Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

Wyszukujesz frazę "belief-distorted Nash equilibrium" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Stock market as a dynamic game with continuum of players
Autorzy:
Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, A.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/970603.pdf
Data publikacji:
2008
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Tematy:
stock exchange
multistage games
continuum of players
Nash equilibrium
belief-distorted Nash equilibrium
Opis:
This paper contains a game-theoretic model describing the behaviour of investors at a stock exchange. The model presented is developed to reflect the actual market microstructure. The players constitute a non-uniform continuum, differing, among others, by the planning horizon, the external flow of money which can be invested, formation of expectations about future prices, which, briefly, divides the investors into five substantially different groups. Prices are determined by orders and the equilibrating mechanism of the stock exchange. The mechanism presented is the actual single-price auction system used, in particular, at Warsaw Stock Exchange. One of the main issues are self-verifying beliefs. Results of numerical simulations of stock exchange based on the model are also included.
Źródło:
Control and Cybernetics; 2008, 37, 3; 617-647
0324-8569
Pojawia się w:
Control and Cybernetics
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Games with distorted information and self-verification of beliefs with applications to financial markets
Autorzy:
Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, Agnieszka
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/453471.pdf
Data publikacji:
2010
Wydawca:
Szkoła Główna Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego w Warszawie. Katedra Ekonometrii i Statystyki
Tematy:
games with continuum of players
n-player dynamic games
Nash equilibrium
pre-belief distorted Nash equilibrium
subjective equilibrium
self-verifcation of beliefs
financial markets.
Opis:
In the paper we examine discrete time dynamic games in which the global state variable changes in response to a certain function of the pro_le of layers' decisions, called statistic, while the players form some expectations about its future values based on the history. Besides, there are also players' private state variables. A general model is built, encompassing both games with _nitely many players as well as games with in_nitely many players. This model extends the class of games with distorted information considered by the author in [20], in which there were no private state variables and there were much stronger assumptions about the statistic of players' decisions considered. The notions of pre-belief distorted Nash equilibrium (pre-BDNE), self-veri_cation and belief distorted Nash equilibrium (BDNE), de_ned already in [20], are applied to our wider class of games. The relations between Nash equilibria, pre-BDNE and BDNE are examined as well as the existence and properties of pre-BDNE. A model of a _nancial market { a simpli_ed stock exchange { is presented as an example. Pre-BDNE using threshold prices are proposed. One of further results in this example is potential self-veri_cation of fundamental beliefs and beliefs in in_nite speculative bubbles.
Źródło:
Metody Ilościowe w Badaniach Ekonomicznych; 2010, 11, 1; 254-275
2082-792X
Pojawia się w:
Metody Ilościowe w Badaniach Ekonomicznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

    Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies