paper is Kornai's concept as contained in Anti-equilibrium. The aim of the paper was to provide a critical analysis of this concept. The analysis focused on the methodological aspect of Anti-equilibrium, namely on the concept of the explanation adopted by the Hungarian economist. The research method used is textual analysis. The result of this analysis allows, as it seems, to see an important methodological flaw of Anti-equilibrium. The thesis of this article is that this defect did not allow Kornai's proposal to be treated as a viable competitor to neoclassical economics.
Przedmiotem artykułu jest koncepcja J. Kornaia, zawarta w Anti-equilibrium. Celem pracy jest przedstawienie krytycznej analizy tej koncepcji. Analiza ta skupia się na aspekcie metodologicznym Anti-equilibrium, a mianowicie na koncepcji wyjaśniania przyjętej przez węgierskiego ekonomistę. Zastosowaną metodą badawczą jest analiza tekstu. Wynik tej analizy pozwala – jak się wydaje – ujrzeć istotny defekt metodologiczny Anti-equilibrium. Tezą niniejszego artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że defekt ten nie pozwalał traktować propozycji Kornaia jako równoważnego konkurenta dla ekonomii neoklasycznej.
Źródło:
Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu; 2023, 67, 4; 114-120
1899-3192
Pojawia się w:
Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Modeling shortest path games with Petri nets: A Lyapunov based theory
Autorzy:
Clempner, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/908393.pdf
Data publikacji:
2006
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:
Nash equilibrium point
shortest path game
game theory
Lyapunov equilibrium point
Bellman’s equation
Lyapunov-like fuction
stability
teoria gier
funkcja Lapunowa
równanie Bellmana
stabilność
Opis:
In this paper we introduce a new modeling paradigm for shortest path games representation with Petri nets. Whereas previous works have restricted attention to tracking the net using Bellman’s equation as a utility function, this work uses a Lyapunov-like function. In this sense, we change the traditional cost function by a trajectory-tracking function which is also an optimal cost-to-target function. This makes a significant difference in the conceptualization of the problem domain, allowing the replacement of the Nash equilibrium point by the Lyapunov equilibrium point in game theory. We show that the Lyapunov equilibrium point coincides with the Nash equilibrium point. As a consequence, all properties of equilibrium and stability are preserved in game theory. This is the most important contribution of this work. The potential of this approach remains in its formal proof simplicity for the existence of an equilibrium point.
Źródło:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2006, 16, 3; 387-397
1641-876X
2083-8492
Pojawia się w:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Modified Coulomb law
Autorzy:
Etkin, V. A.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1179008.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Przedsiębiorstwo Wydawnictw Naukowych Darwin / Scientific Publishing House DARWIN
Tematy:
Coulomb and Newton laws
attraction and repulsion
dipole representation
electric charge
equilibrium
interaction
polarization
unified field theory
Opis:
A field form of the Coulomb law is proposed, which describes the electric field as a function of the charge density gradient. This law is analogous in form to the modified Newton's law and similarly it reveals the possibility of attraction and repulsion of charges of the same sign as a function of the direction of the gradient of its density, and also the existence of electrostatic equilibrium. As an example of the use of this law, the erroneousness of the assertion that there are no free charges in the volume of the conductor is shown and a new treatment of the polarization processes is given as a result of the redistribution of charges of the same sign in it. A solution is proposed for the stability of atoms and their nuclei on the basis of electrostatic equilibrium and the wave concept of the structure of matter. Experimental confirmations of the proposed concept are presented.
Źródło:
World Scientific News; 2017, 87; 163-174
2392-2192
Pojawia się w:
World Scientific News
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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