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Tytuł:
Gleichgewichte auf den Transport-, Verkehrs- und Logistikmärkten
Equilibria in the transport, transport and logistics markets
Autorzy:
Witte, H.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/134334.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Tematy:
equilibrium
equilibrium theory
equilibrium models
inequilibrium models
transport market
równowaga
teoria równowagi
modele równowagi
modele nierówności
rynek transportowy
Opis:
Die traditionelle Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts ist nicht erfolgreich bei der Realisierung von Marktgleichgewichten. Das Hauptargument gegen die traditionelle Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts ist die normalerweise getroffene Annahme einer unrealistischen reinen Konkurrenz. Eine realistische Idee ist die moderne Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts. Diese Interpretation benötigt keine unrealistischen Annahmen und kein hohes mathematisches Verständnis. Die moderne Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts führt zu totalen quantitativen und wertorientierten Marktgleichgewichten. Alle drei Teilmärkte (Waren, Geld und Arbeitsmarkt) befinden sich im Gleichgewicht, wenn alle auf diesen Märkten tätigen Wirtschaftseinheiten im Gleichgewicht sind. Der Vorteil der modernen Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts ist, dass es keine Utopie, sondern eine „Topia“ ist. Die Erkenntnis führt zur Überwindung von Wirtschaftskrisen und zu einem stetig wachsenden Wohlstand trotz weltweit geringer Ressourcen. Die einzige Bedingung, um die moderne Interpretation des wirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichts zu realisieren, ist der Wille, etwas zu verändern. Es ist möglich, die moderne Interpretation des Gleichgewichts für Transport- und Logistikmärkte zu verwenden.
The traditional interpretation of economic equilibrium is not successful in realizing market equilibria. The main argument against the traditional interpretation of economic equilibrium is the normally made assumption of unrealistic pure competition. A realistic idea is the modern interpretation of economic equilibrium. This interpretation needs no unrealistic assumptions and no high level of mathematic understanding. The modern interpretation of economic equilibrium leads to total quantitative- and valuebased market equilibria. All three partial markets (the goods, the money and the labor market) are in equilibrium, when all economic units acting on these markets are in equilibrium. The advantage of the modern interpretation of economic equilibrium is that it is no utopia but a “topia”. The realization leads to overcome economic crises and to steady growing welfare in spite of worldwide low resources. The only condition to realize the modern interpretation of economic equilibrium is the will to change something. It is possible to use the modern interpretation of equilibrium for transport and logistic markets.
Źródło:
Problemy Transportu i Logistyki; 2017, 38, 2; 15-25
1644-275X
2353-3005
Pojawia się w:
Problemy Transportu i Logistyki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Stackelberg Security Games: Models, Applications and Computational Aspects
Autorzy:
Wilczyński, A.
Jakóbik, A.
Kołodziej, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309423.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
Bayesian game
game theory
leadership
Nash equilibrium
normal form games
security games
Stackelberg equilibrium
Stackelberg games
Opis:
Stackelberg games are non-symmetric games where one player or specified group of players have the privilege position and make decision before the other players. Such games are used in telecommunication and computational systems for supporting administrative decisions. Recently Stackleberg games became useful also in the systems where security issues are the crucial decision criteria. In this paper authors briefly survey the most popular Stackelberg security game models and provide the analysis of the model properties illustrated in the realistic use cases.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2016, 3; 70-79
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On ”Games and Dynamic Games” by A. Haurie, J.B. Krawczyk and G. Zaccour
Autorzy:
Więcek, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/748451.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
Tematy:
game theory, dynamic games, equilibrium
Opis:
Although the title, ''Games and Dynamic Games"  of the new book by Alain Haurie, Jacek B. Krawczyk and Georges Zaccour suggests just another textbook on general game theory, with a little more stress made on dynamic aspect of games, the book appears to be something of novelty both in the scope and the treatment of the material. From the very first chapters of the book, it is clear that we will not be given another standard course of game theory, and that the dynamics of games will be the main issue. It starts with the simplest treatment of game dynamics, which is the extensive form of the game, and, having defined and explained the basic notions of static game theory, progresses to more complex dynamic models. Those start with deterministic repeated games, continue with variable state discrete time (or multistage) dynamic games and deterministic differential (that is, continuous time) games, and finish with stochastic models extending the ones presented before. Each part presents in a self-contained and comprehensive way, the main notions and solution concepts (such as open- and closed-loop strategies, Nash and correlated equilibria, subgame-perfectness, using threats to improve the performance of the equilibrium strategies) and theoretical results. It complements them with a number of economic applications, presented in detail. These applications relate to many fields of interest of economists, such as exploitation of renewable resources, environmental and energy issues, macroeconomics and finance. Each chapter ends with a set of excercices and a {\it game engineering} part, where a detailed presentation of a real-life application of some relevant game model is presented. Just this part is a novelty in the game-theoretic literature, as it shows to what extent the game-theoretic models can be applicable. Although the book presents the mathematical tools to model the situations of conflict in a rather rigorous way, it is clear that its target reader is someone with a background in economics or managemant science rather than mathematics. All the basic mathematical concepts used in the book are carefully explained, with those more complex ones (which appear in the latter chapters of the book) approached mainly through examples and intuitions. I believe this is a good decision of the authors, as in that way it makes the book really accessible to its potential readers. In fact, even though the tools (even those most advanced) of dynamic game theory have now been for many years used to model the economic interactions, surprisingly there has not been a single textbook addressed to more advanced students and researchers in economics and management science, presenting the state-of-art in the theory and applications of dynamic games in a comprehensive way. Those already existing required mathematical expertise well beyond what one could expect from typical economics/management students, and could not serve as textbooks for this type of readers. Moreover, those existing books concentrated without exception on some particular classes of dynamic games (such as differential games and their subclasses, stochastic games, repeated games). The book of Haurie, Krawczyk and Zaccour fills well the existing gap.Another important advantage of the book is its stress made not only on theoretical concepts and their adoption in real-life models, but on computation issues. The authors present a host of techniques to compute the solutions to the considered games either symbolically or numerically. They also provide information about software that can be used to solve similar games. Also the examples presented in game engineering sections are not abstract. They are based on real data, and issues of the credibility of the solutions obtained is discussed.The clarity of the exposition of often complicated topics is in general a big advantage of the book, although in latter chapters this clarity is sometimes unfortunatelly lost. The best example is the part about games over event trees with a confusing introduction concerning game with finite action sets and then the whole chapter concerning games with continuous ones. Also the last chapter, about stochastic-diffusion games, seems not very well conceived, as it jumps forth and back between an example and some more general considerations, leaving the reader confused about the generality of what is presented. These are certainly minor problems, but unfortunatelly there are other, more upseting issues. In general, it seems that the manuscript was not proofread carefully enough. The number of typos is enormous (the errata added to the book enumerates just a small fraction). Also some other faults, such as references to the colors on one of the figures, which is in black and white (p. 187), self-contradicting sentences like ''We use $\beta$ for a discount factor because we use $\beta$ to denote a strategy'' (p. 233), faults in references between chapters of the book (p. 372, footnote on p. 419) could have been easily eliminated if the book was properly proofread. What is worse though, is that there are also some more serious mistakes: one of the assumptions of the Kakutani fixed point theorem is missing, $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in Lemma 10.1 should be $A\epsilon$-equilibrium. And finally---it seems that most of the section 11.6.1 is missing from the manuscript. This significantly reduces the value of the book. Nevertheless, although I believe that all these errors should make the reader more cautious when reading the book, they do not unmake its main quality, which is acquainting all those interested in describing some real-life multi-agent economic situations in a rigorous way with the theory which provides the tools for doing it.
Źródło:
Mathematica Applicanda; 2013, 41, 1
1730-2668
2299-4009
Pojawia się w:
Mathematica Applicanda
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
How Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma Can Support Negotiations
Autorzy:
Szopa, Marek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/430038.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:
game theory
quantum game
prisoner’s dilemma
Nash equilibrium
Pareto optimal solutions
Opis:
Decision-making by the two negotiating parties is simulated by a prisoner’s dilemma game. The game is formulated in a quantum manner, where players strategies are unitary transformations of qubits built over the basis of opposite decision options. Quantum strategies are correlated through the mechanism of quantum entanglement and the result of the game is obtained by the collapse of the resulting transformed state. The range of strategies allowed for quantum players is richer than in case of a classical game and therefore the result of the game can be better optimized. On the other hand, the quantum game is save against eavesdropping and the players can be assured that this type of quantum arbitration is fair. We show that quantum prisoner’s dilemma has more favorable Nash equilibria than its classical analog and they are close to the Pareto optimal solutions. Some economical examples of utilizing quantum game Nash equilibria are proposed.
Źródło:
Optimum. Economic Studies; 2014, 5(71)
1506-7637
Pojawia się w:
Optimum. Economic Studies
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Stability and Generalized Competitive Equilibria in a Many-to-Many Gale-Shapley Market Model
Stabilność i uogólnione równowagi konkurencyjne w modelu rynku Gale’a-Shapleya typu „many-to-many”
Autorzy:
Świtalski, Zbigniew
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1050555.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016-09-30
Wydawca:
Główny Urząd Statystyczny
Tematy:
stable matching
Gale-Shapley theory
many-to-many model
competitive equilibrium
discrete market model
contract theory
kojarzenie stabilne
teoria Gale-a-Shapleya
model „many-to-many”
równowaga konkurencyjna
dyskretny model rynku
teoria kontraktów
Opis:
We define, for some variant of a many-to-many market model of Gale-Shapley type, a concept of generalized competitive equilibrium and show that, under suitable conditions, stable matchings in such a model can be represented as competitive equilibria allocations (and vice versa). Our results are far-reaching generalizations of the “discrete supply and demand lemma” of Azevedo, Leshno (2011) for the college admissions market. Using the results of Alkan, Gale (2003), we also prove a theorem on existence of generalized equilibria in our model.
W artykule zdefiniowano, dla pewnego wariantu modelu rynku Gale’a-Shapleya (typu „many-to-many”), pojęcie uogólnionej równowagi konkurencyjnej i pokazano, że przy odpowiednich założeniach, skojarzenia stabilne w tym modelu mogą być reprezentowane jako alokacje równowag konkurencyjnych (i vice versa). Przedstawione wyniki są daleko idącymi uogólnieniami „lematu o podaży i popycie” z pracy Azevedo, Leshno (2011) dotyczącego modelu rekrutacji kandydatów do szkół. Wykorzystując wyniki Alkana, Gale’a (2003), udowodniono również twierdzenie o istnieniu uogólnionych równowag dla podanego modelu.
Źródło:
Przegląd Statystyczny; 2016, 63, 3; 237-254
0033-2372
Pojawia się w:
Przegląd Statystyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Meanders of the Theory of Social Choice
Autorzy:
Sosnowska, Honorata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/942373.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie
Tematy:
theory of general equilibrium
microeconomics
theory of social choice
Źródło:
Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology; 2010, 1, 1; 187-191
2081-9633
Pojawia się w:
Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Analysis of Ineffectiveness Arising in “Investor-government” Relations
Autorzy:
Sokolovskyi, Dmytro B.
Sokolovska, Olena V.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/417302.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-09-15
Wydawca:
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
investors
Pareto-optimality
modeling
Game Theory
Nash equilibrium
Government
economic behavior
Opis:
Purpose: This article deals with the problem of forming Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing designed to reduce risks in investment activity. Methodology: Considering the interdependent type (nature) of interactions between related parties, game theory tools were used to model such interactions. Much attention was directed to search for� parameters of interaction leading to certain Nash equilibriums in pure strategies. The formal results obtained with the model were verified by statistical analysis. Findings: Analysis showed that the rational behavior of related parties can lead to unexpected results. Powerful investors will aim to work in socially-oriented economies, whereas primarily small investors will operate in most liberal economies with a�minimum tax burden but with a�higher level of risk. As for governments’ behaviors, the images are the same: small economies tend to liberalize their tax systems and to secure investment faster than powerful ones. Empirical verification based on statistical data of groups of countries generally confirmed the conclusions. These formal and logical conclusions were from statistical analysis of 124 countries divided into 5 groups: OECD countries, post-socialist countries, Latin American countries, APAC countries and ACP countries. Provided that the more powerful ones are covered economies, there was stronger interdependence between the size of economies and tax burden and also between total investment and tax burden, where this dependence is positive. Originality: The results obtained used Nash equilibriums in pure strategies as models of behavioral norms to define behaviors of related parties and also to explain assumptions concerning the behaviors of investors and government.
Źródło:
Management and Business Administration. Central Europe; 2015, 3; 47-70
2084-3356
Pojawia się w:
Management and Business Administration. Central Europe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Methodological Remarks on Anti-equilibrium by Janos Kornai
Metodologiczne uwagi na temat Anti-equilibrium Janosa Kornaia
Autorzy:
Musialik, Rafał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/22616474.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:
general equilibrium theory
neoclassical economics
methodology of economics
centrally planned economies
teoria równowagi ogólnej
ekonomia neoklasyczna
metodologia ekonomii
gospo-
darki centralnie planowane
Opis:
The subject of this paper is Kornai's concept as contained in Anti-equilibrium. The aim of the paper was to provide a critical analysis of this concept. The analysis focused on the methodological aspect of Anti-equilibrium, namely on the concept of the explanation adopted by the Hungarian economist. The research method used is textual analysis. The result of this analysis allows, as it seems, to see an important methodological flaw of Anti-equilibrium. The thesis of this article is that this defect did not allow Kornai's proposal to be treated as a viable competitor to neoclassical economics.
Przedmiotem artykułu jest koncepcja J. Kornaia, zawarta w Anti-equilibrium. Celem pracy jest przedstawienie krytycznej analizy tej koncepcji. Analiza ta skupia się na aspekcie metodologicznym Anti-equilibrium, a mianowicie na koncepcji wyjaśniania przyjętej przez węgierskiego ekonomistę. Zastosowaną metodą badawczą jest analiza tekstu. Wynik tej analizy pozwala – jak się wydaje – ujrzeć istotny defekt metodologiczny Anti-equilibrium. Tezą niniejszego artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że defekt ten nie pozwalał traktować propozycji Kornaia jako równoważnego konkurenta dla ekonomii neoklasycznej.
Źródło:
Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu; 2023, 67, 4; 114-120
1899-3192
Pojawia się w:
Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Cooperative games with incomplete information for Secondary Base Stations in cognitive radio networks
Autorzy:
Martyna, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/308673.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
Bayesian equilibrium
cognitive radio networks
game theory
wireless communication
Opis:
Cognitive radio (CR) technology is considered to be an effective solution for enhancing overall spectrum efficiency. Using CR technology fully involves the providing of incentives to Primary Radio Networks (PRNs) and revenue to the service provider so that Secondary Base Stations (SBSs) may utilize PRN spectrum bands accordingly. In this paper, a cooperative games with incomplete information for SBSs in a CR network is presented. Each SBS can cooperate with neighboring SBSs in order to improve its view of the spectrum. Moreover, proposed game-theory models assume that the devices have incomplete information about their components, meaning that some players do not completely know the structure of the game. Using the proposed algorithm, each SBS can leave or join the coalition while maximizing its overall utility. The simulation results illustrate that the proposed algorithm allows us to reduce the average payoff per SBS up to 140% relative to a CR network without cooperation among SBSs.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2013, 3; 106-111
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A game theoretical study of generalised trust and reciprocation in Poland. I. Theory and experimental design
Autorzy:
Markowska-Przybyła, U.
Ramsey, D.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/406367.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Tematy:
experimental game theory
Bayesian equilibrium
trust
reciprocation
eksperymentalna teoria gier
równowaga Bayesa
zaufanie
wzajemność
Opis:
Although studies using experimental game theory have been carried out in various countries, no such major study has occurred in Poland. The study described here aims to investigate generalised trust and reciprocation among Polish students. In the literature, these traits are seen to be positively correlated with economic growth. Poland is regarded as the most successful post-soviet bloc country in transforming to a market economy but the level of generalised trust compared to other postcommunist countries is reported to be low. This study aims to see to what degree this reported level of generalised trust is visible amongst young Poles via experimental game theory, along with a questionnaire. The three games to be played have been described. Bayesian equilibria illustrating behaviour observed in previous studies have been derived for two of these games and the experimental procedure has been described.
Źródło:
Operations Research and Decisions; 2014, 24, 3; 59-76
2081-8858
2391-6060
Pojawia się w:
Operations Research and Decisions
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
USEFUL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE INFLUENCE ON THE SHADOW ECONOMY
Autorzy:
Malaczewska, Paulina
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452927.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Szkoła Główna Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego w Warszawie. Katedra Ekonometrii i Statystyki
Tematy:
shadow economy
useful government expenditure
game theory
Nash equilibrium
Opis:
This paper contains the attempt to describe the phenomenon of shadow economy as a zero-sum non-cooperative, normal form game between households and the government. In the model government spending can be treated as a government consumption or as an expenses that contribute to increased social welfare and for the provision of public goods and services. We conduct sensitivity analysis of Nash equilibrium in models with two different types of government expenditure and examine whether proposed models indicate a various mechanisms and determinants of the undeclared economic activity.
Źródło:
Metody Ilościowe w Badaniach Ekonomicznych; 2013, 14, 2; 61-69
2082-792X
Pojawia się w:
Metody Ilościowe w Badaniach Ekonomicznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Applying Game Theory To North Korea-China relations
Autorzy:
Levi, Nicolas
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/451637.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Wyższa Szkoła Gospodarki Euroregionalnej im. Alcide De Gasperi w Józefowie
Tematy:
institutional limitations
Nash Equilibrium
international relations
game theory
theoretical approach
ograniczenia instytucjonalne równowaga Nasha
stosunki międzynarodowe
teoria gier
ujęcie teoretyczne
Opis:
Relations between North Korea and China are not improving on political matters since 2006, when North Korea started to do regular nuclear attempts. In order to explain the nature of relations between these both countries, I propose to apply the framework of Game theory. These concepts and the notion of risk dominance will be used to describe the general diplomatic strategy between North Korea and China and to account for North Korea’s constant provocations. A situation of the Game theory called the Nash Equilibrium will be applied to suggest policy lines specifically after the stronger provocations of the North Korean state. At conclusive remarks, some limitations toward Game theory on its application on relations between China and North Korea will be suggested.
Stosunki polityczne między Koreą Północną a Chinami nie poprawiają się od 2006 r., kiedy północnokoreańskie władze rozpoczęły regularne próby jądrowe. Aby wyjaśnić naturę stosunków między tymi dwoma państwami, proponuję zastosować ramy teorii gier. Te pojęcia, w tym dominacja i ryzyko, będą używane do opisania ogólnej strategii dyplomatycznej obu państw we wzajemnych stosunkach. Będziemy również uwzględniać skale prowokacji Korei Północnej. Równowaga Nasha, czyli profil strategii teorii gier, zakłada optymalną strategię każdego gracza i będzie opisana w poniższym artykule, biorąc pod uwagę stosunki między oboma państwami. Zakończenie artykułu będzie dotyczyć ograniczenia teorii gier dotyczącej jej stosowania w relacjach między Chinami a Koreą Północną.
Źródło:
Journal of Modern Science; 2017, 33, 2; 35-366
1734-2031
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Modern Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Ustalona a preferowana kolejność ruchów w grze pojedynczej
Fixed and preferable order of moves in a single-game
Autorzy:
Laskowski, S.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/317570.pdf
Data publikacji:
2007
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
teoria gier
gry rynkowe
kolejność ruchów w grze
równowaga Nasha
gry Stackelberga
gra pojedyncza
gra podwójna
game theory
market games
order of market player movement
Nash equilibrium
Stackelberg games
single game
double game
Opis:
Przeanalizowano dwuosobowe gry o sumie niezerowej pod kątem preferowanej dla graczy kolejności ruchów, ich związku z faktem istnienia lub nieistnienia równowagi Nasha, związku z modelami gry Stackelberga oraz konieczności wykonywania ruchów w określonej kolejności.
An analyses of two-person non-zero sum games in the context of preferable order of the players moves, and their relationship with the fact of existing or non existing Nash equilibrium, with the models of Stackelberg games and with the necessity of making a move in a given order was made.
Źródło:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne; 2007, 3-4; 10-29
1640-1549
1899-8933
Pojawia się w:
Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Etyka biznesu a naganne powszechne praktyki
Business Ethics and Common Blameworthy Practices
Autorzy:
Kucharski, Jarosław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/469070.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN
Tematy:
blameworthy practices
business ethics,
orruption
game theory
Pareto’s optimum
Nash equilibrium
fairness
Opis:
The aim of this article is to examine how a businessman, who takes care about moral considerations should behave in some situations, in which some blameworthy common practices are present. There is a dilemma between efficiency (or even continuing existence) of business on one side and moral considerations on the other. The proposition formulated by R. M. Green is analyzed and criticized. The „everyone is doing it” argument is rejected., as well as the requirements coming from moral absolutism. In the end an argument based on writings of T. Carson, J. G. Dees and P. C. Crampton, which shows the proper way of moral behaviour where such dilemmas are met, is presented.
Źródło:
Prakseologia; 2009, 149; 241-252
0079-4872
Pojawia się w:
Prakseologia
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Assessment of the historical policy mixes for Poland using the game approach
Autorzy:
Kruś, L.
Woroniecka-Leciejewicz, I.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205620.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
game theory
economic modeling
policy-mix
decision analysis
Nash equilibrium
Pareto optimality
Opis:
The study here presented pertains to the analysis of mutual interactions of the monetary and fiscal policies in the case of Poland. The historical policies carried out during different periods of time and their economic effects are compared with the possible strategies, obtained from the analysis of the proposed monetaryfiscal game. In the study, the methods of non-cooperative game theory are combined with macroeconomic modeling. The respective game is formulated for monetary and fiscal authorities as players. Strategies of these players refer to the respective instruments of their policies: the real interest rate and the budget deficit in relation to GDP. Payoffs include inflation and GDP growth, respectively. The payoffs are calculated using a recursive macroeconomic model estimated for the Polish economy. The model describes influences of the instruments of the monetary and fiscal policies on the state of the economy. The best response strategies, the Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality are analyzed. Changes of the policies towards the more restrictive or more expansive ones and their effects in comparison to the historically applied are discussed. This is performed for two different time periods – the time of recovery after 2004 and the time of the global financial crisis after 2008.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2018, 47, 3; 277-300
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 29

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