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Wyszukujesz frazę "arguments for the existence of God" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
O argumencie moralnym za istnieniem Boga
On the Moral Argument for the Existence of God
Autorzy:
Wojtysiak, Jacek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015607.pdf
Data publikacji:
2004
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
argumenty na istnienie Boga
moralność (etyka)
Immanuel Kant
rekonstrukcja logiczna (logika)
najwyższe dobro
szczęście
arguments for the existence of God
morality (ethics)
logical reconstruction (logic)
the ultimate good
happiness
Opis:
The text analyses various examples of moral arguments for the existence of God. Taking advantage of the ideas from the writings of Kant and his interpreters, we sought to reconstruct them logically, conferring on them a form as reliable as possible. All the arguments have been divided into three groups: practical version, theoretical version, mixed version (thought to be optimal).1) Practical version. It starts from our desires, beliefs, obligations etc. and combines them with desires, beliefs, and obligations with regard to God. There are different varieties of this version. We have discussed in more detail its deontic variety based on the assumption: „we should carry out the ultimate good” (the state of happiness conditioned by virtue). Owing additional assumptions (conceptual and psychological) and corresponding simple logical operations we arrive at the conclusion: „we should believe that God exists.” Reliability, however, of such a week conclusion is undermined by the ambiguous character of the statement „we should carry out the ultimate good.” Rather, we should say that we are obliged to carry out moral law, and thereby expect a just reward. Faith in God is conducive to such efforts, inasmuch as they refer to the morality comprehended in a maximalist manner, justice, and happiness.2) Theoretical version. We have pinpointed its two varieties: „the requirement of the lawgiver” and „the requirement of justice.” In the first variety on the basis of the existence of morality we deduce the existence of God as its „author,” for no other creature has a corresponding power, moral and metaphysical, to establish (execute) universal and unconditional moral obligations. In the second variety God appears to safeguard the carrying out a just reward (punishment, inherent in morality itself) for the satisfaction (violation) of these obligations. The debate about the value of the first argument is reduced to the debate about whether morality is indeed characterised by such features whose existence cannot be explained without reference to God. The main debate connected with the second argument is whether the fact of morality entails the ontic (not only deontic) necessity of a just judgement (and its related reward or punishment) of those who are submitted to morality.3) Mixed version. According to some varieties of the practical version, it takes on a human desire to reach the ultimate good at the point of departure. This desire, natural and right, regards the existence of this good as an indicator. Hence it is possible to transfer from the practical sphere to the theoretical one. If it is well-known that the ultimate good exists, we can ask about its cause. Reasoning – similar to the one given in the previous point – leads to a belief that God is this cause. One may doubt, however, whether our natural and right desires are always reliable indicators that their objects exist.4) The above analyses have unveiled the assumptions and difficulties of all the versions of the family of arguments under consideration. Does this mean that the arguments are not efficient? Not in the least. This means only that they are efficient under certain conditions. These conditions, like anything in philosophy, make up the object of everlasting debates.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2004, 52, 2; 391-428
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Uzasadnianie przekonań religijnych chrześcijan: Peter van Inwagen a teologia fundamentalna
Justification for Christian Beliefs: Peter van Inwagen and Fundamental Theology
Autorzy:
Kaucha, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016199.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
argumenty za istnieniem Boga
krytyka literacka Biblii
pluralizm religijny
teologia fundamentalna
teologizująca filozofia
wiarygodność chrześcijaństwa
wyjątkowość chrześcijaństwa
arguments for the existence of God
critical studies of the Bible
religious pluralism
fundamental theology
philosophical theology
credibility of Christianity
uniqueness of Christianity
Opis:
The article is focused on Theological Philosophy constructed by Peter van Inwagen and modern Fundamental Theology which has been cultivated at KUL. Both disciplines try to present reasonable justification for Christian fundamental convictions. P. van Inwagen − specially in his book God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology − knowing well modern philosophy and the mentality of people living today tries to legitimate the main Christian beliefs. He writes about how Christians can justify the existence of personal God, he legitimates the authority of the Bible (which is questionable according to some scientific theories) and he defends the specific position of the Christian Church among other religions. In conclusion he suggests that Christian beliefs are not certain for non-Christians but it does not mean that they are not reasonable and acceptable. Fundamental Theology cultivated at KUL is very similiar to P. van Inwagen's project in some points. But in some other aspects his position should be deepened.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 2; 23-46
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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