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Tytuł:
On the deformation of porous spherical bodies under radial surface traction
Autorzy:
De Cicco, Simona
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2200889.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Mechaniki Teoretycznej i Stosowanej
Tematy:
linear elasticity
materials with voids
equilibrium theory
spherical solids
Opis:
The paper deals with the linear theory of elastic materials with voids based on the concept of volume fraction. In this model, the interstitial pores are vacuous and can contract or stretch. The change in the volume fraction is measured by a scalar function, so that independent kinematical variables are four: the components of displacements and the volume fraction function. The equilibrium problem of elastic spherical bodies under radial surface traction is solved. The solution is given in closed form and applied to study three special cases. Explicit formulas of the displacement, stress distribution and volume fraction function are given.
Źródło:
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics; 2023, 61, 2; 305--316
1429-2955
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Reconciling Incrementalism with Policy Change. The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory in Political Science
Łącząc inkrementalizm ze zmianą polityczną. Teoria przerywanej równowagi w naukach o polityce
Autorzy:
Czapiewski, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1953206.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-12-31
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Tematy:
theory of politics
policy process
public policy
policy change
punctuated equilibrium theory
Opis:
The aim of this article is to explain current definition and application of punctuated equilibrium theory, which is as influential as any conceptual framework concerning policy process in political science, stimulating thought and research over the last two decades. Baumgartner and Jones borrowed the concept from studies of the evolution of species, but – as author shows – without operationalized definition, and turned it into a metaphor that can have mostly pedagogical use. Author explains how punctuated equilibrium is useful for analyzing policy change in political systems other than the United States, but in the European political systems, political parties and their preferences must be taken into account. It is also presented how punctuated equilibrium is in fact a much-improved version of the incrementalism theory, rather than an application of biological insights to politics. Author differentiate successful application of the punctuated equilibrium in the description of the policy process from the explanation of Baumgartner and Jones about how those identified patterns in modern democracies were caused.
Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie aktualnej definicji i pozycji teorii przerywanej równowagi, która jest jednym z najbardziej wpływowych podejść badawczych dotyczących procesu politycznego w naukach o polityce, stymulując koncepcje i badania przez ostatnie dwie dekady. Baumgartner i Jones inkorporowali pojęcie z badań nad ewolucją gatunków, ale – jak wskazuje autor artykułu – pozbawiając go pierwotnej operacjonalizacji, zamieniając w metaforę o bardziej pedagogicznym walorze. Autor wyjaśnia, jak teoria przerywanej równowagi jest przydatna w analizie zmiany politycznej w systemach politycznych innych niż Stany Zjednoczone, ale w europejskich systemach politycznych konieczne jest uwzględnienie roli partii politycznych i ich preferencji. Zaprezentowano także, jak teoria jest faktycznie raczej znacznie poprawioną wersją teorii inkrementalizmu niż wykorzystaniem dorobku biologii w polityce. Autor odróżnia także pełną sukcesów aplikację teorii, która opisuje rzeczywistość procesu politycznego, od wyjaśnień i związków przyczynowych, które zdaniem Baumgartnera i Jonesa taki przebieg procesu zdeterminowały.
Źródło:
Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne; 2015, 48; 37-50
1505-2192
Pojawia się w:
Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Gleichgewichte auf den Transport-, Verkehrs- und Logistikmärkten
Equilibria in the transport, transport and logistics markets
Autorzy:
Witte, H.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/134334.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Tematy:
equilibrium
equilibrium theory
equilibrium models
inequilibrium models
transport market
równowaga
teoria równowagi
modele równowagi
modele nierówności
rynek transportowy
Opis:
Die traditionelle Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts ist nicht erfolgreich bei der Realisierung von Marktgleichgewichten. Das Hauptargument gegen die traditionelle Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts ist die normalerweise getroffene Annahme einer unrealistischen reinen Konkurrenz. Eine realistische Idee ist die moderne Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts. Diese Interpretation benötigt keine unrealistischen Annahmen und kein hohes mathematisches Verständnis. Die moderne Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts führt zu totalen quantitativen und wertorientierten Marktgleichgewichten. Alle drei Teilmärkte (Waren, Geld und Arbeitsmarkt) befinden sich im Gleichgewicht, wenn alle auf diesen Märkten tätigen Wirtschaftseinheiten im Gleichgewicht sind. Der Vorteil der modernen Interpretation des ökonomischen Gleichgewichts ist, dass es keine Utopie, sondern eine „Topia“ ist. Die Erkenntnis führt zur Überwindung von Wirtschaftskrisen und zu einem stetig wachsenden Wohlstand trotz weltweit geringer Ressourcen. Die einzige Bedingung, um die moderne Interpretation des wirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichts zu realisieren, ist der Wille, etwas zu verändern. Es ist möglich, die moderne Interpretation des Gleichgewichts für Transport- und Logistikmärkte zu verwenden.
The traditional interpretation of economic equilibrium is not successful in realizing market equilibria. The main argument against the traditional interpretation of economic equilibrium is the normally made assumption of unrealistic pure competition. A realistic idea is the modern interpretation of economic equilibrium. This interpretation needs no unrealistic assumptions and no high level of mathematic understanding. The modern interpretation of economic equilibrium leads to total quantitative- and valuebased market equilibria. All three partial markets (the goods, the money and the labor market) are in equilibrium, when all economic units acting on these markets are in equilibrium. The advantage of the modern interpretation of economic equilibrium is that it is no utopia but a “topia”. The realization leads to overcome economic crises and to steady growing welfare in spite of worldwide low resources. The only condition to realize the modern interpretation of economic equilibrium is the will to change something. It is possible to use the modern interpretation of equilibrium for transport and logistic markets.
Źródło:
Problemy Transportu i Logistyki; 2017, 38, 2; 15-25
1644-275X
2353-3005
Pojawia się w:
Problemy Transportu i Logistyki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On ”Games and Dynamic Games” by A. Haurie, J.B. Krawczyk and G. Zaccour
Autorzy:
Więcek, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/748451.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
Tematy:
game theory, dynamic games, equilibrium
Opis:
Although the title, ''Games and Dynamic Games"  of the new book by Alain Haurie, Jacek B. Krawczyk and Georges Zaccour suggests just another textbook on general game theory, with a little more stress made on dynamic aspect of games, the book appears to be something of novelty both in the scope and the treatment of the material. From the very first chapters of the book, it is clear that we will not be given another standard course of game theory, and that the dynamics of games will be the main issue. It starts with the simplest treatment of game dynamics, which is the extensive form of the game, and, having defined and explained the basic notions of static game theory, progresses to more complex dynamic models. Those start with deterministic repeated games, continue with variable state discrete time (or multistage) dynamic games and deterministic differential (that is, continuous time) games, and finish with stochastic models extending the ones presented before. Each part presents in a self-contained and comprehensive way, the main notions and solution concepts (such as open- and closed-loop strategies, Nash and correlated equilibria, subgame-perfectness, using threats to improve the performance of the equilibrium strategies) and theoretical results. It complements them with a number of economic applications, presented in detail. These applications relate to many fields of interest of economists, such as exploitation of renewable resources, environmental and energy issues, macroeconomics and finance. Each chapter ends with a set of excercices and a {\it game engineering} part, where a detailed presentation of a real-life application of some relevant game model is presented. Just this part is a novelty in the game-theoretic literature, as it shows to what extent the game-theoretic models can be applicable. Although the book presents the mathematical tools to model the situations of conflict in a rather rigorous way, it is clear that its target reader is someone with a background in economics or managemant science rather than mathematics. All the basic mathematical concepts used in the book are carefully explained, with those more complex ones (which appear in the latter chapters of the book) approached mainly through examples and intuitions. I believe this is a good decision of the authors, as in that way it makes the book really accessible to its potential readers. In fact, even though the tools (even those most advanced) of dynamic game theory have now been for many years used to model the economic interactions, surprisingly there has not been a single textbook addressed to more advanced students and researchers in economics and management science, presenting the state-of-art in the theory and applications of dynamic games in a comprehensive way. Those already existing required mathematical expertise well beyond what one could expect from typical economics/management students, and could not serve as textbooks for this type of readers. Moreover, those existing books concentrated without exception on some particular classes of dynamic games (such as differential games and their subclasses, stochastic games, repeated games). The book of Haurie, Krawczyk and Zaccour fills well the existing gap.Another important advantage of the book is its stress made not only on theoretical concepts and their adoption in real-life models, but on computation issues. The authors present a host of techniques to compute the solutions to the considered games either symbolically or numerically. They also provide information about software that can be used to solve similar games. Also the examples presented in game engineering sections are not abstract. They are based on real data, and issues of the credibility of the solutions obtained is discussed.The clarity of the exposition of often complicated topics is in general a big advantage of the book, although in latter chapters this clarity is sometimes unfortunatelly lost. The best example is the part about games over event trees with a confusing introduction concerning game with finite action sets and then the whole chapter concerning games with continuous ones. Also the last chapter, about stochastic-diffusion games, seems not very well conceived, as it jumps forth and back between an example and some more general considerations, leaving the reader confused about the generality of what is presented. These are certainly minor problems, but unfortunatelly there are other, more upseting issues. In general, it seems that the manuscript was not proofread carefully enough. The number of typos is enormous (the errata added to the book enumerates just a small fraction). Also some other faults, such as references to the colors on one of the figures, which is in black and white (p. 187), self-contradicting sentences like ''We use $\beta$ for a discount factor because we use $\beta$ to denote a strategy'' (p. 233), faults in references between chapters of the book (p. 372, footnote on p. 419) could have been easily eliminated if the book was properly proofread. What is worse though, is that there are also some more serious mistakes: one of the assumptions of the Kakutani fixed point theorem is missing, $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in Lemma 10.1 should be $A\epsilon$-equilibrium. And finally---it seems that most of the section 11.6.1 is missing from the manuscript. This significantly reduces the value of the book. Nevertheless, although I believe that all these errors should make the reader more cautious when reading the book, they do not unmake its main quality, which is acquainting all those interested in describing some real-life multi-agent economic situations in a rigorous way with the theory which provides the tools for doing it.
Źródło:
Mathematica Applicanda; 2013, 41, 1
1730-2668
2299-4009
Pojawia się w:
Mathematica Applicanda
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Meanders of the Theory of Social Choice
Autorzy:
Sosnowska, Honorata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/942373.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie
Tematy:
theory of general equilibrium
microeconomics
theory of social choice
Źródło:
Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology; 2010, 1, 1; 187-191
2081-9633
Pojawia się w:
Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Methodological Remarks on Anti-equilibrium by Janos Kornai
Metodologiczne uwagi na temat Anti-equilibrium Janosa Kornaia
Autorzy:
Musialik, Rafał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/22616474.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Tematy:
general equilibrium theory
neoclassical economics
methodology of economics
centrally planned economies
teoria równowagi ogólnej
ekonomia neoklasyczna
metodologia ekonomii
gospo-
darki centralnie planowane
Opis:
The subject of this paper is Kornai's concept as contained in Anti-equilibrium. The aim of the paper was to provide a critical analysis of this concept. The analysis focused on the methodological aspect of Anti-equilibrium, namely on the concept of the explanation adopted by the Hungarian economist. The research method used is textual analysis. The result of this analysis allows, as it seems, to see an important methodological flaw of Anti-equilibrium. The thesis of this article is that this defect did not allow Kornai's proposal to be treated as a viable competitor to neoclassical economics.
Przedmiotem artykułu jest koncepcja J. Kornaia, zawarta w Anti-equilibrium. Celem pracy jest przedstawienie krytycznej analizy tej koncepcji. Analiza ta skupia się na aspekcie metodologicznym Anti-equilibrium, a mianowicie na koncepcji wyjaśniania przyjętej przez węgierskiego ekonomistę. Zastosowaną metodą badawczą jest analiza tekstu. Wynik tej analizy pozwala – jak się wydaje – ujrzeć istotny defekt metodologiczny Anti-equilibrium. Tezą niniejszego artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że defekt ten nie pozwalał traktować propozycji Kornaia jako równoważnego konkurenta dla ekonomii neoklasycznej.
Źródło:
Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu; 2023, 67, 4; 114-120
1899-3192
Pojawia się w:
Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Strategic option pricing
Autorzy:
Bieta, Volker
Broll, Udo
Siebe, Wilfried
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1837957.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-09-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Tematy:
option pricing
game theory
Nash equilibrium
Opis:
In this paper an extension of the well-known binomial approach to option pricing is presented. The classical question is: What is the price of an option on the risky asset? The traditional answer is obtained with the help of a replicating portfolio by ruling out arbitrage. Instead a two-person game from the Nash equilibrium of which the option price can be derived is formulated. Consequently both the underlying asset’s price at expiration and the price of the option on this asset are endogenously determined. The option price derived this way turns out, however, to be identical to the classical no-arbitrage option price of the binomial model if the expiration-date prices of the underlying asset and the corresponding risk-neutral probability are properly adjusted according to the Nash equilibrium data of the game.
Źródło:
Economics and Business Review; 2020, 6, 3; 118-129
2392-1641
Pojawia się w:
Economics and Business Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Minority Game and Quantum Game Theory
Gra Mniejszościowa I Kwantowa Teoria Gier
Autorzy:
Bolonek, Katarzyna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/906291.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
Tematy:
minority game
quantum game theory
Nash equilibrium
Opis:
Artykuł zawiera propozycje procedur kwantowania gier dobrze znanych w klasycznej teorii gier. Przedstawiono proste modele gier kwantowych. Jako pierwszy został omówiony dylemat więźnia zarówno w wersji klasycznej jak i kwantowej, który ma wiele praktycznych zastosowań w ekonomii, jednym z przykładów są oszustwa w porozumieniach kartelowych. Kolejnym modelem gry kwantowej jest kwantowa gra rynkowa opisana za pomocą kwantowego oscylatora harmonicznego. Jako ostatni został omówiony model kwantowej gry mniejszościowej.
This paper builds up on proposed convincing procedures telling how to quantize well-known games from the classical game theory. The thesis introduces some simple models of quantum games. At first, the prisoners’ dilemma in classical and quantum version is described. This simple model has many practical applications in economics, one example being frauds in cartel agreements. The next model of quantum game is the quantum market game, described with the help of the quantum harmonic oscillator. It is known that quantum algorithms may be thought of as the games between classical and quantum agents; therefore, as the last example the quantum minority game is introduced.
Źródło:
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica; 2009, 228
0208-6018
2353-7663
Pojawia się w:
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A process algebraic form to represent extensive games
Autorzy:
Gheibi, O.
Ramezanian, R.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/205871.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
extensive games
Nash equilibrium
process theory
process algebra
Opis:
In this paper, we introduce an agent-based representation of games, in order to propose a compact representation for multi-party games in game theory. Our method is inspired by concepts in process theory and process algebra. In addition, we introduce an algorithm whose input is a game in the form of process algebra (proposed in this paper) and as an output, the algorithm finds the Nash equilibrium of the game in linear space complexity.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2015, 44, 1; 129-148
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Berge equilibrium in discontinuous games
Autorzy:
Deghdak, M.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/206586.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
Berge equilibrium
game theory
discontinuous games
abstract games
Opis:
In this paper we consider some classes of abstract discontinuous games, for which the games possessing essential Berge equilibrium are the generic case. We extend the essential Berge equilibrium result from Deghdak (2014) to general abstract games.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2014, 43, 3; 439-448
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Cooperative games with incomplete information for Secondary Base Stations in cognitive radio networks
Autorzy:
Martyna, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/308673.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
Bayesian equilibrium
cognitive radio networks
game theory
wireless communication
Opis:
Cognitive radio (CR) technology is considered to be an effective solution for enhancing overall spectrum efficiency. Using CR technology fully involves the providing of incentives to Primary Radio Networks (PRNs) and revenue to the service provider so that Secondary Base Stations (SBSs) may utilize PRN spectrum bands accordingly. In this paper, a cooperative games with incomplete information for SBSs in a CR network is presented. Each SBS can cooperate with neighboring SBSs in order to improve its view of the spectrum. Moreover, proposed game-theory models assume that the devices have incomplete information about their components, meaning that some players do not completely know the structure of the game. Using the proposed algorithm, each SBS can leave or join the coalition while maximizing its overall utility. The simulation results illustrate that the proposed algorithm allows us to reduce the average payoff per SBS up to 140% relative to a CR network without cooperation among SBSs.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2013, 3; 106-111
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
USEFUL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE INFLUENCE ON THE SHADOW ECONOMY
Autorzy:
Malaczewska, Paulina
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452927.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Szkoła Główna Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego w Warszawie. Katedra Ekonometrii i Statystyki
Tematy:
shadow economy
useful government expenditure
game theory
Nash equilibrium
Opis:
This paper contains the attempt to describe the phenomenon of shadow economy as a zero-sum non-cooperative, normal form game between households and the government. In the model government spending can be treated as a government consumption or as an expenses that contribute to increased social welfare and for the provision of public goods and services. We conduct sensitivity analysis of Nash equilibrium in models with two different types of government expenditure and examine whether proposed models indicate a various mechanisms and determinants of the undeclared economic activity.
Źródło:
Metody Ilościowe w Badaniach Ekonomicznych; 2013, 14, 2; 61-69
2082-792X
Pojawia się w:
Metody Ilościowe w Badaniach Ekonomicznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Stackelberg Security Games: Models, Applications and Computational Aspects
Autorzy:
Wilczyński, A.
Jakóbik, A.
Kołodziej, J.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/309423.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Tematy:
Bayesian game
game theory
leadership
Nash equilibrium
normal form games
security games
Stackelberg equilibrium
Stackelberg games
Opis:
Stackelberg games are non-symmetric games where one player or specified group of players have the privilege position and make decision before the other players. Such games are used in telecommunication and computational systems for supporting administrative decisions. Recently Stackleberg games became useful also in the systems where security issues are the crucial decision criteria. In this paper authors briefly survey the most popular Stackelberg security game models and provide the analysis of the model properties illustrated in the realistic use cases.
Źródło:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; 2016, 3; 70-79
1509-4553
1899-8852
Pojawia się w:
Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Po co matematykom Jan Jakub Rousseau?
Why do mathematicians need Jean-Jacques Rousseau?
Autorzy:
Kalinowska, Alina
Stański, Adam
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1388538.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-09-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Gdański. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego
Tematy:
Game Theory
Competitive game
Cooperative games
Nash equilibrium
Pareto efficiency
Opis:
One day, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who was known mainly as a philosopher and a pedagogue, told a deer hunting story. In doing so, he managed to play a small role in the development of the branch of maths called ‘game theory’. Later his story was converted into a game. Initially game theory was used to explain exchange in the field of economics. Over time, the mathematical modeling was found to be useful in the social sciences. A game theory describes diverse and cognizant participants forced to make decisions. In regards to the game based on cooperation, a choice is at the same time a dilemma. It can be viewed as a moral or philosophical predicament and in addition it gives as an inside into the human psyche and behaviour. Game theory has the potential to offer an attractive mathematical model, useful in analyzing social interactions. Though currently unappreciated by pedagogy, it has the potential to be successfully used in pedagogical studies analyzing conflict of interest of all participants in an educational process.
Źródło:
Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji; 2015, 30, 3; 121-125
1734-1582
2451-2230
Pojawia się w:
Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Analysis of Ineffectiveness Arising in “Investor-government” Relations
Autorzy:
Sokolovskyi, Dmytro B.
Sokolovska, Olena V.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/417302.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-09-15
Wydawca:
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Tematy:
investors
Pareto-optimality
modeling
Game Theory
Nash equilibrium
Government
economic behavior
Opis:
Purpose: This article deals with the problem of forming Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing designed to reduce risks in investment activity. Methodology: Considering the interdependent type (nature) of interactions between related parties, game theory tools were used to model such interactions. Much attention was directed to search for� parameters of interaction leading to certain Nash equilibriums in pure strategies. The formal results obtained with the model were verified by statistical analysis. Findings: Analysis showed that the rational behavior of related parties can lead to unexpected results. Powerful investors will aim to work in socially-oriented economies, whereas primarily small investors will operate in most liberal economies with a�minimum tax burden but with a�higher level of risk. As for governments’ behaviors, the images are the same: small economies tend to liberalize their tax systems and to secure investment faster than powerful ones. Empirical verification based on statistical data of groups of countries generally confirmed the conclusions. These formal and logical conclusions were from statistical analysis of 124 countries divided into 5 groups: OECD countries, post-socialist countries, Latin American countries, APAC countries and ACP countries. Provided that the more powerful ones are covered economies, there was stronger interdependence between the size of economies and tax burden and also between total investment and tax burden, where this dependence is positive. Originality: The results obtained used Nash equilibriums in pure strategies as models of behavioral norms to define behaviors of related parties and also to explain assumptions concerning the behaviors of investors and government.
Źródło:
Management and Business Administration. Central Europe; 2015, 3; 47-70
2084-3356
Pojawia się w:
Management and Business Administration. Central Europe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 29

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